Towards an effective class action model for European consumers: Lessons learnt from Israel by Flavian, Ariel
 Towards an Effective Class Action 
Model for European Consumers: 
Lessons Learnt from Israel  
 
 
 
 
A Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor 
of Philosophy 
 
 
by 
Ariel Flavian 
 
 
 
Brunel University School of Law 
 
September 2012 
 Towards an Effective Class Action Model for 
European Consumers: Lessons Learnt from Israel 
 
Ariel Flavian 
 
The class action is an important instrument for the enforcement of consumers' rights, 
particularly in personal actions for low sums known as Negative Expected Value 
(NEV) suits. Collective redress actions transform NEV suits into Positive Expected 
Value suits using economies of scale by the aggregation of smaller actions into a 
single legal action which is economically worthwhile pursuing. Collective redress 
promotes adherence to the law, deters illegal actions and furthers public interests. 
Collective redress also helps in the management of multiple cases in court. 
 
The introduction of a new class action model in Israel has proven to be very workable 
in the sense that it has improved access to justice, albeit that this system currently 
suffers from over-use, referred to in this work as the "flood problem". 
 
The purpose of this research is to introduce a class action model which brings with it 
the advantages of the Israeli model, as well as improvements upon it so as to promote 
consumer confidence in low figure transactions by individuals with large, powerful 
companies. 
 
The new model suggested in this work relies on the opt-out mechanism, monitored by 
regulatory bodies through public regulation or by private regulators. The reliance on 
the supremacy of public enforcement and follow-on actions over private stand-alone 
actions should make the system of collective redress more efficient than the current 
Israeli model, reducing the risk of a flood of actions whilst at the same time improving 
access to justice for large groups of claimants. Thus far, no unified European class 
action mechanism has been developed, and only some member states have developed 
their own systems. The model discussed in this work may be implemented as a unified 
set of rules in Europe, with some additional adjustments, such as those covering 
cross-border trade, to promote confidence in trade within the European Union. 
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Preface 
 
Collective redress seems to me to be the appropriate method to empower consumers 
to combat abuse from large and powerful companies. It creates equality between 
actors in the consumer markets and it is perhaps the only proper way to bring small 
claims to court on a large scale. 
 
In the early years of this century,
1
 the striking fact was that collective proceedings 
were not in use at all in the European market, supposedly the largest market in the 
world. 
 
However, from the time that I decided to study the absence of a European collective 
redress mechanism, the legal environment in Europe changed dramatically. 
 
The Netherlands developed a new act for settling collective claims in 2005,
2
 followed 
by Denmark in 2008,
3
 and Italy in 2009.
4
 In France, a committee was set up in order 
to suggest a new framework for collective proceedings,
5
 and in the U.K., one such 
committee was followed by another.
6
 In 2007, the European Community's Consumer 
Commissioner, Magdalena Kuneva, published her strategy for the coming years, 
                                                 
1 My first proposal on this topic was submitted in 2004, but due to a lack of resources, I began my 
research in 2007. 
2 On 27 July 2005, the Act on Collective Settlement of Mass Damages (Wet collectieve afwikkeling 
massaschade) came into force. 
3
 Act no. 181 of 28 February 2007 on Collective Redress came into force on 1 January 2008.  
4 Through legislative decree no. 78 of 2009, which entered into force on 5 August 2009, converted with 
amendments into the law of 3 August 2009 no. 102, the government replaced the wording "upon the 
expiry of 18 months" with the wording "upon the expiry of 24 months". 
5 A working group of ministers, consumer organisations, companies and lawyers was formed to 
prepare draft legislation for collective consumer actions (actions de groupe) in France. 
   The recommendations of the working group were introduced in November 2006, in a bill presented 
by French finance Minister Thierry Breton. The bill was introduced at a cabinet meeting as part of a 
new consumer protection programme. 
6
 The Right Honourable the Lord Woolf, Master of the Rolls, "Final Report to the Lord Chancellor on 
the civil justice system in England and Wales" (July 1996).  
Lord Chancellor's Department, Consultation Paper, "Representative Claims: Proposed New 
Procedures" (February 2001). 
Office of Fair Trading, "Private actions in competition law" (Discussion paper, November 2007) at 
<http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft916.pdf> and 
<http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft916resp.pdf> accessed 17 September 
2012.  
In July 2008, the Civil Justice Council made a series of recommendations to the Lord Chancellor at 
<http://www.civiljusticecouncil.gov.uk/files/Improving_Access_to_Justice_through_Collective_Action
s.pdf> accessed 23 September 2012. 
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which included a recommendation for establishing a European mechanism for 
collective redress.
7
  
 
Under these circumstances, I found myself conducting research time and again in 
order to keep abreast of the latest developments in the different states examined, and 
continually amending the text of my work. 
 
In order to become familiar with the features of the Israeli model and to keep track of 
developments in this system, I read books, articles both in English and Hebrew and 
attended several seminars.
8
 I analysed the Israeli Class Actions Registry, including all 
the claims listed until 31 December 2009. Later on, I published a short article on the 
Israeli class action system in the Haifa Law Gazette, a publication of the local bar 
association.
9
 In order to understand the different European models, I read articles in 
English about all the states examined, attended an ERA seminar relating to collective 
redress,
10
 and in 2010 presented a paper on this issue at the City University 
conference on legal practice.
11 
                                                 
7  eSS <http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/overview/cons_policy/doc/EN_99.pdf> and 
<http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/kuneva/speeches/speech_leuven_29062007_en.pdf> 
accessed 23 September 2012. 
8
 Seminar on the issue of securities class actions (Tel Aviv University, 18 November 2009), Judge 
Kogan, (Seminar on class actions in labour law, 27 April 2010). Prof. Klement, (Seminar on 
advanced matters in civil procedure, Interdisciplinary Center, Herzeliya, 2009-2010).     
9    Ariel Flavian 'The Tnuva Case and the Flood of Class Actions in Israel', The Local Bar Association 
Gazette, p. 54 (March 2009) Published in Hebrew. See 
<http://www.israelbar.org.il/uploadfiles/Doors-28b.pdf> accessed 23 September 2012. 
10 "Collective Redress: Towards a system of class actions in Europe?" (Florence, 30-31 October 2008). 
11
 "The Role of the Lawyer in Class Actions" (International Conference on Practising Law, 21-17 July 
2010).   
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Introduction: 
Learning Lessons from the Israeli Class Action Model 
ahead of Shaping a New European Model 
 
 
A new model for collective actions was introduced in Israel in 2006 (Israel's "CAL"). 
The rationale behind it was to improve access to justice in certain situations where the 
personal action consists of only low sums lost, though the action concerns many 
people who have suffered from the same wrongdoing. 
 
Six years after the new enactment in Israel, some conclusions may be reached from 
the use of the Israel's class action model, and some lessons may be learnt. These can 
prove useful ahead of shaping a new collective action model for the European Union. 
 
The European Community indeed has been considering its position in relation to 
collective proceedings for many years, with sixteen member states having adopted 
their own measures so far. These measures vary from state to state, and there is no 
single coherent European framework. In Europe, the search for a collective redress 
model seems to be entering its final stages following the European Commission's 
consultation paper in 2011 and the European Parliament's publication of a resolution 
recommending the introduction of a collective redress mechanism for European 
consumers.
1
  
 
It is beyond the scope of this work to offer a new coherent model for Europe as the 
European Union is facing a wide variety of obstacles which derive from the 
traditional cultures in some member states and which prevent the use of an effective 
class action model. Furthermore, the European market's features differ from those of 
the Israeli market which is not yet a multinational market. Nevertheless, the Israeli 
example together with improvements suggested in this work mainly relating to cross-
border trade, could prove useful for devising a European class action. 
                                                 
1 European Parliament resolution of 2 February 2012 on “Towards a Coherent European Approach to 
Collective Redress”  available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2012-0021+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN> accessed 21 September 2012. 
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A. The Purpose of this Research 
 
The European Union and its member states are now in a search for a collective redress 
measure catering to European consumers. The Israeli model is certainly one that 
functions and produces many collective actions on an opt-out basis every year. This 
work examines the Israeli experience and studies its advantages and its problems, in 
order to bring this experience to the EU debate.   
 
In the course of this work, it will be suggested that the European Community should 
not abandon its plan for a new coherent collective redress measure. Before developing 
such a procedure, it is suggested that the EU consider the lessons learnt from the 
Israeli experience.  
 
The main purpose of this research is to examine the positive provisions of the Israeli 
Class Action model and to suggest some changes so as to mitigate the negative 
consequences of bringing a collective action. 
 
In order to achieve the above purpose, the main questions addressed in this research 
are as follows: 
 
 Is a class action in the consumer area a welcomed procedure at all, and how 
has it affected Israel's field of consumer law? 
 What are the characteristics which make the Israeli class action model work?  
 What features are required to safeguard against possible abuses of collective 
redress?  
 What changes may be introduced to the Israeli model in order to bring it to a 
level whereby it can be considered a useful starting point for a European 
consumer collective redress model?  
 
The ultimate aim of this work is to produce an improved Israeli model which may be 
considered by European scholars and legislators ahead of shaping a new European 
collective redress model. 
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B. Methodology  
 
The work is based on comparative research, and the developments in Israel are 
weighed against the different objections and options raised in some European member 
states and in Europe generally. 
 
Class actions have already become enshrined as an integral part of Israel's 
jurisdiction, and Israel has followed the U.S. class action model to some extent. 
Israel's experiences may be a source for allaying some of Europe's hesitations vis-à-
vis the procedure, in order to determine whether class actions should be welcomed at 
all. 
 
To this end, the author has examined the concept of collective redress, its advantages 
and disadvantages under the Israeli regime, and features of the Israeli model which 
make this model so workable for consumers. Evidence and statistics regarding the use 
of the Israeli model have been gathered in order to emphasise the dramatic 
developments class actions have produced since their introduction in Israel. This is in 
contrast to Europe, where an evaluation study on the effectiveness and efficiency of 
collective redress mechanisms in the European Union
2 
found that systems of 
collective redress are used very little. 
 
The comparative work led to the revelation that there are major differences between 
the concepts of enforcement of consumer rights in Israel and in Europe respectively. 
In Europe, enforcement is carried out by well-established public enforcement bodies, 
whereas in Israel, the main emphasis is on the private realm.  
 
The problems of collective redress in Israel are reviewed, as well as the need to 
maintain strict boundaries in order to safeguard the procedure from possible abuses 
which may result from private enforcement and contingency fees. The study of 
collective redress in some leading European models demonstrated that inconsistency 
currently exists as regards collective redress proceedings in European member states. 
                                                 
2  The European Commission, Study on the evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of collective 
redress mechanisms in the European Union (26 August  2008) at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/collective_redress_en.htm>  accessed 29 January 2011. 
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This inconsistency proves that there is a need to produce a unified European model of 
collective redress.  
 
Since research into the Israeli model and its practical application demonstrates that 
problems do exist and that there is therefore room for improvement, changes are 
recommended for its  improvement, with some references to possible changes which 
may fit a new European model. 
 
C. Terminology 
 
Collective actions are a means of enforcing the rights of victims, and such actions are 
particularly appropriate where victims are not expected to sue the wrongdoer under 
existing legal proceedings. For the purposes of this research, collective actions are 
procedures whereby legal actions pertaining to many injured parties are tried by a 
representative in the same legal proceeding. 
 
The American English terminology for such a procedure is a "class action." In British 
English terminology, the term "representative action" describes these types of 
proceedings, while in Europe, the term "collective redress" is generally used. In this 
work we will use all expressions where appropriate although we have tended to prefer 
‘class action’ as a means to refer to collective actions. Where proceedings are 
managed by a representative without the permission of the group members, they are 
known as "opt-out" proceedings. Where group members provide their explicit 
permission for such representation, the proceeding is known as "opt-in."  
 
D. The Need for Collective Redress in Europe 
 
The European market caters to over 500 million citizens from twenty-seven member 
states. The EU generates an estimated 30% share of the nominal gross world product.
3
 
Yet in the whole European market, the collective redress mechanism has been used 
                                                 
3 
 The Oxbridge Writers, 'European Union' available at 
<http://www.oxbridgewriters.com/essays/international-relations/the-european-union.php> accessed 
29 June 2012. 
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very little to protect consumers, to enforce their rights and to challenge infringements 
of their consumers rights.
4
  
 
The European market is probably the largest market in the world, yet without 
mechanisms for quick and cheap dispute resolution, it cannot be efficient. If 
consumers are to have sufficient confidence in shopping outside their own Member 
State and in taking advantage of the internal market, they need assurance that if things 
go wrong they have access to effective mechanisms to seek redress.
5
 Consumer 
disputes require tailored mechanisms that do not impose costs and delays which are 
disproportionate to the value at stake.
6
  
 
Collective redress may provide European consumers with exactly such a mechanism 
to resolve large scale disputes concerning many consumers in one legal action. Such a 
legal instrument will save time, make the procedure more efficient, and may vindicate 
small claims disputes which affect a large number of consumers.  
 
At the European level the European Commission has recently recognised the 
importance of collective redress mechanism at European level on several occasions. 
However, thus far there is no one coherent mechanism in Europe. European 
Commission officials have stressed the importance of collective actions for the 
confidence of consumer trade within the European Community
7
 time and time again. 
 
                                                 
4 
Civic Consulting, DG SANCO: 'Study regarding the problems faced by consumers in obtaining 
redress for infringements of consumer protection legislation, and the economic consequences of such 
problems Final Report Part I: Main Report' see at page 9.  
5
 
 
Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission on “widening 
consumer access to alternative dispute resolution” Brussels, 4 April 2001 at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress/out_of_court/adr/acce_just11_en.pdf> accessed 23 
September 2012 . 
6 OECD Recommendation on Consumer Dispute Resolution and Redress at 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/50/38960101.pdf> page 6, accessed 23 May 2012. 
7 
 The first collective measure was Commission Regulation EC 1768/95 (implementing rules on the 
agricultural exemption for the purposes of safeguarding agricultural production). But later  
 in 1998, the E.C. Commission introduced Directive 98/27/EC empowering consumer organisations 
to apply to courts in fellow member states for an injunction against an infringement of any of a, 
consumer credit, package holidays, and consumer guarantees, committed in the organisation's own 
state by an entity based in another member state. 
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A statement of policy was published in 1997
8
 by the former Consumer Commissioner, 
Magdalena Kuneva who stated that one of the European Commission’s plans for the 
period from 2007 to 2013 was to introduce a European system of collective redress 
for consumers. This statement of policy was followed by a public consultation paper
9
 
and a green paper.
10
 In February 2011, the European Commission issued a Public 
Consultation Working Document noting the need for a coherent European approach to 
collective redress and soliciting comments on how to structure such a mechanism. 
These developments
11
 indicated that the Commission was closer than ever to 
introducing a collective redress mechanism for European consumers. However, no 
real substantial progress has been made in developing a unified class action system in 
Europe since this statement of policy was published.
12
 In his recent speech on group 
actions, John Dalli, the current European Commissioner for Health and Consumer 
Policy, underlined the necessity of collective redress systems for EU consumers as a 
mechanism for ensuring the enforcement of their rights.
13
 The Single European 
Market confers many rights on individuals, but such rights remain worthless where 
there is no effective means for their enforcement.
14
  
 
                                                 
8 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee 'EU Consumer Policy 
strategy 2007-2013, Empowering consumers, enhancing their welfare, effectively protecting them' 
COM(2007) 99 final <http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/overview/cons_policy/doc/EN_99.pdf> 
accessed 7 November 2011. 
9 >http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/docs/consultation_paper2009.pdf> accessed 7 
November 2011. 
10
 Commission of the European Communities, 'Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress', 
COM(2008)794 final, <http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/greenpaper_en.pdf> accessed 7 
November 2011.  
11 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Public Consultation: Towards a 
Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress, SEC (2011) 173 final (Feb. 4, 2011) available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/dgs_consultations/ca/docs/cr_consultation_paper_en.pdf> 
accessed 25 February 2012.  
12 The European Parliament stressed in its recent report that the Commission has still not put forward 
convincing evidence that, pursuant to the principle of subsidiarity, action is needed at EU level in 
order to ensure that victims of unlawful behaviour are compensated for damages. See:  European 
Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs 'Draft Report on Towards a Coherent European Approach to 
Collective Redress 15 July 2011 (2011/20899INI), (Para D (3) at page 4). 
13
 Commissioner John Dalli, 'Commissioner Dalli delivers a speech on "Group Action: A necessity for 
consumers"'  
<http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/dalli/docs/20101115_group_action.pdf> accessed 7 
November 2011.  
14
 Commission Staff Working Public Consultation, 'Towards a Coherent European Approach to 
Collective Redress' (SEC(2011)173). Sec 1 at page 1. 
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In the European Union, only sixteen member states have developed systems for such 
actions, and these vary from one member state to another.
15
 The European 
Commission recently published a consultation paper seeking the development of a 
coherent European collective redress procedure. The Commission has stated that: 
 
[…] given the diversity of existing national systems and their different levels 
of effectiveness, a lack of a consistent approach to collective redress at EU 
level may undermine the enjoyment of rights by citizens and businesses and 
gives rise to uneven enforcement of those rights. A coherent European 
framework drawing on the different national traditions could facilitate 
strengthening collective redress (injunctive and/or compensatory) in targeted 
areas […]16  
 
The issue of collective redress was left thus far to the discretion of the member states 
and is currently being addressed in many European member states in different ways. 
The Netherlands developed a new act for settling collective claims in 2005,
17
 
Denmark in 2008,
18
 and Italy in 2009.
19
 In France, a committee was established in 
2005 to suggest a new framework for collective proceedings.
20
  
 
In the U.K., the matter of collective redress has been subject to an ongoing debate 
over the last 15 years, and has been addressed in many professional committees. A 
1995 report by the Law Society was followed by a full chapter in L.J. Woolf’s 
                                                 
15 Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK (in England and Wales). See European 
Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific 
Policy Overview of existing collective redress schemes in EU Member States (European Parliament, 
July 2011). 
16 
Commission Staff Working Public Consultation, 'Towards a Coherent European Approach to 
Collective Redress' (SEC(2011)173).  
17
 On 27 July 2005, the Act on Collective Settlement of Mass Damages (Wet collectieve afwikkeling 
massaschade) came into force. 
18
 Act no. 181 of 28 February 2007 on collective redress came into force on 1 January 2008.  
19
 Through legislative decree no. 78 of 2009, which entered into force on 5 August 2009, converted 
with amendments into the Law of 3 August 2009 no. 102, the government replaced the wording 
"upon the expiry of 18 months" with the wording "upon the expiry of 24 months." 
20
 A working group of ministers, consumer organisations, companies and lawyers was formed to 
prepare draft legislation for collective consumer actions (actions de groupe) in France. 
   The recommendations of the working group were introduced in a bill by French Finance Minister 
Thierry Breton in November 2006. The bill was introduced at a cabinet meeting as part of a new 
consumer protection drive. 
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“Access to Justice Report.”21 Lord Woolf observed that group action procedures were 
necessary, since they provide expeditious, effective and proportionate methods for 
resolving complex multi-party litigation. In 2000, the Civil Procedure Rules of 1998 
came into force introducing Part 19 (3) dealing with group litigation. 
 
The Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) Part 19.3 provides the courts with a tool known as a 
"Group Litigation Order" (GLO), which enables the courts to group claims exhibiting 
the same issues of fact or law together. However, since these new CPR rules 
concerning Group Litigation could only be applied to previously submitted claims, in 
reality, they merely constitute a tool by which to manage these claims.
22
 In a survey 
conducted by Prof. Rachel Mulheron, it is noted that the "opt in" nature of the GLO is 
an impediment to the procedure.
23
 
 
A more suitable framework for class actions exists in Rule 19.6 of the 1998 Civil 
Procedure Rules, which deals with representative actions. The new rule of procedure 
adopted the old mechanism of representative actions, allowing such actions only in 
cases in which individuals hold the “same interest” in the claim.24 Subsequently, the 
courts’ strict adherence to the “same interest” requirement led to the following result 
in the vast majority of cases: whenever there is a claim for damages, the machinery of 
a representative suit was held to be absolutely inapplicable.
25
 Thus, there seems to be 
a lack of coherence after the enactment of Rule 19.6.
26
 
 
                                                 
21
 The Right Honourable the Lord Woolf, Master of the Rolls, 'Access to Justice Final Report to the 
Lord Chancellor on the civil justice system in England and Wales', July 1996.  
22 Practice Direction 19 B – Group Litigation. See also Neil Andrews, 'Multi–Party Proceedings in 
England: Representative and Group Actions' (2001) 11 Duke Journal Of Comparative and 
International Law Vol 249. 
23 Prof. Rachael Mulheron, 'Reform of Collective Redress in England and Wales: A Perspective of 
Need' (2008, Civil Justice Council). 
 Part 19 ii (Rule 19.6).
24
  
25  Market & Co` Ltd v. Knight Steamship Co Ltd [1910] 2 KB 1021. Though a more relaxed 
construction was applied in Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd v. Newman Industries Ltd [1979] 3 All ER 
507 and followed in EMI Records v. Riley [1981] 2 All ER 838.  
26 See more recent cases that prove the inconsistency: Chocosuisse Union des Fabricants Suisses de 
Chocolat v. Cadbury Ltd [1999] EWCA Civ 856, The Times Law Report 15 March 1999, [1999] 
E.T.M.R. 1020, [1999] R.P.C. 826 and in Emerald Supplies Ltd & Anr v. British Airways Plc [2009] 
EWHC 741(Ch) , where the court denied representation as opposed to the decision in Independiente 
Ltd. v Music Trading On-Line (HK) Ltd [2003] EWHC 470  (Ch D), where representation was 
allowed. 
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A consultation paper in 2001 suggested that the U.K. is heading towards an opt-out 
English class action.
27
 However, the responses to this consultation paper indicated 
sheer resentment for the opt-out mechanism. Since then, one committee followed 
another and the legal position remained unchanged.
28
 The three most recent 
developments worth mentioning were introduced when the Civil Justice Council made 
a series of recommendations to the Lord Chancellor in July 2008 and offered a 
combined opt-in opt-out mechanism with possible cy pres distribution
29
, notions that 
we will explore later on. The government issued a response and reverted back to its 
2002 stance, providing that collective redress should be introduced in specific sectors 
where there is a clear need for such a procedure.
30
 In February 2010, the Civil Justice 
Committee offered a new model for practice directions
31
, introducing state-of–the-art 
provisions.
32
 Despite all these developments thus far these recommendations and their 
governmental replies have not been enacted and the issue of collective redress 
remains generally unchanged in England and Wales.  
 
It is on this background of inconsistency amongst the member states that the 
Commission has decided to develop a unified European measure to better serve 
European consumers and replace the different measures which are currently in use in 
various member states. The search for an appropriate European collective redress 
model is far from reaching its end goal of finalising and implementing a Europe-wide 
                                                 
27 Lord Chancellor's Department, Representative Claims: Consultation Paper (February 2001). 
28 Office of Fair Trading, Private actions in competition law: effective redress for consumers and 
business, Discussion Paper (April 2007) 
<http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft916.pdf> and 
 <http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft916resp.pdf> accessed 21 September 
2012. 
29 
The Civil Justice Council made a series of recommendations to the Lord Chancellor in Civil Justice 
Council, 'Improving Access to Justice Through Collective Actions' (2008) at 
<http://www.civiljusticecouncil.gov.uk/files/Improving_Access_to_Justice_through_Collective_Acti
ons.pdf> accessed 23 September 2012..  
30 Ministry of Justice, "The Government’s Response to the Civil Justice Council’s Report: ‘Improving 
Access to Justice through Collective Actions’" (2009) available at 
<http://www.lawcentres.org.uk/uploads/Government_Response_20th_July_2009.pdf> accessed 18 
July 2012. 
31  According to this most recent set of rules, the Civil Justice Committee suggested that the judge in 
each case determine whether the procedure be conducted on an opt-in or opt-out basis, that such 
proceedings be made pertinent to non-domiciled class actions, and that they be subjected to a 
certification procedure. The suggested practice directions offered a broad view on cost management, 
allowing even conditional fee agreements. However, all rules are subject to the court’s approval. 
32 Civil Justice Council, 'Draft Court Rules for Collective Proceedings' (2010) available at 
<http://www.docstoc.com/docs/43542510/DRAFT-COURT-RULES-FOR COLLECTIVE-
PROCEEDINGS> accessed 30 June 2012. 
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collective redress system. There is no European state that has a workable and effective 
model which benefits its consumers.
33
  
 
In contrast to the EU, the Israeli experience with collective redress is now well-
established and is worthy of study in order to identify some building blocks useful in 
the development of a European Class action. 
 
E. The Israeli Collective Redress Mechanism: A Basis for a 
New European Model?  
 
The Israeli model was developed gradually, and finalised in 2006 when Israel's CAL 
was introduced.
34
 From the time of its introduction, it has revolutionised Israeli 
consumer law, improving access to justice in relation to consumer cases which 
otherwise would not been submitted to the courts. Banks have been ordered to repay 
unlawful charges,
35
 insurance companies have been forced to refund consumers who 
had paid excessive charges for insurance premiums,
36
 the size of crisp packets have 
been enlarged
37
 and consumers have become much better off in many other respects 
using class actions following the introduction of the CAL in Israel. Following the 
enactment of CAL in Israel, for the first time, the courts have awarded damages in 
favour of the general public.
38
  
 
There are also other examples to the contribution that class actions have made to the 
benefit of consumers, the procedure set down in the Israeli legislation has increased 
access to justice so substantially, that it has brought with it a flood of actions. In the 
                                                 
33 
 European Commission – DG SANCO, 'Evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of collective 
redress mechanisms in the European Union' (2008) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/collective_redress_en.htm#cr> accessed 7 November 
2011. 
34
 The Class Action Law 5766-2006 (Israel). 
35
 For example, Case no. 1805-09 (District Court of Tel Aviv) Bashan v. Bank Hapoalim (2009), 
concerning overcharging for the production of documents.  
36 
For example, Case no. 1251/07 Keidar v. Dikla (District Court of Tel Aviv) (2007), concerning 
unlawful payments for insurance to which the insured were eligible by law. Payments were refunded 
to the insured. 
37
 For example, Case no. 1953/06 (District Court of Tel Aviv) Amar Ashaer v. Osem (2006), where the 
packets of crisps known as bisli were enlarged due to the defendants' misleading behaviour of 
making the packets smaller without changing the weight on the packet or the price of the product.  
38 Appeal No. 10085/08 (Supreme Court) Tnuva v. Rabi (2011) (as yet unpublished). 
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last year (2011) alone, 700 new actions were brought to the Israeli courts,
39
 each 
action amounting to extremely high figures due to the large classes which the 
representatives claim to represent. The strong impact of such court procedures on the 
Israeli economy has had an adverse effect on the market. Companies must concentrate 
more on legal defence than on production, with resources being spent on legal actions 
most of which are unsubstantiated. The fact that voluntary dismissal is a very popular 
way to end the procedure in Israel
40
 is showing that many submitted actions are not 
legally sound. In Israel there is no barrier which filters the actions before they are 
brought to court, a major downside of this system as we will further explore. 
Nevertheless, despite room for improvement, it is our goal to show that the many 
positive facets of the Israeli action as well as some improvements could provide an 
excellent basis for consumer class actions in the EU as well. In order to make this 
demonstration, we will structure this thesis as suggested below.   
 
F.  Structure 
 
In Chapter One, the advantages and problems of the collective procedure for 
European consumers are discussed. The first chapter supports the argument that 
collective actions may assist European consumers to enforce their rights. The chapter 
ends with the suggestion that the Israeli model can be used in order to assist in setting 
down a coherent European model. 
 
Chapter Two introduces the Israeli class action model, and explains the stages of 
development which led to the enactment of the Class Action Law in 2006. Further in 
the chapter, the effects of this law are discussed, including the types of collective 
actions which are submitted to the courts in Israel, the volume of class actions, and 
their effect on the economy.  
 
                                                 
39   According to the Israeli Class Actions Registry available at 
<http://elyon1.court.gov.il/heb/tovanot_y/list.htm> accessed 30 June 2012. 
40  Adini R., 'This is also a Way to End Up - On Voluntary Dismissals in Class Actions' due to be 
published in the Hapraklit Journal, Volume Nun Bet (1) available at 
<www.ronenadini.co.il/news/list.aspx?newscatid=38> accessed 4 May 2012 
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The pillars of the Israeli model are discussed in detail and compared with some 
current collective redress provisions in Europe in Chapter Three. These pillars are the 
opt-out mechanism, the opening of the gates to private enforcement, together with 
organisational and public actions. The latter two pillars are less influential in Israel 
and their use should be promoted. Other pillars discussed are the incentives 
introduced in order to activate the class action machinery and the wide scope of 
possible collective actions permissible in Israel. 
 
The possible abuses that may arise when using the class action, and the relevant 
safeguards imposed in Israel are discussed in Chapter Four. These safeguards include 
the class action certification stage which exists to filter the actions submitted to the 
courts; the supervision of settlements and voluntary dismissals which are 
arrangements reached between the representative plaintiff and the class' lawyer 
together with the defendant; the possibility of replacing the representatives; and the 
use of a public registry and provision of notices to class members and others who may 
be interested in the outcome of the action as a means of assuring transparency of the 
procedure. Finally, the loser pays principle which is also used in current European 
models is discussed. 
 
Finally, Chapter Five introduces suggested changes to the Israeli model, the first step 
to potential adoption of the model within a coherent European model. These changes 
include the introduction of an additional filter mechanism to exclude unsubstantiated 
private stand-alone actions from the courts and the combining of private-led collective 
actions with a regulatory supervising body. The role of the supervising body will be to 
keep unmeritorious actions out of the boundaries of the legal procedure. The other  
way to prevent large scale court disputes is to introduce a collective ADR instrument 
enabling dispute settlement in a collective albeit supervised system. This chapter also 
deals with the fact that the Israeli model lacks a cross-border provision which is 
required in order to allow the Israeli model to be considered as the basis for the new 
European coherent model. The way in which the United States has coped with cross-
border issues in its multi-state model is examined here in order to address the cross-
border issue. 
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Finally, the conclusions of this work suggest a new path in which the Israeli model 
can be improved and then used as a guide as well as a basis for a consumer class 
action system in Europe.  
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Chapter One: 
Considering the Benefits of Collective Action Models 
for European Consumers  
 
The first question to tackle in the search for a European collective action model, is 
whether the constant search for such a procedure for European consumers is worth the 
effort. 
 
Class actions are well-established in the United States, Canada, Australia and Israel. 
Taking a global perspective, the advantages of adopting such a procedure are evident, 
yet it is also clear that some problems and abuses must be avoided. In this chapter, the 
advantages of collective proceedings and the types of disputes which lend themselves 
to such proceedings will be considered. The problematic aspects of collective 
proceedings and the need to adopt safeguards so as to prevent issues arising which 
bring the procedure into disrepute will then be examined. Finally, the needs of a 
European collective procedure system will be considered, so that these may be borne 
in mind in the chapters that follow, dealing with the lessons which the European 
Union may learn from Israel's experience in relation to class actions.  
 
The collective procedure has some clear advantages which outweigh the problems 
that may arise through the use of this machinery. Collective redress empowers 
consumers to combat abuse from large and powerful companies. It creates equality 
between the actors in the consumer markets and it enables bringing court disputes for 
cases involving low amounts of personal damage both by individuals and by large 
scale consumers who have suffered damages. When small personal actions are 
aggregated, it becomes economically viable to bring a class action. In the following 
part of this chapter, the advantages and problems of the collective procedure will be 
discussed so as to decide whether collective redress is a desirable phenomenon at all 
and if so, on which terms it should be introduced. 
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A. The Importance of Class Actions in the Field of Consumer 
Protection  
 
Consumer protection cases are generally "Negative Expected Value suits",
1
 otherwise 
known as "NEV suits." This phrase is intended to describe actions where the expected 
award to the claimant in pursuing the action to judgment is lower than the expected 
litigation costs. The reason for this is that the majority of consumer protection cases 
amount to small sums of compensation and involve many consumers. As plaintiffs, 
consumers are weak when compared with businesses, therefore, consumers are 
reluctant to complain, and are unwilling to go to court for small amounts of damages. 
The need to improve the efficiency of enforcement is obvious in cases where normal 
legal actions are deemed to cost more than the expected profit for each claimant. The 
value of each action is based on the following calculation: the chances of success are 
multiplied by the expected award to the claimant. The expected costs should then be 
deducted from this result. 
 
Some scholars, including Bebchuk and Klement,
2
 have found that this calculation is 
even suitable for multiple claims involving higher sums, and not only for low-value 
multiple claims. The mathematical explanation for this finding is that there are legal 
cases where the expected personal award is high but the chances of success in 
pursuing an individual action are low. 
 
Class actions are used to turn NEV suits into Positive Expected Value (PEV) suits by 
using economies of scale. The chances of success in a claim may remain similar 
regardless of whether the action is individual or collective. However, the costs of 
collective actions may be dramatically lower than an individual action, due to factors 
                                                 
1 Lucian A. Bebchuk and Alon Klement, 'Negative-Expected-Value Suits' (2009) in Chris Sanchirico 
(ed), Procedural Law and Economics (2011); Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 
656. <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1534703> accessed 7 June 2011. 
See also Alba Conter & Herbert B. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions (Section 2, §5:7, 4th ed., 
West Group, 2002). See also Warren F. Schwartz, Abraham L. Wickelgen: "Advantage Defendant: 
Why Sinking Litigation Costs Makes Negative Expected Value Defenses, but not Negative Expected 
Value Suits Credible" (2007) available at: 
<http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/olin/0708/wickelgren.pdf> accessed 2 March 2012. See also JC 
Coffee Jr, ‘The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the 
Large Class Action’ (1987) 54 U Chi L Rev 877, 904-906. 
2 Lucian A. Bebchuk and Alon Klement, ibid. See also: Amy Farmer and Paul Pecorino: "Pretrial 
Signaling with Negative Expected Value Suits" (July 2002) available at 
<http://www.jstor.org/pss/20111976> accessed 2 March 2012. 
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such as the use of a single expert to advise the class as a whole. The aggregation of 
claims may also improve the chances of success in such an action, since the economic 
advantages of such actions make it more viable for representatives to invest more 
money and labour in order to obtain better information and skills to succeed in the 
action.
3
 If the case is managed for large sums of money, it is worthwhile for the 
lawyer representing the class to invest many hours to secure its success and to secure 
expert opinions to assist in proving the class claims.   
 
In certain areas of law, such as consumer protection, competition, environment, 
securities, and welfare, normal individual actions are regarded as NEV suits due to the 
low level of expected income per claimant. In the United States (U.S.), class actions 
are also used to vindicate civil rights infringed by unlawful actions.
4
 A collective 
procedure is needed where each individual action has a low value, and only 
aggregation will serve to reduce the cost of the action and improve the chances of 
success. 
 
Private plaintiffs are driven only by private gain. Therefore, since the expected 
personal damages in consumer cases are generally lower than the expenses of their 
claims, it is perfectly rational from the private consumer's point of view not to bring 
any claim. This problem is known as ‘rational apathy’.5 
 
Consumer enforcement suffers from rational apathy as private consumers find it too 
costly to get involved in legal proceedings; individual victims might prefer to take a 
free ride on the efforts of those consumers who decide to act as plaintiffs, or to simply 
                                                 
3 Prof. Alon Klement, 'Class Action as a tool to neutralize the advantages of a single defendant against 
multiple plaintiffs – following the decision in The State of Israel v. E.Sh.T' (1994), 21 Mechakrei 
Mishpat <www1.idc.ac.il/klement/HebArt/EST.pdf> accessed 3 June 2011.  
Steven Shavell, 'The Social versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System' 
(1982) 11 J. Leg. Stud. 333.  
4 Deborah R. Hensler, Class Action Dilemmas: Pursuing Public Goals for Private Gains (Rand 
Corporation, Santa Monica, 2000) 10. 
  Arthur Miller, 'Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the Class Action 
Rule Problem' (1979) 92 Harv. L. Rev 664. 
5 Roger Van den Bergh & Louis Visscher, "The Preventive Function of Collective Actions for 
Damages in Consumer law" available at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1101377> accessed 23 June 2012. See at page 
1. Also see W. van Boom and M.B.M. Loos (eds.),' Collective enforcement of consumer law in 
Europe. Securing compliance in Europe through private group action and public authority 
intervention', Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, 2007, 231-254. 
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abandon their action. The combined effect of rational apathy and free-riding will 
produce a sub-optimal level of enforcement in consumer cases.
6
 
 
The assumption that consumers' claims do not reach the courts is supported by a 
survey which analyses consumer behaviour in Canada.
7
 This survey shows that 
Canadian households generally prefer to handle their own minor problems without 
the assistance of any third parties. Seventy percent of households surveyed did not 
complain at all, and of the 30% which did complain, 28% had no success in their 
complaint. These figures lead to the conclusion that most of the complaints in 
question were not remedied at all.  
 
Looking in greater depth at the issue of complaints, it is clear that the low number of 
complaints concerned minor grievances valued up to 37 Canadian dollars. Only a 
small number of consumer disputes (up to 5%) reach the judicial decision stage, while 
the rest are settled prior to legal action.  
 
The survey shows that the vast majority of minor consumer disputes are not pursued 
and only on rare occasions will such transactions end in legal proceedings. It seems 
that most consumer disputes are dealt with either by negotiation or using internal 
complaints procedures. This demonstrates that the position of a consumer is weak 
where a dispute arises with a business for low sums, since the possibility of going to 
court in order to bring a justified action against the trader is unlikely. 
 
Similarly, a more recent Eurobarometer survey
8
 stated that: 
 
Most Europeans do not take a further action if they are dissatisfied with the 
way their complaint was handled - The majority of European respondents 
(51%) whose complaints were not dealt with in a satisfactory manner did not 
take any further action. 
                                                 
6  Roger Van den Bergh & Louis Visscher, ibid., 7. 
7
 Neil Vidmar, 'Seeking Justice: An Empirical Map of Consumer Problems and Consumer Responses in 
Canada' (1988) 26 Osgoode Hall L.J. 757 
<http://eprints.law.duke.edu/520/1/26_Osgoode_Hall_L.J._757_(1988).pdf> accessed 10 November 
2011. 
8
 European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 298: Consumer protection in the internal market 
(European Commission, October 2008) page 54 
<http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_298_en.pdf> accessed 23 September 2012. 
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This means that in cases involving low levels of damage, European consumers feel 
undefended. In order to increase confidence in cross-border trade of low-value goods, 
the European Community is looking to introduce a system of collective redress. 
 
The European Community, in its Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress of 
November 2008, mentioned that the main barriers to consumers enforcing their rights 
are the cost of litigation and the complexity of procedures. These barriers are, in 
particular, high litigation costs and complex and lengthy procedures. According to the 
survey, one in five European consumers will not go to court for a sum of less than 
1000 euros (EUR). Half of those surveyed said that they would not go to court for a 
claim of less than EUR 200.
9
 
 
According to the survey, many consumers view the lack of a proper legal procedure 
as the most important challenge to European cross-border trade, and when asked what 
problems they might encounter when shopping cross-border, consumers rated the 
difficulties of resolving problems with traders most highly, at 33%. Hence there is a 
lack of faith in current systems as far as complaint resolution is concerned, and there 
is low confidence in cross-border trade within the community due to the lack of 
available remedies when things go wrong.  
 
In the U.K., a study by the OFT on consumer detriment shows that on average, only 
62% of consumer's harmed make a complaint, and this percentage drops to 54% for 
purchases of less than ten English pounds (hereafter GBP).
10
 This means that 
consumers are apathetic, especially where low sums are concerned, and these cases 
will not go to court unless an incentive is introduced. Through economies of scale, 
collective actions ought to render such low-value cases economically viable. 
 
If many consumers join their claims, the costs per claim decrease which may serve to 
overcome the problem of rational apathy. Collective actions may reduce the 
                                                 
9 
Commission of the European Communities, 'Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress', 
COM(2008)794 final, <http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/greenpaper_en.pdf> accessed 7 
November 2011. See at page 4, section 9. 
10 Office of Fair Trading: ‘Consumer detriment assessing the frequency and impact of consumer 
problems with goods and services’, April 2008 OFT 992 mentioned in footnote 15 of the 
Commission of the European Communities' Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress 
COM(2008)794 final, Brussels, 27 November 2008. 
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individual claimant costs and thus improve the cost-benefit ratio and spread the risk of 
uncertainty over a large number of affected individuals.
11
  
 
Class actions may therefore contribute dramatically to improving access to justice in 
such NEV claims. Collective actions aggregate all small figure claims into one action 
saving expenses and making the case more profitable for lawyers who enjoy less 
expenses due to economies of scale. Thus, when adopting a new measure for a 
collective action, special attention should be paid to mechanisms which facilitate 
bringing low value cases which do not usually reach judicial resolution unless 
incorporated into a class action. 
 
Professor Giussani of the University of Urbino in Italy uses a metaphor to explain the 
necessity of class actions.
12
 She claims that a civil justice system which has no 
collective redress system is like a city with no public bus transportation system. In 
such a system, individuals who can afford to do so may use taxi services, while those 
who cannot afford a taxi remain without transportation. Similarly, class actions 
provide access to justice for large groups of consumers who have suffered damage 
and cannot afford to bring an individual action for such petty damage against a 
powerful defendant with disproportionately large financial resources and relatively 
high quality legal representation. 
 
The bus analogy may be taken further to explain the different mechanisms possible 
within the context of class actions. The first is the opt-in system, whereby a bus which 
leads the class action will only allow on board those passengers who have raised their 
hands and actively asked to join the ride. The other system is the opt-out system, 
whereby the bus will allow all passengers on board, including those who are passive 
and did not ask to join the ride. However, in this case, each passenger has the right to 
leave the bus at any stop.  
 
As the bus illustration indicates, collective actions may make access to justice easier, 
especially in consumer disputes where victims have suffered small amounts of 
damage. In such circumstances, it is unreasonable to expect a single consumer to 
                                                 
11 Roger Van den Bergh & Louis Visscher, (n 5). 
12
 Professor Andrea Giussani, 'Enter the Damage Class Action in European Law: Heading towards 
Justice on a Bus' (2009), 28(1) Civil Justice Quarterly 132. 
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expend time and money on pursuing a court case against a powerful trader. Therefore, 
consumer actions suffer from the rational apathy problem. However, by grouping 
actions together and decreasing individual costs, it is easier to encourage victims to 
seek vindication of their rights and provide compensation for those plaintiffs.
13
  
 
B. The Advantages of a Collective Procedure   
 
Collective redress has several advantages, albeit that there are also obvious dangers 
involved. A model which maximises the advantages of the procedure, while 
minimising its abuse through the imposition of safeguards, can be developed. 
 
An example of such a model is Israel’s Class Action Law 5766-2006.14 Section 1 of 
this law specifies the four major goals of this enactment as follows:
15
 To promote 
access to justice in general, with particular regard to segments of the population not 
expected to bring individual actions; to enforce the relevant law in the areas subject to 
such actions and to deter infringements of this law; to impose appropriate remedies to 
benefit injured parties; and to assist in the fair and effective management of claims.  
 
The parts of this section that follow will explore the four goals mentioned above 
which demonstrate the advantages of collective proceedings.   
 
  1. The Role of Collective Actions in Improving Access to Justice 
 
Collective actions play a crucial role in improving access to justice, and create 
opportunities to litigate matters which would not have otherwise been submitted to 
court. Normally such actions function to aggregate a cluster of smaller actions into a 
single legal action which is economically worthwhile pursuing.
16
 
 
                                                 
13
 Tiana Leia Russell, 'Exporting class actions to the European Union' (2009), 28(141) Boston 
University International Law Journal 145. See also Roger Van den Bergh and Louis Visscher, (n6). 
14
 Published in Hebrew on Israel’s Department of Trade and Industry website,  
<http://www.tamas.gov.il/NR/exeres/C2B5FF40-FE01-4D04-A5DC-155A9511D9A5.htm> accessed 
12 May 2011. 
15
 The Ontario Law Reform Commission in Canada (1982) [Vol 1 Ch 2] in its report on class actions 
provided that the goals of class actions are improved access to justice, judicial economy, and 
behaviour modifications.  
16
 Steven Goldstein and Yael Efron, 'The Development of Class Actions in Israel' (1999) 27 Alei 
Mishpat 31. 
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By combining all possible claims against the same defendant, the action becomes 
economically justifiable and worthwhile both for the plaintiffs and lawyers provided 
that a share of the action income will be paid to these representatives or some form of 
remuneration is paid to them.
17
 
 
Access to justice is also improved in collective proceedings by creating equality 
between the parties.
18
 Such proceedings are aimed at assisting the weak individual in 
challenging large companies. Defendant companies in such cases are often very 
powerful and may have unlimited resources to commit to defending their case against 
an individual plaintiff. By allowing the aggregation of small claims, collective 
proceedings serve to balance out the power differential between the parties.
19
  
 
In general, therefore, collective redress is needed in cases where a large group of 
people has suffered minor damage, allowing representation of an injured party by 
another. Such aggrieved parties are not likely to bring individual proceedings for such 
a minor degree of damage. If representative proceedings were not allowed in these 
circumstances, no action would likely be brought against the company which caused 
the damage.  
 
Various European scholars, among them Professor Andrea Giussani
20
, as well as 
judicial officials, have appraised collective procedures as a means to improving access 
to justice.
21
 Lord Justice Woolf was appointed by England’s Ministry of Justice to 
examine English civil procedure and to suggest ways to improve access to justice. In 
his final “Access to Justice” report published by the Ministry of Justice’s Department 
                                                 
17
 Owen M. Fiss, 'The Political Theory of the Class Action' (1996) 53 no. 1 Washington & Lee L.Rev. 
21. 
18 See Office of Fair Trading, 'Private actions in competition law: effective redress for consumers and 
business, Discussion paper, April 2007 OFT916'. 
<www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft916.pdf> accessed 5 August 2011. 
19
 See Leave to Appeal Request No. 3126/00 (Supreme Court) The State of Israel v. Eshet Project 
Management, P"D Nun Zain (3) 220 (2003), Judge Beinish at page 278. 
20  With regards to the bus example, see Professor Andrea Giussani, 'Enter the Damage Class Action in 
European Law: Heading towards Justice on a Bus' (n 12). 
21
 See also Prof. Rachael Mulheron, 'Reform of Collective Redress in England and Wales: A 
Perspective of Need' (2008) Research paper for the Civil Justice Council, 38 
<http://www.civiljusticecouncil.gov.uk/files/collective_redress.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011. 
The Government’s Response to the Civil Justice Council’s Report: ‘Improving Access to Justice 
through Collective Actions’ available at the Ministry of Justice site, July 2009. 
<http://www.docstoc.com/docs/38408988/REPRESENTATIVE-ACTIONS-IN-CONSUMER-
PROTECTION-LEGISLATION>. 
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for Constitutional Affairs,
22
 he stated that group action procedures are required since 
they provide expeditious, effective and proportionate methods of resolving complex 
multi-party litigation. As these commentators noted, collective procedures are used in 
order to improve access to justice and to enable victims of an unlawful actions who 
suffered only minimal damages to group their actions and to bring them together to 
the court in order to obtain a remedy. 
 
The Israeli and the U.S. examples show that access to justice is improved dramatically 
where class action mechanisms adopt certain features, such as bonuses and 
aggregation of many victims into one action using the opt-out mechanism. The use of 
class actions in these jurisdictions demonstrates that cases are brought to court and 
victims awarded redress in circumstances where individual damage was low and the 
claimant would not have otherwise sought redress through the courts. For example, in 
Israel more than 2400 applications for collective actions have been submitted since 
the introduction of CAL.
23
 
 
  2. The Role of Collective Actions in Improving Law Enforcement and 
in the Deterrence of Violations 
 
It is the public interest that a wrongdoer be punished for his improper behaviour. 
Collective redress has a deterrent effect and may prevent the improper behaviour by 
making the wrongdoer aware of the damage and the cost that he has inflicted on 
others.
24
 Some commentators claim that the main purpose of class actions is to use 
private litigation not primarily for compensatory purposes, but rather as a procedural 
device to assure adherence to substantive legal norms.
25
 This is in fact the role of the 
public dimension in society which, in collective redress procedures, is transferred to 
private hands which normally deal with obtaining remedies rather than furthering 
public policies.  
                                                 
22 
 See <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/final/contents.htm> 
accessed 9 May 2011.  
23
 See the Israeli Registry of Class Actions available in Hebrew at 
<http://elyon1.court.gov.il//heb/tovanot_y/list.htm> accessed 29 January 2011. 
24
 Prof. Alon Klement, 'Class Action as a tool to neutralize the advantages of a single defendant 
against multiple plaintiffs – following the decision in The State of Israel v. E.Sh.T' (n 3). 
25 S. Goldstein, "Class Actions in Israel" (1990) 13 Int. Cong. Comp. Law 45, 65. See also Tezet v. 
Zilbershatz [26 May 2006] Supreme Court, Leave to Appeal Request No. 4556/94, P"D Mem Tet (5) 
page 774. 
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In terms of the legal enforcement of rights which are conferred on class members, 
there are public enforcement methods on the one hand, which may be costly to 
society, and private enforcement methods financed by private means on the other. 
Remedies for any breach of a legal right may also vary depending on the enforcer, 
from injunctions, damages and restoration in private actions, to criminal proceedings 
and fines in the field of public enforcement. Private enforcement is generally less 
costly to society in that it does not rely on public funds. It is regarded as more useful 
and efficient as private enforcers have a personal interest in the result of the action.
26
 
Private persons acting for their personal gain may further common interests shared by 
represented class members. 
 
Broadly speaking, it is often argued that while public enforcement is concerned 
primarily with deterrence and punishment, private enforcement is concerned with 
obtaining compensation and justice for victims. The normative idea is that "if 
someone breaks your arm you call a policeman; if he breaks a window or a contract, 
you call a lawyer."
27
 However, scholars
28
 argue that this may not be the optimal 
solution. This idea reflects that public bodies are traditionally seen as the optimal law 
enforcers whereas private bodies are regarded as suitable to assist in recovering 
personal damages only. However, the dichotomy is not so sharp. Private remedies 
such as injunctions or compensation can replace fines and penalties, create deterrence 
and further goals which are important for the general public. On the other hand public 
enforcement is based on public funds which are normally very restricted. Furthermore 
traditional punishments such as imprisonment are very costly to society.  
 
Injunctive collective redress exists to prevent or to stop an illegal action, and it is 
therefore relevant before or while the unlawful action is ongoing. Collective redress 
for damages is a remedy born after the mischief was made. Actions for damages in 
tort law cannot prevent the tort from occurring, since the remedy comes only after the 
                                                 
26 See, for example, Gary S. Becker and George J. Stigler, ‘Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and 
Compensation of Enforcers’ 3 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1974) 13. 
27 David Friedman, ‘Efficient Institutions for the Private Enforcement of Law’ (Jun. 1984) 13(2) The 
Journal of Legal Studies 379-397 
<http://www.daviddfriedman.com/Academic/Efficient_Inst_For_Priv_Enf/Private_Enforcement.htm
l> accessed 11 November 2011. 
28  See David Friedman, ibid. 
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event. However, tort actions work as a type of market mechanism, increasing the 
expected cost of an offence by imposing economic sanctions on the wrongdoer.
29
  
 
In that respect, tort actions and even actions for damages in general have a deterrent 
effect similar to that of criminal fines, where the fine, more than the moral 
connotation of a criminal sanction, acts as a deterrent. This means that actions for 
damages may attain exactly the same results as fines imposed by the state. In 
employing such a utilitarian approach, society is less concerned with the rights of the 
victim and more concerned with obeying the law.
30
 Criminal proceedings may lead to 
fines or imprisonment. Fines may be considered preferable to imprisonment and other 
types of punishment because they are more efficient in the sense that they have a 
deterrent effect whilst at the same time saving public money. Punishing offenders 
with a fine also produces revenue for the state whereas imprisonment is costly to 
society.
31
 Actions for damages are in that sense designed to reach the optimal level of 
deterrence necessary for the benefit of society, and thus the use of damages is only 
meant as an incentive to reach society's goals.
32
 Therefore, it is said that the optimal 
sanction takes the form of damages from civil actions rather than fines imposed in 
criminal proceedings.  
 
In her work, Sonja Elisabeth Keske
33
 refers to philosophers writing as early as 1788 
writing about the rational behind committing a crime e.g Bentham who wrote about 
the decision of a criminal in terms of “profit of the crime” and “pain of punishment”34 
and other classic writers, such as Beccaria and Montesquieu who applied such logic to 
                                                 
29 Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law (2003), NBER Working Paper Series, Vol. 
w9694, 2003. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=379802. Israel Gilad, 'On the Ambits of 
Effective Deterrence in Tort Law' (1993) 22 Mishpatim 421. 
30
 Prof. Alon Klement, 'The Ambits of Collective Actions in Mass Tort Actions' (2003) 34(2) 
Mishpatim 301. 
31
 Gary S. Becker, 'The Economic Way of Looking at Life', (Nobel Lecture, 9 December, 1992), (1993) 
101 Journal of Political Economy 385 available at 
<http://home.uchicago.edu/~gbecker/Nobel/nobellecture.pdf> accessed 7 June 2011. 
32
 Guy Halfteck, 'General Theory Regarding the Social Value of Class Actions as a Mean for Law 
Enforcement' <http://portal.idc.ac.il/He/lawreview/volumes/volume03/Documents/Halfteck.pdf> 
accessed 7 June 2011. 
33
 Sonja Elisabeth Keske, 'Group Litigation in European Competition Law - A Law and Economics 
Perspective' <http://publishing.eur.nl/ir/repub/asset/17790/Sonja%20Keske%20Thesis[lr].pdf> 
accessed 13 May 2011. See pages 68, 70. 
34
 Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law. The Works of Jeremy Bentham (Edinburgh: William Tait, 
1843), 399 ff. 
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individual behaviour.
35
 Sonja Keske analyses this theory and argues in the context of 
private enforcement that an offender acts rationally and therefore the decision whether 
or not to commit an illegal act is based on rational grounds, weighing up costs and 
benefits. Keske's conclusion is that civil actions and criminal penalties may lead to 
similar results simply because the offender makes the calculation that acting illegally 
is not profitable no matter what the punishment, civil or criminal, as long as an 
appropriate punishment is imposed on unlawful behaviour and makes such behaviour 
unworthy.  
 
The idea to be borne in mind when searching for the optimal punishment in cases of 
collective harm, is that the offender acts rationally in order to gain profit. This idea 
raises the question of what means are best used to deter offenders from engaging in 
unlawful actions. In other words, since we presume that an offender acts rationally, 
the measures to deter the offender from committing the offence may be calculated 
based on logical assumptions. The solution offered by collective redress is a financial 
penalty which will deter others from obstructing fair trade in the market.  
  
The benefits to society resulting from prevented offences must be balanced against 
enforcement costs. Society should try to minimise the costs of enforcement 
activities.
36
 When there is no cost for imposing a fine, and the detection of an 
infringement requires expenditure, society would fare best to increase the fine as 
much as possible, reduce detection efforts and thereby save money on costs, while 
retaining a constant level of deterrence.
37
 
 
                                                 
35
 Cesare Beccaria, 'On Crimes and Punishments' in S. Grupp (ed) 'Theories of Punishment', 
(Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1971), 117. 
36
 Gary S. Becker, 'The Economic Way of Looking at Life' (n 31).  
 Gary S. Becker and George J Stigler, 'Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of 
Enforcers' (n 26) 1.  
 William M. Landes, 'Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations' (1983) 50 University of Chicago 
Law Review 652. 
 Jonathan B. Baker, 'Private Information and the Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Damage Remedies' 
(1988) vol. 4(2), Fall, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 385.  
 Wouter P.J. Wils, 'Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Practice' (2006) 29 World Competition 183. 
 Gary S. Becker, 'Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach' (1968) 76 The Journal of Political 
Economy 169. 
 George J. Stigler, 'The Optimum Enforcement of Laws' (1970) 78 The Journal of Political Economy 
526.  
 Gary S. Becker and William M. Landes, Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, (New 
York, Columbia University Press, 1974).  
37
 Sonja Elisabeth Keske, 'Group Litigation in European Competition Law - A Law and Economics 
Perspective' (n 33). 
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There are classical areas of law where the resources spent on enforcement are much 
higher than the expectation of personal gain from such actions. Optimal enforcement 
is achieved where the total cost of activities which are harmful to society, including 
the cost of law enforcement, is minimised. This requires that any increases in 
resources spent on enforcement be offset by a reduction in costs resulting from 
violations. Where this is not the case, over-enforcement occurs, and resources are 
wasted. Under-enforcement occurs where the costs resulting from infringements 
exceed the cost that law enforcement measures would have incurred. Class actions are 
used in order to achieve the optimal rate of enforcement so as to convince potential 
offenders that acting unlawfully will not result in any gains. Optimal deterrence may 
be reached through claims brought by private individuals as well as by public 
enforcers who may be regarded as being more reliable albeit that their performance in 
achieving damages for consumers has not proven to be ideal. Therefore a combination 
of these two methods of enforcement should be considered. 
 
  3. The Combination of Private and Public Enforcers in Collective 
Actions  
 
In order to reduce society’s costs in enforcing civil rights, the role of the state was 
privatised and a new notion was introduced in the U.S. known as the private attorney 
general
38
 which is a private citizen whose lawsuit, while perhaps benefitting himself, 
also works to the advantage of the public by eliminating discriminatory behaviour.
39
 
Class proceedings may save public funds especially where private lawyers are 
allowed to act as entrepreneurs in the legal action. In class proceedings there is in fact 
"privatization" of the law enforcement service, from public bodies and criminal 
proceedings to private individuals and civil remedies. Yet, such legal privatisation 
may give rise to issues of conflicts of interest and collusive settlements that merely 
provide class members with symbolic awards while attorneys gain large monetary 
fees.
40
 
 
                                                 
38 The definition of "Attorney General" in Black's Law Dictionary (6th edn, 1990) states as follows: 
"The 'private attorney general' concept holds that a successful private party plaintiff is entitled to 
recovery of his legal expenses, including attorney’s fees, if he has advanced the policy inherent in 
public interest legislation on behalf of a significant class of persons." 
39 Michael Waterston, ‘A New Vision of Public Enforcement’ (2007-2008) 92 Minn. L. Rev. 434, 442. 
40 Prof. Alon Klement, 'Who Should Guard the Guardians? A New Approach for Monitoring Class 
Action Lawyers' <http://www.faculty.idc.ac.il/klement/EngArt/TROL.pdf> accessed 14 May 2011. 
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The goal of imposing the optimal sanction could be achieved by bundling claims 
together into one action. Such action may be brought by public bodies, organizations, 
or through privatisation by collective redress proceedings, where enforcement costs 
are lower than the cost of multiple cases due to the advantages of economies of scale. 
The merged actions become financially viable for court action and for subsequent 
enforcement. 
 
The privatisation of class actions is achieved mainly through the introduction of 
incentives provided to both lawyers and class representatives, and such actions have 
the advantage of lowering litigation costs. The large sums of money involved and the 
wide publicity generated by the outcomes of such cases motivate private individuals 
to bring class actions which result in deterring potential violators.
41
 As far as 
collective redress for damages are concerned, the procedure itself may act as the 
financial incentive because successful actions create a pool of money from which the 
representatives may take their share.  
 
With regard to making an injunctive collective redress mechanism workable, a system 
of funding should be introduced and financial resources should be allocated to finance 
the action. The distinction between injunction relief and claims for damages is that the 
latter creates a fund which may finance the procedure.  
 
The Israeli system of collective redress is indeed based on the privatisation of 
enforcement, and allowing private individuals to bring collective redress cases in 
order to further public goals. However, the general view in Europe is to favour public 
enforcement or organisational claims for collective issues over private enforcement.  
 
The question of who should act as a representative is crucial when shaping a new 
model for collective redress. On the one hand, there are calls to concentrate on public 
enforcement and to empower public enforcers with more financial sanctions in order 
to prevent the abuses that are associated with enforcement measures led by private 
lawyers.
42
 On the other hand, private enforcement measures which do not rely on 
                                                 
41 Sinai Deutsh, 'Consumer Class Actions: Are They a Solution for Enforcing Consumer Rights? The 
Israeli Model' 2004 27(2) Journal of Consumer Policy 179. See also T. Bourgoignie (ed), Group 
Actions and Consumer Protection, 179-209 (Brussels, Story Scientia, 1992). 
42
 Prof. Christopher Hodges, 'From class actions to collective redress: a revolution in approach to 
compensation' (2009) Civil Justice Quarterly 41.  
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public funds are less costly to society and may also reach the required deterrence 
levels. 
 
The Israeli class action model has awarded some preferential treatment to the private 
enforcer over public enforcement, as the Israeli legislator - following the U.S. 
example - was aware that private individuals would take the lead in driving Israel's 
class action machinery due to the financial incentives which were introduced into the 
Israeli system. The legislation in Israel allows for organisational or public collective 
action only where it is proved that a private individual may have difficulties in 
bringing a class action.
43
 In practice public bodies did not take the role of leading 
class actions in Israel and in fact all actions are now led by private individuals and 
private lawyers. Organisational class actions are also very limited in Israel. The 
emphasis in Israel on private enforcement improved access to justice dramatically 
though it also raised new questions, particularly on account of the massive volume of 
claims which followed the new legislation.  
 
In Europe, the privatisation of consumer enforcement is far from being adopted. 
However, the emphasis in Europe is on the broad existing infrastructure of 
organisations operating for the general good of consumers. The existing infrastructure 
in Europe has failed to bring real benefits to consumers through collective redress 
thus far. Therefore, when looking at the Israeli model following three years of 
operation, it is evident that private enforcement in Israel has led to massive 
improvement in consumers' access to justice. This may point to the need for some 
changes in the view of most European member states. Although some member states 
allow for private actions, such as the U.K. representative actions or the Portuguese 
popular actions, almost no actions are brought to court due to a lack of incentives and 
proper finance. In this research, it is argued that European jurisdictions should adopt 
the Israeli system with some variations, the most important of which is to reconcile 
public and private enforcement by looking at the United Kingdom’s competition 
model, which distinguishes "stand alone actions" from "follow on actions," in order to 
offer a workable European model.  
 
                                                 
43
 Class Action Law 5766-2006, s 4 (A) (3), (Israel). 
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Follow-on actions are actions submitted following a conviction or a finding by 
regulatory authority whereas stand-alone actions are actions submitted directly to the 
courts with no previous findings against the defendant. Where such a distinction is 
made between "stand alone actions" and "follow on actions," private individual 
actions may be submitted only subsequent to a criminal or disciplinary conviction by 
a public body or in a stand-alone proceeding by an organisation which is permitted to 
bring a collective action. Stand-alone actions by private individuals would be subject 
to very restrictive criteria and safeguards on one hand, but also should benefit from 
financial incentives on the other hand.  
 
Private enforcement in Europe should not be completely disregarded, since it may 
also act as a tool to attain public goals, and not only to obtain damages for injured 
parties. In fact, private collective actions may promote public goals by inflicting 
financial sanctions on wrongdoers. The financial sanctions will deter wrongdoers 
from acting unlawfully and in addition the financial remedies in collective actions 
may be used as a tool to bring benefits to the injured parties or to the general public. 
Private damages action may follow a public action relying on the findings in the 
public process. Damages imposed in collective actions both following a public action 
and in a stand-alone action may take different forms in order to reach the goal of 
collective actions in improving law enforcement and in the deterrence of violations 
and to some extent as explained in the following part of this chapter to remedy the 
injured class members for their losses. 
 
  4. The Relationship Between Collective Actions and Remedies 
 
Damages should be paid to the victim of a wrongful act not only in the interests of 
justice, but also to enable the parties to allocate their risks and insure against 
damages.
44
 In class actions, damages are not always imposed in order to remedy 
losses suffered by group members. Sometimes they are imposed in this type of 
proceeding as a means of disgorgement. Disgorgement is a remedy used to deprive 
wrongdoers of their ill-gotten gains and to deter violations.
45
 
                                                 
44
 Prof. Alon Klement, 'Class Action as a tool to neutralise the advantages of a single defendant 
against multiple plaintiffs – following the decision in The State of Israel v. E.Sh.T' (n 3). 
45
 See, for example, The Securities Exchange Act 1934, s.78u-2(e) and 78u-3(e) from the U.S. See also 
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In its paper on private actions, the U.K.’s Office of Fair Trading (OFT) found that 
civil actions are complementary to public actions, and may increase the possible 
damages that the wrongdoer may be asked to pay.
46
 For example, in certain 
circumstances the courts may award restitutionary damages, which aim to strip away 
some or all of the gains made by a defendant arising from a civil wrong. Exemplary 
damages might also be available in class action. 
 
A. Fluid Class Recovery under Israel's Class Action Regime 
 
Damages in collective proceedings may be calculated by aggregating all personal 
actions. This calculation may be useful in cases where the personal damage is 
minimal and it is doubtful that group members will step forward to claim their share 
of the damages because their individual share may be very small, or where it is 
difficult or impossible to ascertain the group of aggrieved persons.
47
 In these cases, 
the collective procedure may allow the imposition of damages on the defendant for 
the public good. This type of damages is also known as fluid class recovery
48
 which 
replaces the usual damages awarded to each plaintiff based on actual personal damage 
suffered.  
 
The fluid class recovery mechanism in Israel is based on U.S. jurisdiction principles 
and it consists of three stages. In the first stage, a sum of damages is fixed for the 
whole group. In the second stage, the members of the group are invited to claim their 
share.
49
 In the third stage, the court may order the distribution of any unclaimed 
funds.
50
  
                                                                                                                                            
FCPA Resolutions' <
 
http://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/2010/disgorgement-fcpa-how-
applied-calculated/> accessed 10 June 2011.
  
46
 Office of Fair Trading, 'Private actions in competition law: effective redress for consumers and 
business, Discussion paper, April 2007 OFT916' (n 10). 
47
 Case No. 1372/95 (District Court of Tel Aviv) The Heirs of Mr. Rabi v. Tnuva (2008), Judge 
Binyaminy.  
48
 Anna L. Durand, 'An Economic Analysis of Fluid Class Recovery Mechanisms' (1981-1984) vol. 34 
Stanford Law Review 173; 
 Michael Malina, 'Fluid Class Recovery as a Consumer Remedy in Antitrust Cases' (1972) 47 N.Y. L. 
Rev. 477; 
 J.R. McCall, 'Greater Representation for California Consumers - Fluid Recovery, Consumer Trust 
Funds and Representative Actions' (1995) 46 Hastings L.J. 797. 
49 There are cases where the court finds that there is no room to call the members to step forward in 
order to claim their small share and it may then directly order for cy-pres distribution. See, for 
example, In re Vitamin Cases, 107 Cal. App. 4th 820, 831-832 (2003). 
50 State of California v. Levi Strauss & Co. 41 Cal. 3d 460, 472 (1986). 
 In Re: Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.) 1176, 1190 (1982). 
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The imposition of fluid class recovery enables the court to reach three goals, namely, 
the payment of damages to injured class members, the disgorgement of ill-gotten 
gains, and deterrence of future violations.
51
 
 
Fluid class recovery takes two main forms. The first is a payment to class members 
who claim their share, and payment of the remaining funds to a state body with orders 
to use such funds for a specific purpose or to pay them into a special fund. Secondly, 
fluid recovery may be used to reduce the prices of goods or services for a certain 
period. 
 
These distributions are also known as cy-pres distributions.
52
 Cy-pres is a term 
meaning "as close as possible." In class actions it means that the court may order that 
the funds be used for grants to benefit the class members indirectly or as near as 
possible to this purpose in order to remedy or compensate for the harm to the class 
members.
53
 The cy-pres approach to unclaimed funds (which it should be noted 
differs from an award) is already standard practice in class action settlements in the 
U.S.
54
 and in Israel.  
 
Such damages were introduced in the U.S. "Yellow Cab"
55
 class action case in the 
State of California. In this case, a taxi company which operated in San Francisco 
charged its passengers excessive and unlawful tariffs. The court in this case decided 
that since it was unlikely that those who suffered losses would come forward to claim 
their low level of personal damages, it would impose damages on the taxi company by 
ordering them to lower their tariffs for a certain period. In this way, future passengers 
would enjoy lower tariffs and this sanction would act as a deterrent to violations by 
the taxi company.
56
 Such a remedy is one of the possible outcomes of class actions 
                                                 
51 K. Barnett, 'Equitable Trusts: An Effective Remedy in Consumer Class Actions' (1987) 96 Yale L. J. 
1591, at pp. 1594-1597. 
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56
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but it is not the only possible solution. The regular case remains that the court awards 
damages to class members.  
 
The Israeli legislator was concerned with the question how damages would be 
distributed to class members. There was a fear that once the action reached its end, an 
additional procedure would begin on the question of how to divide damages between 
class members.
57
 Therefore, the new act gave courts the authority to order that 
damages be based on an individual basis as either a stipulated sum
58
 or a sum subject 
to examination before apportionment,
59
 or on a cumulative basis to the class as a 
whole.
60
  
 
In cases where the court invites each member to prove his own damage, the court may 
provide criteria as to the division of the uncollected damages, and may appoint a 
supervisor to be in charge of and supervise the distribution of the fund to class 
members.
61
 In addition, the court or the supervisor may order the payment of costs for 
the distribution process.
62
 Each decision by a supervisor may be appealed to the 
court.
63
 If the court finds that the distribution of damages to class members is not 
practical in the circumstances of the case, it may order the payment of damages in 
favour of the class in general or in favour of the general public.
64
 
 
Normally, the uncollected damages are awarded to public bodies acting for the 
general good in the field most relevant to the field of the class action. This provision 
was strongly influenced by the aforementioned decision in the "Yellow Cab"
65
 case.  
 
The possibility of awarding damages in favour of the general public is very relevant to 
collective proceedings as normally such cases concern very small damages to each 
class member and it is impractical to order a minimal loss for each and every class 
member. Furthermore class members may have difficulty proving damage since they 
may not have kept a receipt or the actual goods until the time of the action. 
                                                 
57
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58
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The operation of damages for the general public is well illustrated in the Israeli, 
District Court decision in the "Tnuva case".
66
 In this case, the Israeli court dealt with a 
class action by a plaintiff who claimed that the largest milk producer in Israel, Tnuva, 
mixed silicone into one of its long life ultra-high temperature (UHT) milk products in 
the years 1994 and 1995. It was found that during this period, the relevant dairy 
produced a total of 13 million litres of 1% fat UHT milk into which it mixed an 
additive known as demethylpolysiloxane, commonly known as silicone.  
 
Silicone is presumed to prevent milk from foaming. However, Israeli standards forbid 
the use of silicone as a food additive. At first Tnuva denied the use of silicone in its 
UHT milk and published a denial in the newspapers which later turned out to be false. 
When the truth was revealed, all UHT milk products were taken off the shelves and 
Tnuva, together with some of its directors (the Director General and some directors of 
the specific diary in question) were charged with various criminal offences of which 
they were all convicted
67
. 
 
The convictions were followed by an interesting petition to allow a class action on 
behalf of all those who used this Tnuva UHT milk product. 
 
Throughout the proceedings, Tnuva argued that silicone is not a harmful additive, and 
that it certainly did not cause any damage to the plaintiff.  Until this point, there was a 
clear cause of action against Tnuva for consumer deception and misrepresentation 
relating to its UHT milk. However, the Israeli Courts (both the District and Supreme 
Courts) were unanimous in rejecting the action for restitution, mainly because the 
plaintiff and all class members had already consumed the milk, thus rendering 
restitution impossible. Nonetheless, the motion to allow a class action was decided in 
the Tel Aviv District Court in June 1996, and affirmed in the Supreme Court of Israel 
in May 2003 (by a split majority of two judges in favour of allowing a class action - 
Judges Levin and Naor - and one judge - Judge Prokachia - against).
68
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The problem with allowing compensation in this case was that the plaintiff had failed 
to prove that he or any of the class members had suffered any physical loss and thus 
there seemed to be no action for physical or even financial damages. Thus the plaintiff 
argued that he had suffered from the intangible damage of hurt, distress and a loss of 
enjoyment upon hearing that Tnuva`s UHT milk contained silicone. 
 
Tnuva's bad behaviour certainly made an impression on the Supreme Court,
69
 which 
was prepared to go very far in order to assist the plaintiff by making an unprecedented 
decision. The court faced two main difficulties with this case. The first difficulty was 
the question of whether it could recognise class proceedings where it was argued that 
the class of victims suffered only intangible damage. This type of damage is normally 
experienced by consumers in different ways, and thus feelings vary among group 
members. The second difficulty was that of assessing the damage.  
 
As for the first difficulty, the Supreme Court had already taken the view when 
affirming the motion to allow class proceedings that the plaintiff's claim for intangible 
damages for hurt, distress and the loss of enjoyment may give rise to class action 
proceedings. The deception regarding the content of the UHT milk resulted in an 
invasion of the individual consumer's autonomy and caused intangible damage to all 
class members who consumed Tnuva`s UHT milk in the relevant period. 
 
Invasion of the individual's autonomy is a principle which is new to Israeli law, and 
was introduced initially in relation to medical negligence which inflicts no damage on 
the patient other than the lack of a proper explanation prior to surgery.
70
 The District 
Court decided to accept as evidence a survey presented by the plaintiff showing that a 
majority of the class members (consumers who used this type of UHT milk) were 
disturbed by the invasion of their autonomy and a majority of those suffered further 
negative emotions when they found out that Tnuva`s UHT milk contained silicone. 
 
With regard to the class size, the District Court decided to use the expert opinion of a 
professor specialising in economics and marketing, inter alia. The expert estimated 
the number of people who used this type of UHT milk according to consumption and 
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70
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production data. This opinion led the court to decide that the number of group 
members who purchased UHT milk at the relevant time stood at 220,000 people, half 
of them suffering from negative emotions.  
 
Having determined the size of the class, the court went on to deal with the amount of 
damages in question. The court was aware that all or some of the class members were 
unable to prove their personal damage since most people would not retain receipts for 
milk purchases. Thus the court favoured a system of damages for the general public 
good. Israeli law does not recognise the notion of punitive damages, thus the court 
was troubled by the question of how to assess the damages. The court stressed that 
class actions in principle should serve limited goals, namely, compensation, 
deterrence and disgorgement of ill-gotten gains.  
 
The question of what sort of damages would be suitable in such collective 
proceedings puzzled the Israeli court. In the end the court assessed damages for the 
whole class based on the American principle of fluid class recovery. According to this 
principle, the court sets an amount to be paid to class members and the residue (cy-
pres) is distributed for a public goal. In this case, the court ruled that an 
unprecedented amount of damages (55 million New Israeli Shekels - approximately 
GBP 9 million) be granted in favour of the class, to be paid in three ways: 
 
1. Reduction of milk prices; 
2. Payment to a research fund; and 
3. Distribution of milk free of charge to the poor.  
 
In December 2011, the Israeli Supreme Court reduced the damages to the sum of NIS 
38,500,000 providing that the class should include only 154,000 members who used 
the affected milk.
71
 Such a result, involving the distribution of funds to the general 
public, is very appropriate in class proceedings since the personal damage is very 
small and is very difficult to prove entitlement to damages. 
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B. Price Reduction and Cy-pres Distributions in Europe 
 
Another type of award in a collective action would involve a reduction in the price of 
the goods subject to the action. The reduction is not necessarily awarded to the class 
members, but to a larger group or to the general public as seen in the above-
mentioned Yellow Cab case and the above-mentioned Tnuva case.  
 
A further illustration of the operation of damages by way of a price reduction is the 
U.K. case of The Consumer's Association v. JJB Sports PLC
72
 which led to a fairly 
similar result reached under section 47 of the English Completion Act 1998 
(introduced by the Enterprise Act 2002, and in force as of 20 June 2003). In this case, 
the OFT found the manufacturers and distributors of football shirts guilty of price 
fixing, and they were fined the substantial sum of GBP 18.6 million. It was thought 
that hundreds of thousands of consumers had bought these shirts. However, the action 
brought by the Consumer Association was only joined by 144 consumers.
73
 The 
outcome of the case was nonetheless very impressive and the whole group of 
aggrieved customers was compensated: 
"Fans who bought one of the shirts for up to £39.99 and joined the Which? 
case against JJB will each receive £20.  
Fans who still have one of the affected shirts but did not join the action can 
walk into any JJB store before February 5 2009 and fill out a form to claim 
£10 back, provided the customer can produce proof of purchase or a shirt 
with its label intact.  
Even if the label is missing, customers can claim £5 back per shirt. "
74
 
Cy-pres distributions is also known in other European countries. Article 22 of the 
Portuguese Law 83/95, for example, provides that in cases where some funds remain 
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undistributed after three years, they are to be handed to the Ministry of Justice to be 
directed to cover attorney fees in successful actions,
75
 to support access to justice.
76
  
 
The advantage of a cy-pres distribution in a collective action is that it deprives the 
offender of illegal gains, as the payment of damages is not dependent on the actual 
demand made by group members. Thus, cy-pres distributions assist in promoting 
adherence by businesses to appropriate legal norms. 
 
The above examples from the U.K. and Portugal clearly demonstrate that cy-pres 
distributions are not foreign to European jurisdictions and therefore may fit into any 
new model for European class actions. Therefore the advantages of the diverse types 
of damages that can be imposed in collective proceedings eliminate fears that once the 
action is finalised, group members will not step forward to collect their personal 
share. When the damages are aggregated, the action enjoys economies of scale and 
personal actions exhibiting a negative value transform into actions which are 
worthwhile pursuing. 
 
  5. Collective Actions as the Promoter of Fair and Effective Claim 
Management 
 
When the Israeli legislator referred to the fair and effective management of claims as 
one of the goals of introducing a class action system, the idea was to tackle the 
problem of multiple actions. Such a phenomenon occurs where many actions on the 
same issue are submitted to the court. Multiple actions are problematic as they may 
lead to contradicting judicial decisions, may be very costly, and may burden the legal 
system.
77
 
 
Collective redress may facilitate claims by large groups of people who have suffered 
substantial damage and whose claims raise similar questions of fact or law. However, 
collective redress systems are not only there in order to cater to large groups of 
plaintiffs that each suffer small amounts of damage. They should also serve groups of 
plaintiffs who suffer large amounts of damage. In this case, it is undesirable for many 
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injured parties to bring similar court proceedings since these will burden the courts 
and may lead to contradicting judgments, a consequence which is undesirable in any 
legal system.
78
  
 
Furthermore, in cases of substantial damage, there is also a risk that the initial claims 
will exhaust the defendant's funds, leaving them with nothing with which to 
compensate parties to subsequent legal actions. Representative proceedings in these 
circumstances are primarily aimed at enabling the judicial system to cope efficiently 
with the large scale of actions brought to the courts. 
 
The management aspect of handling multiple claims exists in different European 
jurisdictions. In England for example, such multiple actions are known as group 
actions.
79
 The English GLO (Group Litigation Order) merely serves as a case 
management umbrella under which a conglomeration of individual actions is 
managed.
80
 One advantage of such a managerial procedure is that it saves public 
funds, since massive disputes may be decided in a single court action rather than the 
courts contending with many different cases.
81
 A second advantage of collective 
redress in mass litigation, is that it may prevent a multiplicity of claims hearing as 
well as conflicting judgments even in cases concerning large sums which by their 
nature do not have negative expected value and thus the economies of scale issue is 
not relevant to these actions. Yet, bundling all claims into one procedure is 
advantageous and adds certainty even for defendants and may assist them in deciding 
whether to settle a case or not.  
 
As seen above, there are many advantages to collective procedures, yet the question 
remains as to why the European Union has not yet adopted a class action mechanism 
for collective actions. In fact, thus far, only sixteen member states have adopted or 
intend to adopt such proceedings, albeit proceedings which differ from one member 
state to the next with no single coherent collective redress mechanism operating 
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Europe-wide.
82
 The answer to this question lies, in this author’s opinion, in the 
problems and fears that are an integral part of the procedure. 
 
The "privatization" of the law enforcement service, transferring power from public 
bodies and criminal proceedings to private individuals and civil remedies, creates 
many challenges for the private sector, especially for lawyers who in some 
jurisdictions are the real driving force behind the procedure. Legal privatisation may 
give rise to issues of conflicts of interest and collusive settlements that merely provide 
class members with symbolic awards while attorneys gain large monetary fees.
83
 
 
C. The Problematic Aspects of Collective Proceedings 
 
The collective procedure itself has been highly criticised
84
 even in the U.S. where it is 
most frequently used. The U.S. model is viewed with apprehension in many 
jurisdictions in Europe.
85
 
 
The most criticised feature of the U.S. class action is the provision which allows one 
private representative to represent all other group members even where such 
representative has not been granted a power of attorney. This is known as the opt-out 
mechanism. The danger here is that group members will be bound by a single 
judgment even though they were not aware of the procedure that was filed in their 
favour. Claims may be submitted for ulterior motives such as extortion, competition, 
or hostile takeovers, and still bind the whole class of injured people. In a worst case 
scenario, a collective action could be brought by way of a conspiracy between the 
plaintiff and the defendants in order to bar other potential plaintiffs from bringing the 
action.  
 
                                                 
82
 The European Commission, Study on the evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of collective 
redress mechanisms in the European Union (26 August  2008) at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/collective_redress_en.htm>  accessed 29 January 2011. 
83 Prof. Alon Klement, 'Who Should Guard the Guardians? A New Approach for Monitoring Class 
Action Lawyers' (n 40). 
84 Richard A. Epstein, 'Class Actions: The Need for a Hard Second Look' (2002) No. 4 Civil Justice 
Report, Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, Center for Legal Policy 
<http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cjr_4.htm> accessed 7 June 2011>. 
85 See Commissioner Kuneva, 'Collective Redress: Moving the Debate Forward' (Speech at ALDE 
Seminar, 4 March 2009, 3pm-6.30pm) <http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x99ya8_alev-collective-
redress_news> accessed 10 June 2011. 
Considering the Benefits of Collective Action Models for European Consumers 
 11 
In the U.S., it was noted that frivolous class actions might be brought due to the 
possibility of obtaining treble damages, the use of contingency fees for lawyers, and 
the absence of the loser pays principle which requires the losing party to pay the 
defendant costs and legal fees.
86
 
 
Unmeritorious claims may force defendants to compromise and settle the case solely 
to save the huge costs that may be incurred in running a defence in such an action. 
Such claims may cause severe damage to the economy of certain states. In his speech 
to the U.S. Congress of 18 February 2005, former U.S. President Bush cited the effect 
of unmeritorious claims on the U.S. economy as one of the reasons for introducing the 
new Class Action Fairness Act: 
 
Overall, junk lawsuits have driven the total cost of America's tort 
system to more than $240 billion a year, greater than any other major 
industrialized nation. It creates a needless disadvantage for America's 
workers and businesses in a global economy, imposes unfair costs on 
job creators, and raises prices to consumers
87
. 
 
This situation is understood well in Israel where the market is currently swamped with 
hundreds of actions each year following the 2006 Class Actions Act, each action 
involving huge sums due to the aggregation of large classes of people and the high 
amounts of money claimed by each individual. The position is worsened by the fact 
that no court fee is required for filing an action. In addition, where the application 
fails the certification stage, the court expenses imposed on the plaintiffs are usually 
low. 
 
Some class actions have an adverse effect on consumer benefits. In consumer class 
actions in the insurance market for instance, such actions may give rise to higher 
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insurance policy prices for companies, directors, accountants and other potential 
plaintiffs.
88
  
 
The other major problem with collective proceedings led by private individuals 
involves the representatives who lead the class.
89
 Such agency problems may arise 
either with the representative plaintiff or with the attorney representing the class. It 
should be borne in mind that in practice both in Israel and in the U.S., most private 
class actions are motivated by lawyers due to the financial incentives associated with 
successful actions of this type.
90
 In examining the issue of representation, most 
collective redress proceedings involve conflicts of interest between the class members 
and their lawyers or between the class members and the class representatives.
91
 The 
class representative or the class lawyer bears the costs of litigation, including 
payments for expert evidence, court expenses, hours worked and expenses such as 
photocopying. These representatives only expect to obtain a share of the outcome of a 
successful action at the end of the day. Therefore, the class representatives will seek a 
compromise even if it does not reflect the highest expected outcome of the action.
92
  
 
The class representatives who act for their own profit may prefer to reach a 
compromise even if such a compromise is not the best possible result for the class. 
Thus a control mechanism over settlements reached by the representatives should be 
part of any system of collective redress. The Israeli model contains a very detailed 
procedure for dealing with the problem of unfair compromises. The procedure is 
aimed to check every suggested compromise and its benefit for the class members. 
Furthermore the compromise approval procedure is transparent published to the 
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general public including some safeguards to prevent concealed profits for the 
representative lawyer or to the class lawyer.  
 
D. The Need for Proper Safeguards in Building a European 
Collective Action Model 
 
As illustrated above, class actions may be problematic and they carry with them the 
risk of abuse. Therefore, such proceedings require the imposition of safeguards. These 
safeguards should act to bar unmeritorious actions at the early stages of the action. If 
the safeguard mechanism does not filter out abuses from the outset, then the defendant 
may be willing to settle an unmeritorious claim just in order to avoid expensive legal 
proceedings. 
 
Israel’s regime provides a range of safeguards. Fears that the mechanism may be 
abused led the Israeli legislator to introduce a series of safeguards in order to make 
the procedure more credible. Under the Israeli regime, courts must examine whether 
the representatives can properly represent the interests of the class, and some 
preconditions must be met and examined in the preliminary stages of the case in a 
certification procedure. The preconditions for allowing class actions involve 
examining the prima facie merits of the case, the conduct of the representative 
including whether he or she is acting in good faith, and the suitability of the action for 
collective proceedings. In addition, every important step in the action is subject to the 
court’s examination. Attorney and plaintiff representative fee agreements are subject 
to court inspection and termination of the action - whether by voluntary dismissal or 
by way of a compromise - is subject to court approval.
93
  
  
The following additional safeguards which are employed in the Israeli regime in order 
to prevent abuses of the collective procedure are also worth considering for 
integration at European level: 
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1. A certification process is imposed to filter out unmeritorious claims. As part of 
this process, the judge will have to examine the prerequisites for an action.
94
 
These include whether the action is sound on its merits, whether it appears that 
the action was filed in good faith, and whether there are sufficient common 
questions of law or fact. 
 
2. The requirement that notice be given to members containing information 
relating to all the crucial stages of the action,
95
 as well as an online registry 
containing information on all the crucial stages of the trial
96
 may also operate 
as a barrier to unmeritorious claims. Management of the case is open to public 
scrutiny, and no hidden arrangements between the representatives and the 
defendants are permitted without granting class members or the Attorney 
General the opportunity to express their views.  
 
3. Compromises,97 and voluntary dismissal of the action,98 are regarded as 
carrying the risk of abuse. Representatives may act in bad faith or for their 
own benefit at the expense of class members. The law therefore imposes strict 
supervision on compromises and voluntary dismissals which include using 
expert evidence
99
 in order to examine the economic benefits of the suggested 
settlement to the class members. Judges should not allow arrangements 
between the parties unless they benefit the class members who are not 
normally present at trial. In addition, the parties and the lawyers on both sides 
are required to confirm by sworn affidavit that there are no additional 
agreements which remain undisclosed to the public.  
 
4. Where the judge finds that a representative is not acting in the interests of the 
class members, but the nevertheless claim seems to be meritorious, he may 
replace the representative.
100
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5. Where the court finds that conflicts of interest exist between class members, 
due process allows the judge to divide members into subclasses.
101
 
 
6. In order to prevent the misallocation of funds, the judge has the power to 
appoint trustees in order to supervise the collection of damages.
102
 
 
7. The principle of the "loser pays," which refers to a mechanism whereby the 
loser pays the expenses of the winning party, applies to class actions other 
than in special circumstances where the action, though dismissed, has brought 
some benefit to the members or to the general public.
103 
 
 
8. The requirement to introduce an online registry which was recently adopted in 
Israel is quite innovative. A registry of Group Litigation Orders (GLO) exists 
in the U.K. and Norway also has such a registry. In Canada a voluntary 
database system is operated by the Canadian Bar Association.
104
 This 
innovative idea will be examined in due course as one of the positive aspects 
of the Israeli model. The registry also includes information (mainly decisions 
or settlements) on new decisions for cases submitted before March 2007. 
 
However, these safeguards do not appear to be sufficiently robust to prevent the huge 
numbers of claims which are now flooding the Israeli market. It is therefore necessary 
to examine the consequences of using these safeguards in Israel in order to fine-tune 
the model before transposing it to Europe. The main change required in the Israeli 
system is the introduction of a mechanism to filter the flood of claims which is 
currently inundating the Israeli court system following the introduction of Israel's new 
class action law in 2006. The aim of the improved safeguard mechanism is to filter 
out unmeritorious actions right from the outset and create a barrier even before such 
actions reach court. The filtering may be achieved by prioritising out of court dispute 
settlements and introducing a compulsory procedure for submitting a claim to a public 
body even before allowing the dispute to be submitted to court.  
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E. Introducing a Collective Action Model for European 
Consumers 
 
  1. The Position of European Consumers vis à vis Enforcing their 
Rights 
 
The basic problem in regard to consumer transactions in Europe is that enforcement 
measures are not efficient. The European market is huge, yet consumers remain weak 
when dealing with businesses which have the finances and power to exert their will 
over transactions with consumers.
105
  
 
The efficiency of consumer protection measures do not depend only on the creation of 
rights, but also upon the availability of efficient and appropriate means to assert 
them.
106
 The core reason for the lack of legal enforcement of consumers' rights is that 
the amounts of money involved are generally too small to be worth litigating. The 
area of anti-trust represents only one section of the largest consumer law cases which 
are almost always characterized by being NEV cases. In the context of antitrust 
actions, the ECJ has ruled that citizens of the European Union have the right to 
damages even where such a right is not expressly provided for in the treaty itself.
107
 
On the other hand, reports have shown that the number of anti-trust private 
enforcement court cases in the E.U. constitute only 10% of all E.U. competition law 
enforcement cases.
108
 
 
                                                 
105  Hans W. Micklitz, ‘The Expulsion of the Concept of Protection from the Consumer Law and the 
Return of the Social Elements in Civil Law. A Bittersweet Polemic’ European University Institute, 
The Department of Law, EUI working papers law 2012/03 available at: 
<http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/3/browse?type=dateissued> accessed 23 September 2012. See at 
page 2. 
106
 Nicole L'Heureux, "Effective consumer access to justice: Class actions" (1992) 15(4) Journal of 
Consumer Policy 445-462, DOI: 10.1007/BF01014122. 
107
 See the Courage case: C-453/99 Courage Ltd. v. Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan v. Courage 
and others [2001] ECR I-6297 s 24. and joined cases C-295/04-C-298/04 Manfredi v. Lloyd 
Adriatico Assicurazion Spa [2006] ECR I-6619 s 61.  
108
 Luiss Guido Carli Centre for European Policy Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Report for 
the European Commission 'Making antitrust damages actions more effective in the EU: welfare 
impact and potential scenarios' (Brussels, Rome and Rotterdam, 21 December 2007) 
<ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files/impact_study.pdf> accessed 5 August 
2011. 
 See also Charlotte Leskinen, 'Collective Antitrust Damages Actions in the EU: The Opt-In v. The 
Opt-Out Model (IE Law School Working Paper 10-03, 26 April 2010) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1612731> accessed 5 August 2011. 
Considering the Benefits of Collective Action Models for European Consumers 
 11 
Thus, even though such rights exist in the E.U., and despite the fact that such 
measures have direct effect in national courts,
109
 the question arises as to why private 
enforcement is not influential at all in the anti-trust area. The answer to that question 
lies in the weak foundations of the enforcement mechanism in Europe. On the 
contrary in Israel’s case, once a class action mechanism was introduced into consumer 
protection legislation, court cases on consumer issues began to emerge in the Israeli 
courts. Prior to this legislation, there were no such cases due to the dangers of running 
a court case for small sums and with no incentives.
110
 If a collective action system is 
introduced in Europe, it is very likely that the enforcement of consumers rights will 
improve dramatically as was the case in Israel following the introduction of the new 
class action law in 2006.  
 
  2. The Potential Role of a Collective Procedure in Assisting 
European Consumers to Enforce their Rights 
 
The collective procedure has many advantages and may assist European citizens in 
enforcing legal rights and norms conferred by member state and European legislation 
especially in NEV cases where an individual consumer is not expected to enter 
complicated legal proceedings in order to gain a very small amount of damages.
111
 
Collective redress is one of the forms of settling disputes between traders in the 
internal market and it completes other out of court mechanisms such as complaint 
settlements, ADR and mediation which already operate in Europe.
112
 The aims of 
collective proceedings fully match the needs of the Single European Market, since 
law enforcement, improving access to justice, imposing fair procedures in court 
proceedings, and providing remedies for injured parties are all required to ensure the 
effectiveness of this market. It is in the interests of the European Community that 
consumers are empowered with proper tools to resolve their claims so as to boost 
confidence in trade between member states. 
                                                 
109 Case 127/73 BRT v. Sabam [1974] ECR 51.16. 
110 Sinai Deutch, ‘Consumer Class Actions: Are They a Solution for Enforcing Consumer Rights? The 
Israeli Model’ [2004] 27(2) Journal of Consumer Policy 179. 
111
 C.G. Lang, 'Class Actions and US Antitrust Law: Prerequisites and Interdependencies of the 
Implementation of a Procedural Device for the Aggregation of Low-Value Claims' (2001) 24(2) 
World Competition 285-302. 
112
 Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on certain 
aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters.<http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32008L0052:en:NOT>.  
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  3. The Search for a European Collective Proceedings Model 
 
The search for a proper European mechanism to bring effective consumer collective 
actions, incorporating sufficient safeguards to eliminate possible abuse of collective 
proceedings, is now underway. 
 
One may ask whether the imposition of collective redress should be governed by 
broad principles which leave the implementation to individual member states. Such an 
approach may encourage the introduction of a new model and render it more 
acceptable for adoption by member states. On the other hand, a detailed piece of 
legislation benefits from certainty and coherence. 
 
At the moment there is great confusion on the matter of collective redress in Europe, 
where even the terminology used differs from one member state to the next. Member 
states have different litigation cultures and the introduction of certain aspects of 
collective actions, such as an opt-out mechanism, runs against principles enshrined in 
the legal norms of many member states. 
 
The term collective redress as used by the European Commission may include all 
kinds of models, from opt-in models to opt-out models. However, several member 
states use collective redress proceedings merely as a form of gathering claims (such as 
the Group Litigation Order in England), while other member states have introduced 
representative actions either where the representative sues in its own capacity, as in 
France, or where the representative sues on behalf of its members,
113
 as is the case in 
French joint actions. There are also test case models and models for the skimming of 
profits, such as those used in Germany.
114
 
 
In addition to differing approaches by member states as a result of varying European 
collective action models, there are also differences in the foundational features of the 
procedure. Some member states such as Portugal use the opt-out mechanism whereas 
                                                 
113 Actions for collective interests of consumers under la loi d'orientation du commerce et de l'artisanat 
du 27 décembre 1973 (the Royer Act 1973). 
Action en représentation conjointe des consommateurs (French joint actions). 
114
 Gerhard Wagner, Collective Redress – Categories of Loss and Legislative Options 
 available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1960904> accessed 21 September 2012. 
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others such as France object strongly to the opt-out machinery. Furthermore, it seems 
that even broad principles may contradict traditional jurisdictional norms in several 
member states, such as the French principle of nul ne plaide par procureur (no-one 
shall plead by proxy), or the prohibition which exists in numerous member states 
against contingency fees or payments to lawyers by non-clients.
115
 
 
It should be borne in mind that the majority of the sixteen member states which have 
already introduced a model of their own have each developed differing systems. If 
these member states try to adapt their own mechanisms to the broad principles that the 
Community drafts, there will be no unified coherent procedure and consumers may 
feel more confident purchasing goods in some member states rather than others. Some 
of these state models may be more workable than others and cross-border trade within 
the community will not be as legally redressable as it should be. 
 
In order to provide coherence, the European Community should provide for a binding 
procedure that includes a unified registry, opt-out mechanism and incentives for 
lawyers and representatives. Such a binding procedure should take the form of a clear 
and effective regulation on collective redress adopted by all member states. A 
directive which leaves room for implementation by member states will not be binding 
until its implementation, and it is likely that the interpretation and the implementation 
will not be unified across Europe on view of the current differences regarding 
collective proceedings within member states. 
 
The regulation must be sufficiently clear and should be directly applicable to 
individuals in all member states, so that the Community avoids running the risk of 
inconsistent implementation. 
 
In 1998, the European Commission introduced Directive 98/27/EC empowering 
consumer organisations
116
 to apply to courts in other Member States for an injunction 
against an infringement of any of a number of consumer trading directives committed 
                                                 
115  Veronique Magnier, 'Class Actions, Group Litigation & Other Forms of Collective Litigation 
Protocol for National Reporters France' available at 
<http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/content/class-actions-group-litigation-other-forms-
collective-litigation-protocol-national-reporters> accessed 23 September 2012. 
116
 
 
Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on injunctions 
for the protection of consumers’ interests [1998] OJ L166/51, Article 7(2). 
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in the organisation's own state by an entity in another member state. The directives in 
question cover areas such as misleading advertising, unfair contract terms, consumer 
credit, package holidays and consumer guarantees. Unfortunately, since then only two 
cross-border cases have been brought, the main reason for this being the financial risk 
for the entity bringing the case, as well as the complexity of national injunctive 
proceedings.
117
 
 
Directive 98/27/EC lacks basic provisions on the implementation of collective 
redress, including an opt-out mechanism, claims by individuals and a mechanism for 
settlements. It requires a wider scope of possible plaintiffs as well as incentives to use 
the procedure. In addition to enlarging the scope of Directive 98/27/EC incentives or a 
system of European funding are needed in order to assist in operating the injunctions 
procedure under that regulation. It therefore seems that directive Directive 98/27/EC 
could not form the basis of a collective redress model and a new measure should be 
introduced following the above-mentioned consultation on a search for a coherent 
European model published in February 2011.  
 
It is argued
118
 that such a European intervention could be based on Article 81(2) of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union which allows legislation on, 
inter alia:  
(a) the mutual recognition and enforcement between Member States of judgments and 
of decisions in extrajudicial cases;  
[…]  
(e) effective access to justice;  
(f) the elimination of obstacles to the proper functioning of civil proceedings, if 
necessary by promoting the compatibility of the rules on civil procedure applicable in 
the Member States.  
 
However, Fairgrieve and Howells claim that competence is usually restricted to cross-
border matters leaving purely domestic procedures undisturbed. Furthermore, with 
                                                 
117
 See report from the Commission concerning the application of Directive 98/27/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on injunctions for the protection of consumers' interest 
<http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/enforcement/injunctions_en.htm > accessed 15 November 2011. 
118
 Duncan Fairgrieve and Geraint Howells, ‘Collective Redress Procedures – European Debates’ 
(2009) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 379, 406. 
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regard to the recognition of foreign judgments between member states,
119
 there are 
strong fears that a judgment based on the opt-out mechanism would be regarded as 
manifestly contrary to public policy and therefore unenforceable.
120
 This is because 
group members in an opt-out mechanism scenario do not have their day in court, 
which may run against the fundamental right to a fair trial. Therefore, a procedure 
which is to be introduced in Europe should also be concerned with the matter of 
cross-border disputes and mutual recognition of judgments within member states. 
This matter will be dealt with further in the fifth chapter of this work. 
 
  4. The Relevance of Israel’s Class Action Law in the Search for a 
European Model 
 
Israel’s new Class Action Law 5766-2006 is particularly significant in the search for a 
new European binding instrument because it is more detailed than similar existing and 
operating class action frameworks. It contains 45 sections (by comparison, US 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 contains only 8 sections),
121
 each of which was 
considered in great detail by the legislator. Unlike the US system
122
 and the rules of 
procedure in England and Wales which has influenced the Israeli system in the past, 
class actions in Israel are now enshrined in legislation, rather than rules of civil 
procedure. In Israel, primary legislation prevails over secondary legislation allowing 
the Israeli enactment to defeat any pre-existing contradicting rules of procedure. 
Israel’s new legislation sets norms for private enforcement which were not previously 
used in the country.  
 
The Israeli model may be much more acceptable in the eyes of European legislators as 
it has not adopted all the class action features which are so objected in Europe such as 
punitive damages and settlement which benefit only the class lawyers. 
 
                                                 
119 
Based on Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L12/1, art 
33(1). 
120 
The authors Duncan Fairgrieve and Geraint Howells refer to article 34(1) of the above regulation. 
121
 United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 23(a)-(h). 
122
 United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 23 <http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/> 
accessed 24 September 2012. 
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In order to advance the search for a Europe-wide mechanism, the Israeli model should 
be considered, since it offers a new and very effective model based on legal norms 
which are familiar to Europe. 
 
The new Israeli model is based on legal principles rooted in English law, and it is 
therefore not foreign to the European legal culture. The Israeli model does not follow 
the problems attributed to the U.S. model and which are so criticised in Europe. 
Therefore, the Israeli model may take the lead in the introduction of a new collective 
redress mechanism in the European Union, yet the Israeli model itself needs some 
changes in order to combat problems which have become evident in the five years 
since its creation.  
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Chapter Two: 
The Significance of the Israeli Class Action Model 
 
In our previous chapter, we have explained that there are a number of compelling 
reasons for European legislators to reflect on the Israeli class action model before they 
finalise a European collective action framework. Although there are many differences 
between the E.U. and Israel, an analysis of the Israeli class action experience, 
including both its negative and positive effects, would assist the creation of an 
accessible and efficient class action system in Europe for consumers. 
 
In order to discuss the significance of the Israeli model, the roots of this model and its 
history will be reviewed. Furthermore, the effect of the new class action legislation in 
Israel is explored.  
 
A. The Importance of the Israeli Class Action System to the 
European Debate on Collective Proceedings 
 
It may not be immediately clear why the evolution and effect of the CAL 2006 is 
pertinent to the development of a class action system in Europe. However, there are 
several factors which make consideration of the Israel class action system both 
relevant and valuable. Firstly, the Israeli legal system has certain features in common 
with major European jurisdictions, such as England and Wales, since it is based on the 
English legal system. The similarity in jurisdictions means that legal tools such as 
collective actions may result in similar effects in Europe and in Israel. Secondly, 
Israel has an up-to-date opt-out model, albeit that in specialist cases, such as claims 
for large individual damages including mass tort actions, claims can be made on an 
opt-in basis. The Israeli model was created having studied the experiences of other 
places in the world such as the U.S.  Thirdly, many of the provisions at the core of the 
ongoing E.U. class action debate
1
 have already been tried and tested in Israel. These 
                                                 
1
 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Public Consultation: Towards a 
Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress, SEC (2011) 173 final (Feb. 4, 2011) available at 
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issues include the identity of the class representative, introduction of an opt-out 
mechanism, implementation of appropriate safeguards to ensure that actions are 
submitted in good faith and financial incentives to encourage representatives to bring 
class actions and reward lawyers with contingency fees. Thus, in this respect the 
Israeli experience may supply some useful answers. Fourthly, the Israeli model has 
proved to be much more accessible to consumers than its European counterparts and 
has allowed aggregated consumer power to prevail over the power of huge 
corporations operating in consumer-related areas, such as communications, the food 
industry, and banking. Finally, the CAL is considered to be more reasonable than the 
U.S. class action framework, which alarms many E.U. officials and legislators 
because of its reputation for treble and punitive damages and extremely high 
attorneys’ fees, while bringing little benefit to class members.2  
 
Despite the useful precedent offered by the CAL, the Israeli class action system could 
not be transposed directly into the E.U. without adaptation. For example, the Israeli 
model, unlike a future European class action system, does not need to accommodate 
consumers located in multiple jurisdictions or address issues of cross-border trade 
between member states. In addition, the Israeli system still has certain flaws, which 
have led to class actions flooding the Israeli courts.  These issues would need to be 
addressed in a future European model and this work attempts to provide some 
solutions to these problems.  
 
The CAL also adopts an opposite standpoint on many of the core issues of collective 
redress compared to the position taken by the majority of European member states in 
their existing class action provisions. For example, the Israeli model favours the opt-
out model, rather than the opt-in mechanism which is preferred in most European 
jurisdictions such as France, Italy, and England. The Israeli class action framework 
also relies mainly on private enforcement by individual representatives, as opposed to 
the European emphasis on organisation-led claims.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0054/sec_2011_173_en.pdf>  accessed 2 June 
2011. 
2
 See the Speech of Commissioner Kuneva, ‘Collective Redress: Moving the Debate Forward’ (ALDE 
Seminar, Brussels, 04 March 2009) at <http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x99ya8_alev-collective-
redress_news> accessed 10 June 2011.  
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 Before examining the details of the CAL, it is helpful to review the way in which the 
Israeli model evolved. The Israeli class action system has passed through three main 
stages which represent three different class action options that could also be 
introduced in Europe. In Israel, difficulties were encountered at each of these stages 
and learning the lessons of these challenges could help European legislators to avoid 
the same pitfalls. Aspects of a class action system in respect of which Europe has 
expressed hesitation, such as limiting class actions to specific laws, have been tried 
and tested in Israel with no success and this is likely to be relevant given that the 
Israeli jurisdiction shares many features of its substantive and procedural law with 
European jurisdictions.    
 
B. Historical Development of the Class Action Framework in 
Israel 
 
The class action system in Israel is based on the English legal concept of 
‘representative actions’. Israel then moved towards a more U.S.-influenced approach 
favouring private enforcement and finally created its own class action framework with 
the enactment of the CAL. The evolution from a European to a more American 
approach towards class actions provides an interesting precedent and suggests that the 
European Union could also adopt new legislation to encourage private enforcement 
and improve the effectiveness of consumer law based on provisions in the Israeli 
model.   
 
  1. Foundations in English Law 
  
From 1918 until 1948, Israel was governed under the British Mandate and elements of 
Israeli civil law are thus rooted in the English legal system. 
 
The general rule under English law was that all parties interested in a matter had to be 
present in court so that a final decision could bind all the parties to the dispute. 
However, where the parties were so numerous that it was impractical to bring all of 
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them to court, this rule was not allowed to stand in the way of a decision.
3
 It was, 
therefore, a rule of convenience.
4
 
 
Rule 29 of the Israel Civil Law Procedure Regulations 5744-1984 (‘Rule 29’) 
(previously known as Rule 65 of the Civil Law Procedure Regulations 1938) adopted 
the provisions of R.S.C Ord. 15 r.12 (1) with slight changes.
 5
  
 
Rule 29 stated that: 
 
(a) where a great number of persons are interested in one action, a portion of 
them may, at the request of a plaintiff if they are plaintiffs, or at the request of 
a defendant if they are defendants, and with the permission of the court or the 
registrar, represent in that action all the interested  persons (...) 
 
This rule, imported from the English jurisdiction, forms the basis of class action 
proceedings in Israel. 
 
  2. The Beginning of Representative Proceedings in Israel 
 
It has been suggested that Rule 29 (which was based on the English concept of 
representative proceedings),
6
 in conjunction with Rule 19 of Israel's Civil Law 
Procedure Regulations 5744-1984 (which permitted joinder of multiple claims where 
a common question of law or fact might arise), could have enabled claimants to bring 
American-style class actions for damages.
7
 In effect, one person would have been 
allowed to represent all class members, even though they were not party to the legal 
proceedings. This is, in fact, the genesis of the Israeli opt-out machinery. 
 
                                                 
 
3
 Duke of Bedford v. Ellis [1901] A.C 1.  
4
 See also John v. Rees [1970] 1 Ch. 345.  
5
 R.S.C Ord. 15 r 12 (1) stated that, ‘Where numerous persons have the same interest in any 
proceedings … the proceedings may be begun, and unless the Court otherwise orders, continued, by 
or against any one or more of them representing all or as representing all except one of more of 
them.’   
6
 Representative actions in England were rare and ineffective because of the requirement in R.S.C Ord.   
15 r 12 (1) that all the members of the represented group have the ‘same interest’ in the action.   
7
 Steven Goldstein, 'Collective Representative Action: What and for What' (1978) 9 Mishpatim 416. 
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However, U.S.-style class actions appear to have been prevented by the reliance that 
Israeli courts placed on English judicial interpretation of R.S.C Ord. 15 r 12 (1) upon 
which Israel's Rule 29 was based. Although, unlike R.S.C Ord. 15 r 12 (1), Rule 29 
did not expressly require that the members of the class have the ‘same interest in any 
proceedings’, Rule 29 was nevertheless construed by the Israeli courts in the same 
way as its English counterpart. Consequently, judicial decisions in Israel tended to 
follow English case law.
8
  
 
In Frankische Pelzindustrie Markle & Co. v. Rabinovich
9
 the Court was asked to 
allow one party to represent 43 fur merchants who suffered losses as a result of series 
of fraudulent actions made by the same defendants. The Supreme Court in Israel held 
that although the wording of Rule 29 was different from R.S.C Ord. 15 r. 12, in 
essence, the two provisions had the same effect. Consequently, the court found that 
the ‘same interest’ requirement should be applied, even though it was not expressly 
stated in Rule 29. In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court denied the right of the 
plaintiffs to represent all aggrieved persons who had suffered financial loss and stated 
that Rule 29 could only be used where the plaintiff was seeking an injunction or a 
declaration, but not where the group of plaintiffs was seeking damages. The reasoning 
for this decision was that the damage to each potential plaintiff was different and, 
therefore, did not satisfy the ‘same interest’ requirement.  
 
As a consequence of this judicial reasoning, Rule 29 was rendered obsolete and the 
door was effectively closed to American-style class actions until a number of legal 
decisions interpreted Rule 29 less restrictively.  
 
The movement for change began in the district courts (the highest courts in Israel 
other than the Supreme Court), which interpreted Rule 29 in such a way as to broaden 
the scope of class actions. The district court judges who began to apply a more liberal 
interpretation of Rule 29 did so out of frustration at the many restrictions to which 
                                                 
8
 Duke of Bedford v. Ellis [1901] A.C 1; Prudential Assurance Co. v. Newman Industries Ltd (1979) 3 
All E.R 507; EMI Records Ltd v. Kudhail [1985]  F.S.R 36 C.A. 
9 Appeal Case 79/69 (Supreme Court) Frankische Pelzindustrie Markle & Co. v. Rabinovich, P"D Kaf 
Gimel (1) 645.  
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class actions were subject.
10
 However, in other district court decisions judges denied 
Rule 29 motions because of the absence of a statutory provision permitting a more 
relaxed application of the Rule.
11
  
 
Consequently, a great deal of confusion surrounded Rule 29 and its legal authority 
was very unclear
12
 until the Israeli legislator decided to intervene by introducing 
specific class actions provisions. 
 
  3. Introduction of Class Action Provisions in Specified Areas  
 
As a result of judicial frustration with Rule 29 and its English interpretation, the 
Israeli legislator’s conviction was that American-style class actions would improve 
scrutiny and advance policies of good trade in specific areas. Israel gradually began to 
move away from the English ‘representative actions’, towards U.S.-style class actions. 
This move was the second step in the development of class actions in Israel and was 
made very gradually and cautiously because of concerns about the U.S. system, 
particularly large damages awards. There were also concerns that class actions would 
lead to high costs for defendants that could cause financial ruin with little benefit for 
consumers.
13
 However, these concerns were alleviated by the fact that punitive 
damages and statutory treble-damages could not be awarded under Israeli law (as is 
the case in the E.U.) and Israeli cases were heard by a professional judge, rather than 
a jury (similar to some E.U. member states).
14
 
 
                                                 
10 
See for example Case no. 1472/95 (District Court of Tel Aviv) Shimshi v. Psagot; Case no. 109/94 
(District Court of Jerusalem) The Israeli Student Union v. The University of Jerusalem 
(unpublished); Case no. 1165/97 (District Court of Jerusalem) Shimonov v. The Kadisha Company 
(unpublished); Case no. 16/97 (District Court of Tel Aviv) Zimber v. The Council of Tel Aviv, 
(unpublished); Case no. 1682/95 (District Court of Tel Aviv) Doron v. Secum, (unpublished); Case 
no. 2604/99 (District Court of Be'er Sheva) Avital v. The College of Management Be'er Sheva, 
Dinim Mechozi Lamed Bet (5) 23 (1999); Case no. 28680/97 (District Court of Haifa) Haim Dadon 
v. Israel Land Administration, Dinim Mehozi (6) 709 (1999); Case no. 3259/95 (District Court of 
Haifa) Meirson v. The Electricity Company.     
11 See for example Case no. 545/91 (District Court of Jerusalem) Atiya v. The Council of Jerusalem, 
(1991) and Case no. 1279/96 (District Court of Jerusalem) Givon v. Shaarei Zedek Medical Center 
(1996). 
12 See Dr. Chemy Binun ‘The Position of Rule 29’ 4(1) Shaarey Mishpat 193, and Steven Goldstein 
and Yael Efron, 'The Development of Class Actions in Israel' (1999) 27 Alei Mishpat 31.  
13 Sinai Deutch S, 'Consumer Class Actions: Are They a Solution for Enforcing Consumer Rights? The 
Israeli Model' 2004 27(2) Journal of Consumer Policy 179.  
14
 Ibid.  
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For more than ten years, Israel's Ministry of Justice sought to introduce a collective 
redress mechanism based on U.S. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, specifically 
Rule 23(b)(3) which deals with damages class actions.
15
 The search for a new model 
began with a report submitted to the Israeli Consumer Council, which recommended 
the introduction of class actions into Israeli Law.
16
 The Ministry of Justice 
alternatively suggested a gradual recognition of class actions in specific areas, which 
would be limited to specific plaintiffs.
17
  
 
As a first step towards this latter model, the Israeli legislator identified specific areas 
of law where there was the potential for a large number of people to suffer minimal 
losses for which they were unlikely to sue unless they were given an incentive to do 
so. The existing legislation in these areas was then amended to enable class actions 
for violations of the law. The new enactments were selected on the basis of special 
need and in all of the amending legislation, except for one,
18
 there were criminal 
sanctions for non-compliance, despite the fact that the new class action provisions 
were also intended to encourage enforcement.
19
  
 
These enactments were introduced gradually between 1988 and 2005 and were 
inserted into either existing or new legislation. The Amendment to the 1981 
Consumer Protection Law 1994 is the most relevant provision for this thesis. 
However, the other amendments are also referenced briefly as evidence of the Israeli 
legislator’s view at the time that enforcement should be promoted through the use of 
collective redress. Furthermore the differences between the enactments also indicate 
which types of legislation and which provisions were most effective. The areas where 
the Israeli legislator sought to improve enforcement by introducing collective actions 
tended to be low value individual actions which had to be bundled together in order to 
make the bringing of an action feasible and worthwhile. The areas affected were the 
                                                 
15
 Steven Goldstein, ‘Class Action in Israel’ in C. Wasserstein Fassberg (ed) Israel Reports to the XIII 
International Congress of Comparative Law (1990), 45.  
16
 Steven Goldstein, Developments of Class Actions as Consumer Protection Devices [1978], Report 
submitted to the Israeli Consumer Council 1978 (Hebrew). 
17 Sinai Deutch, (n 13). 
18
  Male and Female Workers Equal Pay Law, 5756-1996 (Israel). 
19
  Sinai Deutch, ‘A Decade of the Consumer Class Action – Interim Summary and a Look at the 
Future’ (2005) 4(1) Shaarei Mishpat 9. 
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securities market,
20
 the environment,
21
 competition claims,
22
 consumer protection 
claims,
23
 banking,
24
 employment discrimination,
25
 insurance,
26
 actions concerning 
shareholders interests,
27
 equal rights for disabled persons
28
 and the pensions market.
29
  
 
The new rules provided for opt-out class actions, except for the environmental 
legislation which contained an opt-in provision
30
 that allowed a plaintiff to seek an 
injunction or order to remove the act provided that 60 days prior notice was given to 
the defendant to enable him to correct the offence. However, the special opt-in rule in 
environmental cases did not promote any collective actions. This point should be 
borne in mind by the European Commission before enacting its new framework for 
class actions, as it proves that collective claims for injunctions in the environment 
area in Israel were not effective at all. 
  
All the new laws contained similar, but not identical, provisions for certification. 
Thus, in order to bring a collective action, the representative had to satisfy the court 
that a class action was appropriate and that the collective procedure prevailed over all 
other court procedures. The claim also had to be brought on behalf of an identifiable 
class of victims and in good faith by a suitable representative. 
 
As a result of these enactments, the number of class actions in Israel rose 
significantly. However, most of the actions failed to pass the certification stage, since 
class actions were limited to breaches of the specific laws and the causes of action 
contained within them. For example, it was held that an action against a bank for 
unlawful interest charges should be dismissed because the cause of action was based 
on Israeli interest law
31
 and not on the amendment to the Banking law
32
 which set out 
the class action procedure and conditions.
33
 
                                                 
20
 Amendment to the 1968 Securities Act 5748-1988 (Israel). 
21
 The Prevention of Environmental Hazards (Civil Suits) Law 5752-1992 (Israel). 
22
 Amendment to the 1988 Business Restrictions Law 5752-1992 (Israel). 
23
 Amendment to the 1981 Consumer Protection Law 5754-1994 (Israel). 
24
 Amendment to the 1981 Banking (Consumer Services) Law 5756-1996 (Israel). 
25
 Male and Female Workers Equal Pay Law, 5756-1996 (Israel). 
26
 Amendment to the 1981 Oversight over Financial Services (Insurance) Law 5756-1996 (Israel). 
27
  The Companies Law 5759-1999 (Israel). 
28
  The Equal Rights of People with Disabilities Law 5758-1998 (Israel). 
29 Supervision of Financial Services (Pension Funds) Law 5765-2005 (Israel). 
30
  Prevention of Environmental Hazards Act (Civil Actions) 5752-1992, s 5 and s 6 (Israel).   
31 
 The Interest Law 5717-1957 which limits the permitted interest rates.  
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The Securities Act 1968 was the first area where class actions were introduced. The 
legislator took the view that it was in the public interest to allow class actions in order 
to improve scrutiny and preserve the efficiency and credibility of the market. The 
typical action in the securities field is similar to that of consumer law. The investor 
who suffers only minimal loss is in a weak position vis à vis a powerful company's 
institutions. This position is similar to the position of the consumer who has dealt with 
a rough trader and has suffered minimal personal damages. In this case, only the 
aggregation of all claims makes the action worthwhile. 
 
The Securities Act amendment was implemented even though the Israel Securities 
Authority already had considerable powers of public enforcement.  For example, the 
Securities Authority had the power to investigate and initiate legal proceedings in 
relation to different kinds of wrongdoing and to finance class actions submitted by 
civilians or groups, or where there was a public interest and a reasonable probability 
that the class action would be approved.
34
 Nevertheless, public enforcement by the 
Securities Authority was not considered sufficiently effective on its own. 
 
However, the new class action measure introduced in the Securities Act 1968 resulted 
in very few class actions.
35
 The only explanation for the limited number of claims is 
the complexity of the securities market and the difficulty of proving that a loss was 
due to factors other than normal market fluctuations. However, in that sense, the area 
of securities differs from that of consumer issues where a normal action is not so 
complicated and typical consumer disputes are familiar to every person. 
 
The Banking (Service to Customer) Law 1981 which was amended in 1996 included a 
new and different provision allowing the courts to order compensation for the general 
public against the wrongdoer in certain circumstances. This will be the case where the 
                                                                                                                                            
32
  Amendment to the 1981 Banking (Consumer Services) Law 5756-1996 (Israel). 
33 
Application No. 2188/04 (District Court of Nazareth) Tfahot Bank v. Migrish, (2005) (unpublished, 
Judgment by Judge Avraham dated 24 May 2005)
.  
34
 Companies Act 5759-1999, s 209(b) (Israel).  
35
 There is no accurate data on the precise number of actions.   
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court concludes that monetary compensation for all or some members of the group is 
not practical and the payment cannot be effected at a reasonable cost.
36
  
 
Similar provisions were added to Section 46I(b) of the Restrictive Trade Practices 
Law 1988 and Section 62I(b) of the Insurance Business (Control) Law 1981 which 
was amended in 1997. The introduction of a clause which allowed general damages in 
favour of the public was very significant. In many cases, the individual claim in such 
actions was very small and members of the class were not expected to come forward 
to collect their share. However, the general damages provision also promoted 
deterrence by restoring the financial benefits that the wrongdoer had acquired from 
his unlawful actions.  
 
With regards to consumer protection legislation, despite the wide range of issues 
covered by the Consumer Protection Law 1981 (CPL), such as misrepresentations, 
extortion, consumer credit transactions, door-to-door sales and labelling of goods, 
virtually no consumer protection actions were brought under the CPL prior to the 
introduction of a class action mechanism.
37
 The CPL was cited in several cases, but 
until 1994 it was never a substantive factor in decisions. Individual claims were 
costly, time consuming, risky due to their uncertain results and the remedies awarded 
were usually inadequate. Individual consumer claims that reached the courts were 
scarce and even the percentage of consumer claims in the Small Claims Courts was 
relatively low. Furthermore, consumer claims were often complicated as they 
concerned promises made by dealers/sellers, which were often undocumented. 
Consequently, until the mid-1990s, consumer law in Israel was hardly enforced.
38
 A 
major change was required to turn the CPL from a symbolic piece of legislation into 
an efficient tool of consumer protection. 
 
In order to rectify this situation, the CPL was amended in 1994 by adding a new 
chapter authorising consumer class actions. The 1994 CPL provision
39
 was an opt-out 
provision which enabled a consumer or consumer organisation to sue in the name of a 
group of consumers, on the same grounds for which he could sue in his own name, for 
                                                 
36
 Previous Sec 16 I of the Banking Services Act 5741-1981. 
37
 Sinai Deutch, (n 13). 
38
 Ibid. 
39
 Consumer Protection Law, as amended in 1994, Sec 35A. 
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causes specified in the CPL. The class action provision required certification by the 
court in order to proceed and was subject to the satisfaction of certain conditions 
based on U.S. Rule 23 (b), which were similar in principle to the prerequisites set out 
in the Securities Act.
40
 
 
The main issue with the 1994 amendment to the CPL was that consumer class actions 
were limited to CPL causes of action. Section 35A(a) of the CPL stated that the 
plaintiff could sue, ‘in the name of a group of consumers on grounds according to 
which he can sue under this law.’ Consequently, even a well-grounded consumer 
claim against a ‘dealer’ could be dismissed at the preliminary certification stage if the 
particular cause of action was not one of the causes of action set out in the CPL. For 
example, in Yaary v. Israel Land Administration,
41
 a class action based on Section 35 
of the CPL was dismissed as it was based on contractual and negligence grounds 
which were outside the scope of the CPL. Similar problems also existed in relation to 
other enactments, which were confined to specific areas other than consumer 
protection law.  
 
The 1994 amendment to the CPL led to more than eighty published cases between 
1995 and 2001 that dealt with and analysed substantive issues of the CPL.
42
 As a 
result, the CPL became a meaningful source of court decisions on consumer issues.
43
 
At that time there were hardly any collective claims in Europe although the possibility 
of consumer collective or class actions was first raised in the EU context in a 
Commission paper of 1984.
44
 
 
                                                 
40
 The class must be so large as to make individual suits impractical (numerosity). 
There must be legal or factual claims in common (commonality). 
The claims must be typical (typicality). 
The representative parties must adequately protect the interests of the class (adequacy). 
The court should find at this stage that common issues between the class and the defendants will 
predominate the proceedings, as opposed to individual fact-specific conflicts between class members 
and the defendants and that a class action instead of individual litigation, is a superior vehicle for 
resolution of the disputes at hand. 
41 Case no. 388/96 (District Court of Tel Aviv) Yaary v. Israel Land Administration,  (unpublished). 
See also Case no. 1228/00 (District Court of Tel Aviv) Alroy v. Tnuva (2001) (unpublished, 
Judgment dated 21 June 2001). 
42
  Sinai Deutch, (n 13). 
43  Ibid. 
44
  European Commission, Memorandum: Consumer Redress COM(84) 692, 12 December 1984. 
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Although the amendment to the Consumer Protection Law led to cases that for the 
first time tackled consumer issues, new case law closed the gate in cases relating to 
reliance on misrepresentations and false advertisement. In the Barazani
45
 case, the 
majority opinion of the Israeli Supreme Court was a serious setback to the potential 
use of consumer class actions in cases of mass deceptive advertising.
46
 In this case, 
the court held that the class representative had to prove that every member had seen, 
read and understood a deceptive advertisement and had changed his behaviour in 
reliance upon the deceit.  The court refused to allow the action by the representatives 
who did not provide an affidavit themselves and the court was afraid that the 
plaintiffs’ real intentions when bringing the action was to try and force the bank to 
reach a personal settlement with the plaintiffs. That decision was considered a serious 
setback to the development of class actions in Israel since the court decision means 
that each member has to prove personal reliance. Such reliance may differ from one 
class member to the other and therefore the case is not suitable for collective hearing 
due to the requirement that common questions should prevail over personal issues. 
This decision was followed in Adv. Shtendel v. Bezeq International,
47
 where the 
applicant claimed that Bezeq International - one of the leading phone companies in 
Israel - deceived the public by advertising that its rates for long distance calls were the 
cheapest, when, in fact, customers had to become subscribers to obtain the cheap 
rates. The Supreme Court reverted back to the old Barazani decision and held that 
since the applicant did not prove his personal claim and his reliance on the misleading 
advertisement, the requirement for a personal action was not satisfied and the 
application failed. 
 
However, other issues, such as defective products or unlawful charges, did develop 
under the new class action system which was limited at that time to consumer 
protection legislation and not to related areas, such as tort or contract law. As a result 
of this limitation of the class action provision in specific enactments, a new law, 
which permitted class actions in a wider number of consumer areas, was required.  
 
 
                                                 
45 Request for Additional Hearing no. 5712/01 (Supreme Court) Barazani v. Bezeq, Padi Nun Zain (6) 
385. 
46
 Sinai Deutch, (n 13).  
47
 Appeal no. 458/06 Shtendel v. Bezeq International (Supreme Court) (2009) dated 6 May 2009. 
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C. Introduction of the Class Actions Law (CAL) 2006 
 
As a result of frustration with the existing provisions
48
 and in the absence of general 
class action legislation, consumers and representative plaintiffs tried to bring claims 
under Rule 29 of the Israeli Civil Procedure Rules 1984 in order to circumvent the 
restrictions in the specific enactments.  
 
However, on 2 April 2003, in the The State of Israel v. E.Sh.T case, the Israeli 
Supreme Court decided (in a split decision) that Rule 29 could not be relied upon to 
bring class actions.
49
 The case concerned employers of foreign workers who were 
opposed to the State of Israel’s requirement that they deposit bank guarantees in order 
to secure the exit of the foreign workers on termination of employment. The decision 
to reject the use of Rule 29 as a class action mechanism was adopted by a majority of 
three justices (against two), who opined that Rule 29 lacked some of the essential 
characteristics required for a class action mechanism. The judges went on to state that 
these requirements should only be imposed by legal enactment.
50
 For example, Judge 
Beinish proposed that court supervision on submission of the action, rules of 
procedure, ways to claim the personal damages and court supervision on the 
termination of the action should be adopted for any class actions provisions.
51
 The 
majority also provided that, in principle, class actions against the state could be 
allowed but the matter should be considered in the light of the existing mechanisms in 
Israel to obtain recourse from the state.  
 
It was in this context that the Israeli legislator decided to look for an alternative 
system, even though the Ministry of Justice feared that general class action legislation 
would lead to a flood of claims that would inundate the courts.
52
 As a result, the CAL 
was drafted and enacted in 2006 after extensive and detailed debate on each section 
                                                 
48
 Prof. Alon Klement, 'Class Action as a tool to neutralize the advantages of a single defendant against 
multiple plaintiffs – following the decision in The State of Israel v. E.Sh.T' (1994), 21 Mechakrei 
Mishpat <www1.idc.ac.il/klement/HebArt/EST.pdf> accessed 3 June 2011.  
49
 Case no. 3126/00 (Supreme Court) The State of Israel v. Eshet Project Management, Tak El. Nun 
Zain (3) 220, (2003). 
50
 Ibid at page 271 of the judgment. 
51
 See n 49 at page 270 of the judgment.  
52
 Sinai Deutch, (n 13).  
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and following consultation between the government and scholars.
53
 The details and 
specific provisions of the CAL will be discussed in subsequent chapters, but in 
essence, the Act favours private actions based on the opt-out mechanism and offers 
financial incentives for representatives and lawyers in successful actions, while also 
integrating various safeguards to discourage the bringing of unmeritorious cases and 
unfair settlements. 
 
However, five years after its enactment, the CAL has given rise to a flood of claims 
led by private individuals encouraged by the accessibility and financial incentives 
offered by the opt-out mechanism. In fact the Israeli courts are swamped with class 
actions in many areas and since 2011, there have been approximately 700 claims per 
year, about 80% of which are consumer related,.
54
 On the other hand, the volumes of 
actions in Europe are very small and there are very few actions for damages in the 
differing jurisdictions in Europe. The different features of the Israeli system and those 
features which are employed in major European member states should explain the 
sharp difference in the outcomes of collective actions as dealt with in the following 
paragraphs of this chapter. The comparison between the features employed in Europe 
and in Israel will be further explored in Chapter Three.    
 
  1. The Number of Class Action Claims Brought in Israel Compared to 
Individual European Member States 
 
There is a very marked difference between the numbers of collective claims made in 
Israel since the enactment of the CAL, compared with the number of collective 
actions brought in several European jurisdictions.   In Israel the system is based on the 
opt-out model whereas in Europe very few jurisdictions have introduced an opt-out 
model. There are also differences in the incentives and the funding mechanisms. 
                                                 
53
 Prof. Alon Klement of the Interdisciplinary Centre Herzliya appeared before the legislative 
committee in three of its meetings at the Knesset (Israel's legislature) on 20 April 2005, 17 August 
2005, and 22 September 2005. Dr. Peretz Segal of the Ministry of Justice, appeared before the 
committee on the 20 April 2005. Dr. Hadara Bar-Mor and Dr Michal Horovitz from the Netanya 
Academic College appeared on 20 April 2005. Guy Halfteck and Dr. Issachar Rosen-Zvi from the 
Tel Aviv University appeared before the committee on 20 April 2005. Dr Michael Wigoda from 
Sha'arei Mishpat College appeared before the committee on 31 May 2005.    
54
 According to the Israeli Registry of Class Actions available in Hebrew at 
<http://elyon1.court.gov.il//heb/tovanot_y/list.htm> accessed 29 January 2011. 
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Nonetheless the comparison shows that the Israeli system is very workable, arguably 
too workable, as many actions for damages are brought before the courts.   
 
Israel class action registry shows that between March 2007 and the end of 2007, about 
130 collective actions were brought (approximately 13 new actions each month). In 
2008, the number of actions rose to 246 actions per annum (approximately 20 new 
actions each month).  In 2009, there were more than 270 claims (approximately 22 
new actions every month). In 2010, there were about 360 new actions (approximately 
30 actions per month) and the numbers rose to 715 in 2011 (approximately 60 new 
actions per month).
55
 
 
These numbers prove that the Israeli jurisdiction is producing many actions. The 
Israeli system improves dramatically access to justice whereas the European models 
are stuck with low numbers and thus far do not bring any financial benefits to 
consumers. Once it has been proved that there are substantial differences in case 
volumes, there should be analysis of the features that make the Israeli model so 
accessible, though the problems of the Israeli market should also be studied. The 
existing safeguards will be examined in particular in Chapter Four, to ascertain 
whether they function effectively in Israel, and whether they are relevant for 
European jurisdictions. 
  
 
                                                 
55
 See Table 1 below. 
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TABLE 1 
The number of collective actions bought in individual EU member states and Israel: 
 
 Country Year collective 
proceedings 
were introduced 
Average number of 
collective actions per 
annum 
Total number of 
collective actions 
brought since 
collective 
proceedings 
introduced 
 
1 Austria 2000 1-2 15 
2 Bulgaria 2006 1-2 5 
3 Denmark 2008 1 1 
4 Finland 2007 0 0 
5 France 1992 10 196 
6 Germany 2004 3 29 
7 Greece 2007   
8 Italy 2009   
9 Portugal 1995 Less than 1 6 
10 Spain 2000 5 49 
11 Sweden 2003 1 8 
12 Netherlands 2005 Less than 1 3 
13 U.K 2000 1-2 14 
14 Israel 2007 700*
56
 2,418*
57
 
 
 
 
                                                 
56 
An average of 214 per annum in the first three years following the new act and later the average rose 
to approximately 400 claims a year. In 2011 the number rose to 700. 
57
 There were 608 (in 34 months) and 1204 by 30 May 2011. 
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The average number of collective actions was calculated using the information in the 
‘Study on the Evaluation of the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Collective Redress 
Mechanisms in the European Union’58 and the data set out in Israel's online class 
action registry.  
 
Israel's online class action registry has been in existence since March 2007 following 
the entry of the CAL into force. Between March 2007 and December 2009, 608 new 
applications to certify class actions were submitted (and reported in the registry). 
These actions were studied throughout this research in order to draw conclusions with 
regards to the areas of law susceptible for collective actions and the numbers of 
compromises reached. In order to calculate the number of new claims made between 
March 2007 and 31 December 2009 (a period of 34 months), 38 claims which 
appeared on the register, but which were submitted before the relevant period, were 
subtracted from the total number of claims during the relevant period. 
 
These figures do not include class action cases that were commenced, but not reported 
to the registry, usually because they were dismissed at an early stage in proceedings.
59
 
Looking at the registry, it seems as though many of the cases were settled and thus 
ended up with some benefit to the consumer class members bearing in mind that the 
majority of actions (around 80%) concern consumer issues.  
 
The rise in the numbers of claims in Israel shows that the concept of class actions is 
still developing in Israel, with new case law being made on a daily basis. The 
increased use of class actions in Israel has also empowered consumers much more and 
has made defendants much more cautious about consumers’ rights. Potential plaintiffs 
are now observing the conduct of the largest companies in order to find more causes 
of action. 
 
 If class actions were introduced in Europe there is no reason to think that a similar 
model would not produce better outcomes and boost consumer confidence there too. 
                                                 
58
 The European Commission and DG SANCO, 'Evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of 
collective redress mechanisms in the European Union' (2008) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/collective_redress_en.htm#cr> accessed 29 January 
2011. 
59
 See (n 54).  
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The introduction of collective actions may improve consumer confidence in cross-
border trade within the European Union member states. Consumers may be able to 
presume that the introduction of class actions will make large firms more careful 
about their consumer rights, thus making trade in the internal market much safer.  
 
According to the data in Table 1, France and Spain are the only European member 
states where a significant number of collective actions has been brought (although less 
than in Israel). There are certain features of the Spanish and French systems which 
have made collective redress actions more accessible for consumers than in other E.U. 
member states, while preventing a flood of actions, as occurred in Israel. However, 
the numbers of collective actions for damages are still very low even in France and 
Spain. In France, an action under Article L.422 of France's Consumer Code for joint 
representative action may only be submitted by approved associations representing 
consumers or investors at a national level and only five such actions have been 
submitted since its creation in 1992.
60
 These are opt-in actions for damages where 
each individual grants the organisation a mandate to act as his representative. 
 
On the other hand, according to the evaluation study (French Final Report)
61
 a total of 
196 claims in the ‘interest of consumers’ were brought  by organisations in France 
under Article L.421-1 of the Consumer Code in the last decade.  These are non-
personal damages actions, mainly for injunctions, which are totally financed by the 
consumer organisations.
62
 Therefore, the French system is not producing 
compensation for class members, but rather deals mainly with the prevention of 
illegal actions by injunctions. Class actions for damages in France are rare and 
ineffective. The French system would not form an effective basis for a new class 
action model for damages in Europe in light of its current performance.  
 
                                                 
60
  BEUC, 'Where does collective redress for individual damages exist?' in Country Survey of 
Collective Redress Mechanisms (BEUC, July 2010) available at 
<http://www.beuc.org/Content/Default.asp?PageID=2140> accessed 17 November 2011. 
61
 Véronique Magnier and Dr. Ralf Alleweldt, ‘Evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of 
collective redress mechanisms in the European Union – country report France’ (Civic Consulting, 
2008) at <http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/fr-country-report-final.pdf> accessed 17 
November 2011.  
62
 European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies 'Policy Department A:  Economic and 
Scientific Policy: Overview of existing collective redress schemes in EU Member States’ (July 2011) 
<www.europarl.europa.eu> accessed 6 October 2011.    
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Forty-nine representative claims have been submitted to date in Spain. Spain has had 
two collective redress procedures for damages since 2000 and Spanish legislation has 
defined two separate types of interests: quasi-class actions, where the members of a 
group are unidentified or unnamed
63
 and multi-party actions, where the members are 
identified or easily identifiable (also known as collective action groups of 
consumers).
64
 
 
The Spanish system is based on a special kind of opt-in procedure which has proved 
to be more successful than others, probably because it allows representation by a 
group of consumers and not just registered and qualified organisations. It is not a 
regular opt-in action because it may affect members of the group who are not present 
in court. All claims affecting a significant number of consumers may be solved 
through the collective action in defense of rights and interests of consumers.
65
 The 
Spaniards have introduced a funding system in order to encourage access to justice
66
 
and are tolerant, to some extent, of contingency fees.
67
 Examination of the 49 actions  
mentioned in the evaluation study reveals that 28 actions were brought in the area of 
education, and the remaining 21 actions were brought in other consumer-related areas 
as reflected in the following chart:  
 
                                                 
63
 Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil, Article 11(3) (Civil Procedure Law, Spain). 
64
 Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil, Article 11(2) (Civil Procedure Law, Spain). 
65
 BEUC, (n 60). 
66
 In order to encourage access to justice, Ley 1/1996, de 10 de enero, de Asistencia Jurídica Gratuita 
(Law 1/1996, of 10 January 1996, on Legal Aid) (Spain).  
67
 Prof. Fernando Gomez and Marian Gili, ‘Evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of collective 
redress mechanisms in the European Union: Country report Spain’ 
   <ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/sp-country-report-final.pdf> accessed 17 November 2011. 
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The education-related actions all followed the bankruptcy of a Spanish chain of 
language schools and the subsequent breach of financing contracts. If this action is 
removed from the list of actions, the result is that very few actions were brought in 
Spain and the Spanish model does not improve access to justice, as would appear to 
be the case from a first glance at the statistics. However the special features of the 
mixed collective opt-in and opt-out action will be reviewed in Chapter Three and 
compared with other available mechanisms. 
 
  2. The Markets Subject to Class Action Claims in Israel 
 
Traditionally in collective actions, some markets are more amenable to class actions. 
Areas that are characterized by many small actions, such as consumer cases, are most 
suitable for collective actions. Indeed, an examination of the Israeli registry reveals 
that after implementation of the CAL, most actions related to consumer issues 
(approximately 78%), whereas prior to the CAL they comprised only 40% of class 
action applications.
68
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
68
 Sinai Deutch, (n 13).  
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Diagram No 1  - The Division of Claims to Markets 
 
 
 
A survey published in the Israeli financial newspaper ‘Globes’69 revealed that 217 
applications for class actions were submitted in the Tel Aviv district in 2010 and 149 
applications were submitted in the first six months of 2011. 
 
                                                 
69
 'Sharp Increase in Class Action Suits Submitted, particularly against Communications Companies' 
Globes News (Israel, 6 July 2011) at <http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1000661350?> 
accessed 7 July 2011. 
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Fifteen percent (15%) of the actions were submitted against communication and 
internet companies in 2010 and this number rose to 19% in the first six months of 
2011. 
 
Seven percent (7%) of the actions in 2010 were pursued against local authorities or 
their bodies for restitution of unlawful levies of taxation and this number had risen to 
8% in the first six months of 2011.  
 
This information, which was supplied to the newspaper from Tel Aviv District Court, 
is approximately in line with the data collected from the general registry which is 
based on the numbers of claims in all six districts in Israel. 
 
Therefore, on the basis of this data, the claims may be divided into the areas of law 
shown below: 
 
– Seventy-eight percent (78%) of actions are consumer related, which includes 
the food industry 14.4% , telecoms and internet providers 12.8%, banks 
9.7%,insurance 8.8%, and transportation and other areas related to the 
purchase of goods or services. 
– Fifteen point three percent (15.3%) of the actions are connected to taxation. 
– Five point seven percent (5.7 %) of the actions are labour actions. 
– Less than 1% of the actions are related to competition or environmental issues.  
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Diagram Two – The Areas of Law Covered by Collective Redress Actions in Israel 
from 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This information demonstrates that consumers in Israel are eager to bring their 
disputes before the courts and many new consumer questions which would have never 
reached the courts previously were resolved by collective proceedings.
70
   
 
If a similar system is imported into the European Union, there is no reason to suspect 
that European consumers will react any differently once the gate to consumer 
collective redress has been opened in Europe, provided they are equipped with an 
equally accessible collective redress framework. Indeed, according to the evaluation 
study, most French collective actions relate to food, telecommunications and 
pharmaceutical goods,
71
 whereas in Spain, banking, telecommunications and the gas 
industry are the leading sectors to be challenged with collective redress proceedings.
72
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 Sinai Deutch, (n 13). 
71
 Véronique Magnier and Dr. Ralf Alleweldt, (n 61), see Annex 1 on page 32. 
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 Apart from Education, which has been the subject of many actions in recent years in Spain. See Prof. 
Fernando Gomez and Marian Gili, (n 67). 
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Generally consumers do not go to court when they are in an ‘underdog’ position 
compared to wealthy defendants. A recent Eurobarometer survey showed that 51% of 
consumers did not take any action when they were dissatisfied with the way their 
complaint was handled. The survey also showed that 76% of European citizens would 
be more willing to defend their rights in court if they could join with other consumers 
who were complaining about the same issue.
 73
 This survey explains the high numbers 
of consumer collective redress. Once the law creates a proper infrastructure for 
bringing consumer cases, consumers tend to respond immediately and use the 
collective action machinery quickly and in high numbers. 
 
 The flood of claims following the enactment of the CAL in Israel suggests that rather 
than lacking the will to pursue class actions prior to 2006, Israeli consumers simply 
lacked the means to do so due to the inherent difficulties of the class action model 
prior to the CAL. The number of consumer claims has doubled annually in 
comparison with the position before the 1996 Act. Other areas of law such as 
securities and competition were very complicated prior to 2006 and could result in 
lengthy proceedings. In fact, the first case to go through all class action stages in 
Israel reached its final judgment in the Court of Appeal after a 15-year legal battle.
74
  
 
The CAL has certainly made class actions into a more efficient tool for consumers. It 
has made the procedure more accessible and many of the cases indeed do not go 
through lengthy proceedings and are settled in the early stages. The aggregation of 
claims creates a real threat and provides an incentive for defendants to settle the case.     
 
  3. High Value Damage Claims under the CAL 
 
Since class actions are exempt from payment of court fees in Israel, claims are 
submitted for extremely high sums. 
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 European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 298: Consumer protection in the internal market 
(European Commission, October 2008) page 54 
<http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_298_en.pdf> accessed 7 November 2011. 
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  Reichart v. Shemesh – the decision to approve the action as a class action was given in the Israeli 
Supreme Court in Appeal no. 8332/96 concerning fraud in securities. 
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A survey that was published by the Israeli financial newspaper ‘Globes’75 showed that 
in 2010, the average claim was for NIS 564,000,000 (approximately GBP 100 
million) and the average claim in the first six months of 2011 was NIS 131,000,000 
(approximately GBP 22 million). 
 
The highest value claims were against telecommunications and internet companies. 
The average claim in 2010 was for NIS 283,000,000 (approximately GBP 65 million) 
and the figure for the first six months of 2011 was NIS 100,000,000 (approximately 
GBP 16 million). 
 
 According to the above-mentioned Globes survey the average figures for claims 
against local authorities in 2010 were NIS 22,000,000 (approximately GBP 3.5 
million) and the figure for the first six months of 2011 was NIS 26,000,000 
(approximately GBP 4.5 million). 
 
These large sums of money involved in class actions can be very threatening for 
defendants, potentially pushing them to settle a case despite having a strong defence. 
A further result of fighting such a large claim is that resources are diverted to 
defending the action rather than being used for production. In addition, the fear of 
potential defendants from being sued in collective actions may result in such 
companies developing restrictive practices which may lead to a rise in insurance 
premiums due to the potential for large-scale attacks through class actions. 
 
  4. Settlement Rates in Israeli Collective Actions 
 
It seems that there are areas in which it is easier to reach settlements. These areas and 
percentages of cases settled are as follows: 
 
- Environment - 50% of the actions were finalized by a settlement (probably due 
to the small number of claims) 
- Competition - 50% (probably due to the small number of claims) 
- Welfare (pensions) and Health - 18.51% 
                                                 
75
 See Globes, (n 69).  
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- Oil and Fuel - 21.4% 
- Labour - 14.2% 
- Food - 13.6 % 
- Sports and Leisure - 13.1%  
- Telecommunications - 12.8% 
- Pharmaceuticals - 17.6% 
- Internet Sales - 14.2 % 
- TV and Newspapers - 10.5% 
 
As a consequence, there are likely to be more claims in these fields than in other areas 
where defendants tend to fight until a court judgment is handed down, since the 
chances of achieving a settlement are higher. The rates of settlement are shown in 
Diagram Three. 
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Diagram Three (A and B) – The Rate of Settlements 
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This diagram represents the percentages of settlements in each area of law. In 
environment claims and competition claims, rates of settlement were highest for the 
period from March 2007 to December 2009. 
 
The statistics on the rates of settlement show that class actions in Israel are not 
submitted in vain. It is difficult to assess the exact benefit for each action. However, 
the fact that many cases are settled shows that the procedure benefits consumers, 
while also rewarding representatives. It should be borne in mind that the fairness of 
settlements are monitored under the Israeli system and, in principle, the courts will 
not approve a settlement which has no benefit for class members.  
 
The Israeli precedent exemplifies both the strengths and weaknesses of the collective 
action system and therefore should be studied before the introduction of a European 
model. The rationale behind allowing class actions in Israel is to assist in improving 
access to the courts and law obedience by financial sanctions. The Israeli legislator 
has succeeded in achieving these goals. Indeed, there are many class actions in Israel, 
and many new consumer law issues have been settled through collective proceedings. 
Such case law would not have been submitted to the courts without the introduction of 
the very important machinery of class actions. 
 
The features of Israel's new legislation differ from those of standard collective redress 
legislation existing in Europe. Should some of these central characteristics be 
imported into a coherent European model, they may result in a system which is more 
accessible for European consumers. 
 
In Chapter Three the features of the Israeli model will be discussed in detail, 
including the accessibility of the system. These features will be compared with the 
existing collective redress models in several European member states so as to identify 
the distinctions between the Israeli model and the models currently operating in 
Europe.  
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Chapter Three: 
The Pillars of a Workable Model for Collective 
Actions 
 
 Introduction 
 
The introduction of Israel's Class Action Law (CAL) led to a sharp increase in the 
number of collective redress actions brought before the courts. Although it could be 
argued that the increase in cases had a negative impact on the Israeli economy, for 
example, by causing a rise in insurance premiums, the CAL has proved to be more 
workable and accessible than any comparable European class action framework. The 
increase in the volume of collective actions has enabled consumers to merge their 
personal claims and transform them into weapons fit to challenge large firms 
operating in the consumer market. On the other hand, the perverse effects of 
accessibility can be controlled through the use of safeguards and ‘brakes’ as well as 
additional filters as we will further explore in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively.  
 
At this stage, we want to focus on the reasons why the Israeli model succeeded in 
opening the filed for consumers bringing actions In this chapter those features which 
affect the accessibility and workability of the Israeli model will be discussed in more 
depth. The aim of this chapter is to isolate the elements which may transform a model 
of collective redress into a workable model bringing benefit to consumers at large. In 
an effort to create a practical European model for collective redress that will improve 
access to justice for European consumers, it is interesting to compare the effectiveness 
of the Israeli provisions with the existing European models. In order to do so, the key 
elements of the Israeli model should be examined and compared with the features of 
systems operating in some European Union member states.  
 
In essence, the workability of the Israeli system rests on four main pillars enshrined in 
the CAL: an ‘opt-out’ provision, which enables large classes to group together with a 
wide range of possible representatives both from the private and public sector, 
financial incentives, possible funding, and the wide scope of the CAL which allows 
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class actions to be bought in many areas of law. These elements will be reviewed in 
turn in the next parts of this chapter. In Part A of this chapter, the opt-out mechanism 
operating in Israel will be reviewed and compared with the opt-in machinery which is 
the most common collective redress mechanism used in Europe. In Part B of this 
chapter, the nature of the representative that leads the action will be examined. Part C 
of this chapter deals with financial incentives and their contribution to the collective 
procedure. The last part of this chapter, Part D, deals with the scope of actions 
suitable for collective redress cases. 
 
Part A. The Opt-Out Mechanism as the Basis for a Workable 
Model 
 
The Israeli collective redress system relies almost entirely on the opt-out machinery. 
This is the default provision in Israel, although opt-in cases are also possible under the 
Israeli system, the latter never having been used in Israel thus far. In the following 
sections of this part of the chapter, the essence of the two systems will be examined, 
and the importance of the distinction between the two systems will be emphasised.  
 
  1. The Debate over the Opt-Out versus the Opt-In Mechanism  
 
In an opt-out system, every class member is automatically considered to be a member 
of the group in the court proceedings, unless they elect to opt-out of the class during a 
specified period of time, often referred to as the opt-out period. Thereafter, anyone 
who has not excluded himself from the class by giving express notice will be bound 
by the decisions in the action. Conversely, in an opt-in system, the judgment in the 
proceedings binds all members of the class provided they were named as parties to, or 
actively joined, the legal proceedings. Once a class member has elected to join the 
class he is bound by any decision in the proceedings. The opt-in model could be 
described as a more conservative approach than the opt-out system, since it requires 
each member of the group to actively elect to become a member of the class.  
 
The choice between an opt-in or opt-out mechanism is critical to the success of any 
collective redress framework. As the English Civil Justice Council (CJC) stated:   
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An essential feature of any court-based collective redress system is the 
possibility that proceedings can be brought on an opt-out basis. The failure to 
provide such a mechanism, as an option alongside an opt-in mechanism, will 
ensure that any collective redress system introduced will fail to become fully 
effective.
1
  
 
The question whether to design an “opt in” or “opt out” regime was described by the 
Ontario Law Reform Commission as “one of the most controversial issues in the 
design of a class action procedure.
2
 
 
In the European context, Professor Mulheron has claimed that ‘piercing the river of 
ink that has poured forth on this topic of collective redress…, there is one question 
which hovers above all others, namely, whether European member states implement 
an opt-out mechanism.’3  
 
The European Commission Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress also 
recognised the importance of this issue for a future European collective redress 
model.
4
 In fact the decision between the opt-out and the opt-in mechanism is one that 
makes the system function. Lessons from the U.S. and Israel have taught that the opt-
out mechanism renders the system workable, albeit raising questions of fair trial and 
representation of victims without having a power of attorney to do so. The Israeli 
system is one of the most modern opt-out models capable of combating some of the 
problems which were so evident in the U.S. The Israeli model does not allow punitive 
damages, and therefore avoids one of the most troubling features of the U.S. regime. 
It is the Israeli model, set down in the CAL 2006, that will be reviewed in the 
following part of this chapter.  
 
                                                 
1 Civil Justice Council, Response to European Commission Public Consultation: Towards a Coherent 
 European Approach to Collective Redress (SEC (2011) 173 Final) available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_collective_redress/cjc_en.pdf> accessed 28 July 
2011. 
2
  Ontario Law Reform Commission, Class Actions (Report, 1982) 306 see at page 454. 
3
 Professor Rachael Mulheron, ‘The Case For an Opt-Out Class Action for European Member States: 
A Legal and Empirical Analysis’ [2008-2009]15 Colum. J. Eur. L. 409.  
4
  European Commission ‘Green Paper On Consumer Collective Redress’ COM(2008) 794 final. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/greenpaper_en.pdf> accessed 26 October 2011. 
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  2. Theoretical Background: Interest v. Consent Theories  
 
The opt-out mechanism is strange to conservative types of two party litigation. 
Normally it is the parties to the case who choose their representatives. However, in 
the opt-out system, there is no choice of representative. The opt-out machinery may 
be explained along the lines of the interest theory presented by Prof. Yeazell
5
 which is 
based on the debate around the issue of parliamentary representation which took place 
in the early 19
th
 century prior to the enactment of the Reform Bill.
6
 According to this 
theory, the representative (like parliamentary representatives) does not have to be 
appointed by the represented group and they may still act as proper representatives as 
long as they are acting in the interests of the group's members. There is no need for 
Parliament to represent all the residents in all counties - it is sufficient that all the 
interests of such residents are represented in Parliament. The concept at hand is that in 
a capitalistic society all rational people will act for their economic benefit, and thus 
the representative will act in the interests of the entire group of residents sharing his 
interests, even though they did not elect him. With regards to representative actions, 
the interest theory does not require that the group members appoint their 
representative. This theory only requires that the representative claimant represents 
the interests of the group members properly. The interest theory emphasises the 
proper representation of the group by a representative who has the same interests and 
who is acting for the group's benefit. Yet, the problem with this theory is that not all 
groups of persons have the same interests. The theory regards it as sufficient that the 
interests are represented and thus disregards the idea that every person has the right to 
choose his own representative.  
 
In relation to collective redress, this interest theory has the power to rebut one of the 
major arguments against the opt-out mechanism, namely, that each person has the 
right to be present in his case and decide when to commence legal proceedings. The 
theory implies that if citizens agree that someone else with the same interests will 
represent them in parliament, why should court proceedings be any different?   
 
                                                 
5 Stephen C. Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action, Part II: Interest, Class, and 
Representation 27 UCLA L. Rev 1067 (1980) p. 1068. 
6 Gil Lotan and Eyal Raz, Class Actions Part I (2006) 36. 
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By contrast, the opt-in theory is based on consent. This theory is based on the consent 
of all group members to be joined in one procedure. It is more joinder than 
representation.
7
 This theory is considered part of a due process requirement theory.
8
It 
was argued
9
 that this theory is suitable for group members in large scale actions who 
do not have the necessary resources to file an action against a large company which 
has acted as the wrongdoer. In these cases after the core common questions have been 
decided in favour of the group, a notice should be given to enable all potential group 
members to join in the legal proceedings in order to benefit from the judgment in 
favour of the group. In return for joining the action, these new group members will be 
required to pay a share of the costs of the class in managing the action. This offer is 
based on the consent theory which provides that only those members who have 
actively elected to join the action will be bound by the decision in the proceedings. 
 
The consent theory is regarded as unfair to defendants, since members of the group 
may elect to opt in once a court decision has been made in favour of the group. The 
defendants will not know the amount of damages they are facing until the process is 
complete. On the other hand, if judgment is made against the group, group members 
will not join the action and the defendant may be sued in the future by other group 
members. 
 
In the debate over the proper mechanism to use, the interest theory may be persuasive 
in demonstrating that the opt-out mechanism is not foreign to European culture and 
since persons act by representatives in Parliament, so too such an approach may be 
taken in the courts. 
 
  3. The Hybrid Opt-Out Solution in Israel 
 
The CAL includes an opt-out mechanism and provides that once a motion to allow 
class proceedings has been approved, each class member is considered part of the 
proceedings unless he indicates within 45 days, or a period of time determined by the 
                                                 
7
 Stephen C. Yeazell, (n 5). 
8
 See J. E Kennedy "Class Actions: The Right to Opt Out" 25 Ariz. L. Rev 3, 35. 
9
 H. Kalven, Jr. & M. Rosenfield "The Contemporary Function of The Class suit" 8 U. Chi. L. Rev. 684 
(1941). 
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court, that he wishes to opt-out of the action.
10
 The opt-out period aims to give each 
member a reasonable period of time to consider his individual circumstances and to 
decide whether to opt-out of the proceedings. The definition of ‘class action’ under 
the CAL provides that it is an action on behalf of a group of persons who have not 
granted a power of attorney to the representative plaintiff. This definition indicates in 
itself that the procedure in Israel is based on the opt-out mechanism. In an opt-out 
system, the plaintiffs are not identified from the outset and thus they cannot grant a 
power of attorney to their lawyer. The provisions of the CAL provide that opt-in 
actions are intended to be used in large personal claims, thus demonstrating that the 
legislator intended opt-out actions to be used in circumstances involving many small 
actions of the same kind. It is only the aggregation of these small claims which make 
it rational to deal with court actions in these circumstances. The CAL provides that 
the judgment in a class action binds all the class members, unless explicitly provided 
otherwise
 
.
11
 This provision is at the heart of the opt-out mechanism and it provides 
that unless the class members opt-out of the class, they will be bound by the 
judgment. 
 
However, with regards to opt-in claims, the CAL preserves the court's right to decide 
in exceptional circumstances that the class of persons represented should include only 
those members who have given notice that they wish to become part of the class.
12
 
The opt-in procedure in Israel is an exception to the default opt-out mechanism in the 
Israeli class action, and only applies if the process of ascertaining all members of the 
group and notifying them of the proceedings can be carried out at a reasonable cost.
13
  
The exceptional circumstances in which the court may allow an opt-in action include, 
inter-alia: 
 
1. Where there is a reasonable probability that many of the class members will 
submit claims for the same cause of action; and 
2. Where the amount of each action is substantial, including negligence claims. 
 
                                                 
10
 Class Action Law 2006, s 12 (Israel). 
11
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 24 (Israel). 
12 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 12 (Israel).  
13
 Ibid. 
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The Israeli legislator took the view that ‘big sum’ claims were not suited to regular 
opt-out class action proceedings. Consequently, the CAL provides that where such 
claims are approved, the court may provide that they will be managed as opt-in class 
actions and that the expenses will be shared by all the members of the class. The 
Israeli legislator was of the opinion that the opt-in system was suitable for cases 
involving substantial sums where the plaintiff could bring and manage his own 
action.
14
 Class actions in these cases assist in the management of the proceedings and 
may prevent contradicting judgments which could result from several actions on the 
same issue. Although the opt-out mechanism has led to more class actions in Israel, it 
is questionable whether such a provision should be adopted in Europe as in some 
member states such as representation without power of attorney contradicts 
fundamental principles of the jurisdiction. The opt-in collective action has the 
advantage that it preserves the liberty of an individual to choose whether to bring the 
action or not.
15
 On the other hand, the opt-out mechanism in typical consumer cases is 
the only mechanism which may be useful to consumers. Consumers are normally 
apathetic as regards their rights, making the right to opt-out or object less meaningful 
for class members. Opts-out from class participation are very rare. On average less 
than 1% of class members opt out.
16
  
 
In the search for a new European coherent model, the European Commission must 
decide which mechanism best suits consumer interests in the European Union. In 
order to address this point, it is helpful to examine the empirical evidence on the 
effect of opt-out class actions, the legal arguments both in favour and against the opt-
out model, and the current use of such instruments in Europe. Further, we will 
investigate the reasons why the Israeli jurisdiction, despite having put in place and 
opt-in mechanism
17
 has never acknowledged it and made us of it. All collective 
claims in Israel, without exception, have been based on the opt-out model. One of the 
main reason the Israeli law based its mechanism on opt-out stems from the experience 
                                                 
14 S. Goldstein and T. Fisher, ‘The Interaction Between Mass Actions and Class Actions – Procedural 
Aspects’ [2004] Mishpatim Lamed Dalet 21. 
15
 R. Mulheron: 'Some difficulties with group litigation orders- and why a class action is superior' 
C.J.Q 24 (Jan), 2005 p. 40-68 at p. 50. 
16
 T. Eisenberg and G. Miller, ‘The role of opt-out Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical 
and Empirical Issues’ [2004] 57 Vand. L. Rev 1530 at page 1532. See also Myriam Gilles and Gary 
B. Friedman: 'Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial 
Lawyers' 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 106-08 at page 133. 
17
 Class Action Law 2006, s 11 (Israel). 
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learnt from the U.S. which, as we will shortly demonstrate in the next part of the 
chapter, clearly shows that the opt-out mechanism dramatically improves access to 
justice.  
 
  4. Gathering Evidence from the U.S. on the Importance of the Opt-
Out Mechanism 
 
In 1938, the U.S. Congress promulgated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
introduced a new, significantly different class action system. Rule 23 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure imposed a new set of requirements for certifying a class 
action and divided class actions into three different categories: ‘true’, ‘hybrid’ and 
‘spurious’.18  
 
Rule 23 was silent on whether all potential class members were excluded from an 
action unless they affirmatively opted in, or whether all potential class members were 
included unless they affirmatively opted out.
19
 Despite this lack of clarity, the default 
standard in the U.S. before 1966 was the opt-in model and a judgment was not 
binding upon those who were not explicitly included in the class. 
The argument against this system was that many people may not have realised that 
they had been harmed, and it was difficult to communicate effectively with large 
numbers of potential class members. In addition, an affirmative opt-in requirement 
was seen as a substantial obstacle to class formation and could leave large numbers of 
claimants, who were unaware of the proceedings, with no remedy.  
There were difficulties for defendants as well as potential plaintiffs, since an opt-in 
system could lead to serial litigation, with claimants waiting for the outcome of a  
group action before deciding to join their personal action to the proceedings. One 
                                                 
18
 True class actions were available where the owner of the primary right of action refused to enforce 
it. Hybrid class actions were permitted when the rights among class members were several and the 
object of the action was the adjudication of claims affecting specific property involved in the action.  
 Spurious class actions were available when the rights among class members were several and when 
there was a question of law or fact affecting the several rights and when common relief was sought. 
This category caused confusion due to the unclear requirement for common relief and it could only 
bind those who were named as parties.  
19
 Benjamin Kaplan, ‘Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure’ [1967] 81 Harv. L. Rev. 356. 
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District Court observed, ‘Prior to the 1966 amendment to the Rule, an individual 
could wait to see the outcome of the litigation before deciding whether or not to 
become a party’.20  
However, as a result of a recommendation by the Advisory Committee on Rule 23, in 
1966 this Rule was revised to permit opt-out class actions.  
The opt-out regime appeared to resolve these problems by creating large classes, 
preventing multiple litigation and providing an incentive in the form of bonuses to 
plaintiffs and lawyers who wanted to represent large classes. It also allowed classes to 
be created more quickly since it abolished the need to wait for many members to opt-
in and it facilitated the prompt adjudication of claims in one action.
21
  
The introduction of the new opt-out rule seemed to be the most advantageous change 
of the 1966 amendments, since it brought with it a change in the use of class actions 
in the U.S.
22
 From 1938 and until the 1966 amendments, the use of class actions in the 
U.S. had been very low, with actions being few and far between.
23
 The supporters of 
the amendments expected that consumers would benefit most from the changes to 
Rule 23 and did not anticipate that lawyers would become the real entrepreneurs of 
class action litigation.  
 
As the Ninth Circuit explained,  
There is nothing in the Advisory Committee’s Note that suggests that the 
amendments had as their purpose the authorization of massive class actions 
conducted by attorneys engaged by near-nominal plaintiffs.
24
 
                                                 
20 Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 71 F.R.D. 461, 463 (N.D. Ind. 1976). 
21 Richard A. Nagareda, ‘The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action’ [2003] 103 
Colum. L. Rev. 149, 226. 
22 In Amchem Products, Inc. et al. v. Windsor et al. 521 U.S. 591 592 (1997) it was said that ‘Rule 
23(b)(3) was the most adventuresome innovation of the 1966 Amendments, permitting judgments for 
money that would bind all class members save those who opt out’. 
23
 Edward F. Sherman, 'American Class Actions: Significant Features and Developing Alternatives in 
Foreign Legal Systems', 215 F.R.D. 130, 132 (2003) see at page 133. 
24
 La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co. 489 F.2d 461, 465 (9th Cir. 1973). See Thomas B. Leary, ‘The 
FTC and Class Actions’ available at: <http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/classactionsummit.shtm> 
accessed 18 November 2011. 
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The effect of the 1966 amendment and, more particularly, the introduction of the opt-
out mechanism, was a much greater than expected increase in the number of class 
actions.
25
 Under this revised rule, classes “were almost certain to be larger – and the 
sum of their potential damages, therefore, much larger – than classes certified under 
the old rule.”26 Consumer rational apathy meant that consumers did not opt-out, thus 
creating actions with large classes. It turned class actions into profitable business and 
thus attracted lawyers to taking on such actions. The new opt-out system exacerbated 
pre-existing principal-agency problems by permitting lawyers to speak for immense 
phantom classes of people who had not selected them, and who may have been 
entirely unaware that they were parties to a lawsuit.
27
 The large number of claims 
brought after 1966 renewed the debate on the most appropriate class action 
mechanism and a reversion to the opt-in model was contemplated in 1998 by a 
subsequent Advisory Committee on amendments to Rule 23 due to the abuses that 
were so evident following the adoption of the opt-out class action system in the U.S. 
However, the Advisory Committee took the view that people generally do not tend to 
respond to invitations to join court cases and therefore left the opt-out model intact.
28
 
Furthermore, the opt-in system could lead to smaller classes which would be less 
attractive for representatives and thus less effective, especially in consumer cases, 
since one of the aims of the opt- out mechanism was to maximise economies of scale 
by gathering all the claimants into a single proceeding.
29
  
 
The developments in the U.S since 1966 provide a very significant example for 
European legislators, demonstrating that the opt-out mechanism transformed an 
                                                 
25 Edward H. Cooper, ‘Class Action Advice in The Form of Questions’ [2001] 11 Duke J. Comp. &  
Int'l L. 215.  
26 Edward F. Sherman, American Class Actions: Significant Features and Developing Alternatives in 
Foreign Legal Systems, 215 F.R.D. 130, 132 (2003) see at page 133. 
27 Tiana Leia Russell, 'Exporting Class Actions to the European Union' (2009) available at: 
<http://works.bepress.com/tiana_russell/1/> accessed 21 March 2012  
28
 In a speech to the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. on May 20, 1998, the then-chair of the 
Civil Rules Advisory Committee, Judge Paul V. Niemeyer, observed, ‘The inertia of not responding 
[to notice] has been identified as the cohesive force behind the viability of plaintiff class actions. 
[Requiring individuals to opt in] is. . . the change to the rule that could be made to eliminate most of 
the class actions or radically reduce their size’ Deborah R. Hensler, Bonnie Dombey-Moore, 
Elizabeth Giddens, Jennifer Gross, Erik Moller. Hensler, Deborah R., Nicholas M. Pace, Bonnie 
Dombey-Moore, Elizabeth Giddens, Jennifer Gross and Erik Moller, Class Action Dilemmas: 
Pursuing Public Goals for Private Gain (Rand Corporation, 2000) Chapter 16 ‘The objectives of 
rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions’ 16 (477 fn 10).  
29
 T. Eisenberg and G. Miller, ‘The Role of Opt-Out Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical 
and Empirical Issues’ [2004] 57 Vand. L. Rev 1530. 
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unused tool of legislative class action machinery into a workable system albeit with 
some deficiencies which should be dealt with separately. The fact that the flourishing 
of the U.S. class action occurred after the opt-out system was introduced in 1966 may 
emphasise the importance of the opt-out system in dramatically improving access to 
justice.  
 
    5. Empirical Examination on Participation Rates in Opt-In and Opt-
Out Cases 
 
The main argument that one can put forward in order to convince the European 
Commission to include an opt-out provision in the new collective redress model is the 
improvement of access to justice which results from large classes engaging in typical 
consumer actions that would have never gone to court, rendering such actions 
economically viable for lawyers to take on. Plaintiffs would never go to court against 
a powerful defendant for a petty amount of damage. The only way to bring such 
actions to court where no other collective solution is available is by aggregating the 
claims into a single large legal action. 
 
Empirical studies are of great assistance when considering whether the the opt-out 
model leads to better rates of participation and larger classes. The differences between 
the two systems of collective actions may be only exemplified from data gathered 
from the U.S. or Canada where the opt-in and opt-out mechanisms were in use. Once 
the empirical data has been studied, conclusions may be reached in relation to the 
recommended model for European consumers. 
 
A. Opt-In Rates 
 
With regard to opt-in statistics, information from several sources demonstrates that 
the rates of participation in opt-in cases are extremely low. In the U.S., a study from 
1974
30
 cited by Prof. Mulheron
31
 referred to three cases where judges were required to 
manage the action on an opt-in procedure, reducing the class size by 39%, 61%, and 
                                                 
30 Bruce I. Bertelsen, Mary S. Calfee, and Gerald W. Connor, 'The Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action: An 
Empirical Study' [1974] 62 Geo. L.J. 1123, 1145. 
31 According to statistics collected by Prof. Rachael Mulheron, see at page 155 of The Perspective of 
Need report. 
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73% respectively. Thus the median level of participation was between 27% and 61%. 
This data shows that use of the opt-in mechanism caused the size of the group to drop 
considerably.  
 
With regard to opt-in cases, Prof. Mulheron examined a number of European 
collective redress cases and their participation rates in her Perspective of Need report 
for the CJC.
32
 In the majority of the English cases examined, which were managed 
under a Group Litigation Order, the opt-in rate was less than 50 percent. This 
information was gathered by Prof. Mulheron from practitioners dealing with these 
matters who were asked to fill out a questionnaire in order to study the participation 
rates in the opt-in cases which were tried in the U.K.
33
 With regard to other European 
jurisdictions, Prof. Mulheron found a low figure of participation in opt-in cases and 
cited
34
 an example from the Italian courts where Italian investors were invited to sue 
for wrongdoings in the financial market. The class in this case included hundreds of 
thousands of investors. Only 3000 members opted in.
35
 In a case in France, only 
12,521 class members opted in from a class of 20 million telephone subscribers.
36
 
These cases demonstrate a rate of participation as low as 0.03% of all class 
members.
37
 
 
Prof. Mulheron goes even further to prove that opt-in actions have low participation 
rates even in "follow-on cases". These actions are well-founded on their merits, with a 
first instance finding that the complaints were justified in an early ruling. Prof. 
Mulheron refers specifically to the follow-on actions
38
 which are conducted under the 
U.K. regime in antitrust cases and are generally less risky for consumers and carry a 
higher chance of success since the defendant has already been convicted for 
misconduct. Consequently, the low rates of participation in follow-on opt-in cases 
suggest that it is not the fear of having to bear heavy expenses that deters consumers 
                                                 
32 See Prof. Rachael Mulheron (n 31) at pages 154-156. 
33 See Prof. Rachael Mulheron (n 31) at pages 154-155. 
34
 See Prof. Rachael Mulheron (n 31) at pages 155-156. 
35 Altroconsumo v. Parmalat published in the Dow Jones News on 15 January 2004 available at 
<http://www.milanofinanza.it/news/dettaglio_news.asp?id=2004011527124&chkAgenzie=PMFNW&s
ez=news&testo=Altroconsumo&titolo=Parmalat:%20Altroconsumo%20valuta%20possibilita'%20azio
ne%20legale> accessed on the 24 March 2012. 
36 UFC Que choisir v. Orange France, SFR and Bouygues telecom press release available at 
<http://www.ufcquechoisir-iledefrance.org/fcporange.htm> accessed 24 March 2012. 
37
 Ibid.  
38 Prof. Rachael Mulheron (n 31) at page 42. 
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from opting-in, but rather consumers are unwilling to intervene positively in legal 
proceedings when they only stand to recover a small share of the damages award. 
This is the result of the so called 'rational apathy' of consumers
39
 and financial 
rewards have been suggested as the solution to overcome this apathy.
40
  
 
In order to prove that there is also a low rate of participation in English follow-on 
cases, The Consumers Association v JJB Sports plc case was examined.
41
 This case 
concerned price-fixing arrangements between the manufacturers and distributors of 
replica Manchester United and England football shirts, as a result of which potentially 
hundreds of thousands of consumers paid inflated prices for the shirts. The Office of 
Fair Trading (OFT) found the defendant guilty of price-fixing and imposed a 
substantial fine of GBP18.6 million. However, in the civil suit that followed brought 
by the consumer association 'Which' against the trader JJB, only 130 consumers 
joined the opt-in proceedings and were named in the claim form. The only 
explanation that can be given for such a low level of participation in a follow-on case 
is consumer rational apathy. Where the level of personal loss is very low, consumers 
do not care and do not wish to get involved. This corollary is particularly true in NEV 
suits, also referred to as "Group B" consumer litigation, where the costs of litigation 
exceed the personal value of the claim.
42
  
 
Prof. Mulheron's findings are substantiated by a more recent report which agreed with 
previous findings that individuals in opt-out procedures remain in the class more often 
than individuals who join opt-in procedures. Individuals in opt-in procedures fail to 
file a claim more often than individuals in an opt-out procedure. This study also found 
that knowledge of the outcome of the class action impacts upon individuals’ decisions 
and preferences. More specifically, individuals who know the result of the class action 
consider filing an individual complaint more often (and actually do so) than  
                                                 
39 Hans-Bernd Schaefer, ‘The Bundling of Similar Interests in Litigation: The Incentives for Class Action 
and Legal Actions taken by Associations’ [2000] 9(3) European Journal of Law & Economics 183. 
40 Sonja Elisabeth Keske, 'Group Litigation in European Competition Law: A Law and Economics 
Perspective' at <http://publishing.eur.nl/ir/repub/asset/17790/Sonja%20Keske%20Thesis[lr].pdf> 
accessed 18 November 2011 at page 297. 
41 The Consumers Association v JJB Sports plc, CAT Case number 1078/7/9/07. 
<http://www.catribunal.org.uk/238-640/1078-7-9-07-The-Consumers-Association.html> accessed 16 
July 2011. 
42
 Maria Ioannidou, 'Enhancing the Consumers’ Role in EU Private Competition Law Enforcement: A 
normative and practical approach' (Dec 2011) 8(1) The Competition Law Review 59-85, see at page 
69. 
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individuals who do not know the result. Similarly, those are aware of a class action 
outcome are less likely to file no complaint than individuals who are unaware of the 
outcome. Certainty regarding the outcome of the class action results in more 
individuals filing claims.
43
 Yet the participation rates in opt-in collective actions are 
very low. 
 
B. Opt-Out Rates 
 
A U.S. survey from 1974 showed that 58% of cases in a national study had one or 
more opt-outs.
44
 A subsequent survey of four federal district courts found that one or 
more class members opted out in only 42-50% of class actions for damages brought 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 b(3).
45
 In all the four districts that were 
examined, the median percentage of members who opted out was either 0.1% or 0.2% 
of the total membership. In 75% of the opt-out cases, 1.2% or fewer class members 
opted out.  
 
The 1974 survey suggests that the smaller the average individual claim, the greater the 
number of cases in which low figures of opt-outs were registered. This data stresses 
the assumption that in consumer claims, class members are apathetic, and incentives 
must therefore be introduced in order to make the actions economically viable. The 
opt-out mechanism is not an incentive per se, but since it creates large classes making 
the action worth undertaking. 
 
With regard to opt-out systems, the CJC's report on ‘Improving Access to Justice 
through Collective Actions’ sets down statistics collected by Prof. Mulheron from 
various countries which show that the opt-out classes examined were almost full.
46
 
                                                 
43 Gijs van Dijck, 'Class Membership in Class Actions: An Experimental Study of Opt In and Opt Out 
Models' (2011) 142 nr. 6912 Weekblad voor privaatrecht, notariaat en registratie 1105-1112. 
44 Bruce I. Bertelsen, Mary S. Calfee, and Gerald W. Connor, 'The Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action: An 
Empirical Study' (n 30). 
45
 Thomas E. Willging, Laural L. Hooper and Robert J. Niemic, Empirical Study of Class Actions in Four 
Federal District Courts: Final Report to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 1996 (Federal Justice 
Center, 1996) at <ftp://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/fjc/rule23.pdf> accessed 18 November 2011.  
46 Civil Justice Council, ‘Improving Access to Justice through Collective Actions: Developing a More 
Efficient and Effective Procedure for Collective Actions’ [2008] Final Report, 153. 
<http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/CJC/Publications/CJC%20papers/CJC%20I
mproving%20Access%20to%20Justice%20through%20Collective%20Actions.pdf> accessed 16 July 
2011.  
The Pillars of a Workable Model for Collective Actions 
 221 
For example, in Victoria State (Australia), the rate of participation was 87%,
47
 in the 
U.S. it was 99.8%,
48
 in Canada it stood at between 60-100%,
49
 in Australia, 59-98%,
50
 
in Portugal, 100%,
51
 and in the Netherlands, 97%.
52
  
 
The Manitoba Law Reform Commission’s Paper on Class Proceedings53 cited by 
Professor Mulheron,
54
 which referred to the above-mentioned survey of four districts 
by Thomas E. Willging, Laural L. Hooper & Robert J. Niemic, reached the same 
conclusions, namely that participation rates are much higher in opt-out regimes. This 
is also the conclusion reached by Prof. Mulheron.
55
  
 
This evidence suggests that opt-in actions are characterised by low participation rates, 
since consumers and those with small damage claims are apathetic and prefer not to 
participate in legal actions where they have little to gain by doing so. In contrast, it 
would appear that this same sense of apathy leads to high rates of participation in opt-
out class actions as potential claimants are not sufficiently motivated to exercise their 
right to opt-out. Therefore, in claims involving low sums, it is essential that the 
European Commission favours an opt-out model which better serves consumers who 
trade in the European market. 
  
                                                 
47
 Based on information published in Prof. Rachael Mulheron, Reform of Collective Redress in England 
and Wales: A Perspective of Need (Civil Justice Council, 2008), hereafter, The Perspective of Need 
report, <http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications-and-reports/reports/civil/civil-justice-council/cjc-
research-need-consumer-redress> accessed 18 November 2011 which referred to the Morabito’s 
National Report: ‘Group Litigation in Australia — “Desperately Seeking” Effective Class Action 
Regimes: National Report for Australia Prepared for the Globalisation of Class Actions Conference, 
Oxford University, December 2007', available for perusal at 
<http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events_media/Australia_ National_Report.pdf  
48 Based on Thomas E. Willging, Laural L. Hooper & Robert J. Niemic, (n 45). 
49 According to statistics collected by Prof. Mulheron from five cases see at page 150 of The Perspective 
of Need report . 
50 Prof. Mulheron based her conclusions on four cases and information received from practitioners in 
Australia from Clayton Utz Solicitors in Sydney. 
51 The Portuguese information was gathered by Prof. Mulheron from three collective redress cases 
managed by the Consumer Association, DECO. DECO v Portugal Telecom, DECO v Academia 
Opening, DECO v Water provider company.  
52 This information is mentioned in The Perspective of Need report and is based on the Dexia case in the 
Netherlands and published in BEUC, Private Group Actions — Taking Europe Forward (8 October 
2007), p 15.  
53 Manitoba Law Reform Commission, ‘Class Proceedings’ (1999) Report 100, 27 available at 
<www.gov.mb.ca/justice/mlrc/reports/100.pdf< accessed 22 March 2012. 
54 Prof. Rachael Mulheron, ‘Justice Enhanced: Framing an Opt-Out Class Action for England’ [2007] 70 
(4) The Modern Law Review 550, 557 fn 75.  
55
 Civil Justice Council, (n 46). 
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It may be mistakenly presumed that if proper notices were given, the opt-out 
mechanism would result in the same rates of participation as opt-in cases. This 
presumption is based on the assumptions that if consumers were acting rationally, 
they would opt out of unjustified cases and opt in to cases with a good chance of 
success. However, the studies mentioned above (Mulheron, Gijs van Dijck, Bertelsen, 
and Willging) demonstrate that class members do not care sufficiently about the legal 
proceedings, probably due to the small personal sums which are at stake.  
 
Therefore, class members are usually indifferent to the outcome of class action 
proceedings and in most instances will not bother to opt in or opt out of an action. 
This apathy may explain why opt-out classes are always larger than opt-in classes. In 
view of Prof. Mulheron's conclusion that the rates of participation in opt-out cases are 
much higher than opt-in cases,
56
 a proportionate opt-out mechanism should be 
introduced with some brakes and safeguards in order to prevent possible abuses of the 
system. Yet, the case in Europe is that many member states, having weighed the 
arguments in favour and against the opt-out mechanism, prefer the opt-in model. 
These arguments will be discussed in the following part of this chapter.  
 
  6. The  Opt-In Mechanism is Expensive and Has More Administrative 
Requirements 
 
One of the issues associated with an opt-in system is that the organization seeking to 
bring the case must seek potential claimants to join the action, for example, through 
the press. It can be very difficult to identify and name all class members allegedly 
affected by the defendant's conduct where identifying potential class members may be 
easily within the defendant's knowledge but not within the group's knowledge.
57
 
 
In addition to the expense and administrative burden of locating potential claimants, 
the representative (which is bringing the action) has to keep records of all members of 
                                                 
56
 Civil Justice Council, (n 46). 
57 European Commission, SANCO, The Study Centre for Consumer Law, Centre for European 
Economic Law Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium,,'An Analysis and Evaluation of 
Alternative Means of Consumer Redress other than Redress through Ordinary Judicial Proceedings 
Final Report' Leuven (January 2007) available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress/reports_studies/index_en.htm> accessed 24 March 2012 see 
at page 289. 
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the class and keep track and maintain complete files on them, which might dissuade 
an organisation from bringing a collective action. In opt-out cases the members are 
not personally identified at this stage and consequently, the administrative burden is 
much less than in opt-in cases. The European Consumers’ Association (BEUC) noted 
the high expenses of running an opt-in collective action in the Forum-Afinsa cases,
58
 
where the Spanish consumer organisation OCU had to hire nine full-time members of 
administrative staff to collect all the necessary information, record and store all the 
documents and follow up with consumers.
59
  
 
The expenses relating to opt-in litigation prove to be a burden on the claimants and 
reduce the amount of actions brought substantially. The management and the 
organisation costs make the opt-in procedure unworthy and risky. On the other hand, 
in opt-out proceedings there are less expenses, there is no need to trace the class 
members from the outset of the case, and there is no need to keep a constantly 
updated file on all class members. Furthermore, due to the large size of the class there 
is better utilization of economies of scale. Therefore the expenses arguments favour 
use of the opt-out model and should be taken in consideration for the new European 
model.   
 
  7. Under-Compensation in Opt-In Proceedings 
 
It is thought that the opt-in system may result in under compensation, and would 
therefore provide compensation to fewer victims,
60
 since many potential class 
members do not join the action. The small classes of victims mean that the defendant 
will not account for the full damage caused by his actions. Consequently, some of the 
illicit gain may remain in the hands of the wrongdoer.
61
  
                                                 
58 <http://www.adicae.net/international/classactions.asp> accessed 20 November 2011. 
59
 BEUC, Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress, European Commission 
Consultation: The European Consumers' Organisation (BEUC)’s response (2011) available at: 
<http://www.beuc.org/Content/Default.asp?PageID=2140> accessed 20 November 2011. See at page 
12, footnote 25. 
60
 Robert Gaudet, Earth to Brussels: Lessons Learned From Swedish, Norwegian, Danish, and Dutch 
Class Actions for the European Union debate on collective redress, Stockholm University (June 
2008) available at: <www.stanford.edu/group/lawlibrary> accessed 25 November 2011 see at page 
64. 
61 European Commission ‘Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the White Paper on 
Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules {COM(2008) 165 final}’ 2008 SEC(2008) 404 
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Potential defendants would tend to favour the opt-in mechanism as they are more 
likely to be sued for smaller amounts and will not have to provide full compensation 
for the damage caused by their wrongful actions. On the other hand, opt-out class 
actions usually involve a larger class and the defendant is therefore more likely to be 
held accountable for the full damage caused. 
 
This argument is also the main objection to the opt-out mechanism. The fact that there 
are large classes in opt-out proceedings is due to the fact that these actions sweep in 
even those who are not interested in joining.
62
 This is because many class members 
may not be aware of the proceedings or, on account of consumer rational apathy, will 
not exercise their right to opt-out. As a result, opt-out classes tend to be large and 
include members who are often not interested in suing the defendant for his 
misconduct.  
 
If many disinterested members are inadvertently included in the class, the defendant 
may pay higher damages than he would have paid in an opt-in proceeding. However, 
this argument is also an advantage of the opt-out system, as it ensures that the 
damages award is based on the full loss caused and not merely on the number of class 
members who have joined the action. There is no doubt that consumers’ interests are 
better served if large firms are held accountable for the full amount of harm they have 
caused.  
 
In order to deal with this objection to the opt-out mechanism, Israeli legislation 
requires all members interested in the action to join at the end of the case in order to 
claim their share of the compensation paid to the class (except where compensation is 
granted for the general good at large). Therefore once an Israeli court has held in 
favour of a class, it sets down criteria for distributing the fund and appoints a trustee 
to monitor the distribution process.
63
 This means that only those who are interested in 
the action will step forward at the end of the case to collect their share of the 
compensation. This is preferable to the opt-in model which requires all members to be 
                                                                                                                                            
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52008SC0404:EN:NOT> 
accessed 28 July 2011 (See section 58). 
62
 Professor Rachael Mulheron, (n 54) 550.  
63 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 20(B)1 (Israel).  
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part of the case from the outset. In the opt-out class action, the class members who 
join the proceedings at the end of the case need only collect their share of the 
compensation, and are not subject to cross examination or payment of costs. 
 
Professor Hodges seems to object to the type of provision which enables class 
members to come forward in order to collect their share at the end of the case, 
claiming that there is strong empirical evidence that consumers do not step forward in 
many cases, since the sums involved are too small to be worth collecting.
64
 Therefore, 
a solution is required to deal with uncollected funds. In Israel, this solution takes the 
form of a cy-pres distribution whereby the court directs distribution of the uncollected 
funds. In Israel, damages are distributed among the class members but no member is 
permitted to receive more than his allocated share, and the remaining funds are 
handed to the Treasury without any limitation as to the purpose for which such funds 
may be used.
65
 The court may also order damages for the benefit of the public in 
general or the distribution of funds for good causes.
66
 In this way, the defendant 
remains accountable for the full damage that he had caused. 
 
Looking at the European market, the opt-out provision should be preferred in our 
view. The opt-out mechanism will make defendants accountable in full for their 
actions and will compel them to adhere to consumer protection legislation in the long 
run, given that the full amount of any unlawful gain will be paid back to the victims. 
In opt-in cases, defendants are not accountable in full for their actions, and will 
therefore lack a real incentive to refrain from unlawful behaviour in the future.  
 
  8. Better Treatment of the "Free Riding" Problem in the Opt-Out 
Mechanism  
 
In an opt-in situation, the potential plaintiffs may choose not to opt-in, but rather to 
wait for the outcome of the action and then decide whether to join it or not. In the 
event that the litigation succeeds, the waiting member may ride on the success and 
                                                 
64 Professor Christopher Hodges, ‘Response to consultation: Towards a Coherent European Approach 
to Collective Redress:’ available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/index.html> accessed 28 July 2011. 
65 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 20 (A) 3 (Israel).  
66 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 20 (C) (Israel).  
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expenses of the other party and bring their own action.
67
 This situation is different 
from the follow-on action discussed earlier, because in a follow-on action, none of the 
class members sue before the outcome of the regulatory or disciplinary proceedings is 
announced. The problem with free riding is that fewer plaintiffs form a party to the 
action, and with fewer economies of scale, the legal proceedings become more 
expensive. The plaintiffs in these situations are fewer and less powerful than the 
defendants. The other problem with free riding is that it entails subsequent satellite 
litigation by members of the class who have decided to bring proceedings following 
the outcome of the trial. 
 
Opt-out proceedings, however, eliminate the free riding issue since those who do not 
opt-out remain members of the class and enjoy the outcome of the action without 
having to pay any expenses.
68
 The opt-out mechanism prevents the satellite litigation 
which may arise where consumers hold back until the judgment in the case. Avoiding 
satellite litigation is preferable from a defendant’s perspective, since it removes the 
cloud of uncertainty that might otherwise hang over the defendant’s business 
activities. In addition, if further proceedings are possible in the future, it may render 
the possibility of a settlement less likely, since a settlement could be seen as a sign of 
weakness, which might encourage other parties to bring similar actions.  
In contrast to opt-out actions, the opt-in mechanism carries the risk of additional 
proceedings from those who did not join the class in the proceedings. Therefore, in 
terms of the free riding issue, the opt-out mechanism is a better option as it leads to a 
binding decision that will apply to class members who did not opt-out of the action. 
 
  9. Objections to the 'Opt-Out' Mechanism on the Basis that it 
Contradicts the Tradition of Litigation 
                                                 
67
 Roger Van Den Bergh and Peter D. Camesasca, European Competition Law and Economics: A 
Comparative Perspective (Thompson - Sweet and Maxwell, 2006); M. W. Friedman, ‘Constrained 
Individualism in Group Litigation: Requiring Class Members to Make a Good Cause Showing before 
Opting Out of a Federal Class Action' [1990] The Yale Law Journal 100 745; George J Stigler, 'Free 
Riders and Collective action: An appendix to theories of economic regulation' [1974] The Bell 
Journal of Economics and Management Science 5 359.  
68 Michael A. Eizenga and Daniel E.H. Bach, Siskinds, LLP, ‘Recent Developments in Pension Class 
Actions: an Obvious Trend', (Pension Fund Invitational Forum, October 27, 2006), see at page 2, 
available at <www.derivativelitigation.ca/content/publications/index.asp> accessed 20 November 
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On balance, an opt-out mechanism would appear to offer a more workable collective 
redress model for Europe, since it creates large classes, making the action more 
economically viable. Yet such actions are rarely pursued in Europe. There are certain 
objections to the opt-out model based on traditional litigation habits which need to be 
addressed. Generally, it is thought that the opt-out mechanism runs contrary to the 
existing litigation systems in most member states, such as France, Italy and the U.K. 
The objection to the opt-out model is that it enables the court to deal with a plaintiff 
who is not present at court and who may be not interested in the litigation.  
 
Indeed, the Commission has expressed a preference for the opt-in model because it is 
more similar to existing litigation systems in Europe and would probably be easier to 
implement than an opt-out model.
69
 
 
The opposition of European member states to the opt-out model was well illustrated 
in Ireland where the Law Commission initially advocated an opt-out mechanism and 
then changed its mind,
70
 preferring an opt-in mechanism
 
where all parties would have 
to appear before the court. The opt-in principle was followed even though the 
Commission knew that it would influence the number of collective redress cases that 
would be brought before the courts.
71
 The Irish Commission claimed that: 
 
2.13  The tradition of litigation in this jurisdiction follows an opt-in model. In 
general, the onus lies on the litigant to institute proceedings, in the absence of 
which it will be assumed that no such intention exists.  
 
2.14  One of the attractions of an opt-in system lies in its familiarity or, 
conversely, in the unfamiliarity of the opt-out approach. An opt-out regime 
would require a dramatic shift away from the traditional voluntary method of 
instituting litigation. The idea of compelling an individual to take steps to 
                                                 
69European Commission ‘Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the White Paper on 
Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules {COM(2008) 165 final}’ 2008 SEC(2008) 404 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52008SC0404:EN:NOT> 
accessed 5 August 2011.
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71 Ibid. 
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withdraw from litigation that they never undertook sits uneasily with the 
traditional concept of litigation. Thus, the real possibility arises that individuals 
may become involved unwittingly in litigation.
72
 
 
The opt-out model also runs against fundamental principles in other jurisdictions, 
such as France.
73
 An opt-out model is contrary to the French principle of law nul ne 
plaide par procureur or no one shall plead by proxy, which requires an individual to 
have a personal interest in the case that they have initiated.
74
 According to this 
principle, a representing party can act on behalf of someone by obtaining an explicit 
mandate, but can never act instead of someone. In addition, the French Civil Code 
stipulates that a judge may not decide on general provisions, because only parliament 
may make decisions that are applicable to the general public.
75
 In particular, Article 
1351 of the French Civil Code allows people to benefit from a court decision only if 
they were party to the proceedings.
76
 Article 1351 of the French Civil Code states that 
the force of res judicata applies only with respect to the subject matter of a judgment. 
It is necessary that the thing claimed be the same; that the claim be based on the same 
grounds; that the claim be between the same parties and brought by them and against 
                                                 
72 The Irish Commission also raised other arguments for rejecting the opt-out mechanism in Ireland, 
such as the existence of a small claims court as an alternative dispute mechanism, the fact that in 
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(16 May 2006).  
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 Ibid. 
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them in the same capacity.
77
 Thus it is difficult to benefit from the outcome of a 
French court case unless one becomes a party to the case.  
 
The French system distinguishes the individual interest from the collective interest. 
According to the French Cour de Cassation,
78
 the collective interest is different from 
the individual interest of victims who have suffered personally and can request 
compensation. As a result, there are two different systems for group actions that now 
operate in France, both of which are strange to the operation of the opt-out machinery: 
one being a system for the collective interests of consumers, and the other a system 
for joint actions on an opt-in basis. Article 46 of The French Law of 25 December 
1973, the Loi Royer, introduced a mechanism enabling consumer organisations to 
bring a collective action in circumstances where the collective interest of consumers is 
directly or indirectly harmed by the activity of a supplier. This type of action can be 
used only to pursue the collective interests of consumer organisations, which are 
considered to be different from those of individual consumers under French law. This 
development was a move towards developing a system of class actions under French 
law. The French Consumer Code
79
 allows consumer-approved
80
 associations
81
 to join 
proceedings in civil courts or to commence representative actions to stop wrongful 
behaviour or remove unlawful clauses from contracts. The Consumer Code also 
allows consumer-approved associations to initiate proceedings in civil courts without 
any criminal offence having been committed and to request the cessation of illegal 
behaviour or to remove illegal clauses.
82
 This claim should be distinguished from any 
opt-in or opt-out model because it is the action of the organisation itself and not its 
members.  
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actions-group-litigation-other-forms-collective-litigation-protocol-national-reporters> accessed 20 
November 2011.  
79
 C. Cons. Article L. 421-7 (The Consumer Code). 
80
 C. Cons. Article L. 421-1 (The Consumer Code).  
81
 According to the French National report from 2007, only 20 organisations were recognised. See the 
Leuven study (n 58) at <http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/collective_redress_en.htm> 
accessed 21 November 2011. 
82
 C. Cons. Article L. 421-6 (The Consumer Code).  
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Although actions brought by consumer organisations are on the increase in France, 
they are not as powerful as class action suits in gaining significant awards for victims. 
Their principal purpose is to stop illegal practices, rather than to obtain damages, 
since damages only compensate the association as a whole and not its individual 
members. Such a model may operate alongside a true opt-out collective redress 
model, which is more workable as the evidence shows. 
 
Consequently, the preference of main European jurisdictions for an opt-in model 
suggests that there may be a very long way to go until new European opt-out model is 
introduced. However, in recent years there have been positive moves towards the 
implementation of a new type of opt-out model in Europe. These include the 
introduction of a new opt-out settlement model in the Netherlands, and a mixed opt-
out opt-in model in some other member states albeit some member states remain 
devoted to the traditional opt-in model. The different types of models are examined in 
the next part of this chapter in order to determine whether there any model can 
operate as a sample workable model to improve access to justice in the way that 
Israel's opt-out class action model has done. 
 
  10. Existing Mechanisms Currently Operating in Europe 
 
In the search for a suitable European collective redress provision, it is instructive to 
examine the current models in operation in the European member states, since one of 
the existing systems might be replicated in a unified European model. It is also 
helpful to consider the Israeli model, which has been in operation for several years. A 
comparison of all these models should lead to a conclusion regarding which of these 
models is most appropriate to cater to European consumers.  
 
The majority of existing collective redress frameworks in Europe are based on the 
opt-in principle with some exceptions. The European systems can be classified as 
follows: 
 
A."Complete" opt-out models, for example, in Portugal;   
B. Mixed opt-in/opt-out models, such as Denmark; 
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C. Quasi opt-out and quasi opt-in models, such as Spain where the judgment in opt-in 
actions may bind other parties that were not part of the action; and 
D. Strict opt-in models, such as the French, Italian
83
 and Swedish models.
84
 
 
A. The Complete Opt-Out Model85  
 
This provides that every plaintiff may bring proceedings on his own initiative and 
without the need for a mandate or express authorization from all the other rights-
holders, save those class members who have decided to opt-out. The advantage of 
such a model is that class members are not required to take any action in order to 
benefit from the collective action.
86
 
 
An essential requirement of such a system is a provision that sets down the procedure 
for class members to opt out
87
 and a section that provides that the judgment in the 
action binds all the members of the class except those members who have opted out.
88
 
 
Portugal has a complete opt-out scheme for collective actions and its system has some 
similarities to the Israeli opt-out model, except for financial incentives which are 
lacking in Portugal. The Portuguese model has been in operation since as far back as 
1995.
89
 The Portuguese Law provides that every plaintiff may represent all other right 
holders on his own initiative and without the need for a mandate or express 
                                                 
83 Legge 99/2009, Art. 49 (Law 99/2009).  
84 Per Henrik Lindblom, ‘National Report: Group Litigation in Sweden’ (December 2007)  
<http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events_media/Sweden_National_Report.pdf> 
accessed 27 October.2011. With regard to the Swedish Act, it should be noted that this was a 
compromise Group Proceedings Act which was introduced in 2002 and came into effect in 2003. The 
Act included no incentives and the primary emphasis was changed from an opt-out to an opt-in 
mechanism. Still, it must be remembered that this procedure has hardly been used since its 
introduction, which is similar to the experience in other opt in jurisdictions. 
85 For example, Article 14 of Law No. 83/95 Right of Proceeding, Participation, and Popular Action 
(Portugal).  
86 R. Mulheron, ‘Some Difficulties with Group litigation Orders – and why a Class Action is Superior' 
[January 2005] C.J.Q 24 40. 
87 For example, Article 15 of Law No. 83/95 Right of Proceeding, Participation, and Popular Action 
(Portugal). 
88 For example, Article 19 of Law No. 83/95 Right of Proceeding, Participation, and Popular Action 
(Portugal). 
89
 Law No. 83/95 Right of Proceeding, Participation, and Popular Action and Law 24/96 Establishing 
the Legal System Applicable to Consumer Protection. 
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authorization, unless such class members with the same interests have decided to opt 
out.
90
 
 
The Portuguese system requires a notice to be given to all the holders of the interest in 
question. The notice is aimed at allowing the class members to exercise their right to 
opt out, failing which they are deemed to approve the representation.
91
 Opting out is 
possible until the stage where evidence is produced. Notice is given by advertisement 
in the media or press depending on the circumstances and the geographical distance 
between class members.
92
 The judgment in the action binds all members of the class 
except those who have opted out.
93
  
 
According to a survey published by the Commission, only six actions for damages 
were brought between 1995 and 2009.
94
 Commentators concluded that the use of 
Popular Actions in its civil phase was very scarce. In her report for the CJC,
95
 Prof. 
Mulheron cites commentary from Nuno Oliveira, former legal advisor at Deco (the 
Portuguese Consumer Organisation) on the Portuguese model. According to Oliveira, 
one of the problematic elements of the Portuguese model is that 
 
the law should state clear rules for calculating different types of damages 
(liquidated, general, reliance, restitution, punitive, expectation, etc), and 
include also a provision for damages distribution between consumers as well 
as a partial distribution for the plaintiff consumers’ association.96 
 
The Portuguese law almost fully resembles the Israeli model but for the lack of a 
provision for financial incentives for the plaintiffs which is allowed in Israel. Thus, 
the fact that there are very few actions in Portugal indicates that an opt-out 
                                                 
90 Article 14 of Law No. 83/95 Right of Proceeding, Participation, and Popular Action (Portugal). 
91 Article 15 (1) of Law No. 83/95 Right of Proceeding, Participation, and Popular Action (Portugal). 
92 Henrique Sousa Antunes, Class Actions, Group Litigation & Other Forms of Collective Litigation - 
Portugal (2007) at 
<http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events_media/Portugal_National_Report.pdf
> 
93 Article 19 of Law No. 83/95 Right of Proceeding, Participation, and Popular Action (Portugal).  
94
 European Commission - DG SANCO, 'Evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of collective 
redress mechanisms in the European Union - Main Report' (Civil Consulting and Oxford Economics, 
2008) see at page 88 at <http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/collective_redress_en.htm.>. 
95 Prof. R Mulheron (n 31). 
96
 Prof. R Mulheron (n 31) at page 99. 
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mechanism per se without any financial incentives for the representative leading the 
actions does not improve access to justice. The investigation of this model leads to the 
conclusion that the lack of positive financial incentives for the representative who has 
led the action and has taken the risk of paying the costs, is the reason for the relatively 
small number of opt-out actions in Portugal.  
 
Another complete, albeit unique, opt-out model has existed in the Netherlands since 
2005.
97
 The Dutch model was created in order to ensure that a settlement binds all 
parties in one legal action.
98
 The settlement, which must be reached out of court, is a 
prerequisite for the parties to apply to the court. Where there is no agreement, no class 
action for damages is available.
99
 
  
The Dutch system is unique and cannot form the basis of a coherent European model 
because it does not provide for a solution where a dispute may have to be tried failing 
a settlement between the parties.  
 
The Dutch and the Portuguese models are the only opt-out models that exist in 
Europe. Having looked through them, it is clear that these models on their own cannot 
form the basis of a new coherent model as they stand at the moment. The Portuguese 
model has little success in improving access to justice due to a lack of financial 
incentives. The Dutch model only deals with settlements and not with collective 
claims. On the other hand, both systems together may be incorporated within a new 
European enactment and these features could take the leading role in dealing with 
European collective settlements.  This may be done by providing for an opt-out model 
which encompasses a provision which deals with approving settlements. Yet such a   
model would lack incentives to overcome consumers' rational apathy. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
97
 The Dutch Act on Collective Settlement of Mass Damages (Wet collectieve afwikkeling 
massaschade) came into force on the 27 July 2005.  
98 Dr. I.N. Tzankova, ‘Class Actions in the Netherlands (Parts 1 & 2)’ [2007] and [2008]. 
<http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/taxonomy/term/65> accessed 29 July 2010. 
99 Article 7:907 par. (1) Civil Code (Netherlands).  
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B. Mixed Models 
 
The complete opt-out model may be distinguished from those systems which combine 
both opt-out and opt-in mechanisms. 
 
Denmark has developed a mixed opt-in/opt-out model.
100
 The system is based 
primarily on the opt-in mechanism which is the default procedure for all disputes. 
However, there is an exception which enables the use of the opt-out mechanism by 
the Consumer Ombudsman.
101
 Both individuals and associations can bring opt-in 
proceedings, whereas at present,
102
 opt–out proceedings may only be brought by the 
Consumer Ombudsman.
103
  
 
Under the Danish opt-in system, once a claim has been submitted, the court specifies 
a deadline for joining the class action by written submission. In contrast, in opt-out 
actions the court specifies a deadline for opting-out of the class action by written 
notification. With both mechanisms the court decides to whom notice (either to opt-in 
or opt-out) should be given and, in exceptional circumstances, the court can permit 
joining after the deadline.
104
 
 
At the request of the Consumer Ombudsman, the court may decide that a group action 
should be opt-out, provided two conditions are satisfied.
105
 The case must concern 
claims that are so small that it is evident that they generally would not be expected to 
be brought in individual actions, because the inconvenience and financial risk for the 
individual would be disproportionate to the amount of the individual claim (in other 
words, these are NEV claims). According to the Act, this condition will normally be 
                                                 
100
 The current position in Denmark has its roots in report No 1468/2005 of the Standing Committee on 
Procedural Law (Retsplejerådet). This reform was introduced by Act no. 181 of 28 February 2007 on 
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101
 Section 254 e (8) of the Administration of Justice Act (Denmark). 
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103 Section 254e(8) of the Administration of Justice Act (Denmark). 
104
 Prof. Erik Werlauff, ‘Class actions in Denmark’ (Aalborg University) at 
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accessed 27 October 2011. 
105 
Sec. 254 e, s 9 of the Administration of Justice Act (Denmark). 
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satisfied if a consumer’s individual claim does not exceed an amount of 
approximately 2,000 Danish Krone (DKK) (equivalent to EUR 264). The second 
condition is that a group action based on the opt-in model must be considered an 
inexpedient way of dealing with claims, particularly if the case includes a large 
number of persons so that the administration of opt-in notices will require 
disproportionate resources.
106
 
 
Professor Hodges expresses satisfaction with the Danish model
107
 which leaves opt-
out actions in the hands of the Consumer Ombudsman alone. However, in fact there 
are no signs that the Danish model has brought significant progress as far as rates of 
access to justice are concerned. Public sector enforcement alone may lead to very 
scarce use of collective redress. Public enforcement has proved thus far to be very 
unsuitable for collective actions. Consequently, other representatives should also have 
the power to bring actions in the event that the designated public authority refuses to 
do so.  
 
There are also other possible mixed opt-out, opt-in systems which give the judge 
discretion to decide when to apply the opt-in mechanism and when to order the action 
to be managed using the opt-out mechanism. The Irish Law Commission also 
mentioned a mixed approach
108
 which would give the court the discretion to decide 
which mechanism ought to be used on a case by case basis. Such a model was also 
recommended by the English CJC in its response to the European consultation paper, 
since it gives the court the flexibility to decide which model will better serve each 
case.
109
 The problem with this model is that it undermines the certainty which is so 
necessary for the representatives who take risks when deciding to undertake the 
representation of a class in an action themselves. The cost of finding a representative 
                                                 
106
 Peter Møgelvang-Hansen, Copenhagen Business School, ‘Evaluation of the effectiveness and 
efficiency of collective redress mechanisms in the European Union – Country report Denmark’ 
(Civic Consulting, 2008 ) 
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who does not intend to represent other class members from the outset may lead to 
unfair situations. This was one of the main reasons for the Irish Commission's 
rejection of such a flexible model.  
 
It is clear that if the representatives are potentially going to spend their own time and 
resources on the case, they will want to know from the outset that the case involves 
large classes of represented persons so as to take the advantage of economies of scale.  
 
Another disadvantage of granting the judge the discretion to decide whether to use an 
opt-in or an opt-out model is that it might unnecessarily burden judges and could 
invite additional litigation challenging the judge’s decision.  
 
C. Quasi Opt-In Opt-Out Models 
 
The Spanish introduced collective litigation in the Civil Procedure Act (LEC) of 
2000.
110
 The Spanish system is an opt-in system but the judgment in the proceedings 
may have a binding effect on non-participating parties. The Spanish model differs 
from the U.S., Israeli and Portuguese class action systems because it is based on the 
opt-in model and contains no opt-out mechanism. 
 
The interesting part of the Spanish legislation is that it defines two separate types of 
interests: 
 
Collective (diffuse) actions, under Article 11(3) of the LEC, are appropriate where it 
is difficult to determine the composition of a group of people in a similar legal 
position. When victims are not individualized or easily individualized, the diffuse 
interests’ suit, in the name of consumers, will correspond exclusively to consumer 
associations that are representative according to the law. Such actions, where the 
members of a group are unidentified or unnamed, are also known as quasi-class 
actions. 
 
                                                 
110 Ley 1/2000, de 7 de enero, de Enjuiciamiento Civil (Civil Procedure Law, Law 1/2000, passed on 7 
January 2000). 
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Multi-party actions, where the members are identified or easily identifiable, are also 
known as consumer collective actions for groups of consumers. Article 11(2) of the 
LEC provides that groups of consumers can be represented by consumer association 
organisations which defend specific interests or even the group of affected consumers 
itself (as long as it represents the majority of the affected consumers).
111
 
 
The multi--party procedure is quite similar to the procedure for quasi-class actions, 
but there are some specific points to note regarding the former procedure. Firstly, 
before the claim is filed, the claimant or claimants must notify each affected consumer 
of the impending filing of a claim to defend their collective interests. Once the claim 
has been filed and admitted by the court, the affected consumers are notified in 
accordance with specific rules so that they can join the proceedings. Unlike quasi-
class actions, the notification does not suspend the proceedings. Affected consumers 
may join the proceedings at any time but may participate only in those parts of the 
action that have yet to take place.
112
 As is the case in quasi-class actions, affected 
consumers who have not joined the proceedings cannot ask for the provisional 
enforcement of the judgment in their favour and will be bound by the final result of 
the proceedings. Any individual claimant wishing to be compensated must wait until 
the final judgment, which will then be fully applicable to him, though he is unable to 
take individual action during or after the group proceedings.
113
  
 
The main issue with the Spanish model is that it provides that judgments will affect 
all the parties to the proceedings, including their heirs, as well as non-litigants with 
similar rights. This rule applies regardless of the outcome of the case,
114
 even where 
the claim fails.
115
 Therefore, the procedure which is not an opt-out model turns into an 
opt-out model once affected consumers are bound by the judgment. 
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The judgments handed down in connection with consumer claims for monetary 
compensation filed by consumer associations with standing to sue should specify 
which consumers and users can benefit from the judgment.
116
 Where such a 
determination is impossible, the judgment will establish the details, features and 
requirements necessary to demand payment and, where appropriate, to apply for or 
take part in the enforcement of the judgment, if requested by the claimant 
association.
117
 Consequently, consumers who do not participate will neither be bound 
by, nor able to enforce, the judgment.  
 
However, if the claim is brought by a consumer organisation and not by a group of 
affected consumers then any affected consumer (including those who do not 
participate) may benefit from the judgment.
118
 In this way the system achieves a 
similar effect to the opt-out mechanism.  
 
The opt-in part of the Spanish model creates several severe problems:  
 
Firstly the requirement that in order to bring a collective action, the group of affected 
consumers wishing to bring such action must include most of the affected members 
causes difficulties in bringing the action.
119
 The majority requirement increases the 
burden of proof for the potential claimants since they must be traced from the outset 
of the case.
120
 Secondly, the problem of funding payments for bringing the action to 
the public by mass media as demanded in Spain is very problematic. No public funds 
are available for this purpose, and the representatives gain no profit from such an 
action so they have no incentive to do so.
121
 Thirdly, even where the outcome of the 
action is favour of the class, the award is made personally, not to the whole group. 
Therefore, each individual class member must come forward in order to collect his or 
                                                 
116 Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil, Article 221 (1) (Civil Procedure Law, Spain). 
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119 Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil, Art. 6(1)(7) (Civil Procedure Law, Spain). 
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her share. However, consumer actions normally concern low sums and it is expected 
that few will come forward in order to prove and collect their share of  the 
compensation.
122
 
 
Looking at the Spanish model, the inevitable conclusion is that in small figure claims 
any opt-in proceedings will not perform well. This is due to the rational apathy of 
consumers. The other problem that this model encounters is that personal claimants 
are required to step forward in order to collect their share, and they are not likely to do 
so due to the small individual sums at stake. Therefore, a provision for damages for 
the general public or as a lump sum should be introduced. If not, consumers are 
unlikely to come forward to collect small sums of damages, unless the procedure for 
private collection is made very simple. 
 
D. The Strict Opt-In Models 
 
Most European models are based on the opt-in mechanism. This is due to the fact that 
opt-in systems are in line with traditional European court proceedings. 
 
As mentioned above, the Irish Law Commission which initially favoured an opt-out 
mechanism ultimately recommended an opt-in mechanism because it fitted in with 
traditional litigation habits.
123
 Similarly, a compromise opt-in act, the Group 
Proceedings Act (the Swedish Act) was introduced in Sweden in 2002 and came into 
effect in 2003. The Swedish Act includes no incentives and the primary emphasis was 
changed from an opt-out to an opt-in mechanism.
124
 This procedure has hardly been 
used since its introduction and this fact is in line with other opt-in jurisdiction 
outcomes.  
 
                                                 
122 Denis Waelbroek, Donald Slater, and Gil Even-Shoshan, 'Study on the conditions of claims for 
damages in case of infringement of EC competition rules - National report on Spain' (Ashurst, 2004) 
7 available at <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/study.html> accessed 30 
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123  Irish Law Reform Commission (n 70) at pages 82-83 available at 
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The French action en représentation conjointe des consommateurs (joint action) 
enables an organization, instructed by at least two individuals (consumers, investors) 
who have given such organization their prior authorisation or mandate, to sue in their 
name and on their behalf. The instruction must be given in writing and can be 
dismissed by these individuals without explanation. This is a strict opt-in model 
which requires any consumer to positively elect to join the action. The claimants must 
have suffered damage which was caused by the same person and having a common 
origin. Organisations may seek potential claimants to join in the action through the 
press but they are not allowed to advertise, send mailings or make public 
announcements on television or on the radio.Very few actions of this kind have been 
brought. 
 
In Italy,  a new law from 2010,
125
 remained very faithful to the opt-in model. The new 
procedure is an opt-in procedure and thus consumers who want to join the action must 
express their intention to join the action (adesione)
126
 within 120 days of the notice.
127
  
Consumers can join in the class action through an act called adesione (adhesion) 
which can take place also through telefax or authenticated electronic mail. Class 
members joining the action do not become full party to the proceedings and cannot 
appeal the final decision. However, once such consumers opt to be joined into the 
proceedings, they are bound by the outcome of the proceedings.
128
 
 
 
In England, the Amendments to the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 which were adopted 
in 2000 are contained in Civil Procedure Rules Part 19, Section III and in a Practice 
Direction entitled Group Litigation. The procedure adopted in 2000 deals mainly with 
the management of group claims which give rise to common or related issues of fact 
or law. A Group Litigation Order (GLO) is normally suitable for managing existing 
cases and thus differs from a representative action. The unified management of the 
case means that all common questions will be dealt in one proceeding and one lead 
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solicitor may be appointed by the managing judge. In this way there are no conflicting 
judgments and judicial time and financial resources are saved. However, there is 
neither a representative plaintiff, nor incentives such as receiving a share of the 
proceedings. The appointed solicitor must consult the Law Society’s "Multi–Party 
Action Information Service” and obtain information about other cases which might 
give rise to a proposed group action. If there are a few solicitors dealing with the same 
matter, it is expected that the group or the court will appoint a leading solicitor.  
 
The English Group Litigation Order provides for an opt-in system. Those wishing to 
join and take advantage of group litigation must either affirmatively register as parties 
to the relevant claim or at least have their particular claims adjoined by judicial 
consolidation with the group action.  
 
Thus the GLO regime does not merely require litigants to opt in, it also requires each 
litigant to serve a claim form by virtue of paragraph 6.1A of Practice Direction 19B. 
The GLO serves as an umbrella under which a number of claims are managed.  
 
A decision made with respect to a GLO binds all parties on the group register at the 
time the decision is given, unless the court orders otherwise. Latecomers are also 
bound. A party who is adversely affected by a judgment or order may seek permission 
to appeal. The court may give directions as to the extent to which that judgment or 
order is binding upon claims entered on the registry after the date of judgment. An 
aggrieved late claimant cannot appeal against the relevant judgment or order, but must 
instead apply to the court for an order that the judgment or order does not bind him. 
 
GLOs have been issued in a range of areas, including product liability (McDonalds 
Hot Drinks, Sabril Group Litigation) and the compatibility of UK tax provisions with 
EC law (Thin Cap Group Litigation). A list of GLOs is published on the court 
website.
129
 According to the GLO registry, from 2001 to 30 March 2012, only 75 
GLOs were made. But in her 2008 report to the CJC, Prof. Mulheron noted that the 
majority of GLOs concerned care-home and school abuses and maltreatments (21%), 
environmental claims (15%), taxation disputes (13%), and product liability cases 
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(11%).
130
 The low numbers of orders given in the last eight years is surely the result 
of the GLO opt-in system. Furthermore, relevant issues of class action claims such as 
investors or shareholders claims are totally absent from the list of GLO as well as 
other core class action issues such as product liability cases show only minimal ratios 
due to the opt-in system employed. Prof. Mulheron noted that in most GLO cases, the 
opt-in mechanism did not suit the action. According to a practitioner's survey, this 
was the case for several reasons: 
 
- In 82% of GLO cases, the reason was the sheer number of class members who 
had to be identified at the outset of the action. 
 
- In 84% of GLO cases the "opt-in" mechanism caused difficulties due to the 
low – value recovery per class member.  
 
- In 87% of GLO cases, the "opt-in" mechanism caused difficulties due to the 
actual or perceived barriers (whether economic, social, etc.) to class members 
coming forward at the outset of the action.
131
 
 
The English GLO system is a very problematic opt-in model as it requires each class 
member to bring his own action to court and not only to sign a power of attorney. It is 
not suitable for consumer actions as it is unreasonable to expect each consumer to 
bring his personal action to the courts. 
 
  11. Conclusions on the Opt-Out Mechanism - The Most Appropriate 
Provision: A Mixed Opt-Out Mechanism 
 
Israel's opt-out model, together with evidence collected from the U.S., demonstrate 
that an opt-out mechanism can improve access to justice dramatically. The numbers 
show that once the opt-out system was introduced in the U.S., the class action 
machinery started to operate more effectively. In Israel, the numbers have risen to 700 
                                                 
130 Prof. Rachael Mulheron (n 31) at pages 9-14. 
131 Prof. Rachael Mulheron (n 31) at page 24. 
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new actions in 2011, all of them based on the opt-out mechanism. By comparison, 
traditional opt-in collective redress models suffer from scarce use.   
 
A flood of actions is not an inevitable consequence of an opt-out mechanism, as the 
systems in the Netherlands and Portugal demonstrate. In those jurisdictions, the opt-
out system has not led to a deluge of collective actions, even though the victims are 
unified in single court proceedings and benefit from economies of scale. The Dutch 
mechanism is unique in the sense that it only serves settlements reached by the parties 
and the Portuguese model is rarely used due to a lack of a provision for financial 
incentives. The Dutch and Portuguese experiences also indicate that the introduction 
of an opt-out mechanism per se, with no further financial incentives for the 
representatives, will not render a model workable. The corollary that should be learnt 
from these models is that the opt-out mechanism may be controlled and should not be 
feared. The other necessary conclusion is that in order to promote the use of this very 
important legal tool, some financial incentives such as financial bonuses to the 
representatives and the class lawyers should be introduced in order to drive collective 
redress forward. Thus, in the third part of this chapter, the proper financial incentives 
will be discussed. 
 
The opt-out mechanism should not be feared as it is the only mechanism which may 
deal with small value claims. The opt-out mechanism overcomes consumer rational 
apathy and ensures that rough traders pay for the damage caused by their unlawful 
actions. Therefore, the opt-out model is an appropriate deterrence mechanism to 
prevent traders from acting unlawfully. 
 
With regard to the argument that the opt-out mechanism contradicts traditional legal 
proceedings in Europe, the interest theory supplies a good explanation that agents 
with the same interests may represent the group's members. Representation is a 
mechanism employed in a parliamentary system, so there why should it not be the 
same in relation to collective actions? To these arguments one may add that in 
consumer actions, the personal economic interest is very small so there is no reason 
not to allow a representative to act in favour of all  group members. 
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Looking at the existing opt-out models in Europe, the Danish principle of imposing a 
maximum value for each individual claim in opt-out cases may lead to a better result, 
since it is important to distinguish small claims from those involving large sums of 
money. However, the problem with the Danish mixed mechanism is that the opt-out 
action under this model is vested solely in the public hands of the Consumer 
Ombudsman. In contrast, the Israeli complete opt-out model distinguishes between 
cases involving small and large claims, granting the judge discretion to decide 
whether an opt-out or opt-in action is more appropriate based on the amount of the 
claim in question. If the personal amount of the action is high, then the action would 
suit individual proceedings based on the opt-in mechanism rather than a collective 
opt-out action. In cases involving large amounts, the opt-in mechanism is useful, since 
there is no real fear of rational apathy with plaintiff consumers likely to take their 
action to court.  
 
The recommended model both for Israel and for Europe will need to distinguish small 
claims from large sum claims as the Danish model suggests, without limiting them to 
public sector claims as is the case in Denmark. The opt-out mechanism should be 
introduced for cases involving small claims, with the adoption of an opt-in scheme for 
those claims involving larger sums. 
 
Part B. The Question of Standing - Who Should Act as Class 
Representatives? 
 
The possible representatives in collective redress actions are private representatives 
who are class members who have suffered damage and their lawyers, or public bodies 
or associations that are relevant to the dispute concerned. Each one of the possible 
representatives carries some advantages and disadvantages. The Israeli model puts  
emaphasis on private enforcement. In Europe on the other hand, public enforcement 
and organisations take the leading role. 
 
In the following part of this chapter, we will try to observe these agencies and find an 
appropriate frame for their operation in the new suggested model. 
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  1. The Israeli Emphasis on Private Enforcers   
 
Under Israel's CAL, the three agencies - private individuals, organisations and public 
bodies - are allowed to bring class actions. However, in practice, about 99% of the 
class actions submitted in Israel are initiated by private individuals. The standard case 
in Israel is initiated by an individual private consumer who purports to bring the claim 
on behalf of a group of consumers using the opt-out mechanism.
132
 This is also the 
case in the U.S. class action model.
133
 In Europe there are some jurisdictions that 
allow all three agencies to bring collective actions (for example, Portugal
134
). 
However, the majority of member states rely solely on organisational actions. 
Organisational actions are safe from abuses yet are not sufficiently used mainly due to 
a lack of resources. As seen in the Israeli model, the question of agency is crucial for 
the workability of the collective redress mechanism and thus it constitutes one of the 
pillars of the Israeli model which is based on private enforcement. 
 
In Israel, the debate concerning private and public enforcement has led to a 
broadening of the possible agents that can bring a class action, which has resulted in 
allowing all three agencies to operate under the CAL.
135
 Previously, only individuals 
could bring a collective action. Under the CAL, organisations and public bodies
 
as 
well as individuals are given the power to commence proceedings. However, the 
broadening of the range of agencies has not brought with it any change in the 
litigation mentality which has remained entirely in the private realm. Thus the Israeli 
legislator places the emphasis on private enforcement, the reason being that 
organisations and public bodies have been less proactive than private individuals in 
leading collective actions.  
 
                                                 
132
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 4 (a) 3 provides that an action may be represented by an 
organisation (except the Israeli Consumer Council) only if it is proven that a private plaintiff faces 
difficulties in bringing the action.    
133
  See Federal Rule 23 (a) which provides that one or more of the class members may represent the 
others. 
134
   L.Tortell, 'Evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of collective redress mechanisms in the 
European Union: Country report Portugal' (Civic Consulting, 2008) at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/pt-country-report-final.pdf> accessed 27 October 
2011 
135
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 4.  
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Individuals are allowed to lead the action under the CAL provided that they have a 
personal cause of action and have suffered prima facie personal damage.
136
 By 
contrast, organisations and public bodies must demonstrate that bringing a private 
individual class action is difficult under the circumstances of the case as we will now 
discuss.  
 
A. The Requirement from Organisations and Public Bodies to Show that Private 
Individual Action is Difficult 
 
The requirement which proves that the Israeli regime has a clear preference for 
private actions brought by individuals rather than organisational or private actions is 
the requirement to allow organisational or public actions only where there is a 
difficulty in bringing a private individual action. Consequently, an organisation is 
allowed to bring an action only where the court is satisfied that it is difficult for 
individuals to bring the action.
137
 The Council for the Protection of Consumer Rights 
in Israel is exempt from this requirement following an amendment to the CAL in 
2008, since Israel's legislature has welcomed the Council's intervention as a secure 
agent subject to no abuse. The Israeli Council is funded by the government and thus 
far has been party to four collective actions and has intervened in many other 
consumer-related cases not dealt with by collective actions. The Israeli Council is 
established by law
138
 which also provides that the Council should act independently
139
 
to further consumer interests inter alia by bringing legal actions in favour of 
consumers.
140
   
 
This pre-requisite stands for other organisations and public bodies and allows them to 
intervene only where it is difficult for consumers to bring an action. In this author's 
opinion, this requirement is an unjustified barrier, preventing organisations and public 
bodies from bringing class actions. It is difficult to understand why the Israeli 
                                                 
136 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 4(B)1 (Israel).  
137
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 4(B) 3.  
138
 Consumer Council Law 5768-2008. 
139 
Though set out in a separate budget, it is completely government funded. See section 4 of the 
Consumer Council Law 5768-2008. 
140 
The independence is presumably achieved by the appointment mechanism which is led by a retired 
Supreme Court Judge and two other figures from academia or from the market who suggest a list of 
ten recommended directors from which the relevant Minister must choose five directors. See section 
3 of the Consumer Council Law 5768-2008. 
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legislator decided to adopt a hurdle that makes organisational claims in Israel so 
complicated. The only justification seems to be that the Israeli legislator wanted to 
give preference to private individual claims over organisational claims in order to 
ensure the workability of the system, since public bodies and organisations are 
generally regarded as less effective at pursuing claims. This approach has proven to 
be correct, with only four actions having been submitted or joined by the consumers’ 
organisation in Israel since the enactment of the CAL in 2006.
141
 However, in this 
author's opinion, such a requirement should not have been adopted and claims by 
organisations should have been welcomed and promoted in Israel as they are not 
subject to any abuse. Organisation's have their own filtering mechanisms, and thus the 
actions they bring are regarded as more professional and are believed to be brought in 
good faith for the members' benefit. Nonetheless the Israeli model puts full emphasis 
on private individual actions which undergo no filtering mechanisms before being 
submitted to the courts. 
 
B. The Requirement to Show Personal Interest 
 
Under the CAL, private individuals who ask to represent a class of injured members 
should form part of that class. The requirement for private representatives to show 
that they have a personal interest in the action is currently the major obstacle to the 
certification of class actions by individuals in Israel. The problem with this 
requirement is that legitimate proceedings may be dismissed simply because the 
specific representative cannot prove a personal interest in the action and not because 
the case lacks merit. However, on the other hand this requirement may be seen as part 
of the interest theory. It means that since the representative has suffered personal 
damage as every class member has, there is no conflict of interest and the other group 
members may rely on him to represent their interests properly. 
 
In Luk v. Bank Hamizrachi,
142
 the court found that the bank had unlawfully applied 
certain charges to its clients. The bank had also acted unlawfully by not revealing 
such charges when clients opened their accounts. However, the court refused to allow 
                                                 
141 Claim Nos. 111, 111, 766 and2211 in the Israeli class actions registry available at 
<http://elyon1.court.gov.il//heb/tovanot_y/list.htm> accessed 25 November 2011. 
142
  Luk v. Bank Hamizrachi [December 2008] District Court of Tel Aviv, Case no.1121/21. 
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the action brought by individual representatives since they had failed to prove their 
own personal damage. The court was afraid that the plaintiffs’ real intentions in 
bringing the action were to try and force the bank to reach a personal settlement with 
them rather than to properly represent the class interest.  
 
In Adv. Shtendel v. Bezeq International,
143
 the applicant claimed that Bezeq 
International, a leading telephone company in Israel, had deceived the public by 
advertising that its rates for long distance calls were the cheapest when in fact, in 
order to obtain these cheap rates, customers had to become subscribers. The Supreme 
Court referred to an old authority
144
 and held that since the applicant had not proven 
his personal claim and personal reliance on the misleading advertisement, he had 
failed to show that he had a personal interest in the action and the application 
consequently failed. This case demonstrates that Israel's courts require the 
representative to show that they have suffered personal damage.  
 
This requirement is strictly adhered to even though theoretically the action may be led 
by other representatives who have not suffered the minimal amount of damage which 
each class member has suffered. The rationale behind these decisions by the Israeli 
courts is to maintain the boundaries of the class action so that it remains within the 
framework of what appears to be a traditional legal action. In no other civil 
proceedings may a plaintiff with no personal damage bring an action on behalf of his 
friends or on behalf of a third party. This requirement is part of the interest theory 
which requires the representative to have similar interests as the interests of the class 
members.  
 
The requirement for personal interest is intended to filter out unmeritorious claims 
and blackmail claims brought by private individuals. The rationale here is that if a 
person brings an action in which he does not have a personal interest there may be an 
ulterior motive involved rather than the recovery of the personal damage inflicted on 
the plaintiff. Consequently, public bodies and associations are exempt from the 
requirement to show that they have suffered damage or that they have a personal 
interest in the action. The rationale is that these bodies are representative in their 
                                                 
143 Adv. Shtendel v. Bezeq International [6 May 2009] Supreme Court, Appeal No. 458/06.  
144
 Barazani v. Bezeq [2001] Supreme Court, Appeal No. 1977/97, P"D Nun Hei (4) 584.  
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nature. The organisation is deemed to represent the interests of its members or act 
according with its terms of association, and any relevant public body is deemed to act 
on behalf of the public. Under the Israeli model, organisations and public bodies are 
assumed to be acting in good faith in most cases. Therefore the requirement applied to 
show personal interest in the action which is imposed in Israel in order to maintain 
proper representation by private individuals is unnecessary as far as organisations and 
public bodies are concerned.  
 
C. The Lawyer who Represents the Class 
 
With regard to private enforcement, the role of lawyers should not be disregarded. 
Private lawyers in Israel are seen as guardians of the market and enforcers of private 
rights. Lawyers may work on a conditional fee basis taking as their salary a share of 
the damages in the case and may also initiate proceedings in order to obtain damages 
for consumers, while also profiting from the action.
145
 In such cases, the private 
representative assumes the role of the entrepreneur and initiates the legal proceedings. 
In most cases it is the lawyer of the class who stands behind the case. The traditional 
image of a lawyer sitting in his office independent from his client does not apply in 
class actions. The absence of client control means that there is a risk that the attorney 
will act for his own personal benefit rather than for the benefit of the class. The 
lawyer may prefer to settle a case with good merits in order to secure high 
remuneration for himself even though the class members will only get a small share of 
the income. Where lawyers are the real entrepreneurs of the action there is a very high 
risk of a conflict of interest between the lawyer and the class he represents.  
Yet private litigation in class actions is initiated in most cases by lawyers who identify 
the cause of action and then look for the proper client to represent the class. It has 
been suggested that, since the requirement to find a representative is a mere formality, 
the class lawyer should be allowed to act as the class representative as he is behind the 
representative and in fact initiates the action.
146
 In this way, a private attorney 
                                                 
145 S. Macaulay suggests that lawyers may not be professionally good enough to protect the interests of 
consumers. See S. Macaulay, ‘Lawyers and consumer protection laws’ [1979] 14 Law and Society R 
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assumes the role of a quasi attorney-general, pursuing the public interest by bringing 
an action for an injustice that might otherwise be disregarded.
147
  
 
The assumption that lawyers will take a very active role in collective actions in Israel 
proved to be correct. Lawyers have opened new practices based on collective actions. 
Lawyers' intervention in private enforcement is not regarded as a negative 
phenomenon as it is thought that lawyers are bound by their professional rules of 
conduct which operate as safeguards against possible abuses. The rules of conduct are 
aimed at controlling lawyers' behaviour and protecting clients from any abuses on the 
lawyers' part.
148
 On the other hand, the professional rules of conduct are aimed at 
controlling such conduct in the context of a lawyer's traditional role, and not within 
the role as an entrepreneurial initiator of class actions. As a consequence of this 
unique role, it could be argued that, ‘the ethics rules cannot be mechanically applied 
to class actions’,149 as there are certain situations such as solicitation or conflict of 
interest where a relaxation (or special application) of the ethics rules might be 
necessary to accommodate the unique needs of a class action lawsuit. An example of 
this would be to relax advertising rules to allow lawyers to advertise in order to reach 
as many class members as possible. Furthermore, in order to enable the lawyer to 
initiate an action, a conditional fee mechanism should be introduced with some 
supervision and limits imposed by the local Bar association. 
 
Yet leaving the role of the attorney-general who enforces consumer rights to private 
lawyers is problematic. The problem with the Israeli model allowing lawyers to act as 
entrepreneurs in class actions (as is the case in the U.S.) is that there is a risk that 
private lawyers may abuse the collective action mechanism. There is no filtering 
system to bar lawyers from submitting unmeritorious class actions before such actions 
are brought to court. The control of the action by the judge in the certification stages 
may be too late as, until that stage is reached, defendants may have to deal with bad 
publicity and high legal costs. The costs and risks of defending a claim are very high 
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 William B. Rubenstein, ‘On What a "Private Attorney General" Is-And Why It Matters’ [2004] 57 
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and, in many instances, commercial defendants may find it cheaper to settle. This 
effect is known as ‘the blackmail effect of class actions’150 because such actions are 
brought by lawyers in order to force the defendant to settle the case rather than to 
vindicate claims by class of members on account of unlawful behaviour by the 
defendant. In such cases, settlements are favourable for the class lawyer and class 
representative but the class members are entitled to only minimal sums. For this 
reason, strict safeguards should be imposed on settlements led by private lawyers and 
private representatives.
151
  
 
  2. The European Emphasis on Organisational and Public Actions 
 
Conversely to the Israeli model, there is reliance on private enforcement in all the 
European Union member states which have introduced some sort of collective redress 
system, consumer organisations are the leading authority for initiating class actions. 
 
Fabrizio Cafaggi and Hans-W. Micklitz conducted a survey on administrative and 
judicial collective enforcement of Consumer Law in the U.S. and in the European 
Community. In their survey, they noted that in some European countries such as 
Austria and Germany, consumer organisations are the sole enforcers in areas such as 
unfair terms and unfair commercial practices. In other European countries, such as the 
Scandinavian countries, administrative bodies - such as the Consumer Ombudsman in 
Denmark - play a major role in consumer law enforcement while consumer 
organisations play only a subsidiary role.
 
There are no unified criteria regarding which 
organisations should defend consumer's interests in Europe. There are some minimal 
criteria which may be gleaned from the existing directives
152
 but it is clear that there 
is a need to set full unified standards for organisational agency in order to serve best 
the interests of consumers.
153
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 Bruce Hay and David Rosenberg, 'Sweetheart and Blackmail Settlements in Class Actions: Reality 
and Remedy' (1999-2000) 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1377.  
151 The importance and effectiveness of such safeguards will be discussed in Chapter Four. 
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Organisations are regarded as more credible enforcers than individuals. Organisations 
possess the required expertise and have better access to evidence and information than 
private individuals.
154
 However, their performance thus far in presenting collective 
redress cases in Europe has been very weak, since such performance depends on the 
resources and powers granted to the organisations, and in most cases, European 
organisations lack the necessary resources to be active enough in enforcing consumer 
rights.
155
  
 
Looking back at the European trends, the European Union puts its emphasis on 
organisational cooperation in order to enforce consumer rights. Lawyers and private 
actions are not regarded as the proper enforcers of consumer rights in Europe. 
However, the European Commission has so far not done enough to align consumer 
organisation behaviour: no effective system of cooperation has been set up, and no 
licensing criteria have been established at Community level. 
 
The European approach is aimed at preventing abuses which are caused by private 
enforcement. However, as proven thus far in Europe, organisational enforcement has 
not resulted in sufficient benefits to consumers and has not been as active as private 
litigation in Israel and the U.S. Therefore, in the course of this chapter, it is necessary 
to look at promoting organisational and public actions alongside private actions. 
However, with regard to private actions, it should be noted that although the Israeli 
model has proven that access to justice has been enhanced, there remains a clear need 
to improve the safeguard mechanisms in private litigation as we will see in further 
details in chapters 4 and 5. For the time being we ought to concentrate on 
understanding the reasons for such preference towards organizational enforcement 
and such enforcement should be permitted.  
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A.  Why is Organisational Enforcement Preferred in Europe? 
 
The principal-agent problem is inherent in collective redress, since the agent who 
represents the class, being either the representative plaintiff or the class lawyer, could 
potentially have a conflict of interest with the class members especially where 
conditional fees are concerned. This is particularly the case since agents prefer to 
allocate as much of the funds as possible to themselves at the expense of the class. 
The principal-agent problem results from information asymmetries between the 
representative (the agent) and the class member (the principal). This information 
asymmetry prevents proper control on the agent's actions because, for example, the 
class member will not have enough information to decide whether a settlement is 
suitable, and whether the agent has made his best efforts to extend the class members' 
share of the damages. The problems of information asymmetries and conflicts of 
interest increase the risk of opportunistic behaviour, which leads to frivolous suits.
156
 
The best solution for the elimination of agency problems is to promote secure agents 
to act.  
 
Professor Rachael Mulheron, prefers organisational claims. She uses the phrase 
‘ideological claimant’ when referring to ‘a body that has a special expertise or 
background that enables it to be an appropriate and adequate class representative’.157 
Other scholars mention that legal actions taken by associations may offer a way to 
mitigate problems surrounding a potential principal-agent conflict, which is 
particularly true in cases of widespread damage.
158
 Organisations are regarded as 
capable of reducing the risk of frivolous actions since they are authorised and 
supervised to bring representative actions and because organisations do not have a 
financial interest in the outcome of the litigation.
159
 
 
The argument in favour of associations as secure representatives is that associations 
are repeat players and need to retain their credibility. Associations are not deemed to 
act for their own benefit and thus they minimize the principal-agent problem, which 
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exists in collective redress proceedings.
160
 Commentators reach the conclusion that if 
certain conditions are met such as accountability, independence, and member control 
over the association's behaviour, then consumers will be much better off if the 
organisation controls both the action and the lawyer who represents the class. When 
this is the case, the costs of the action to the class members are lower and the outcome 
is preferential to the class of injured members.
161
  
 
With regards to organisational enforcement, the results of a survey carried out by the 
European Community has shown that consumers prefer private collective redress 
mechanisms, followed by independent organisations rather than public authorities.
162
 
According to this survey, 76% of European citizens prefer individual collective 
actions. Only 64% of European citizens have confidence in independent consumer 
organisations. Public authorities are trusted by only 54% of European citizens to be 
able to protect the rights of consumers.
163
 In some of the new member states like 
Romania and Bulgaria, the level of trust in independent organisations and in public 
bodies is lower than in other states. In the Nordic countries where such institutions 
have existed for the longest time, public authorities are more trusted. However, it 
should be noted that according to the same Eurobarometer survey, people from 
member states who are sceptical about independent and public authorities tend to 
purchase less outside their countries. Consumers in twenty out of the twenty-seven 
member states preferred organisational enforcement over public agency 
enforcement.
164
 In a more recent Flash Eurobarometer survey entitled 'Consumer 
attitudes towards cross-border trade and consumer protection’ published in March 
2011, 79% of European consumers said that they would be more willing to defend 
their rights in court if they could join other consumers complaining about the same 
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issue.
165
 These studies ought to lead to a switch in the minds of European legislators 
who tend to rely only on public or organisational collective redress. The European 
emphasis on organisational actions should be reconsidered as it has not proven 
effective in a number of jurisdictions. Instead, the Commission should encourage the 
introduction of a system combined with features of the Israeli model which favours 
private enforcement. Indeed, even the English National Consumer Council (NCC) has 
expressed its concern that limiting representative actions to organisations would mean 
that class actions would have little use in practice.
166
 The NCC also expressed its 
doubt that consumer organisations would be prepared to bear the financial risks of 
bringing an action and whether the procedure would be likely to exclude valid 
consumer claims.
167
  
Looking at the performance of organisational claims in Europe and thus far in Israel, 
the inevitable conclusion is that organisations as representatives do not create a 
workable system on their own. Organisations have neither the incentives nor the 
budget, and would not take the risks of very expensive litigation in order to bring an 
action for damages for a group of injured members.  
 
On the other hand, independent organisations are reliable agents, ideological 
claimants and therefore they should be further encouraged to bring collective actions 
for damages. In order to promote organisational collective redress, a new vision is 
required. There should also be intervention from the Commission to decide which 
organisations should be deemed to be reliable and how cooperation between these 
bodies should take place. The Commission should set new criteria for representative 
collective redress which require accountability, independence and credibility from 
licensed cooperation as well as an agenda for cooperation in cross-border cases. 
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B. Which Organisational Enforcement Should be Permitted? 
 
The idea for preferring organisation actions over private actions is based on the 
credibility of organisations as secured agents. As seen in Israel, the Consumer 
Council, an organisation established by law, is trusted to bring collective actions as 
are other organisations which comply with certain conditions. However, thus far there 
have been no organisational actions in Israel, and the Israeli legislator would have to 
consider how to promote such actions.   
 
On the other hand, not all organisations may be regarded as secured agents. There are 
different features that may risk the credibility of organisations such as the system of 
governance, the extent to which the members can control the association and prevent 
the association from pursuing goals of its own which conflict with objectives of the 
class members, the extent to which the association can control the lawyer acting on its 
behalf, and the possible influence of third parties on the association. Looking at the 
above features, it seems that there are certainly some organisations which are more 
secure than others for the purpose of leading class actions for damages. Therefore, in 
order to decide which organisations should be allowed to act as representatives in 
collective actions in Europe it is important to look at the different types of 
organisations operating in Europe and their distinct features.  
 
Currently, the organisations that are permitted to bring collective actions in Europe 
can be categorised as follows: 
 
- The first category of organisation that may bring a collective action is an 
organisation based on membership, such as football associations, jockey clubs, 
and associations of certain producers, such as farming organisations based on 
farmer participation in value chains. These associations are well-known in the 
world and they are generally regarded as suitable agents.  
- The second category is an organisation with a broad purpose, such as a 
consumer organisation.  
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- The third type of organisation is an ad hoc organisation which is formed in 
order to bring an action following a certain event.
168
  
 
These categories may all be authorised to bring collective actions but the main 
question is what standards of reliability should be imposed in order to ensure that 
organisations which are allowed to bring collective redress cases on behalf of their 
members can be trusted.  
 
i.  Existing Criteria for Organisations Engaged in Collective Actions 
 
Generally, in most member states, an organisation's articles of association are 
examined before certifying its standing. Some jurisdictions require additional 
elements, for example, a minimum number of members
169
 or length time in 
operation.
170
 In addition, some jurisdictions require that an association is not acting 
for profit
171
 and in some jurisdictions, ad hoc groups formed specifically to bring an 
action may also act as claimants.
172
  
 
In Israel, any non-political organisation which acts consistently to further a certain 
public goal for a minimum period of a year may bring an action in relation to a public 
goal with which the organisation is dealing.
173
 The requirement that an organisation 
should act consistently means that ad-hoc groups of class members are in effect 
excluded as representatives of class actions in Israel. The reason for this is that ad-hoc 
groups are not supervised and there is insufficient control over such bodies, hence 
they may be subject to abuse. The Israeli law does not put its emphasis on 
organisational actions, and thus the CAL lacks any requirements relating to the 
organisation's system of governance, the number of members and previous conduct of 
the organisation and its directors.  
 
                                                 
168 
One of the better known farming organizations involves the milk industry in India: more than 70% 
of India’s milk is produced by households who own only one or two dairy animals, and these 
producers form part of a nationwide network of dairy cooperatives.
 
169
 For example, Denmark. 
170
 For example, Denmark. 
171
 For example, Portugal. 
172 
For example, The Netherlands. 
173
 The Class Action Law 5766-2006, s 2. 
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In Europe, the infrastructure for organisations operating as consumer representatives 
is much more established and open towards organisations. In Spain, for example, 
where the interests of the class members are diffuse and it is difficult to determine the 
composition of the group of class members, the only consumer associations entitled to 
bring such actions at national level are those which are members of the Council of 
Consumers and Users (Consejo de Consumidores y Usuarios), which are in turn 
designated by the Ministry of Health and Consumer Affairs (Ministerio de Sanidad y 
Consumo). This is due to the higher credibility of such organisations which are 
supervised by the Ministry. In different types of Spanish collective actions i.e. actions 
for groups of consumers where members are identified or easily identifiable, other 
organisations may also act as representatives provided that these organisations 
represent the majority of relevant consumers.
174
 
 
The main advantage of the Spanish system is that group actions can be commenced by 
a wider range of entities in cases involving identified consumers, since both consumer 
organisations and groups of consumers themselves may bring an action, provided that 
the majority of the group consists of affected consumers.
175
 The Spanish system is 
more sophisticated than the Israeli mechanism in that it distinguishes organisations by 
their level of licensing and credibility. The Spanish system improves organisations' 
access to justice by increasing the number of organisations which may represent class 
members while taking a much more cautious approach towards non-party members 
who may only be represented by special and more reliable designated and licensed 
organisations. Indeed, statistics show that in Spain, opening the doors to a variety of 
organisations (together with the funding options discussed in the next part of this 
chapter and the quasi opt-out model discussed in the earlier part of this chapter) 
resulted in the number of collective actions there being the highest in Europe and 
brought most benefits to consumers through collective actions.
176
   
 
                                                 
174
 Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil, Article 11 (2) (Civil Procedure Law, Spain).  
175
 Laurel J. Harbour and Marc E. Shelley, ‘The Emerging European Class Action: Expanding Multi-
Party Litigation To A Shrinking World’ (ABA Annual Meeting, Section of Litigation, August 3-6, 
2006) <www.shb.com/attorneys/Shelley/TheEmergingEuropeanClassAction.pdf> accessed 2 
September 2011. 
176 
European Commission - DG SANCO, 'Evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of collective 
redress mechanisms in the European Union - Main Report' (Civil Consulting and Oxford Economics, 
2008) see at page 88 at <http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/collective_redress_en.htm.> 
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In the Netherlands
177
 and France
178
 only associations may initiate collective claims. 
The associations may take several forms including groups of individual victims 
(groups of consumers). Consumer associations can also initiate proceedings to defend 
their members’ interests, as well as their own interests and the general interests of 
consumers. The French adopted a different approach to the Spanish legislator, 
distinguishing between actions taken by organisations where the collective interest 
has been harmed and actions where a group of consumers has given a specific 
mandate to the organisation to sue on their behalf on an opt-in basis. The latter action 
is enshrined in the Royer Act which was codified in the Consumer Code in 1993, and 
this instrument allows associations whose aim is the protection of consumer interests 
to take actions in the collective interests of consumers. Furthermore, non-profit 
organisations are allowed to act before civil or criminal courts to protect the collective 
interests of consumers.
179
  
 
In its Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach 
of the EC Antitrust Rules, the European Commission recommended, that qualified 
entities should take two forms. Firstly, it recommended organisations authorised by 
member states and which meet certain criteria, designated in advance to represent a 
certain interest. These organisations may bring collective actions for damages in the 
name of identified members or even in certain cases in the name of identifiable 
members who are not part of the organisation. Secondly, ad hoc organisations were 
recommended, which are set up and certified by member states to bring a 
representative action in relation to a particular infringement. Such organisations 
should provide sufficient assurances that abusive litigation will be avoided.
180
 
 
However, thus far the European Commission has left the criteria for approving 
qualified agencies for bringing actions open and vague, allowing each member state 
                                                 
177 Burgerlijk Wetboek, art. 3:305a-c CC (The Dutch Civil Code). 
178 Under the French Consumer Code, C. Cons. Article L. 421-1, action for collective interests of 
consumers regarding actions under the Royer Act introduced the "Action for collective interests of 
consumers and action en représentation conjointe des consommateurs (joint actions) under Article L. 
422-1 of the French Consumer Code. 
179 According to the Leuven study – French national report from 2007, only 20 organisations were 
recognised. Available at <http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/collective_redress_en.htm> 
accessed 26 November 2011. 
180 European Commission (n 62) 19 <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52008SC0404:EN:NOT> accessed 28 July 
2011. 
The Pillars of a Workable Model for Collective Actions 
 211 
to authorise any organisation it finds fit. The problem with the performance of 
organisations in Europe is that they have different powers which vary from one 
member state to another and that they perform differently. 
  
The European legislator gave a very vague definition to the phrase “qualified entities” 
in its Council Directive 98/27 (EC) on injunctions for the protection of consumers' 
interests, as follows:
181
 
 
(a) one or more independent public bodies, specifically responsible for protecting the 
interests referred to in Article 1, in Member States in which such bodies exist; 
and/or 
 
(b) Organisations whose purpose is to protect the interests referred to in Article 1, in 
accordance with the criteria laid down by their national law. 
 
Such a vague definition left the decision on how to authorise organisations for this 
purpose to the discretion of each member state.  
 
Looking at these poor guidelines for certifying organisations at Community level, it is 
clear that a collective redress representative would be better monitored by the 
European Commission and, at least as far as cross-border actions are concerned, the 
Community should step forward and set down appropriate criteria for certifying 
consumer organisations licensed to submit collective actions. This leads us to making 
our own propositions for a set of viable criteria.  
 
ii. Current Criteria Governing Representative Organisations 
 
When dealing with organisational representation, preference should be given to 
organisations that are deemed to be more accountable to their members. The system 
of governance of the organisation should be such that the voice of the injured 
members is heard and that the organisation will be accountable to its 
                                                 
181
 Council Directive (EC) 98/27 on injunctions for the protection of consumers' interests [1998] OJ 
L166/51, art. 3. 
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members.
182
There is always the fear that the organisation will act in its own 
interests,
183
 in the interests of a third party, or under government pressure (where 
funds are received from the government or where the government is licensing the 
organisation). Thus the organisations should prove their independence and intention 
to pursue the wishes of their members in the legal actions which the organisation 
brings. These independent organisations should be regarded as more credible and 
accountable to their members.
184
 
 
The other relevant requirement is that the organisation possesses the appropriate 
funding necessary to manage independent legal proceedings for the benefit of the 
injured class members. The organisation would have to prove that it has the required 
expertise necessary in order to deal with the matter and that it has control over the 
lawyer chosen to represent the class. 
  
Furthermore, organisations that have a proven track record of bringing successful 
actions should be given preference over ad-hoc associations that are formed only to 
bring a specific action. Such organisations are deemed to act in a manner which will 
maintain their good reputation and preserve their integrity.
185
In the U.K. the only 
organisation which has been granted the power to bring representative actions is 
‘Which?’. However, in most cases ‘Which?’ preferred to refer the matter to the OFT 
rather than take action itself.
186
 The enforcers in the U.K. undergo a very detailed 
examination which is set under the guidance of the DTI. This examination may be 
summarised as follows:
187
 
 
(1) The management of the organisation is such that it is expected to act 
independently, impartially and with complete integrity. 
 
(2) The organisation possesses experience and expertise in promoting or protecting 
the collective interests of consumers. 
                                                 
182
 Fabrizio Cafaggi and Hans-W Micklitz, (n 153) 18. 
183
 Roger Van den Bergh and Louis Visscher, (n 156). 
184 Department of Trade and Industry, 'Enforcement of consumer protection legislation' (2008) 
available at <http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaflets/enterprise_act/oft512.pdf> 
accessed 9 April 2012. 
185 Ibid. 
186
 Prof Rachael Mulheron (n 31). 
187
 The Department of Trade and Industry (n 184). The guidance includes 6 criteria with some overlap 
between them. 
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(3) Capability to investigate infringements and carry out the enforcement procedures; 
and  
(4) Cooperation with the OFT and other general enforcers. 
 
On the other hand, in France, associations must meet various criteria in order to be 
approved. They must obtain government approval, must have been in existence for at 
least six months and must have a minimum number of members. Once these criteria 
have been met, an administrative agreement for five years may be granted by a local 
or national authority (Préfet (Prefect), or Ministre de l’Economie, de l’Industrie et de 
l’Emploi (Minister of Economy, Industry and Employment)). Only twenty such 
agreements have been concluded in France. The rules of standing therefore limit the 
effectiveness of this action.
188
 
 
In Italy,
189
 independent Italian public bodies and certain organisations recognised in 
other EU member states and registered on an official list,
190
 may act to protect the 
collective interests of consumers and users,
191
 provided that it meets the following 
requirements:
192
 
 
1) The association must have been in existence for at least three years; 
2) The association must be not-for-profit; 
3) A list of members must be maintained and updated annually;  
4) The number of members must not be less than 0.5 per thousand of Italy's 
population;  
5) The association must have a presence in at least five regions or autonomous 
provinces, with a number of members no less than 0.2 per thousand inhabitants in 
each region;  
                                                 
188
  Véronique Magnier and Dr. Ralf Alleweldt, ‘Evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of 
collective redress mechanisms in the European Union – country report France’ (Civic Consulting, 
2008) at <http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/fr-country-report-final.pdf> accessed 27 
October 2011. 
189
 See Prof. Dr. iur. Hans-W. Micklitz and Dr. Cristina Poncibò, Evaluation of the effectiveness and 
efficiency of collective redress mechanisms in the European Union – country report Italy’ (Civic 
Consulting, 2008) <http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/it-country-report-final.pdf> 
accessed 11 April 2012. 
190
 The Ministry of Productive Activities keeps a list of all consumers’ and users’ associations. 
191
 Codice del consumo, Art. 139 (Consumer Code, Italy). 
192
 Codice del consumo, Art. 137 (Consumer Code, Italy). 
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6) A statement of income and expenditure must be produced each year; 
7) Continuous activities must have been carried out during the three previous years; 
and 
8) The association’s legal representatives must not have been convicted of any 
offences in relation to the association’s activities and the representatives must not 
be businessmen or directors of manufacturing or service companies for the sectors 
in which the association operates. 
 
These requirements are intended to be sufficiently strict to exclude unsuitable 
representatives, but they may also reduce the number of authorised associations, 
strengthen the power of the few accredited ones, and ultimately make them detached 
from individual members of the community. 
 
In Portugal, standing is granted to associations, even those which do not have a direct 
interest in the claim, albeit that their statutes or articles have a connection with the 
interests that they are pursuing in the Popular Action. With regards to associations,
193
 
the criteria set down
194
 provide that the associations be legally registered and that 
their operations be not for profit. The memorandum of association must prove that 
one of the association’s objectives is the protection of the rights and interests of 
consumers in general or their members as consumers. 
 
In view of the current differences in procedure between the European Union member 
states discussed above, it is clear that the Commission needs to set its own criteria for 
‘qualified entities’ in order to create a unified and coherent collective redress system 
for consumers.  
 
iii. Suggested Criteria for Qualified Entities 
 
The Relevant Criteria Suggested may be Categorised and Grouped as follows: 
 
                                                 
193 Associations are allowed to bring popular actions under Article 17 of Law 24/96 of 31 July 1996 
(Portugal). 
194
 Article 13 of the Law No. 83/95 Right of Proceeding, Participation, and Popular Action (Portugal). 
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The Goals of the Association: The memorandum of association should indicate that 
the suggested legal action falls within the targets of the associations as suggested in 
the Israeli provision.
195
 The importance of this condition is that the organisation gains 
expertise in the areas most familiar to the organisation. Moreover, operating in the 
regular field mitigates the fears of conflicts of interests as the interests of the 
organisations are similar to the interests of the injured class members. 
 
Accountability: Accountability is reached by appropriate management. The 
organisations that have listed members and run an election process are deemed to be 
more accountable to their members. Such an organisation maintains a list of its 
members.
196
 The members are updated by the board of directors from time to time in 
order to show their activities. In most cases the budget is subject to the general 
assemblies approval each year (as required in Italy). 
 
Therefore, associations based on membership will qualify best under the 
accountability criterion. General organisations such as government-funded consumer 
organisations are less accountable to injured members. However, they normally have 
to undergo a licensing procedure which may require such bodies to update their 
members as a good practice requirement. Ad hoc associations are less accountable as 
they do not normally need to follow good practice management, they do not require 
government approval and they cannot show previous successful conduct.  
 
Length of Operation: The law in Israel requires the organisation to operate for a year 
before bringing the action. The U.K. guidance indicates that two years' previous 
experience is required
197
 and the Italian legislation requires a minimum period of 
three years of experience. This provision is aimed to disqualify ad hoc groups which 
are set up especially for the specific actions in question. Such organisations do not 
maintain records of previous positive conduct, their previous actions cannot be 
examined, and thus they may lead abusive litigation or may be dangerous to the 
injured parties.  
 
                                                 
195
 Class Action Law 5766-2006 (Israel), s 2. 
196 Maintaining a list of members is a criterion set down in the Italian Consumer Code. 
197 Department of Trade and Industry, (n 184). 
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Funds Available: The criteria in the U.K. provide that the organisation should 
produce evidence that it possesses financial resources and the capability to properly 
investigate complaints.
198
 The other relevant criterion is that the organisation is acting 
independently with no commitment to any third party. In order to maintain its 
independence, funds should be available from sources which do not seek to exert their 
will on the organisation by financing it. It is therefore important that associations be 
allowed to maintain capital in order to obtain high level expert advice and consulting 
services before bringing the action. The activities of the organisation would be very 
limited if the organisation lacked funding and if one unsuccessful action were capable 
of financially destroying it.
199
 One the other hand, associations may have better means 
of finance than private individuals and therefore they may bear the risk of losing 
individual lawsuits, although scholars suggest exempting organisations from litigation 
fees unless they act unreasonably.
200
  
 
Reputation: Some member states
201
 require that the organisation be a non-profit 
organisation in order to ensure that it maintains its integrity. This requirement also 
stipulates that the organisation itself and its directors have no previous criminal 
convictions.
202
 The reputation requirement is important in order to prove credibility 
which is very important where an organisation suggests representing victims, 
especially in opt-out actions where the group members are absent and the organisation 
is deemed to act for their benefit. Reputation also includes looking at the 
organisation's track record and its achievements in protecting its members' rights.
203
 
 
Number of Members: In Italy, the number of members in an organisation which may 
bring an action must not be less than 0.5 per thousand of the Italian population. The 
association must be present in at least five regions or autonomous provinces, with a 
number of members no less than 0.2 per thousand inhabitants in each region; A 
minimum number is also required in other jurisdictions such as France. The idea 
                                                 
198 Department of Trade and Industry, (n 184). 
199 Peter Rott, ‘The Protection of Consumers’ Interest After the Implementation of the EC Injunctions 
Directive into German and English Law’ 24 Journal of Consumer Policy 401.  
200 Ibid.  
201 Such as Sweden, Italy, France and Portugal. See sec 13 of Law No. 83/95 Right of Proceeding, 
Participation, and Popular Action (Portugal).  
202
 As required by the Department of Trade and Industry guidelines in the U.K and the Italian criteria. 
203 Department of Trade and Industry, (n 184). 
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which underlies these requirements is based on the interest theory. The organisation 
has to be representative in the relevant area. On the other hand, a requirement such as 
that in Portugal that the organisation must prove that it represents the majority of the 
injured class is problematic in opt-out actions as it is difficult to precisely predict the 
size of the class of injured members from the outset. The minimum requirement is not 
relevant to general consumer organisations which are established by the government 
to deal with consumer complaints. Such organisations normally supervise a certain 
geographical area. In so far as organisations which are aimed to supervise a certain 
market (e.g. gas consumers, electricity consumers etc) are concerned, the 
representation requirement should provide that the organisation reflect the interests of 
the players in the area. There is no logic in limiting the number of members (apart 
from the minimum number of members required for establishing an association) as 
the minimum number may change from one area to another. 
 
Licensing and Cooperation: When dealing with cross-border cases, cooperation 
between organisations is very important in gaining as much relevant information as 
possible. The cooperation between member states should be compatible with 
Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
27 October 2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the 
enforcement of consumer protection laws, albeit that organisations should be allowed 
to bring collective redress cases for damages and not just for injunctive relief. Acting 
in accordance with this regulation means that when a competent authority becomes 
aware of an infringement committed in the EU, it must notify the authorities of other 
member states as well as the Commission. It must also supply, at the request of 
another competent authority, all relevant information required to establish whether an 
infringement has occurred. In addition, it must take all necessary enforcement 
measures to bring about the cessation or prohibition of the infringement.
204
 
Currently the requirement of mutual cooperation provides that the competent 
authorities inform the Commission of the existence of an infringement, the measures 
taken and the effects thereof, and the coordination of their activities. The Commission 
                                                 
204 Cooperation between Member States for consumer protection as explained by the Commission with 
regards to regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 available at 
<http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/consumers/protection_of_consumers/l32047_en.htm> 
accessed 26 November 2011.  
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stores and processes the information it receives in an electronic database. All requests 
for mutual assistance must contain sufficient information to enable the authority to 
fulfil the request.
205
 
Currently, cooperation is limited to investigation and injunctions to stop 
infringements. However, there is a clear need to enlarge this field to allow qualified 
entities which conform with the above-mentioned criteria to deal with collective 
actions. 
Such organisations should have a cooperation agenda in cross border cases within the 
Community,
206
 which would include publishing important information, such as: 
 
1. New cases of collective redress; 
2. Complaints about businesses;  
3. Any abuse in collective redress cases; 
4. Relevant judgments; 
5. Compromises in collective redress cases; 
6. Distribution of damages to class members; and 
7. Licensed collective redress authorities and organizations; 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘relevant information’).207 
 
The relevant information would appear on the internet websites of all the 
organizations at a place designated for the publication of all relevant information on 
collective redress cases.
208
 This would enhance cooperation where the members of the 
                                                 
205 Cooperation between Member States for consumer protection as explained by the Commission with 
regards to regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 available at 
<http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/consumers/protection_of_consumers/l32047_en.htm> 
accessed on the 26 November 2011. 
206 The information suggested is different from the current information which the competent authorities 
have to provide under Decision 2007/76/EC of 22 December 2006 which implemented Regulation 
(EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 2004 on 
cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection 
laws as regards mutual assistance [Official Journal L 32 of 6.2.2007]. 
This Decision provides the information requirements, which include the minimum information to be 
included in requests for mutual assistance and in alerts, the time limits to be complied with, access to 
information and the use of languages. 
207 The relevant information and cooperation may be monitored by community central organisations 
such as BEUC (Bureau Européen des Unions de Consommateurs) and ANEC (European Association 
for the Co-ordination of Consumer Representation in Standardisation). 
208 A public registry of collective cases is operated in several countries, for example,  
 The Class Action Registry in Israel at <http://elyon1.court.gov.il//heb/tovanot_y/list.htm>; 
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class are scattered geographically or where additional information in relation to a 
rough trader is required. Registration of any action should be mandatory immediately 
on submission of every collective redress case in order to prevent multiplicity of 
actions and in order to allow maintaining centralised information in this respect.  
 
  3.  Promoting Public Enforcement Combined with Private Individual 
Actions for Damages  
 
The state is another player in the area of enforcement. The establishment and 
enforcement of legal norms to secure the market from unlawful behaviour is the 
traditional role of the state. The traditional division between public and private 
enforcement is that public enforcement is concerned primarily with deterrence and 
punishment, whereas private enforcement is concerned with obtaining compensation 
and justice for victims.   
 
However, there have been some attempts to involve the state in the damages process 
and allow the state to act as a representative in class actions. For example, according 
to the Israeli model, the state acting through authorities and public bodies has the 
authority to bring class actions in order to claim damages for groups of injured 
members. However, to date in Israel no collective actions have been submitted by a 
public authority. The fact that the performance of public authorities is very weak 
insofar as actions for damages are concerned, even where financial incentives for 
successful actions are available, suggests that public authorities are apathetic towards 
financial incentives. Instead, public enforcers are traditionally concerned with the 
prevention of unlawful behaviour.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 The GLO registry in the U.K. at <http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/courts-and-
tribunals/courts/queens-bench/group-litigation-orders.htm>; 
 The Class Actions Registry, (for members who opt in) under Sec 35 of the Dispute Act (Act of 17 
June 2005 no. 90 relating to mediation and procedure in civil disputes) in Norway;  
 The Class Proceedings Registry in Ontario, Canada at 
<http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/scj/en/notices/pd/classproceedings.htm>.  
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A. Enforcement of Consumer Law by Public Bodies in some Major European 
Jurisdictions 
 
In Europe, the involvement of the state through its agencies in the collective redress 
process is much more natural than in Israel where private individuals are seen as the 
major drivers at the fore of the collective redress machine. In fact, in Europe some 
member states, such as Denmark, the U.K. and Portugal, have granted powers to the 
administrative authorities to initiate collective actions. However, the powers vary 
from state to state, although in general public authorities in Europe have not brought 
collective redress cases.  
 
Looking at some examples it becomes clear that in Europe, the interaction between 
public consumer protection agencies and private consumer associations is not 
homogenous and varies depending on the rules in each individual member state.
209
 
There is no proper supervision at Community level. According to the principle of 
subsidiarity,
210
 the E.U. may intervene in the enforcement proceedings of public 
agencies only if it is able to act more effectively than member states in enforcing 
consumer rights. The fact that the E.U. generally leaves enforcement of consumer 
rights to the determination of each member state has led to an inconsistent approach 
between member states.
211
 
 
In the U.K. for example, consumer organisations designated by the Secretary of State 
(such as the Consumers' Association) submit ‘super-complaints’ to the OFT.212 A 
super-complaint is used where there is a risk that consumer interests are significantly 
harmed. The OFT may take enforcement action, launch a market study or refer the 
                                                 
 
209 Fabrizio Cafaggi and Hans-W Micklitz, (n 153). 
210 The principle of subsidiarity is established in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union, 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2008] OJ C115/13 at <http://eur-
<lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0013:0045:EN:PDF> accessed 7 
October 2011. 
211
 Under Article 4 of the The Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (Consolidated Version of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union [2010] OJ C83/47), the EU and Member States are 
authorised to adopt binding acts in these fields. However, Member States may exercise their 
competence only in so far as the EU has not exercised, or has decided not to exercise, its own 
competence. See <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0047:0200:EN:PDF> accessed 7 
October 2011.   
212
 Enterprise Act 2002, s 11.  
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complaint to the Competition Commission or a sector regulator. A representative 
organisation may also complain to the OFT that a contract term drawn up for general 
use is unfair under the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. The 
OFT will decide whether to bring proceedings for an injunction in order to stop an 
illegal action. This procedure does not allow damages claims but yet is for the benefit 
of a class of injured members who suffer from the unlawful action which the OFT is 
aiming to stop. Since the OFT has the authority to deal with super-complaints, this 
raises the question as to why the OFT is not entrusted to deal with consumer class 
actions for damages.  
 
There are currently other public authorities which represent consumer interests and 
their power may potentially be enlarged to deal with consumer collective redress for 
damages. In Italy for example, the Publico Ministero (Attorney General) has been 
entrusted with the role of protecting consumers by instigating criminal proceedings. 
The Consumer Code adopted in 2005 did not include any mechanism for consumer 
protection by collective redress. However, the Italian Consumer Code assigned 
various functions to governmental organisations such as the National Council of 
Consumers and Users (Consiglio Nazionale dei Cosumatori e degli Utenti). The 
Italian Consumer Code
213
 gives this Council powers to represent consumer 
associations nationwide. The Council is composed of 17 recognised associations. 
Thus far the performance of the Council has been very limited and its main role has 
been to carry out bureaucratic work for the Italian government. Another relevant 
governmental authority is the Italian Antitrust Authority which has the power to 
impose fines according to Articles 18-37 of the Consumer Code. The Antitrust 
Authority in Italy has only recently been given this power in order to comply with the 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive.
214
 The Authority is also responsible for the 
application of the Regulation on Consumer Protection Cooperation.
215
 
 
In Sweden, public enforcers such as the Consumer Ombudsman or the Swedish 
Environmental Protection Agency may bring a public collective action on broad 
                                                 
213 Codice del consumo, Art. 136 (Consumer Code, Italy). 
214
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grounds which are not limited to consumer law.
216
 The Swedish class action 
legislation has had minimal use, much less than expected by the legislators, which is 
mainly attributed to the opt-in nature of the procedure. There are indeed some 
member states that permit representation by public bodies or private individuals, but 
such claims are very rare in Europe. In Sweden, only twelve cases have been brought 
in the first five years since the law was enacted in 2003. One action was brought by 
the Consumer Ombudsman
217
 and 11 cases were submitted by group members 
(assisted, in some instances, by organisations).
218
 None of the actions were initiated 
by an organisation. However, it was also anticipated that the public authorities would 
bring many more actions than the single case which has been reported thus far.
219
 The 
scarce use of public actions in Sweden is additional evidence that public authorities 
cannot be solely responsible for claiming damages for consumers. There should be 
better mechanisms for making public enforcement more effective. 
 
In Denmark
220
 the only eligible class representative that can bring an opt-out action is 
the public authority authorised for this purpose by law, which at present is the 
Consumer Ombudsman.
221
 The Danish jurisdiction is the first jurisdiction to allow a 
state body to act as representative in collective redress cases and bring such actions 
(up to a limited amount of money) on an opt-out basis.
222
 Thus far this model has not 
resulted in higher rates of collective redress cases than in other European member 
states. However, the interaction of the state in actions for damages has been warmly 
welcomed and praised by commentators, and may form the basis for a European 
development
223
 with some modifications to improve the interaction with private 
enforcement as suggested later in Chapter Five.    
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B. The Advantages of Public Enforcement 
 
Public enforcement has not yet proven to be fruitful insofar as damages actions are 
concerned. However, public enforcement should not be neglected since it has some 
clear advantages over private enforcement.  
 
These advantages include special powers conferred on public bodies of investigation 
and discovery
224
 which may assist in proving consumer cases. These powers are not 
shared by consumers who normally lack sufficient financial resources to prove 
business misconduct. In addition, where misconduct also constitutes a criminal 
offence or, in other special matters such as competition, a legal infringement, public 
bodies might have additional powers to confiscate documents, conduct searches and 
to enforce formal inquiries and interrogations.
225
   
Public enforcers appear to be more objective and will look at the general good of all 
players in the market, whereas private enforcers may look at their own pocket.
226
 In 
addition, private enforcement has a smaller range of sanctions and the damages 
claimed generally cover the individual losses of the plaintiffs who have brought the 
action.  
 
In the American system, private claimants have been said to act as a ‘private attorney 
general’.227 The meaning here is that private enforcement is led by lawyers who are 
acting as private attorney generals. Commentators have criticised the role of private 
enforcement, at least insofar as civil rights actions are concerned.
228
 Professor Coffee 
has criticised the idea of a private attorney general and noted that lawyers 
representing class actions may have different interests to those of their clients, which 
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could result in either poor representation (where plaintiffs’ lawyers sell out their 
clients) or excessive litigation (as the parties to litigation do not bear the costs)
229
 
whilst the lawyer tries to burden the defendants with excessive litigation or works on 
an hourly basis.
 
 
 
In addition, Professor Michael Selmi analysed a survey of high-profile employment 
class actions with large settlements (in which the issue examined was the benefit of 
private enforcement in lawyer-driven class actions). All of these cases were brought 
by private plaintiffs’ lawyers. Professor Selmi concluded that these class actions 
produced only modest financial benefits for class members, despite the fact that the 
remedial focus of the cases was monetary relief. Therefore, Professor Selmi claimed 
that one of the few things that these cases accomplished was enriching the lawyers 
involved. In addition, the lawyers did not stand to gain any substantial benefits from 
deterring future wrongdoings.
230
 Therefore private enforcement led by private 
lawyers, though highly praised in Israel and in the U.S., may lead to abuse and may 
not lead to the maximum benefit to the class of injured members. 
 
Looking back at some European scholars' views on the issue of enforcement, the 
general view in Europe gives precedence to public enforcement. Willem van Boom 
and Marco Loos argue that whatever the enforcement culture of each E.U. member 
state, public enforcement is indispensable.
231
 They base their argument, inter alia, on 
more recent European legislation such as the Cooperation Regulation and the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive which designate ‘competent administrative 
authorities’ and ‘public bodies’ with the task of enforcing and cooperating in the 
collective interests of consumers.  
 
                                                 
229 Professor John C Coffee Jr, ‘Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer 
as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working’ [1983] 42 MD. L. REV. 215 see at page 220.  
230 Michael Selmi, ‘The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action Employment 
Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects’ [2003] 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1249. 
231 Willem van Boom and Marco Loos 'Effective enforcement of consumer law in Europe 
Private, public, and collective mechanisms' in W.H. van Boom, M.B.M. Loos (eds.), Collective 
enforcement of consumer law in Europe. Securing compliance in Europe through private group 
action and public authority intervention, (Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2007), available at 
<www.professorvanboom.eu/pdf_files/Consumer_interests_TOC.PDF> accessed 25 November 
2011. 
The Pillars of a Workable Model for Collective Actions 
 212 
Professor Hodges, also prefers public enforcement and notes that: "Unlike the United 
States, the “big stick” would not be that of private class litigation, but would primarily 
be that of public authorities, which would operate on a far more immediate, flexible 
and responsive basis, involving incentives for restitution rather than delayed weighty 
financial penalties."
232
 Professor Hodges considers public enforcement to be a better 
system than private collective redress because it involves lower costs as there are no 
intermediaries (such as lawyers and class representatives), and quicker procedures. 
Therefore, he suggests that before introducing a new private collective redress system, 
the outcome of the public regulatory mechanism should be examined. Professor 
Hodges recommended a new approach, preferring public enforcement to civil 
enforcement, claiming that efficient use of public authorities may be more effective in 
eliminating any financial gain or benefit from non-compliance.
233
 His new approach is 
based on the Hampton Report on reducing enforcement burdens on businesses
234
 and 
the Macrory Report on penalties policy,
235
 both of which are not directly connected to 
‘collective redress,’ but which Professor Hodges considers a good starting point for 
his new and innovative approach. The Macrory Report encouraged settlement of 
infringements through restorative justice, a process whereby those most directly 
affected by a wrongdoing come together to determine what needs to be done to repair 
the harm and prevent a recurrence. This is in line with Professor Hodges' view that 
disputes should be settled more quickly, cheaply and effectively thus making recourse 
to the courts the last resort. These reports led to new regulations in the U.K., the 
Regulators Compliance Code,
236
 which is made under the Legislative and Regulatory 
Reform Act 2006. Section 21 of this Act enacts the principles of good regulation 
mentioned in the Hampton Report which require good regulation to be transparent, 
accountable, proportionate and consistent. The Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions 
Act 2008
237
 gives the regulator the power to impose sanctions on the offender aimed 
to ensure that the offence will not recur and the position is restored so far as it is 
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possible. In cases where the offender refuses to comply with a discretionary 
requirement, the enforcer may decide to prosecute the original offence. The 
restoration order may be brought by a civil action by the injured parties but this is 
unlikely to happen where the damage to each individual is low. The restitution order 
is aimed at eliminating any financial gain which the offender has gained from non-
compliance. Otherwise, the authority may negotiate a settlement with the offender. In 
this case, the public authorities can promote payment to the injured members for any 
infringement without the intervention of public enforcement bodies. 
 
However, in practice, public authorities have, thus far, not been very successful in 
obtaining damages for individuals as seen in Israel and in the member states which 
allow collective redress by public authorities.
238
 It should be borne in mind that public 
bodies are working under budget constraints and may not be able to deal with all 
cases brought to their attention. Therefore, there is a risk that the selection of cases 
and the investment of time and effort in preparing cases may also be biased towards 
more prestigious causes, rather than focusing on market correction. Thus even though 
public, rather than private, enforcement is the preferred option (it is safe from abuses, 
less costly to society, needs no intermediaries or lawyers), due to its poor record of 
achievement to date, it should not be designated as the sole enforcement method. 
Cooperation between public and private enforcement systems may therefore allow 
each of these methods to complete one another. 
 
Indeed, the OFT takes the view that private enforcement is complementary to public 
enforcement, since the latter is more suited to dealing with wrongful activities and 
practices, while the former has a deterrent effect on businesses due to the magnitude 
of the possible damages.
239
 The OFT stated in a discussion paper relating to 
competition that private actions are an essential complement to public enforcement. 
The OFT stated that public enforcement and private actions work alongside and in 
harmony with one another to the best effect for consumers and for the economy.’240 
The ideas related to enforcement of competition law, which is also a consumer related 
                                                 
238
 Such as Denmark, Portugal and Sweden. 
239
 The Office of Fair Trading, 'Private actions in competition law: effective redress for consumers and 
business', Discussion paper OFT916, (April 2007) at  
<http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft916.pdf> accessed 17 September 2011. 
240
 Ibid.  
The Pillars of a Workable Model for Collective Actions 
 211 
area, the enforcement mechanism of the regulatory bodies, as well as private 
enforcement, are similar to general consumer cases. 
 
C. Combining Private and Public Enforcement 
 
A solution proposing that private actions should only be used as a supplement to 
public enforcement may combine the best of both enforcement systems. There are 
several advantages of public enforcement which make it superior to private 
enforcement. Public enforcement, through its reliance on state power, benefits from 
more effective investigative and sanctioning powers. Public enforcement is also 
superior because it entails more effective sanctions - it is not limited to the imposition 
of monetary sanctions in the form of fines, but also encompasses other types of 
sanctions, such as director disqualifications and prison sentences. Public enforcement 
is also cheaper than private enforcement, because it requires fewer resources to be 
spent in the determination and allocation of the damages.
241
 Public enforcement has 
the additional advantage of allowing better control in setting the optimal amount of 
the sanction.
242
 Public enforcement may also generally be cheaper because of the 
higher degree of expertise and the generally lower cost of administrative procedures 
compared to civil litigation.
243
 Public enforcement is also regarded as more neutral in 
comparison with private actions for damages which are driven by the private interests 
of the parties concerned, which may be different from those of the general public.  
 
However, public enforcement has not improved access to justice or provided any 
substantial remedy to consumers thus far. On the other hand, as far as the pursuit of 
personal compensation is concerned, private actions for damages appear to be 
superior to public enforcement. In Israel, the private agency mechanism has proven to 
be very workable, although it has been subject to excessive use and subject to abuse 
by lawyers trying to obtain a share of the damages rather than bringing compensation 
to the injured class members.  
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The question is whether these two mechanisms should be combined, reaping the 
advantages of both while preventing the hazards as much as possible. 
As Wouter P.J. Wils argues in his article in relation to antitrust actions,
244
 public 
antitrust enforcement is the superior instrument for pursuing the objectives of 
clarification and development of the law and deterrence and punishment of 
infringements, whereas private actions for damages are superior for the pursuit of 
corrective justice through compensation. Therefore to Wils' mind,
245
 the optimal 
antitrust enforcement system would appear to be a system in which public antitrust 
enforcement aims to clarify and develop the law and to deter and punish 
infringements, while private actions for damages aim to achieve compensation. This 
approach of separating the tasks of different enforcement systems corresponds to the 
classic, time-honoured concept of the different roles of public enforcement and 
private actions for damages, not just in the area of antitrust but in the law in 
general.
246
  
It seems that the English approach, which distinguishes follow-on actions from stand-
alone actions
247
 in competition cases, should be adopted as the basis of the new 
collective redress model.
248
 Such a model gives preference to public enforcement and 
allows private stand-alone actions only following a public authority action.  
According to this system, private claims for damages can take two different forms. 
Firstly, they can be conducted in the footsteps of public enforcement as follow-on 
suits, or they may be pursued where no public action has been taken as stand-alone 
suits. Follow-on actions for damages submitted by private individuals are much easier 
to bring than stand-alone actions for damages, because the public enforcement action 
will have established the existence of an antitrust violation, and may also have 
generated useful evidence which may be open for the individual to use in his 
subsequent action.
249
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If this approach is adopted, public enforcement will act as a filtering mechanism for 
private enforcement. It will resolve the problem of excessive private litigation as seen 
in Israel and the U.S. Under the suggested model, public enforcement is left to take 
precedence over private enforcement of consumer's rights. Yet private enforcement 
for damages claims which is favoured by the general public and may raise the 
confidence of consumers in cross-border trade remains available for consumers.
250
 
 
This mechanism makes it clear that public enforcement is superior to private 
enforcement as it avoids the risks of unmeritorious claims and the extortion of 
defendants. Every complaint is examined by the relevant public authority and only 
when the public authority finds that the complaint is justified may a follow-on action 
be available. 
 
It should be made clear that follow-on actions are not sufficient on their own and they 
must be supplemented with stand-alone actions to be used where the relevant public 
enforcer fails to take proceedings within the specified time limit. This approach does 
not shut the door completely on private actions. The best solution would be to bring 
every private action to the desk of the relevant public body, allowing a private person 
to bring a representative stand-alone action only if the public body decides not to 
commence group proceedings within a reasonable period. The stand-alone actions 
would be treated with caution and the representatives would have to comply with 
financial conditions and the viability of each case on its merits. The application for a 
stand-alone action would undergo a filtering process to allow the action to be 
certified.  
Individuals, rather than public bodies, are best placed to know of situations where an 
abuse leading to damage has occurred. If a complaint leads to public action which 
results in compensation for a group of consumers, it seems only fair that a private 
individual or organisation which has referred the matter to a public body should be 
remunerated with a share of any financial award in return for initiating the process 
that led to compensation for the group’s members. Such a procedure does not exist in 
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Israel. However, there are several examples that may be followed such as the super-
complaint mechanism operated by the OFT in the U.K.
251
 Another source for such a 
complaint mechanism is Article 16(1) of Regulation 1/2003
252
 which gives binding 
effect to some of the findings of the Commission in relation to competition 
infringements following an investigation on its own initiative or by acting on a 
complaint,
253
so as to create uniform application of Community competition law. Such 
a complaint can be lodged by any natural or legal person who can show a legitimate 
interest, having suffered harm as a result of the infringement which certainly qualifies 
as a legitimate interest. The claimants in the follow-on action for damages need only 
establish the harm they have suffered and the causal link between the infringement 
and the harm suffered. 
  
This is a change which should be introduced into the Israeli model to rebalance the 
enforcement mechanism and put more weight on public enforcement with possible 
complementary proceedings by private individuals. If the Israeli model were to adopt 
this change, it would benefit from more careful public enforcement with possible 
complementary private follow-on private damges. This way the flood problem which 
is caused by private stand-alone actions would have been seriously mitigated.
254
  
However, thus far the Israeli jurisdiction lacks proper infrastructure for public 
enforcement and lacks organisations to deal with class actions. Indeed very few 
actions have been brought in Israel by organisations.  
 
On the other hand organisational intervention is very welcomed in most European 
member states albeit organisations in Europe have failed to bring collective redress 
actions and the European Commission has failed to develop a unified system for the 
licensing of organisations to deal with collective actions for damages. The European 
Union is capable of accepting a collective redress mechanism led by organisations and 
private follow-on actions. 
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Part C. Should a Class Action Model include Financial 
Incentives? 
 
Under the Israeli model, collective actions led by private individuals are most popular. 
This can in part be explained by the fact that under the Israeli system, financial 
incentives are offered to private claimants. It is thus crucial to analyse the role that 
those incentives play in the decision making of private individuals engaging in class 
actions and assess if financial incentives should form an integral part of any private 
class action. In the European context, it should be noted that, whilst Europe would 
tend to favour public enforcement, a mixed regime enabling private actions as well as 
public agencies and organisations would, in our view, bring the best benefits, as 
already demonstrated. The intervention of private individuals in a representative claim 
for damages may be very risky for the representative who may be liable to pay the 
court fees and other party expenses at the end of the case. Therefore some incentives 
should be introduced in order to convince such representatives to take the risks of 
handling a collective action. There are various types of incentives that may be offered 
to encourage private individuals to engage in representing groups of consumers in 
claims for damages. On the other hand if financial incentives were unlimited and the 
risk of paying costs very low, this may carry the risk of excessive use of the class 
action machinery. For this reason, commentators regard financial incentives for 
private plaintiffs as the source of the multiplicity of claims.
255
 Professor Hodges 
claims that if financial incentives for private litigants are combined with collective 
proceedings, there is an inherent risk of abuse.
256
  
 
In the search for a new European model, Professor Hodges reached the frustrating 
conclusion that either collective redress mechanisms do not work effectively or they 
work too much:  
 
 Most of the existing collective procedures that exist in EU Member States are 
little used, because of the problems of funding and the costs rules. But if those 
features were to be changed, the system would quickly attract many claims (a) 
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that could be dealt with in other ways and (b) in which the merits were 
lowered. Increasing the financial incentives would merely attract 
intermediaries to capture the procedures […]257 
 
This is certainly a correct analysis when looking at the Israeli model where the 
introduction of financial incentives for individuals has led to an increased number of 
class actions. However, before giving up the idea of collective redress and looking for 
other workable mechanisms, an in-depth study of the various types of financial 
incentives which may be offered to private plaintiffs is required. There are various 
cumulative incentives and measures employed in the Israeli regime which together 
have made the Israeli model too accessible. However, the different types of incentives 
should be inspected one by one and compared with other European member state 
mechanisms in order to decide which of the incentives should be adopted as part of 
the new collective procedure. 
 
The different types of financial incentives in use under the Israeli CAL may be 
classified into two main categories. Firstly, the negative expenditure incentive. . This 
incentive which is preventative in its nature, exempts the representative plaintiff from 
making extensive payments. This might deter him or her from submitting a justifiable 
action. Secondly, positive incentives which are a financial bonus paid to the 
representative to encourage the representative to act positively and bring justifiable 
actions.  
 
  1. Positive Incentives and Negative Expenditure 
 
In the first category of negative expenditure, the representative is exempted or enjoys 
reductions in expenditure which may be the outcome of bringing the action and the 
out-of-pocket payments that he might be liable to pay. This category includes court 
payments that the representative is expected to pay and costs that may be imposed on 
the losing party if the action is unsuccessful. The latter is also known as the ‘loser 
pays’ principle. If the representative is expected to pay high court fees and the other 
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party's expenses, the risk of running the action may be higher than the profit that the 
representative stands to gain from the action.  
 
In Israel, class actions are almost totally exempt from court fees. In the past, before 
the certification process existed, a minimal fee was paid and court fees would only be 
paid from the proceeds of the action if the action was successful. However, the courts 
decided that court fees should be paid in class actions only in respect of personal 
actions by a representative plaintiff.
258
 This decision meant that in fact court fees were 
very low as the normal case in class actions is that the cost of the personal action is 
very low, hence the court fees which the representative had to pay for his personal 
action were minimal.  
 
The legal position changed under the CAL in Israel which provided that the matter of 
court fees is subject to further enactment.
259
 This enactment never came into force and 
the result is that since the introduction of CAL in 2006, class actions are completely 
exempt from court fees.
260
 As a consequence of this exemption, the doors are open to 
every individual consumer who wants to file an action, even on weak merits, as there 
is no barrier of paying court fees. The position would have been different had the 
courts required full payment of court fees in relation to the total value of the collective 
actions. If that would have been the case, representatives would have been asked to 
pay 2.5% of the total value of the collective action which, due to the aggregation of all 
personal claims, usually amounts to an extremely high figure. Had representatives 
been required to pay court fees according to the total value of the collective action, 
these fees would surely form a serious barrier to representatives, even if they had been 
promised that the losing party would repay this amount in a successful action.  
 
It is important to consider the effect of lowering costs and whether an exemption from 
court fees is a useful incentive for the submission of class actions. After examining 
jurisdictions other than Israel, the conclusion is that high court fees may deter 
plaintiffs from bringing class actions, but low court fees do not act as a real incentive 
to bring class actions. That means that if Europe is considering a new coherent 
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collective redress model, the incentive of lowering costs would not cause any 
improvement in so far as access to justice is concerned. In reaching this conclusion 
some concessions from the rigid rules of cost payments in some jurisdictions were 
examined.  
 
In Portugal for example, plaintiffs in Popular Actions are exempt from prepayment of 
costs
261
 and pre-payment of stamp duty.
262
 If the action fails, the judge will determine 
the costs which will be low - probably between 10 and 50% of the normal costs. This 
means that the reduction on legal fees may be as much as half of the normal fees.
263
 
The Portuguese law provides that the judge in the case takes into account the 
complexity of the case, the amount in question,
264
 the financial situation of the 
representative plaintiff and the reasons for the dismissal of the action. As mentioned 
earlier,
265
 there are very few collective actions in Portugal, which means that negative 
expenditure provisions, such as lowering court fees, do not per se improve access to 
justice. Some positive incentives are also needed. It is not sufficient to lower costs. It 
should be borne in mind that the Portuguese model is an opt-out model which lacks 
positive incentives and the system remains almost totally unused. The problem with 
the Portuguese model of reduced legal fees is that an individual consumer who wishes 
to initiate a collective action does not know from the outset how much money he will 
have to secure and the level of fees that he might have to pay when the case comes to 
an end. Thus, even if the judge decides to reduce the amount of costs dramatically at 
the end of the case, it does not reduce the risk which the representative has had to 
undertake from the moment of submission of the claim and until the judge's decision 
on costs. Therefore the representative is at risk of paying the full costs until the judge 
makes a decision on exemption from court fees.  
  
On the other hand, the Danish approach creates greater certainty and ought to be 
carefully considered as it could provide an interesting starting point for any class 
action model. The Danish introduced new rules
266
 relating to the payment of costs, 
including the requirement to deposit a surety imposing a cap on the amount a party to 
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a class action may have to pay. Indeed, according to this requirement, representatives 
and class members (in opt-in proceedings) are required to provide security for costs. 
In the event that the action fails, they are not required to pay legal costs in excess of 
the amount specified
267
 i.e. the security provided plus any sum owing to the class 
member as a result of the case.
268
 In addition, the court may require that any group 
member wishing to join the action provide security for the legal costs if the costs are 
not insured under Section 325 of the Danish Act or the costs are not covered by legal 
aid. The costs are paid by the state if the class action fulfils the terms for free legal aid 
under Sections 327-329 of the Administration of Justice Act, but at a maximum 
calculated according to Section 254e(7) of the latter Act.
269
 These measures have the 
effect of mitigating the risk of bringing a collective action as, from the beginning of 
the case, the representative knows the amount of the expenses which will be charged 
should the action fail. Therefore, these measures assist in calculating the risk that the 
representative might face. 
 
In an opt-out action, members of the opt-out collective redress action can only be 
ordered to pay the amount of money which they stand to recover if the proceedings 
are successful.
270
 Again, here the Danish model exhibits an interesting feature, as it 
gives the representative parties the information required when considering whether to 
bring a collective action.  
 
Features of the U.K. system, though different from the financial concessions in the 
Danish model, may lead to the same result. This system is known as the protective 
costs order which may allow claimants, in certain cases against a public body and in 
which the claimant lacks funds, to apply to the court for the costs of the action to be 
capped or to be indemnified against costs entirely. Thus, there is clear recognition that 
in exceptional circumstances, some types of litigation which are in the public interest 
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should not be constrained by cost pressures on the claimants.
271
 The advantage of 
protective costs orders is that they provide clarity on the issue of costs from the 
outset
272
 in the same way the Danish surety provision does.  
 
However, such incentives to class actions in circumstances where the public interest is 
not at stake may be abused and thus safeguards are needed. If these incentives are 
abused, the utility of the system disappears. As a result, in the England for example, 
the Court of Appeals has set down some very stringent criteria for allowing protective 
costs orders, which take into account the public interest of the case and whether the 
plaintiff is acting for private gain.
273
 The effect is similar to the Danish concept of a 
costs surety and it provides some security to the plaintiff by limiting his expenses 
from the outset of the case. This idea is excellent for consumers who sue for a small 
amount and may run the risk of having to pay huge costs.  
 
However, there is a disadvantage to the surety requirement. It may deter 
representatives from bringing just actions because they have to incur out-of-pocket 
expenses at the outset of the case, even if the case is strong on its merits. Nonetheless, 
the advantages of capping the costs from the outset outweighs the burden of 
depositing the surety as its gives the representative security from the risk of further 
payments at the end of the case, and enables the discontinuation of the action if the 
surety required is too high.  
 
A further consideration which should be taken into account is that in follow-on 
actions, the case is more substantiated as the public authority had already ruled 
against the defendant. Therefore, in these cases, a further concession from the surety 
requirement may be awarded, or a lower cap of costs should be imposed. In stand- 
alone actions where the action is much more complicated and may be less 
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substantiated, a higher security cap is justified. Therefore, the suggested rule should 
not follow the Israeli full costs exemption from court fees and the decision on costs at 
the end of the case. The new European mechanism should adopt a cost capping 
measure which gives private individuals security from excessive costs at the end of 
the trial. The cap should be higher in stand-alone actions than in follow-on actions. A 
full exemption from the surety requirement may be considered in follow-on cases. 
 
Furthermore, in considering the question of costs generally (not only court fees), it is 
important to consider that where the action has brought a benefit to the class or to the 
general public, the judge should have the discretion to relax the costs incurred by 
plaintiffs, for example, by exempting payment, or rewarding the losing party where 
the action has brought the violating behaviour to an end, or by reversing a cost order. 
This discretion is very important in cases where the action has brought some general 
benefit even if has not resulted in payment of compensation to class members. Such 
cases may occur where the defendants undertake to stop illegal actions in the future or 
where the action has ended in reparations for misconduct which will benefit the class 
of consumers indirectly. 
 
For example, under Section 22(c) of Israel's CAL, the court may reverse a costs order 
and grant the losing party an award of costs after considering the following factors:  
 
1. The extent of work and the risks which the representative had to undertake; 
2. The benefits that the action has brought; and 
3. The importance of the action to the public. 
 
However, as seen above, the relatively small number of actions that have been 
brought in European member states (even those that offer costs concessions) 
demonstrates that lowering costs on its own does not provide an incentive for the 
submission of class actions. This is in fact the position with all negative preventive 
financial incentives.  
 
In order to be effective, negative expenditure incentives should be dealt with in the 
preliminary stages of the case, prior to filing a defence, in order to give some certainty 
to the representative parties and to enable them to calculate their expenses in advance. 
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A provision similar to Section 22(c) of Israel's CAL, enabling a court award to the 
representative plaintiff for payment of expenses where the case has brought some 
general benefit or where reparations for unlawful conduct is justified, should be 
retained in the new model. 
 
Such a provision has the effect of lowering the risk in paying lawyers' fees where the 
action has brought some benefit, even if the class members did not receive a payment 
of monetary compensation. 
 
  2. Imposing Positive Financial Incentives in order to Gear Collective 
Actions 
 
Positive financial incentives are legal measures that encourage potential 
representatives to submit collective redress cases despite the dangers of bearing the 
costs of the process. Such measures should be distinguished from negative 
expenditure incentives, such as exemptions from court fees that may reduce the 
danger of paying high costs. The best example of a positive incentive is a measure 
that allows the court to award the representative a share of the action’s outcome. 
 
According to the Israeli model, such a reward is subject to the court’s discretion, 
bearing in mind certain criteria
274
 which are generally dependent on the contribution 
that the action and the representative have made to the general public or to the class 
members. In fact, the idea that the representative should be rewarded in return for 
assuming the risk of costs and the burden of representing the group of injured 
members is at the heart of the Israeli model. This reward is the reason that so many 
actions are brought by individuals in Israel. It is important to note that organisations 
and public bodies are also entitled to a reward under the Israeli Act, although, their 
performance in submitting class actions thus far in Israel has been comparatively 
weak. The CAL went as far as providing that organisations or public bodies be 
allowed to participate in a collective action
275
 and, if they decide to participate in the 
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action and express their views in the matters which are relevant to the legal 
proceedings, they may be entitled to a reward even though they were not parties to the 
court case.
276
 The low figure of participation of these bodies in class actions in Israel, 
despite the financial incentives offered, leads one to the conclusion that organisations 
and public bodies in Israel are apathetic towards positive financial incentives. 
 
There are cases that lead to no financial benefit for class members, for example, 
where the wrongdoer has understood that his behaviour was wrong and rectifies his 
wrongful action. The Israeli legislator provided that in such exceptional 
circumstances, even if the motion was not accepted, the court may reward the 
representative with a sum of money having regard to the above-mentioned criteria set 
down in Section 22 of the CAL.
277
 The purpose of this rule is to encourage 
representatives to bring collective actions which benefit the general public, even if the 
damages claim for the group's members does not ultimately succeed. Positive 
financial benefits are very important for the promotion of private enforcement. The 
bonus should be allowed in both types of cases, both follow-on and stand-alone 
actions, provided that the action results in the payment of damages and creates a fund 
from which legal expenses and the bonus for the representative party are paid. There 
is a case for making a higher bonus payment to a representative of parties in stand-
alone actions who have assumed the risk of the legal proceedings and have succeeded 
in the action.  
 
  3. Lawyers' Fees as Incentives for Collective Actions  
 
Another positive incentive is allowing the group’s counsel to receive a share of the 
proceeds in a successful action. In consumer cases each personal action is generally 
very small and only the aggregation of claims makes such an action economically 
viable for lawyers. The representative plaintiff cannot usually pay the lawyer’s fees as 
his own personal claim is very small. Despite some reservations about the structuring 
of lawyers fees, the Israeli legislator took the view that since the lawyer has an 
entrepreneurial role in bringing a collective action, he should have a financial 
incentive for doing so. However lawyers' fees may be problematic and lead to abuse. 
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A. The Problems with Lawyers’ Fees  
 
With regard to private lawyers, whilst indeed seeking their own private gain, they also 
serve the public good. Notwithstanding that class actions have been repeatedly 
‘criticized for allowing class attorneys to appropriate more than their rightful and 
efficient share of the common fund and for providing much less compensation and 
deterrence than alleged. Lawyers’ gain has often come at the price of class members’ 
loss.’278 Professor Deborah Hensler from the RAND institute in the United States 
tried to survey the financial gains of lawyers in ten consumer and mass tort cases and 
found that it is difficult to evaluate the outcome precisely for the class lawyers. 
However, the estimate was that the lawyers’ share was between five and 50% of the 
money generated by the action.
279
 This study shows that lawyers' fees are not 
predictable and may vary from case to case. There is no proper control over lawyers' 
fees and in some cases, fees may reach unreasonable figures which leave the group of 
class members with no real benefit from a successful action. 
 
The problems with fee structures mainly arise due to collusive settlements that award 
class members mere coupons to buy the defendants merchandise, while providing 
lawyers with large monetary fees.
280
 There are even settlements known as ‘sweetheart 
deals,’ whereby the court is led to believe that the benefit of the settlement to the class 
is higher than it is in reality. For example, the settlement may include a reduction in 
price or coupons to buy the defendant's merchandise, which benefits the defendant but 
does not bring real benefits to the group’s members, while the lawyer gets a high 
percentage of a theoretical sum that the parties claim is for the benefit of the class. 
The normal practice in the U.S. is to award the lawyer a contingency fee at a rate 
equal to one third of the damages for all the class members.
281
 However, not all cases 
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end with the strict payment of compensation to the class members. Settlements may 
result in granting consumers a future reduction to purchase the defendant's products 
("coupon settlements") or with general payments to a fund managed by the 
defendant's lawyers or with some donations. Other cases may result in future 
undertakings which the defendants may take upon themselves. For example, in the 
Tnuva case,
282
 the judge ordered that compensation be provided in three different 
ways. One third of the sum was to be awarded by way of a general price reduction of 
the defendant's milk products (for a period set by an expert) or by an increase in the 
contents in the milk carton with no price increase. Another third was to be donated by 
the defendant to a special fund for research in the area of food in connection with 
public health issues. The reminder of the compensation was to be divided amongst the 
poor by special organisations.  
 
In another case, a bakery which stated that the bread it baked did not contain salt, but 
which in fact did so, agreed in a settlement to donate 12 tons of its products and to 
amend its labels from no salt to low salt.
283
 A distributor of 5% vinegar who claimed 
that the vinegar was "natural" but which also contained unnatural products agreed in a 
settlement to change the label by deleting the word "natural," as well as to reduce the 
price by 30% for a period of three months.
284
  
 
In all these cases, it is difficult to estimate the exact benefit to the class by the 
reduction offered or by the future undertaking undertaken by the defendant. It is 
questionable how many class members would have stepped forward in order to prove 
their small sums of personal damage granted by the settlement and collect their share. 
Therefore, it is very difficult to calculate the lawyer fees as a share of the settlement. 
Normally in such cases, the lawyer will suggest a fee calculation which is beneficial 
to himself.     
 
Looking at the issue of lawyers’ fees, it seems that there is an inherent conflict of 
interest between the class and the lawyer or class representative in most collective 
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redress proceedings. The lawyer has an interest in making a profit and reaching a 
good settlement with a high sum for his own fees, while the client’s interests is to 
maximize the income for the class members.  
 
It is the class representative or the class lawyer who bears the costs of litigation, 
including payments for expert evidence, court expenses, photocopies and hours of 
work. These representatives can expect to obtain only a share of the outcome of a 
successful action. Therefore, the class representative and the litigator lawyer are 
interested in obtaining a compromise even when it is not the optimal outcome for the 
group. 
 
Professor Klement
285
 emphasises this problem in the following way: 
  
Assume that the expected litigation costs for obtaining a compromise are 10, 
the expected costs of a full procedure are 100 and the expected fee is 10 
percent of either outcome, whether settlement or judgment. If the value of the 
action is estimated at 2000, then the representative’s expected profit for 
pursuing a ruling (10 percent. of 2000 minus 100 for expenses) comes to a 
total of 100. If, however, the procedure ends in a lower compromise of 1100, 
then the representative’s profit is equal to the amount that would have been 
obtained by pursuing the judgment. However, the class itself could have 
earned 1800 but only 990 on the lawyer-led compromise, which is the 
outcome preferred by the lawyer. 
 
Hans-Bernd Schaefer
286
 argues that there is a direct link between the lawyer's effort in 
the case and his readiness to settle the case. The problem with contingency fees is that 
the lawyer does not work in order to get the best financial result for the class, but 
rather to maximise his fees.
287 Given these problems the question is now how to 
structure lawyers’ fees in a way which will act as an incentive for the lawyer to reach 
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the best result for the class, while avoiding the danger that the lawyer will prioritise 
making his own profit. 
 
B. Structuring Lawyers' Fees 
 
Under the Israeli regime, high remuneration for class action lawyers is considered 
necessary in order to cover a lawyer's expenses and to motivate other lawyers to 
initiate class actions for good causes.  
 
In the Knesset (Israel's legislature) debate it was even argued that judges are not 
generous enough in respect of lawyers' fees, thereby preventing lawyers from 
fulfilling their entrepreneurial role in leading class actions.
288
 The chairman of the 
Knesset Commission on the CAL, Knesset Member Chen, suggested introducing a 
system of fixed percentages for the lawyer to be divided between the class members 
and the defendants. The percentage was 30% up to NIS 1,000,000 (about GBP 
160,000) and 15% for amounts above this sum. The chairman also recommended that 
in compromise agreements, the fees should be 80% of the suggested fees.
289
 
Unfortunately this proposal was later changed and the Israeli legislative committee 
decided to draw up broad criteria which would enable the court to decide how to 
structure lawyer fees on a case by case basis.
290
 This system lacks certainty and often 
results in inconsistencies between different judges. 
 
The criteria set out in the CAL relate to the benefit that the class action brings to the 
class members,
291
 the complexity of the procedure, the time and effort that the lawyer 
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has invested and the risks that the lawyer assumed in dealing with the case.
292
 The 
court should also consider the way in which the lawyer has managed the case,
293
 the 
difference between the remedies which were claimed and the result that was 
achieved
294
 and the importance of the action to the general public.
295
 
 
Professor Klement divides these criteria into three main categories:
296
  
 
 The Lawyer's Investment in the Case: This category examines the expenses 
incurred by the lawyer and the time invested in the case instead of investing in 
other cases. In addition, Professor Klement argues that the risk which the 
lawyer assumes should be a very important factor in deciding the lawyer’s fees 
under this category. In fact, Professor Klement argues that the chances of 
success should be multiplied by the risk factor and the lawyer’s expenses in 
order to reach a suitable lawyer's fee. The risk multiplier is equal to one 
divided by the chances that the lawyer will recover fees from a judgment or 
from a successful settlement. Thus if the chances of success are 0.4 and the 
lawyer's expenses are 100, then the risk multiplier is 1/0.4 = 2.5. The fee 
should be set, according to this example based on the risk multiplier theory, at 
a minimum of 250.
297
 The idea of this system of fee structuring is to 
compensate the lawyer for the investment and expenses incurred in case 
management. Normally the expenses should be examined by the court 
registrar at the end of the case, and by the winning party for coverage of 
expenses. The problem with this system is that in Israel, the general rule is that 
the lawyer is not allowed to pay expenses instead of his clients, and thus this 
system of fee structuring may lead to unethical conduct. The other problem 
with this system of fee structuring is that since the representative plaintiff has 
no risks and no financial involvement in the case, and the case management 
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falls solely in the hands of the lawyer without any client control, then it may 
lead to over expenditure by the class lawyer in order to obtain higher fees at 
the end of the day. 
 
 The Output to the Class Members: According to this mechanism, lawyers' 
fees are structured according to the expected gain for the class members. The 
reasoning here is that the class members should pay for the services which the 
lawyer provides, especially where the action succeeds in creating a fund to 
compensate the class members.
298
 The lawyer should get incentives to use his 
best endeavours for the success of the action. On the other hand, there is a 
conflict of interest if lawyers' fees are paid from the fund designated for the 
class members, since high lawyers' fees will be awarded at the class members' 
expense. This system of fee structuring is more accepted in Israel despite the 
fear of conflicts of interest as stated above. There is also a common interest 
between the lawyer and the class members to use best endeavours in order to 
create as large a fund as possible for the class of which the lawyer will be 
granted a portion. 
 
 The Benefit to the General Public: It is very important to look at the 
advantages of the class action for the general public, because the aim of 
collective redress is to assist in promoting legal obedience and to deter 
potential defendants from acting illegally. Professor Klement argues that this 
category should be used only in cases where lawyers' fees based on a 
percentage of the income would provide a small income for the lawyer, even if 
the action brings great benefit to the general public. This is to say that others 
who are neither class members nor the lawyer's clients in the case have 
benefitted from the action. However, Professor Klement argues that if the 
action benefits class members but not the general public, the lawyer's fees 
should not be lowered simply because others have not benefitted from the 
action.
299
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In Israel, the criteria for lawyer's fees have been inconsistently applied by the courts. 
However, it is possible to say with certainty that the sums that the courts in Israel 
have awarded have been much lower than in the U.S. For example, if awards in the 
U.S. are generally on average equal to one third of the damages paid to the class 
members in the action,
300
 in Israel they are normally between eight and ten percent of 
a successful action (mainly in compromise cases). However, fee structuring not only 
concerns how much the lawyer should be paid, it also aims to ensure that the lawyer 
uses his best efforts to achieve a successful outcome for the class and receives 
reasonable fees. In order to ensure that the lawyer will do the best for the success of 
the action, the lawyer's actions must be supervised. 
 
Professor Klement suggests adopting a private monitoring system that will ensure that 
lawyers perform their role for the benefit of the class they represent.
301
 The idea is 
that the monitor will perform the role that a client would have in a “normal” case. 
This means that the monitor will choose the class lawyer, negotiate his fee, examine 
the performance of the lawyer and have the power to object to settlement offers. The 
monitor may even petition the court to replace the lawyer. The monitor would be 
appointed on an auction basis. The problem with such a monitoring system is that it 
would raise the costs of managing the class action. Thus one should ask whether 
employing a private monitor paid from the proceeds of the action will cost more with 
no real benefit to the class, since the monitor and the class lawyer have the same 
interest in increasing their share at the expense of the class members. 
 
C. Contingency Fees in European Member States 
 
Positive incentives which may drive lawyers and representative claimants to get 
involved in the action are based on contingency fees arrangements. However, in most 
European jurisdictions, conditional fee agreements which are necessary to motivate 
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lawyers to get involved in collective actions are not currently permitted. Contingency 
fees operate as a positive incentive to persuade lawyers to manage a class action. 
Since class actions primarily involve claims for high overall losses with low 
individual damages, it is difficult to motivate each member of the group to bear part 
of the financial risk or to contribute an advance payment towards costs.
302
 
Consequently, someone else may need to assume this financial burden, but rewards 
need to be forthcoming for a lawyer or other third party to take on the action.  
 
The problem with contingency fees is that it is foreign to the litigation culture of some 
states in central European jurisdictions. The objection to contingency fees may 
prevent the lawyer from engaging in the entrepreneurial job of managing the legal 
proceedings. 
 
In some jurisdictions which object to contingency fees, alternative solutions have 
been found. In the Netherlands, lawyers who are members of the bar are not permitted 
to charge contingency fees, so entrepreneurs fill the gap in financing the expenses of 
managing the action.
303
 The fact that ‘no win no fee’ agreements are not allowed may 
deter lawyers from becoming involved in collective proceedings in those member 
states, although they can agree with their clients that they will be paid a reasonable 
higher hourly rate if the action is successful. In Sweden, ‘no win no fee’ arrangements 
with lawyers are not allowed but the law permits risk management agreements. These 
agreements are based on an uplift of the hourly fee paid for the lawyer in the case of 
success, but they are not based on paying a share of the action proceeds to the lawyer 
or the representative plaintiff. The defendant is only bound to pay the customary fee 
and is not bound by the risk agreement. Group members are bound by risk agreements 
only if the agreement is approved by the court.
304
 
 
Certain developments were introduced in other member states, such as Italy. In Italy, 
a prohibition on lawyers' contingency fee arrangements existed until quite recently. 
However, the statutory provision prohibiting contingency fees in Italy was abrogated 
                                                 
302
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303
 Ianika Tzankova, ‘Class Actions, Group Litigation and Other Forms of Collective Litigation - Dutch 
Report’  
< http://0-www.law.stanford.edu.lawlib.nyls.edu/calendar/details/1066/ accessed 27 November 2011. 
304 Per Henrik Lindblom, (n 84). 
The Pillars of a Workable Model for Collective Actions 
 211 
by Law Decree no. 223 of 4 July 2006. The law was amended to allow lawyers a 
certain latitude in taking on cases on a conditional fee basis.
305
 However, the Italian 
Lawyer’s Code of Conduct contains the principle that ‘fees have to be proportionate 
to the activity carried out.’ In Spain, the civil division of the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged
306
 the validity of contingency fee agreements (pactum de quota litis) 
between lawyers and clients, although the scope of permissible agreements needs 
clarification. The view of the Consejo General de la Abogacía Española, the Spanish 
bar, is that contingency fees may be used but an engagement on a ‘no win no fee’ 
basis is forbidden.
307
 The result is that contingency fees may be used only as long as a 
minimum fee to cover the costs of the legal advice is agreed.
308
 
 
In Portugal, there are no provisions allowing payment of a share of the damages in the 
action to the lawyers or to the plaintiffs. Contingency fees are forbidden. Lawyers' 
fees are usually based on an hourly rate as per Article 65 of the Code of Conduct. 
According to Article 66 of the Code of Conduct, lawyers may not claim as their fees a 
percentage of the amount obtained as a result of a legal suit (quota litis).
309
 Lawyers 
are also forbidden from making their fees dependent on the success of the action 
(palmarium). However, lawyers may receive a fee bonus subject to success.
310
 
 
In England ‘no win no fee’ arrangements are currently subject to a review as part 
of a wider review of civil litigation costs carried out by Lord Justice Jackson
311
 
and a suggested reform of fee arrangements.
312
 The OFT has already 
recommended the introduction of a contingency fee scheme in the U.K. in 
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competition cases
313
 and the CJC has suggested a contingency fee system in 
collective redress cases.
314
 However, these recommendations have yet to be 
enacted.   
 
Under French law, contingency fees are illegal.
315
 There are also some related 
prohibitions, for example, a lawyer cannot engage in professional work solely on a 
‘no win no fee’ basis. Moreover, French lawyers are allowed to receive payment 
only from their clients.
316
 Lawyers' fees are either a fixed sum or (more often) a 
percentage of an hourly rate. In limited circumstances, complementary fees 
(‘success fees’),317 whereby fees are conditional on liability, are accepted. 
However, the complementary salary can only represent a small proportion of the 
total fees. 
 
The current opposition to contingency fees by the majority of member states is an 
obstacle to the introduction of an effective collective redress mechanism in Europe. It 
is difficult to see why member states are so opposed to contingency fees. Indeed, 
scholars who have investigated the effect of contingency fees have found that 
contingency fees give rise to significantly more frivolous or fraudulent claims.
318
 On 
the other hand, the CJC's research on this issue concluded that contingency fees 
improve the quality of claims brought to justice.
319
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There is no doubt that without contingency fees, there is no incentive for lawyers to 
perform their entrepreneurial role. Contingency fees are particularly appropriate for 
collective redress cases because the individual representative cannot pay the legal fees 
and other expenses necessary to fight a case against large companies, normally the 
defendants in class actions. Moreover, it is reasonable that lawyers should be 
compensated for the risk that they may not be paid at all if the action fails and that 
lawyers who had to finance the action remain with no coverage of their expenses.  
 
Consequently, any future E.U. framework for collective redress will have to include a 
binding measure that compels member states to allow contingency fees in collective 
actions in order to enable lawyers to participate actively in conducting collective 
redress cases for damages. Contingency fees will enable lawyers to perform their 
entrepreneurial role.  
 
D. Lodestar v. Percentage Fees 
 
Lawyers' fees should be high enough to encourage lawyers to act as entrepreneurs. 
The question to be asked is how fee structure could assist in getting lawyers to 
perform their important role as the driving force in class actions. There are two 
common types of fee structure in operation. The first one, known as the percentage 
system, is based on awarding the lawyer a share of the profit. The other system, 
known as the lodestar system, is based on an uplift in the lawyer's hourly rate.  
 
Critics of the lodestar system argue that it may encourage lawyers to exaggerate the 
number of hours that they have worked on a case, while making it difficult for a judge 
to determine whether the time spent by the lawyer is reasonable.
320
 It is also argued 
that the lodestar mechanism may induce lead counsel to prolong the litigation beyond 
the optimal point from the plaintiff's perspective simply in order to accrue more 
hours, or to engage in unnecessary work, such as submitting motions that have little 
chance of success.
321
 In addition, the risk multiplier used in the lodestar mechanism is 
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calculated at the end of the trial when the risk inherent in the case appears very 
different to the perceived risk of representing counsel at the early stages of the action.  
 
The advantage of the percentage system is that it is simple and does not require 
complicated calculations and a monitoring system. On the other hand, critics of the 
percentage approach say the method might lead the plaintiff's attorney to settle the 
case prematurely as soon as counsel’s opportunity costs begin to mount. Early 
settlement allows counsel to collect a large fee after investing relatively little time in 
the case, rather than continuing the litigation in order to maximise plaintiff’s recovery 
but receiving a lower marginal rate of return on his work.
322
 Furthermore, it is argued 
that the percentage system overlooks the lawyer's investment in the case. For 
example, in cases involving large sums, the lawyer will be better remunerated on the 
percentage system than in low sum cases, even though the time invested in both cases 
may be equal. This is because the share in the outcome of a case relating to high sums 
is higher than a calculation based on hourly fee in such a case. Since collective redress 
actions reach high amounts due to the accumulation of personal claims, contingency 
fees on percentage will normally lead to a higher result than the normal calculation of 
hourly fees. Research conducted in the U.S. which compared the two fee systems in 
different cases found that court cases where the fees were based on the percentage 
system did not lead to dramatically different results than other cases which used the 
lodestar mechanism.
323
 This means that the results will be similar, regardless of which 
fee structure is chosen. 
  
On the whole, commentators prefer the percentage system over the lodestar system 
because it reduces uncertainty and establishes reasonable expectations on the part of 
the plaintiff's lawyers regarding their expected recovery. The reduction in the risk of 
litigation might induce additional private enforcement.
324
 Others prefer the percentage 
system because it induces the lawyer to fight for the best result for the class, though it 
is argued that in settlements the percentage should be lower than in cases where the 
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case proceeds to judgment, in order to reduce the temptation to settle cases 
prematurely.
325
 
 
Under the Israeli law, the court may also award the class lawyer interim payments on 
account of his fees. These payments are intended to assist the lawyer with expenses 
that are necessary in order to manage the case properly.
326
 However, another way of 
assisting the lawyer to calculate his actions is to make preliminary decisions regarding 
fees at the certification procedure. In this way, the lawyer may calculate the expected 
income and weigh it against the predicted expenses and make better decisions with 
regard to compromise. At the preliminary stage, the court should also decide on the 
question of the fee structure, whether percentage or lodestar, in order to allow the case 
to continue in a normal way where the client makes a fee agreement with his lawyer.   
 
E. Other Possible Models of Financing the Action 
 
Collective redress funding may also be secured in ways
327
 other than by contingency 
fees. For example, in Israel, a special fund ('The Fund for the Financing of Class 
Actions') was established under the CAL to finance class actions with public and 
social importance.
328
 The fund was only recently formed and, consequently, statistics 
on the fund’s performance have not yet been published. The fund receives some 
governmental support, but is also funded by the diversion of money from other 
successful class actions or from uncollected funds in successful class actions. Yet 
such a fund cannot replace conditional fees, which act as an incentive for private 
individuals to bring class actions. However, such funds may still assist in covering the 
costs of the action. The fund was set up for an initial period of seven years after which 
time the Minister of Justice may extend the fund’s period of operation. The idea was 
to open a new source of class actions which will finance itself in future by the 
allocation of funds.  
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The Fund accepts applications for class action finance from the outset of the case and 
as the case progresses. The fund receives applications from organisations which have 
been operating for at least twelve months prior to the application and that operate 
legally. Individuals may also receive finance from the fund, provided that their 
personal financial situation demonstrates a need. The applicant should not act for 
political causes and should not be bankrupt or have any criminal convictions.  
 
The finance usually covers up to 50% of the expenses which are needed for managing 
the case, but in special circumstances the finance may reach even 90% of the 
expenses. However, there is no finance to cover lawyer's fees. The finance is limited 
to NIS 80,000 (approximately EUR 15,000) or 80% of the actual costs, whichever is 
the lower. In the event of any of the following, the applicant must reimburse the fund:  
 
1. The claim was successful and the applicant received his expenses. 
2. The applicant used the finance which was received from the fund for other causes 
or in contravention of the conditions subject to which the finance was granted. 
3. If the applicant or his lawyer were replaced, the fund may require information 
concerning the reason for the replacement. If the replacement involves any 
wrongdoing, the fund may require the applicant to return the sum which he 
received.   
4. The applicant decided to voluntarily abandon the action. 
5. The applicant provided the fund with misleading information. 
 
The Israeli solution of a designated fund is more appropriate than a general legal aid 
fund for collective redress cases. The reason for this, is that the former takes into 
account the interests of the general public or the interests of the larger group in 
bringing the action, whereas general legal aid schemes consider the merits of the 
specific action in question and the financial means of the applicant which are less 
important issues in collective redress cases where the applicant is merely an agent for 
a wide class of injured members. 
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Calls for the establishment of such a fund have been raised in the U.K
329
 In the U.K., 
finance can be raised by insurers, another form of third party finance, where the 
insurer agrees to cover the legal expenses in return for a share of the profits generated 
by the action.
330
 Such insurance can be secured by way of an insurance policy before 
the event or an agreement with the insurers after the event. The only relevant way of 
securing insurance in collective redress cases is after the event, where the insurer feels 
that the collective case is profound on its merits. The CJC has taken the view that 
where ‘after the event’ insurance is unavailable, the Legal Services Commission 
should give further consideration to a Conditional Legal Aid Scheme (CLAS). Such a 
fund would operate without additional costs to government and would provide 
financial support to claimants in return for a share of any award or the income 
following a settlement, thereby providing a solution for both claimants who are 
ineligible for legal aid and those who can afford to pay but who wish to access private 
funding rather than legal aid. 
 
In addition, the provision of finance would also promote organisational actions in 
preference to individual private actions.
331
 In Portugal, for example, finance for 
collective redress proceedings is available only to consumer organisations from the 
State, via the central, regional or local administration.
332
 The result of such special 
funding in Portugal is very impressive. According to an evaluation study,
333
 all six 
collective actions in Portugal were brought by consumer associations (five claims by 
Deco and one action by Acop). The Portuguese system demonstrates that legislators 
may achieve policy goals providing collective redress funding to preferred agents, 
which in Portugal are consumer associations.
334
 The only difficulty with this idea is 
that consumer organisations in all jurisdictions have not pursued many collective 
redress actions. Even such funding for organisations is probably not enough to offer a 
real incentive to bring many class actions. 
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Legal aid is also available in Spain.
335
 Such legal aid covers lawyers' fees, publication 
of announcements or edicts, copies, certificates and notaries’ fees. The Spanish 
scheme provides assistance both to consumers who have insufficient funds
336
 and to 
organisations.
337
 A comparison between the Spanish collective actions and the 
Portuguese collective actions show that the agents who brought actions in Spain are 
more diverse, as representation was by both organisations and consumers.
338
 This is 
the result of the wider variety of funding in Spain. 
 
Legal aid may cover only expenses or it can also cover lawyers' fees. Funds which 
only cover expenses do not create real incentives to fight the case and win it. Such 
funding requires an additional supplement by way of contingency fees to create an 
incentive for the lawyer to fight the case for the class members in order to obtain the 
highest possible remuneration. The Spanish and Portuguese experiences show that 
consumer organisations are more active when their expenses are covered. 
 
Another form of expense coverage is provided by third party funding. Third party 
funding should be recognised as an acceptable supplement to legal aid and to 
contingency fees which should be permitted in Europe as a general principle. Third 
party funding is similar to after the event insurance. In third party funding, the funder 
assesses the case and finances the action against payment of a share of the successful 
action. The problem with third party funding is that it may interfere in the 
management of the case as the funder's interests may be different from those of the 
plaintiff who may prefer to proceed until the end of the case. 
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As suggested in the English CJC report,
339
 third party funding should be subject to 
regulation. Scholars who favour this option agree.
340
 The first draft code of conduct 
on the issue was published on 23 November 2011.
341
 The code provides that litigation 
funding agreements should contain restrictions on the termination of funding without 
reasonable cause and the independence of legal advice. The code lacks regulations on 
funds of third party funders and on minimal capital for third party fund providers in 
order to ensure that such funders do not abandon consumers in the middle of a case, 
leaving them to pay high legal expenses without the financial resources to do so. The 
code should be amended in order to prevent financing where it is being sought by a 
party due to an ulterior motive, such as to bypass the course of justice. 
 
Third party funding is currently developing in Europe and serious fund providers are 
now operating in the market. According to a recent report by a private law firm, the 
list of funders in the U.K. includes insurance companies.
342
 The availability of such 
funding may push the use of collective redress forward, especially in those member 
states which have not yet introduced a system of contingency fees.  
 
In Israel, funding is available mainly through the introduction of contingency fees, 
though partial expenses may also be recovered from a special designated fund.  
 
On the other hand, the traditional view in Europe is against contingency fees as they 
may create abuses and lead to conflicts between the lawyer and the class members. 
Despite the above-mentioned disadvantages, contingency fees have many advantages 
such as filling the gap where public funds for legal aid are lacking, and creating 
incentives for lawyers to act as a driving force in bringing the action. This would be 
of particular importance in collective actions where claimants do not have the 
expertise and experience required to act as group representatives. Contingency fees 
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would also give an incentive to lawyers to achieve the best possible recovery for their 
clients since their own recovery would depend on that of their clients.
343
 
 
In Europe, funding otherthan contingency fees is available from legal aid or from 
private insurers. However, such funding is normally very limited. 
 
The lack of funding in Europe is very unfortunate because in normal cases, consumer 
actions concern very small amounts and the defendant is a trader with the financial 
resources to fight a case. In those cases, it is little wonder that consumers will be 
apathetic as to their rights. Therefore, if funding is not available, there will be no 
incentives for class members and lawyers to deal with a collective action.  
 
Thus a designated legal aid fund should be available in the new European framework, 
similar to the Israeli collective action fund
344
 to cover the costs of litigation. In 
addition, third party funding may assist in financing class actions, especially where 
there is no legal aid available for private actions based on a lawyer's initiative. 
However, these methods of funding should be companied by a system of contingency 
fees which is a very cheap way to raise funding through lawyers’ work. 
 
Part D. The Scope of the Action 
 
In Israel, prior to the in introduction of the CAL, consumers could have brought class 
actions under the specific provisions of the Consumer Protection Law 5741-1981, 
which covers misrepresentations, extortion, various duties of disclosure, misleading 
advertisements, consumer credit transactions, door-to-door sales, labeling of goods, 
standard contracts and good’s return policies. Until the introduction of the CAL, class 
actions in Israel were limited to specific laws, for example, Section 35 of the 
Consumer Protection Law
345
 which allowed Israeli consumers to bring class actions 
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only for causes included in the Act. However, cases were often dismissed because the 
causes of action were connected to other causes that were not covered by the 
Consumer Protection Law.
346
 
In order to remedy this problem, the Israeli legislator could have adopted the U.S. 
system which does not restrict class actions to specific enactments. In the U.S., there 
is no limitation on the scope of the action. Instead, the types of possible action are 
divided into three categories and there are prerequisites which operate as safeguards 
and are examined in the certification process. The first category is known as the ‘anti-
prejudice’ class action because the court examines the prejudicial effect of running 
multiple individual claims.
347
 For example, multiple individual claims might cause 
inconsistent judgments harmful to class members or if portions of the fund are 
distributed in individual suits on a first come first served basis, thereby exhausting the 
fund
348
. The second category of class action is used most often for civil rights suits 
and in other constitutional litigation.
349
 For example, where the plaintiff alleged that 
the University of Michigan Law School used race as a ‘predominant’ factor in its 
admission process, giving minority applicants a ‘significantly greater chance of 
admission than students with similar credentials from disfavored racial groups’.350 
The third type of class action
351
 is ‘the common question’ or ‘damage’ class action, 
which provides that two elements are necessary in order to permit a class action. 
Firstly, the court must find that questions of law or fact common to the members of 
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members and, 
secondly, that a class action is superior to other available methods. This is in fact the 
most common and most criticised class action for damages.  
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All categories are subject to the prerequisites listed in Rule 23(A) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, which provides that one or more members of a class may sue or be 
sued as representative parties on behalf of all if: 
(1) The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; 
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; 
(3) The claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or 
defenses of the class; and  
(4) The representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
class. 
When the Israeli legislator examined the practical consequences of the U.S. model, it 
decided to take a different approach on the scope issue, due to fears of uncontrolled 
actions, collusive settlements, and frivolous actions. Instead, the Israeli legislator 
decided to allow class actions in specific and targeted areas, which were drafted very 
widely to include various kinds of possible actions. 
The CAL sets out a list of rules and causes of action which facilitate class actions with 
the permission of the court.
352
 Professor Klement divides the list of causes that may 
lead to class actions under the CAL into three categories.
353
 
 
The first category is new causes of action relating to labour law. 
 
The second category is the list of laws that were not changed and permitted class 
proceedings before implementation of the CAL, such as competition law and 
company law.
354
 
 
The third category includes a list of laws that were enlarged in the new Act, such as 
consumer law (class actions are now allowed under the Israeli CAL even where the 
consumer did not make the transaction), banking, insurance and environmental law 
                                                 
352 Class Action Law 5766–2006, Annex B (Israel). 
353
 Professor Alon Klement, ’Guidelines for Interpreting the Class action Act 2006’ (n 296). 
354
 The full list of specific laws was mentioned in Chapter Two, part B (3) of this work. 
The Pillars of a Workable Model for Collective Actions 
 211 
(where in the past class actions were only allowed on an opt-in basis and for remedies 
other than damages). 
 
The rules and causes of actions are listed in the second schedule to the CAL and are 
defined in broad terms: 
 
1. An action of a customer against a dealer having contractual relations or even 
where no contract exists between them. 
 
2. An action against an insurance company or agent in relation to a contract of 
insurance or benefits from contractual relations or even where no contract exists 
between them. 
 
3. An action against a bank in relation to matters between banks and customers 
whether business has been transacted between them or not. 
 
4. An action relating to restrictive practices and fair trading. 
 
5. Actions relating to securities. 
 
6. Actions relating to protection of the environment. 
 
7. An action relating to discrimination in goods, services and entering to public 
places. 
 
8. Actions in relation to sex discrimination at work. 
 
9. Actions in relation to fair access for disabled persons. 
 
10. Actions in relation to the TV Broadcasting Act (signs and written notices). 
 
11. Actions in the jurisdiction of the Employment Appeal Tribunal, except in 
relation to increased damages for late payment of salary or compensation. 
 
12. Actions in relation to minimum pay. 
 
13. Actions against state bodies for recovery of payments, such as taxation duties. 
 
 
In so far as consumer actions are concerned, it should be noted that the ambit of the 
possible claims are substantially enlarged by the CAL and include claims against a 
wide range of possible defendants who normally engage in small scale value 
transactions with many clients. These include banks, insurance companies, provident 
funds and any ‘dealer’, which, under the Consumer Protection Law's wide definition , 
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includes every person who sells property or a service through his or her practice, 
including manufacturers. 
  
The former Section 35 of the Israeli Consumer Protection Law provided that only 
causes of action which arose before the agreement between the consumer and the 
dealer could be a cause for a class action.
355
 
 
Commentators criticised the narrow view of the old law prior to CAL.
356
 
Consequently, when the CAL was introduced in 2006, the causes of action included 
relations of the parties prior to contractual relations, for example misrepresentations, 
and not only contracting parties. The enlargement of the scope of consumer class 
actions was the result of the new approach taken by the legislator in looking at the 
transaction rather than at the specific enactment. Under the new Act any customer 
transaction with a dealer could give rise to class action even if the transaction was not 
carried out and a contract of sale was not created. 
 
The consumer to dealer transaction test which operates now in Israel may lead to 
some strange results. For example, in Taib v. Camel Restaurant,
357
 the district court in 
Haifa was ready to certify a class action against a pub-restaurant because customers 
complained that the non-smoking laws were not observed by the restaurant owners. 
The action was certified under the provision that allows any customer to bring a class 
action against a dealer even though it does not concern any breach of the Consumer 
Protection Law, but merely because it is an alleged infringement of other legislation 
(in this case, smoking protection legislation) which was breached during a transaction 
between a customer and a dealer. 
 
 
                                                 
355 See Civil Appeal no. 3613/97 (Supreme Court) Ezov v. The Jerusalem City Council P"D Nun Vav 
(2)b 787. 
356 Moshe Bar Niv (Bronovsky), 'The Ambits of the Consumer Class Action’ [1994] 19 Eyuney 
Mishpat 251; Sinai Deutch, The Law of Consumer Protection, Vol. 1, Foundations and Principles, 
(The Israel Bar Publishing House, 2001) (Hebrew) 403;  
Hillel Sommer, 'A Hand Grenade With its Pin Removed? The First Decade of the Consumer Class 
Action', (2004) 1 Haifa Law Review 347, 353 (2004).  
357 Case no. 53364-11-10 (Haifa District Court) Taib v. Camel Restaurant (2011), decision dated 30 
August 2011. 
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  1. The European Implications on the Scope of Areas of Collective 
Redress  
 
The debate about whether class actions should be restricted to specific enactments or 
should be part of more general legislation has also taken place in several European 
member states. 
 
In Europe there is inconsistency between member states with regard to the ambit of 
legislation that may give rise to collective actions. Collective redress action is allowed 
in some states in relation to investments, consumer and environmental actions. In 
other cases, the application is wider and may include public health or public rights 
and even actions against the state. The question arises as to what the necessary scope 
of areas suitable for collective actions is in order to create a workable model.   
 
In 2009, the British government rejected the CJC’s recommendations358 to introduce a 
combined opt-in–opt-out mechanism, which would not be limited to a specific area of 
law. The government took the view that rights of action should be introduced only in 
specific areas of law where there is evidence of need and following an assessment of 
economic and other impacts and after considering alternative approaches.
359
  
The Swedish opt-in class action model was the first class action law in Europe.
360
 The 
Swedish legislator followed the U.S. model with regards to the scope of the action and 
did not limit the enactment to consumer law or environmental law, but rather decided 
to allow collective actions of any kind. However, the Swedish group claims brought 
by non-profit organisations are limited to consumer law and environmental law 
                                                 
358 In July 2008, the Civil Justice Council made a series of recommendations to the Lord Chancellor at 
<http://www.civiljusticecouncil.gov.uk/files/Improving_Access_to_Justice_through_Collective_Acti
ons.pdf>. 
359
 The Government’s Response to the Civil Justice Council’s Report, ‘Improving Access to Justice 
through Collective Actions’ (2009) available 
at.<http://www.lawcentres.org.uk/uploads/Government_Response_20th_July_2009.pdf> accessed 24 
July 2012. 
360
 Robert Gaudet, ‘Turning a Blind Eye: The Commission's Rejection of Opt-out Class Actions 
overlooks Swedish, Norwegian, Danish and Dutch Experience’ [2009] Vol 30 Issue 3 ECLR 2009 
107. 
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only.
361
 This restriction on non-profit organisations is unnecessary. As mentioned 
earlier in this chapter, organisations which are licensed are ideological claimants and 
their operations should not be limited to specific causes of action. On the other hand, 
the Portuguese popular actions model has a wide scope
362
 and includes investment,
363
 
public health, the environment,
364
 quality of life, consumer rights, cultural heritage
365
 
and the public domain. The 1995 Act in Portugal
366
 the extended ambit of popular 
actions and even allows actions on the prevention and prosecution of offences and to 
claims for damages.
367
 Portuguese Law 24/96 empowers consumers to apply for 
damages caused by defective products or services. 
 The French have limited collective actions to specific areas such as consumer 
actions,
368
 investments
369
 and actions for the protection of health.
370
  
 
In Spain
371
 the law allows for class actions in the consumer sector,
372
 most of which 
are derived from EU Directives, such as the Directive on Unfair Competition and 
Electronic Commerce,
373
 which empowers consumer organisations to apply to the 
courts for an injunction, and, in some cases, for monetary claims in defence of 
                                                 
361
 Duncan Fairgrieve and Geraint Howells, ‘Collective Redress Procedures – European Debates’ 
[2009] International and Comparative Law Quarterly 379. 
362
 Article 1 (2) of the Law No. 83/95 Right of Proceeding, Participation, and Popular Action 
(Portugal). 
363 Decree no. 486/99 which enables investors in securities the right to bring Popular Actions in that 
field (Portugal). 
364
  Article 45 of Law 11/87 amended in Law 13/2002 which provides for Popular Actions in the 
Environment area (Portugal). 
365
  Law No 107/2001 Heritage Protection Law (Portugal). 
366
  Law No 83/95 Right of Proceeding Participation and Popular Action (Portugal). 
367
  Until then, the popular action was confined to supervision on acts of the administration. 
368
  C. Cons. Articles L. 421-1 and L. 422-2 (The Consumer Code, France). 
369
  Since 1994, securities investors may also act jointly through approved associations of shareholders 
or investors under Article L. 452- 1 of the French Financial and Monetary Code or under Article L. 
452- 2 of the French Financial and Monetary Code if several identified investors have suffered 
personal prejudice having a common origin through the action of the same defendant. Any 
approved association of investors may also act if it received the mandate of two or more investors 
to bring an action on behalf of those investors. As in consumer cases, the organisation must have a 
written power of attorney (mandat) from at least two investors. It may then seek remedies for 
common losses suffered by those investors. 
370  According to Article L.1114-2 of France's Code de la Santé Publique (Public Health Code) 12. 
371
   Pablo Gutiérrez de Cabiedes Hidalgo, (n 115). 
372
  Ley General 26/1984, de 19 de julio, para la Defensa de los Consumidores y Usuarios (General 
Law No 26/1984 of 19 July 1984 for the Protection of Consumers and Users, Boletín Oficial del 
Estado No 176, of 24 July 1984, Law No 26/1984) (Spain). 
373  Council Directive (EC) 2000/31 on Certain Legal Aspects of Electronic Commerce in the Internal 
Market, (2000) OJ. L 178/1. 
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consumers’ rights.374 Collective redress actions in Spain are also allowed under 
different acts relating to the environment.
375
 
 
In Italy, consumers are allowed to bring actions in relation to a variety of consumer 
transactions on issues such as contractual rights, unfair commercial practices and 
anticompetitive conduct.
376
 Italy also permits collective actions in relation to anti-
discrimination legislation based on gender, race, ethnic background, religion, personal 
beliefs, disability, age, or sexual orientation
377
 and also claims against the state.
378
 
 
Under the Israeli system almost 80% of the actions are consumer-based, which leads 
to the inevitable conclusion that any collective redress model should be based on 
consumer class actions. Taking this conclusion a step forward, the question is whether 
collective action in consumer cases should be limited to specific enactments or should 
have a general application to all consumer or consumer-related cases. This question 
                                                 
374
  Misleading advertising: Ley 34/1988, de 11 de noviembre, General de Publicidad (General 
Advertising Law 34/1988, of 11th November). 
 Unfair commercial practices: Ley 3/1991, de 10 de enero, de Competencia Desleal (Unfair 
Competition Law 3/1991, of 10th January). 
Standard Terms in Contracts (with a special regulation): Ley 7/1998, de 13 de abril, sobre 
condiciones generales de la contratación (Standard Terms in Contracts Law 7/1998, of 13th April). 
 Ley 34/2002 de 11 Julio de servicios de sociedad de info y comercio electronico 
(Law 34/2002, of 11th of July, Governing Information Society and 
 Electronic Commerce Services (LSSI-CE).)  
Ley 39/2002, de 28 de octubre, de transposicion al ordenamiento juridico espanol de 
diversas directivas comunitarias en materia de proteccion de los intereses de los consumidores 
y usuarios. (Law 39/2002, of 28th of October, for the transposition into the Spanish legal system of 
some community Directives on protection of the interests of consumers and users).,  
Ley 23/2003, de 10 de julio, de Garantías en la Venta de Bienes de Consumo (Law on Guarantees 
for Consumer Goods 23/2003, incorporating Directive 99/44, 25 May 1999, on Certain Aspects of 
Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees). 
375
  Under Ley 29/1998, de 13 de julio, reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa 
(Law 29/1998 of July 13th on Administrative Jurisdiction), access is possible whenever there is a 
breach of any specific environmental legislation. Law 27/2006 expressly recognises the right to 
actio popularis whenever a public authority acts or fails to act in breach of environmental 
legislation. Articles 22 and 23 lay down the scope of this actio popularis.  
376
  Codice del consumo, Art. 140–bis, Section 2 (Section 2 of the 140-bis Consumer Code, Italy). 
377  Professor Elisabetta Silvestri, ‘The Globalisation of Class Actions: Italian report’  
   <http://www.law.stanford.edu/library/globalclassaction/PDF/Italian_National_Report.pdf>  
accessed 23 September 2011. 
378   Attuazione della legge 4 marzo 2009, n. 15, in materia di ottimizzazione della produttività del 
lavoro pubblico e di efficienza e trasparenza delle pubbliche amministrazioni. (09G0164) (Law no. 
15 of 4 March 2009, known as the "Brunetta law") sets out the principles and criteria for a class 
action to be brought against Public/Government Entities and the public services providers who 
harm interests deemed legally relevant to many users or consumers. The Legislative Decree of 20 
December 2009 no. 1985, which laid down provisions for the implementation of a class action 
against public bodies, formally entered into force on 15 January 2010 although actual 
implementation is still subject to further legislation.  
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has troubled the 2007 DTI Committee in the U.K.
379
 which took into considerations 
three options on this area. 
 
Option One: The scope of representative actions will cover all ‘business’ to 
 ‘consumer’ infringements.  
 
The proposal would allow cases to proceed that satisfy the definition of business to 
consumer transactions. It is possible that some products or services should be 
excluded from this definition. For instance, some products or services are already 
highly regulated and offer high levels of consumer protection.  
 
This option was preferred by the committee since it defines the scope clearly without 
being unduly unwieldy. For instance, new legislation within the definition would 
automatically fall within scope, unless specifically excluded.  
 
Option Two: The scope of representative actions will cover all ‘business’ to 
‘consumer’ infringements of Acts or regulations which are specifically listed  
 
The list could be amended by order of the Secretary of State if additional legislation 
needed to be included at a later stage. The court would not permit a representative 
claim, unless the detriment suffered resulted from a breach of specifically listed 
legislation.  
 
The committee regarded this option as having clear borders however at the price of 
bureaucracy and a limitation in scope. The committee argued that there is a great deal 
of consumer legislation and producing an exhaustive list may be very difficult. 
Keeping the list up to date via secondary legislation may also prove a burden on 
parliamentary time.  
 
Option Three: The scope of representative actions will all be ‘business’ to 
‘consumer’ infringements within broadly defined areas. The court will be 
                                                 
379
 The Department of Trade and Industry, Representative Actions in Consumer Protection Legislation 
– Consultation paper 7/2006 <. http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file31886.pdf> accessed 24 July 2012, 
see at page 14. 
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allowed to determine whether a case falls within the scope at the permission 
stage.  
 
Under this proposal, broad areas of consumer protection legislation or contract law 
would be specified in secondary legislation. It would then be a matter for the court to 
consider whether a case falls within the scope.  
 
The committee regarded this option as lacking clarity as a court would decide on a 
case by case basis whether areas of consumer protection legislation should fall within 
the scope.  
 
As mentioned before, the Israeli legislator decided to adopt the wide scope provision 
in relation to consumer cases, allowing collective redress for every business to 
‘customer’ transaction. The legislator intentionally ignored the legal wording of the 
word ‘consumer’ which is defined under the consumer protection legislation in Israel 
as a person who buys property or receives services from dealers for use which is 
primarily personal, or for his household or family. The Israeli law did not adopt the 
word 'consumer' but preferred to adopt the word ‘customer’ which has no legal 
definition in the act. Therefore, the legislator meant to give this phrase the broadest 
possible meaning to include even a business plaintiff that may act as a customer 
despite not being a consumer under the definition in the Consumer Protection law.  
 
The Israeli legislator did not specify the legislation which could have the effect of 
being consumer protection legislation because there is no defined ‘consumer 
protection legislation’ in Israel and consumer rights may derive from other legislation. 
This does not mean that in Europe the Israeli solution is the optimal solution, but this 
option leaves room for marginal cases where the action is related to consumers albeit 
connected to other areas of law. The Israeli approach to include business plaintiffs is 
very reasonable taking into account that where a business in involved in a consumer 
transaction, the same rational apathy will apply with regard to its tendency to bring a 
court action.  
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  2. Should Collective Actions Comply with a List of Consumer 
Protection Legislation? 
 
The answer to this question depends on the existence of a firm body of legislation 
which may be regarded as consumer law in a jurisdiction. In the European context, the 
Masastricht Treaty came into force on 1 November 1993 and it was the first time that 
consumer protection was recognised as an independent principle. The relevant 
provision introduced at Maastricht was a new Article 129a EC., which was later 
renumbered as Article 153 E.U.
380
 
 
Following the introduction of Article 153,
381
 E.U. law-making may take two forms: 
through harmonization provisions: by Article 153(3)(a) or by virtue of Article 
153(3)(b) i.e. special European consumer legislation aimed at improving national 
legislation on consumer protection issues. Those measures adopted by the E.U. in 
accordance with Article 153(3)(b) operate as a minimum level of protection. Member 
states may regulate more intensively however the rules act as minimum requirements. 
 
Geraint Howells and Stephen Weatherill claim that there is a firm body of directives 
that form consumer law in Europe.
382
 This body of legislation touches both private 
and public law and covers the safety of consumers and their economic interests.
383
 
                                                 
380
 Treaty Establishing the European Community (Nice consolidated version) 
 Part Three: Community policies Title XIV: Consumer protection Article 153 available at 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12002E153:EN:HTML> 
accessed 28.July 2012. 
381  Ibid. 
382
  
1. Council Directive 85/374 of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products. 
Directive 1999/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 1999 
amending Council Directive 85/374/EEC on the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products. 
2. Council Directive 90/314/EEC on package travel, package holidays and package tours. 
3. Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts. 
4. Council Directive 88/378 on the approximation of the laws of the members states concerning 
the safety of toys. 
5. Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 December 2001 on 
general product safety. 
6. Council Directive of 10 September 1984 relating to the approximation of the laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning misleading advertising 
(84/450/EEC). Directive 97/55/EC OF European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 
1997 amending Directive 84/450/EEC concerning misleading advertising. 
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The list which is offered by the authors should be implemented by all member states 
in their domestic legislation by national implementing measures.
384
 The measures are 
binding but each member state has the authority to decide on the way to implement 
these measures. Once the directives are implemented, domestic legislation should be 
interpreted in light of these directives.  
 
There are some problems with making a list of directives, for example, where 
consumer matters do not fall under the specific provisions of these articles or where 
the rights derive from other legislation. The other way of looking at scope is the 
Israeli method of looking at the transactions and not at the specific enactment. In this 
case the scope would cover:  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
7. Council Directive of 20 December 1985 to protect the consumer in respect of contracts 
negotiated away from business premises (85/577/EEC). 
8. Council Directive of 22 December 1986 for the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning consumer credit (87/102/EEC). 
Council Directive 90/88/EEC of 22 February 1990 amending Directive 87/102/EEC for the 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States 
concerning consumer credit. Directive 98/7 of the European parliament and of the Council of 
16 February 1998 amending Directive 87/102 for the approximation of the laws regulations 
and administrative provisions of the members states concerning consumer credit. 
9. Directive 94/47 of the Parliament and Council of 26 October 1994 on the Protection of 
purchasers in respect of certain aspects of contracts relating to the purchase of the right to use 
immovable properties on a timeshare basis. 
10. Directive 97/7 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the 
protection of Consumers in respect of distance contracts. 
11. Directive 99/44 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain 
aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guaranties. 
12. Directive 98/27 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on injunctions 
for the protection of consumers' interests. 
13. Directive 2000/31 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on a certain 
Legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce in the internal 
market. 
14. Directive 2002/65 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 
concerning the distance marketing of consumer financial services and amending council 
Directive 90/619/EEC and Directives 97/7/EC and 98/27/EC. 
383
 Geraint Howells and Stephen Weatherill Consumer Protection Law (2nd edn, Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd., 2005) page 124. 
384
  Article 10 (ex 5) EC and Article 249 (ex 189) EC. 
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1. An action of a customer against a dealer having contractual relations or even 
where no contract has been entered into.  
 
2. An action against an insurance company or agent in relation to the contract of 
insurance or benefits within contractual relations or even where no contract 
has been entered into. 
 
3. An action against a bank in relation to matters between banks and customers 
whether business has been transacted between them or not. 
 
4. An action relating to restrictive practices and fair trading. 
 
The combined way to tackle the scope definition is to list all relevant enactments, as 
well as the transactions as mentioned in the Israeli legislation. In this way, even if a 
certain infringement is not covered by a certain enactment, it may fall within the 
widely drafted list of transactions (for example every action of a customer against a 
bank) therefore such an infringement will still be a possible cause of action for 
collective redress. 
 
The problem with this approach is that the scope may be too broad and many actions 
may be submitted on grounds which are indeed consumer transactions, but for which 
the legislator did not intend to provide collective redress, such as where the customer 
is a large business which needs no protection or where the sum of the action is 
substantial (for example in a claim for infringement of advertisement by a competing 
businesses). The view of the Israeli legislator on these issues is to allow a wide scope 
provision with breaks which will be examined in the certification process to ensure 
that a class action is suitable for the claim.  
 
It is also possible to draft a new provision on scope to allow all consumer-related 
transactions to constitute a cause of action for collective actions provided that the 
personal damage does not exceed a certain low figure. This suggested enactment has 
some similarities to the Danish provision that allows opt-out actions provided that the 
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personal action does not exceed DKK 2000.
385
 However, the limitation on actions due 
to the sum may lead to undervaluation of claims by representatives only to certify 
their action by way of collective redress.  
 
  3. Claims Against the State 
 
Another very interesting and very appropriate field for collective actions is the 
defence of citizens’ rights against their states. This means that if states fail to comply 
with their obligations to their citizens, they could be sued for their failure to do so. 
 
States and local authorities operate in the economic markets, they monitor the 
economy and they have duties which they are expected to carry out for the good of 
their citizens. States and state bodies may act unlawfully or may levy unlawful minor 
payments from individuals. States also levy charges from citizens and supply them 
with services. 
 
The Israeli legislator restricted claims against the state to repayment of uncollected 
levies by the state, and in addition provided state and local authorities with special 
defences. The first special defence is that a state cannot be sued in collective actions 
to repay an unlawful levy for a period exceeding 24 months.
386
 The other defence is 
that the state or local authority may undertake to stop the unlawful levy before trial 
and, if such a notification is given, a collective action on this matter is barred.
387
  
 
The problem with such a defence is that it allows the state to retain the fruits of unjust 
enrichment in its hands instead of paying back money which was unlawfully 
collected. 
 
However, it is clear that the provision in the CAL in Israel which allows collective 
actions to be brought against the state only for repayment of unlawful levies is too 
narrow as the interaction between the state and its citizens is much wider and relates 
to many areas of law as well as administrative actions relating to administrative 
                                                 
385
 Prof. Erik Werlauff, (n 104). 
386
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 21 (Israel).  
387
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 9 (Israel). 
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decisions. In all these actions the state is much more powerful than each individual 
citizen separately. Therefore there is a strong argument in favour of allowing broad 
collective actions against state.  
 
On the other hand, governments may be sued in judicial review proceedings, though 
these actions only deal with the administrative side of governmental decisions and not 
with payment of damages for damage caused by governmental actions. Public bodies 
which are controlled by the state, or organisations which are licensed or financed by 
the state, are not likely to sue the government in collective proceedings. Thus it is 
crucial to allow private independent individuals to bring such actions against the state 
or local authorities in order to balance the legal strength of the state against any 
individual member.  
 
Other possible grounds for bringing collective actions against States (apart from 
unlawful levy of different duties) are: 
 
1. Negligence in supervising markets e.g. on the collapse of banks; 
 
2. Negligence in taking action against wrongdoers; 
 
3. Negligence in implementing community directives; 
 
4. Unlawful demands for taxes; and 
 
5. Failure of a member state to implement a European Community measure.  
 
A state may breach any of its obligations or act negligently and will have to 
compensate many individuals who have suffered loss resulting from such a failure. 
This may also be a cause for collective redress. Unfortunately the Israeli collective 
redress provision does not contain such a provision.  
 
In Europe, member states are under an obligation to implement these directives in 
their domestic legislation. The EC treaty envisages that directives will become part of 
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national law through national implementing measures.
388
 The failure to implement a 
Commission measure may result in payment of damages
389
 and an individual may 
demand this if there is a sufficiently serious breach of a superior rule of law for the 
protection of the individual
390
 and provided that certain conditions are met.
391
 
 
Non-implementation of binding European law may result in serious harm to many of 
the member states citizens. Therefore, there is a very strong argument for allowing 
private organisations to bring collective redress cases against a member state for a 
failure in its duty to implement the law which has had a sufficiently serious effect on 
the group of injured people. It is important to include such claims against member 
states in the scope of the suggested European collective redress mechanism to enable 
members of the European community to challenge their state in court. If such 
collective proceedings are not permitted then it seems that individuals will not be able 
to challenge their state on an equal footing in court proceedings. 
 
It should be noted that under Italian Law no. 15 of 4 March 2009 (known as the 
"Brunetta law") there are new principles and criteria for a class action to be brought 
against public/government entities and public service providers who harm interests 
that are deemed legally relevant to many users or consumers.  
 
The Italian Legislative Decree of 20 December 2009 no. 1985, which laid down 
provisions for the implementation of class actions against public bodies, formally 
entered into force on 15 January 2010, although actual implementation is still subject 
to further legislation.
392
  
 
 
                                                 
388 Article 226 (ex 169) – 228 (ex 171) EC, which empowers the Commission to start proceedings 
against Member States failing to comply with their obligations under EC law. Article 227 (ex 
Article 170) EC allows every member state to bring proceedings against another member state for 
breach of their treaty obligations.  
389
 Case 39/72, Commission v. Italy, [1973] ECR 101, [1973] C.M.L.R. 439, at par. 11.  
390
 Case 5/71, Aktien-Zuckerfabrik Schöppenstedt v. Council of the European Communities [1971] ECR 
975; Case 45/96 Bayerische Hypotheken und Wechselbank Ag v. Dietzinger [1998] ECR I-1199.  
391
 Francovich and Others v. Italian Republic Cases C-6 & C-9/90 [1991] ECR 1-5357. 
392
 Lia Campione, Fabio Guastadisegni ‘Class actions in Italy’ (Clifford Chance, 27 January 2010) at 
<http://www.cliffordchance.com/publicationviews/publications/2010/01/class_action_in_italy.html> 
accessed 27 October 2010. See also Franco Bassanini, ‘Twenty years of administrative reform in 
Italy’ (Rome, 2009) at <http://www.astrid-online.it/Riforma-de1/Studi-e-
ri/Bassanini_Review_Economic_Conditions_Italy_3_09.pdf> accessed 27 October 2011. 
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Part E. Conclusions on the Pillars of a Workable Model 
 
In this chapter the elements that have brought improvements in access to justice in 
Israel have been reviewed. Firstly, the adoption of the opt-out machinery as the 
default procedure assisted in creating large groups of claimants under the Israeli 
system. The creation of large groups enables representative to benefit from economies 
of scale and make the action more profitable. On the other hand, looking at other 
European models such as the Portuguese model, it becomes obvious that opt-out 
mechanism alone does not make a system more accessible.  
 
Secondly, the Israeli experience shows that most actions are brought by private 
individuals and thus the European emphasis on organisational claims alone results in 
less class actions being initiated. With regard to public bodies, their position as the 
preferred enforcers should take precedence over private individual actions. Therefore 
it is suggested that individual private actions be allowed to bring only follow-on opt-
out or opt-in actions, or stand-alone actions where the authorities refuse to intervene 
for unjust reasons or delay their action for an unreasonable time. 
 
Thirdly, the importance of funding and introduction of incentives to encourage 
representative to impose damages on large defendants through class actions is crucial. 
Preventive incentives such as exemptions from payment of costs proved to be 
insufficient in order to encourage representatives to break with rational apathy and 
engage in lengthy and costly legal proceedings. The result is that positive incentives 
such as conditional fees and financial bonuses to representatives (both lawyers and 
representative claimants) should be introduced in the new suggested model as far as 
private individual actions are concerned. Other funding such as after the event 
insurance and third party funding are also very welcomed in collective redress cases, 
so as to persuade representatives to take on the risks of bringing a court case.  
 
Fourthly, the wide scope of class actions in Israel enables representative plaintiffs to 
submit collective redress cases for almost all consumer actions and in addition, class 
actions are allowed in very broadly defined areas of law. In Europe, consumer law 
may be defined with more precision with reference to specific enactments and 
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directives but some additional areas should be allowed in order to assist in the 
supremacy and imposition of Community law. In addition, the Israeli model should 
contain a provision which enables bringing damages claims against the state as the 
availability of actions for repayment of unlawful levies alone is too limited. In Europe 
a new model may allow collective actions for damages against member states for 
breach of their European Union obligations where such member states fail to comply 
with their Community obligations so as to further the enforcement of the European 
Union's provisions amongst member states. 
 
Having examined the features which have improved access to justice in Israel through 
class actions, the next chapter will examine the problems that the Israeli model creates 
and the possible solutions and safeguards which may prevent abuse and excessive use 
of the system.   
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Chapter Four: 
Safeguarding the Collective Redress Procedure from 
Abuse 
 
Having dealt with the ingredients that make a collective redress mechanism workable 
and effective in Chapter Three, it is now important to deal with some possible 
negative side effects which may lead to abusive litigation which is so criticised in the 
U.S. 
 
Collective redress may give rise to agency problems where the agent tries to gain 
personal profit to the detriment of the class.
1
  Sometimes representatives may try to 
bring unmeritorious claims in order to blackmail the defendants and force a 
convenient settlement for the representatives. There is also the problem of information 
asymmetries between the agent and the class members which representatives may use 
for their own benefits by entering into an agreement with the defendant which is 
beneficial to the representatives rather than to the group of class members. 
 
In this chapter, the safeguards used under the Israeli model will be viewed in order to 
examine whether these safeguards may be amended so as to prevent the flood of 
claims problem which is now threatening the existence of the Israeli model. In the 
first part of the chapter, the certification procedure will be reviewed in order to 
examine whether it operates effectively to bar unmeritorious claims from reaching the 
courts. Thereafter, the limitations on the power of the representatives to dismiss or 
settle the action will be viewed in order to prevent situations where the agent profits 
from a settlement on the account of the absent class members. Safeguards reviewed 
include provisions aimed to bridge the gap in information between the representatives 
and the class members. In the end, the review of safeguards will also include the 
imposition of financial sanctions by way of costs in order to deter representatives 
from bringing unmeritorious claims. 
                                                 
1
 Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, 'The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and 
Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform' (1991) Faculty 
Scholarship Series Paper 1717 available at <http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1717> 
accessed 6 May 2012>, see at page 3. 
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The review of the current safeguards is aimed at preserving the Israeli model's central 
features, and producing an opt-out model secure from abuse which is led by reliable 
agents, minimising the flood of claims problem as much as possible.  
 
A.  General View on Safeguards 
 
There are certain characteristics of consumer collective proceedings that require 
special safeguards in order to prevent misuse of the procedure.
2
 The first problem is 
the information asymmetry between the class representative and the class members. 
The representative has more information than the class members. In the context of 
collective redress, it means that the representative better understands the chances of 
success, the quality of the arguments put forward, and the advantages and 
disadvantages of certain alternatives and choices. In collective redress cases there is 
also investment asymmetry between the representative and the class members. In 
regular actions, the clients have a greater interest than their representatives in the 
outcome of the action. However, in collective actions, the representative financial 
interest is much greater than the class members' interests. Such asymmetry may lead 
to abuse as the representative may prefer their own personal interests over the class 
member's interests.
3
 In the U.S., there are abuses due to large payoffs offered to 
lawyers. Class actions in the U.S. are largely lawyer-driven exercises in which the 
idea to bring a suit comes not from an injured consumer or investor, but rather from 
an entrepreneurial lawyer who sees an opportunity for profit. U.S.-style litigation 
imposes crippling costs on the national economy. The explosion of U.S. class actions 
over the past four decades has imposed a substantial cost on American business.  Not 
only are U.S. companies forced to allocate billions of dollars to legal fees and 
litigation costs every year, but the overall litigation climate in the United States deters 
significant foreign investment in U.S. businesses and impedes research and 
development.
4
  
                                                 
2 Ianika Tzankova and Jeroen Kortmann,(2010) 1 'Remedies for Consumers of Financial Services: 
Collective Redress and Improvements of Class Representation' European Journal of Consumer Law 
117 at page 121. 
3 Ibid at page 124. 
4 Lisa Rickard, ‘The Class Action Debate in Europe: Lessons from the U.S. Experience’ 
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One of the principal objections to the introduction of the CAL was that Israeli class 
actions would suffer from the same problems as the American class action system, 
such as lawyers motivated by their own personal gain
5
 and inadequate redress for 
class members.
6
 In addition, class actions have proven to be detrimental to the U.S. 
economy
7
, with companies forced to divert financial resources to defending class 
actions instead of developing their products. 
 
Some writers have referred to the class action phenomenon as Frankenstein’s 
Monster,
8
 arguing that lawyers in such cases act as entrepreneurs without real clients 
and engage in a form of legalized blackmail. This is due to the fact that defending 
class actions can be very costly and may force the defendants to reach a settlement 
even where the merits of the action are weak.
9
 Lawyers tend to sue whoever they 
believe may be vulnerable to a settlement and capable of paying large lawyers’ fees,10 
without paying much attention to the question of the case’s merits.11 
 
The European Commission was ready to consider an EU collective redress 
mechanism which would facilitate meritorious claims and benefit consumers. At the 
same time, it stated that such procedure needs to discourage a "litigation industry."
12
 
The term "litigation industry" is describing the class action litigation abuse in the U.S. 
                                                                                                                                            
The European Business Review (4 December 2008) at 
<http://www.europeanbusinessreview.com/?p=273> accessed 20 October 2011. 
5
 Lisa Rickard, (n 4). 
6
 Lisa Rickard, (n 4). The problem is especially acute in securities class actions which represent about 
50% of federal actions in the U.S. according to U.S. Chambers of Legal Reform, Securities Class 
Action Litigation: The problem, its impact, and the path to reform (July 2008) 
<www.instituteforlegalreform.com> accessed 20 October 2011.  
7
 George Bush’s speech dated February 18, 2005 available at 
<http://rncnyc2004.blogspot.com/2005/02/president-signing-class-action.html> accessed 2 
December 2011. 
8
 Arthur R. Miller, ‘Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the Class 
Action Problem’ [January 1979] Vol. 92, No. 3 Harvard Law Review 664-694. See also 
Deborah R. Hensler, ‘Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Action and Other 
Large Scale Litigation’ 11 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 179 at 
<http://www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?11+Duke+J.+Comp.+&+Int'l+L.+179> accessed 2 
December 2011. 
9
 Samuel Estreicher, ‘Forward: Federal Class Actions After 30 Years’ [1996] 71:1 N.Y.U.L Rev. 1 at 2. 
10
 Lawrence Schonburn, ‘The Class Action Con Game’ [Fall 1997] Regulation 50-51.  
11
 Debora Hensler, Class Action Dilemmas: Pursuing Public Goals for Private Gain (Santa Monica 
CA, Rand Institute for Civil Justice, 2000) 402. 
12 Commission of the European Communities, 'Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress', 
COM(2008)794 final, <http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/greenpaper_en.pdf> accessed 20 
April 2012, see at paragraph 52. 
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The Commission expressed its view that a European model should refrain from 
abusive elements, such as punitive damages and contingency fees which would 
benefit lawyers rather than consumers and create high costs for defendants.
13
 
Discussions in Europe over controlling abuse in class actions are fuelled by various 
features of the U.S. class action system. The European Commission claimed that the 
U.S.- style class action is based on ‘toxic cocktail’ which is a result of a combination 
of several elements: punitive damages, contingency fees, opt-out system, pre-trial 
discovery procedures and that it should not be introduced in Europe.
14
 
 
It is claimed that the U.S. class action system produces excessive volumes of 
litigation, that cases often have little merit, that if a case is certified by a court as a 
class action the defendants have little commercial alternative but to settle (known as 
‘blackmail settlements’). The system is claimed to encourage and fail to prevent 
frivolous, fraudulent or abusive claims, thereby wasting the resources of defendants 
and courts, leading to deleterious effect on the economy, and potentially bringing the 
legal system into disrepute.
15
 
 
The Civil Justice Council in England has warned that one of the most significant 
concerns regarding collective actions is the possibility that so-called blackmail suits 
may proliferate. Such actions are typically unmeritorious and are prosecuted with a 
view to procuring a settlement from a defendant. Settlement is procured due to the 
possible large-scale cost consequences that might be incurred in the proceedings 
combined with the prospect that such costs, from a successful defendant’s 
perspective, would be in practice irrecoverable.
16
 
 
                                                 
13 Commission of the European Communities, (n 12), see paragraphs 48-53. 
14 European Commission and DG SANCO, Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress – Questions 
and Answers MEMO/08/741 available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/741&format=HTML&aged=0
&language=EN> accessed 20 April 2012. 
15 Professor Christopher Hodges, ‘Response to Consultation: Towards a Coherent European Approach 
to Collective Redress’ (28 April 2010) available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/index.html> accessed 28 July 2011. 
16
 The Civil Justice Council, Civil Justice Council, 'Improving Access to Justice Through Collective 
Actions' Developing a More Efficient and Effective Procedure for Collective Actions. Final Report. 
A Series of Recommendations to the Lord Chancellor (Civil Justice Council, 2008) at 
<http://www.civiljusticecouncil.gov.uk/index.htm> pp156-158. 
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In order to avoid the possibility of abuse of a collective redress the EU Commission 
offered some safeguards which would prevent unmeritorious claims. The judge can 
play an important role by deciding whether a collective claim is unmeritorious or 
admissible. Certification of the representative entity acts as a gatekeeper, as does the 
loser-pays-principle in the Member States where it exists. Public authorities could be 
potential gatekeepers when funding collective redress, refusing to allocate resources 
to unmeritorious claims. The consumer's position in collective redress court 
procedures could be reinforced by giving legal standing to pursue a representative 
action to qualified entities such as consumer organisations or ombudsmen.
17
 
 
The European Commission has provided that the effective safeguards to avoid 
abusive collective actions is the ‘loser pays’ principle, meaning that the losing party 
pays the court and lawyers fees of both parties.
18
 The Civil Justice committee argued 
that the proper safeguards are: the certification process, security for costs by imposing 
an order against a representative costs-shifting, the ability for a defendant to bring an 
application that claimants provide security for costs, and court approval of 
settlements.
19
 Professor Hodges argued that the proper safeguards should operate at 
the earliest time, that the merits of the claims should be made clear and evaluated as 
early as possible, and that claimants should be required to use negotiation or public 
oversight procedures before going to court, especially for aggregate claims. Professor 
Hodges explains that the type of safeguard depends on the type of abuse that it is 
sought to guard against. If this is the case, then the highest degree of safeguards 
should be imposed on private stand-alone actions, and there is no need for such 
safeguards on organisational or public actions which are secure from any abuses. 
Since the new European collective redress framework will be set against the 
background of the strong regulatory and organisational infrastructure which exists in 
Europe, many of the safeguards that exist in Israel should be relaxed or removed 
altogether if an action is led by a secure agent, such as government approved 
organisations or public bodies.   
                                                 
17 Commission of the European Communities, (n 12), see paragraphs 48-53. 
18 The European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Public Consultation: Towards a 
Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress, SEC (2011) 173 final (Feb. 4, 2011), para 22–
23 available at <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0054/sec_2011_173_en.pdf> 
accessed 2 June 2011. 
19
 See The Civil Justice Council, (n 16) p156-158. 
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The Israeli legislator included several safeguards in the CAL in an attempt to avoid 
the abuses which appeared to accompany lawyer-driven litigation in the U.S.  
The need for safeguards in Israel arises due to some of the elements of the 'toxic 
litigation'
20
 which are the opt-out mechanism and the contingency fees which are 
allowed in Israel. These safeguards operating in Israel have so far prevented some of 
the possible abuses of the collective redress system in Israel. The Israeli model is 
based on private collective actions using contingency fees and yet, there are no 
reported instances in Israel of an action being brought in bad faith (for example 
actions led by the plaintiffs themselves). The merits of the claims in Israel are 
checked in the certification procedure and actions in bad faith or unmeritorious 
actions are not supposed to go beyond the certification process. Furthermore, the 
judge at that stage will give orders with regards to the fair hearing of the trial. 
However, the safeguards in the CAL have failed to prevent collective actions from 
flooding the Israeli courts. Consequently, the improved model suggested in this work 
should take note of the Israeli experience and include additional safeguards to prevent 
a similar deluge of collective actions.  
 
During the course of this chapter, it is proposed to adopt a number of safeguards that 
operate in Israel, such as the certification process, the supervision of compromises and 
voluntary dismissals, and a public registry which could be integrated into the future 
model advocated in this work.  
 
B. Safeguards Operating in Israel 
    
  1. The Certification Procedure as a Barrier to Unmeritorious Claims  
 
The certification procedure is an important safeguard which filters out claims that are 
unsuitable for collective redress at a relatively early stage in proceedings. One Israeli 
court has referred to the certification procedure as ‘the corridor which leads to the 
                                                 
20
 The term mentioned above by DG SANCO. See (n 14). 
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parlor’21; the certification procedure should be efficient and should not be used to 
deter legitimate plaintiffs from bringing collective actions, yet it should prevent 
unsuitable representatives from bringing actions. In the Israeli model, the first 
filtering procedure is the certification procedure. Therefore any action starts with a 
motion to certify the action as a class action. Only if the action is certified by the court 
at this initial stage, may it proceed to a collective procedure.  
 
However, once the claim form has been submitted, it becomes public knowledge and 
may have a detrimental impact on the defendant’s business. For example, if the 
defendant is a public company, it must give immediate notice of the action to its 
shareholders and its share value may fall. Furthermore, banks and potential investors 
will regard the company as being at financial risk due to the threat of the class action. 
Consequently, companies often prefer to pay compensation, even if the action has a 
low chance of success on its merits, rather than suffer the negative impact of a 
threatened collective action. 
 
In this part of the chapter, the Israeli certification procedure will be viewed in order to 
recommend the adoption of a similar procedure in the new model with some 
additional recommendations. These recommendations relate to improving the filters 
employed in Israel at the certification stage, as these come into operation too late once 
the case has been submitted to the courts. An additional filtering mechanism to stop 
unmeritorious claims from being submitted to the courts should be introduced. 
 
A. The Decision of whether to Certify a Class Action 
 
In Israel, a representative has to submit his personal claim form together with a 
motion to certify the claim as a class action.
22
 The court then hears the motion and 
decides whether the claim is suited to a class action. In Israel, the role of the judge at 
this stage is to decide if the claim should be approved as a class action. Once the 
motion is certified, the court gives orders relating to the management of the class 
                                                 
21
 Leave to Appeal Request No. 4556/94 (Supreme Court) Tezet v. Zilbershatz, P"D Mem Tet (5) page 
774, 784 (2006). 
22
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 5 (Israel). 
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action, which may include a representative replacement,
23
 the definition of the class,
24
 
setting a time limit to opt-out of the action
25
 and, in exceptional cases, turning the 
action into an opt-in action.
26
 The ruling judge may also certify the action with such 
changes as he sees fit.
27
 The management orders are aimed at ensureing the fair 
hearing of the trial.  
 
The ruling judge must decide whether the action raises similar questions of fact or law 
and whether there is a reasonable chance that the substantive questions of law and fact 
common to the class will be determined in favour of the class.
28
 This is a merits 
examination which filters out actions that have little chance of success and protects 
defendants from being blackmailed into settling unfounded cases rather than pursuing 
long and protracted actions.
29
 The Israeli prerequisite was not imported directly from its 
American counterpart
30
 and although it was intended to prevent abuse of the class 
action procedure,
31
 it has not prevented a flood of applications from being made before 
the Israeli courts. This is because the courts in Israel have loosened their belts since the 
introduction of CAL, and now allow many actions to successfully pass through the 
certification procedure. Many actions give rise to similar questions of fact or law. In 
Israel, there has been a relaxation of the requirements to approve the action, mainly 
since there is ambiguity regarding the required burden of proof at this stage. It is 
unclear whether the burden of proof at this preliminary stage is higher than in non-class 
actions, but the court has ruled that a plaintiff must convince the judge prima facie that 
the similar questions will be decided in favour of the class. The level of persuasion 
required on the merits of the case and the chance of success should be higher than in 
any other preliminary proceedings in any other type of action.
32
 The level of precaution 
                                                 
23
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 8 (c) (Israel). 
24
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 10 (Israel). 
25
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 12 (Israel). 
26
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 12 (Israel). 
27
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 13 (Israel). 
28
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 8 (A) 1 (Israel). 
29
 Geoffrey P. Miller, ‘Review of the Merits in Class Action Certification’ [2004] 33 Hofstra L. Rev 
51. 
30 Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Eran B. Taussig, ‘Prerequisites to Class Action 
Certification: A Comparison of New Israeli Law and Rule 23 (A) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure’ (2007) 5 J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 3:1 at 
<http://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jil/jilp/articles/5-1_Taussig_Eran.pdf > accessed 6 January 
2012.  
31 S. Goldstein, ‘Class Action in Israel’ in Wasserstein Fassberg C. (ed) Israel Reports to the XIII 
International Congress of Comparative Law (1990), 45.  
32
 CA 2967/95 (Supreme Court) Magen and Keshet v. Tempo, Padi Nun Alef (2) 312, 329-30 (1997). 
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needed in collective proceedings is higher than any normal procedure so as to enable 
the court to perform the role of gatekeeper and prevent unmeritorious claims as the 
earliest stage possible once the action has been filed. This is why the courts in Israel 
have looked at the merits of the case even before CAL was adopted, even though at that 
time there was no requirement to do so.
33
 The reasoning behind this decision was that 
an unmeritorious claim against a commercial company could cause severe harm to its 
commercial and financial standing and should be barred as soon as possible.   
 
A further preliminary condition that the Israeli courts are required to examine at the 
certification process stage is whether a class action would be the most efficient 
procedure and the most appropriate means of resolving the dispute in light of the 
circumstances of the case.
34
 Under this condition, the court is required to look at other 
available measures to resolve the dispute. The alternative measures are joinder of 
personal actions which are submitted to the courts on the same issues, or adjudicating 
of the individual personal claims separately.
35
 The court should also examine whether 
other legal measures such as criminal penalties or administrative proceedings could 
achieve the same goals more efficiently than a class action.
36
 If the class action 
concerns a large number of members, dealing with each case separately would be 
impracticable and costly and a class action would be preferable.
37
  
 
Class actions are most commonly denied on this ground because there appear to be 
special circumstances that apply to class members, for example, where it is necessary to 
prove the reliance of all group members on a specific misrepresentation. Rather than a 
collective action, the court may prefer joinder of personal actions (similar to the GLO 
in the U.K. where many personal court actions are joined to one procedure but each 
personal action has to be submitted to the court). The decision may be dependent on the 
number of class members and the existence of common issues to all class members 
(commonality). For example, in Adv. Shtendel v. Bezeq International 
38
 the Supreme 
                                                 
33
 Leave to Appeal no. 6567/97 (Supreme Court) Bezeq v. Gat Padi Mem Bet 2, 719-720 (30 June 
1998). 
34 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 8(A)2 (Israel). 
35 Eran B. Taussig, (n 30) at 3:11. 
36
 Professor Alon Klement, 'The Ambits of Collective Actions in Mass Tort Actions' (2003) 34(2) 
Mishpatim 380-381. 
37
 Professor Alon Klement, ‘Guidelines for Interpreting the Class Action Act 2006’, (2006) 145-146 
<www.hapraklit.co.il/_Uploads/dbsAttachedFiles/memtet1_6.pdf> accessed 15 December 2011>. 
38
 Appeal no. 458/06 Shtendel v. Bezeq International (Supreme Court) (6 May 2009). 
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Court took the view that a class action was not the most efficient or appropriate way to 
deal with the dispute, as the reliance placed on a misrepresentation was potentially 
different for each class member. In this case, the plaintiff argued that Bezeq (Israel's 
leading telecoms company) deceived the public in its advertisement whilst claiming 
that its international telephone rates are the cheapest. Bezeq's advertisement was 
misleading because it did specify that in order to enjoy the cheap rates, one had to 
subscribe to Bezeq. The District Court and the Supreme Court in Israel decided that the 
action should not be permitted on a collective basis, since personal questions of reliance 
existed (each person would have to prove that he/she made telephone calls in reliance 
on the misleading advertisement) and that these questions outweighed the collective 
issues. 
 
Indeed, where the representative represents a class of members with different 
characteristics, collective proceedings are usually not the most efficient and appropriate 
means of resolving the dispute as the court will have to examine the circumstances of 
each class member. For example, in Barkan v. Ayalon Insurance Company the Israeli 
High Court of Employment refused an appeal against an employment tribunal’s 
decision not to certify an action brought by six hundred and fifty of the defendant’s 
employees who were claiming non-payment of overtime hours of work. The court 
stated that payment of overtime work depended on each employee’s individual hours of 
work and thus a class action was not the most efficient and appropriate means of 
resolving the dispute.
39
 Thus the court did not approve the collective proceedings due to 
the different causes of action which each plaintiff might have. 
 
Thus it is possible to say that the court's examination at the certification stage will be 
both on procedural matters, i.e. that the collective procedure is the most appropriate and 
that the common question prevails over personal issues, and in addition, a merits 
examination in which the court will decide whether the case prima facie has a good 
chance of success. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
  
39
 Appeal no. 686/09 (High Court of Employment) Barkan v. Ayalon Insurance Company (30 May 
2011) (unreported) available at <www.glima.info/verdicts/30-5-2011.pdf> accessed 16 December 
2011. 
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B. Different European Views on Certification 
 
There are European models which do not provide for a certification process and the 
case is treated as a collective action from the outset. For example, the law in Portugal 
does not require certification before submission of a Popular Action.
40
 Nonetheless, 
the judge dealing with the case has broad discretion to strike down cases which he 
considers unsuited to collective proceedings.
41
 Article 13 of Law 83/95 provides that 
a Popular Action should be dismissed where the judge finds that it is highly 
improbable that the action will proceed having heard the Public Prosecutor and made 
the preliminary inquiries that he considers justified or that the claimant or the Public 
Prosecutor’s request.42 Before making the decision, the judge hears the public 
prosecutor’s position and makes preliminary inquiries. Thus, there are no strict 
criteria to be examined in the preliminary hearing in Portugal and the matter of the 
suitability of the procedure is left to the discretion of the hearing judge. Under such a 
model, the action does not go through any filter and may proceed even if it is not 
sound on its merits. Since the adequacy of the representation is not examined, the 
Portuguese model carries a severe danger of abuse without a certification procedure.  
   
There are, however, European jurisdictions which see the certification procedure as a 
necessary part of any collective procedure model. In England, for example, the CJC 
reviewed the possible mechanisms of collective redress and recommended the 
introduction of a certification procedure as a safeguard to ensure fairness to all 
parties.
43
 In its response to the CJC recommendations, the government agreed that 
there should be a certification process.
44
 The Civil Justice committee claimed that the 
                                                 
40
 Dr. Lisa Tortell, ‘Evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of collective redress mechanisms in 
the European Union – country report Portugal’ (Civic Consulting, 2008) at 
 <http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/collective_redress_en.htm> accessed 4 December 
2011. 
41
 Article 265-A of the Code of Civil Procedure (Portugal). 
42 Henrique Sousa Antunes, ‘Class Actions, Group Litigation & Other Forms of Collective Litigation 
(Portuguese Report)’ at 
<http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events_media/Portugal_National_Report.pdf
> accessed 8 November 2011, see at page 11. See Article 16(3) of Law 83/95 (Portugal).  
43 Civil Justice Council, (n 16).  
44
 Ministry of Justice, "The Government’s Response to the Civil Justice Council’s Report: ‘Improving 
Access to Justice through Collective Actions’" (2009) available at 
<http://www.lawcentres.org.uk/uploads/Government_Response_20th_July_2009.pdf> accessed 18 
July 2012. 
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certification procedure is an absolutely mandatory element of any collective action 
certification procedure and is consistent with the general approach to case 
management. In a certification procedure, the court will be best able to maintain strict 
control of any collective action process and in so doing, it acts as a diligent gatekeeper 
at the outset of any such action. In the Italian model, the judge may refuse to allow the 
action if the claim has a low chance of success, there are conflicting interests between 
the plaintiff and the class members, and there is a fear that the representative is not 
adequate or the collective interest in question is not recognised under Italian Law.
45
 
The public prosecutor is served with the petition and he may decide to intervene in the 
admissibility decision.
46
 At this stage, the court hears the motion and decides whether 
the claim is suited to a collective action. The suitability of the claim refers to both the 
cause of action and the suitability of the representatives in leading collective redress 
proceedings. Therefore, it seems that a certification procedure is necessary in all 
collective redress systems, the rationale being that no party should be able to use a 
heavy weapon such as collective redress without court supervision and approval. In 
these circumstances, the court acts as a guardian for the missing parties, a role which 
is not fulfilled in actions involving two parties. 
 
The certification procedure is also important in defending the rights of defendants by 
filtering actions and preventing claims which are brought in bad faith or which have a 
low chance of success. The other function of the certification process is that it 
provides the judge with an opportunity to give precise orders for the management of 
the case. If a certification procedure is adopted as part of the new European model, it 
may quell some of the current fears among European legislators regarding abusive 
litigation in collective proceedings as such a procedure will act as a barrier to abusive 
litigation. 
 
 
                                                 
45
 Prof. Dr. iur. Hans-W. Micklitz and Dr. Cristina Poncibò 'Evaluation of the effectiveness and 
efficiency of collective redress mechanisms in the European Union – country report Italy' (Civic 
Consulting, 2008) at <http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/collective_redress_en.htm> 
accessed 4 December 2011.  
46
 'Newsletter Class Action' Chimkent Studio Legale, 18 January 2010. 
<http://www.chiomenti.net/CMS/upload/attach/NEWSLETTER/Class%20Action%202009_18.1.10_
EN.pdf> accessed 6 January 2012.  
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C. Creating a New Certification Procedure – Pre-Legal Action 
 
The problem with the certification procedure is that from the defendant’s perspective, 
conducting the merits examination at the certification stage sometimes comes too late. 
The certification itself may be very lengthy and costly and harm may already have 
been caused to the defendant’s business by the mere submission of a large class action 
against the defendant.
47
 Conversely, a lengthy examination of the merits may 
sometimes be very detrimental to the plaintiffs, as the defendants will try to prolong 
the certification hearing, exhausting the little funds available to the class 
representatives. Therefore in small claims proceedings the defendants tend to resist 
class certification.
48
  
 
Consequently, an additional safeguard is required to filter out unmeritorious actions 
before certification proceedings are commenced in order to ease pressure on the court 
system and to protect defendants. This could be achieved if public enforcers of the 
type that exist in Europe would be more active in promoting the use of collective 
actions. Ideally, if these regulatory bodies were required to take action first, only 
allowing a private action afterwards if necessary,   the first action would have a filter 
effect since it takes place before the dispute reaches the courts. In this way many costs 
would be saved, and the benefits to the consumer class could be similar to those of a 
court decision.  
 
Professor Hodges refers to several existing European regulatory mechanisms where 
the regulator has extensive powers to bring collective redress cases on behalf of 
consumers, such as Finland
49
, Denmark
50
, Sweden
51
 and Norway.
52
 Even in England 
there are calls to appoint a Consumer Advocate, to monitor cases where a large 
                                                 
47 The U.K government in its reply to the CJC recommendation stated that the merits examination 
should take place in the certification process, exactly as the case is currently under Israeli legislation. 
Ministry of Justice, (n 44). 
48 John C. Coffee, Jr., 'Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action' (1995) Colum. L. Rev. 
1343 at page 1352. 
49 Act 444/2007 on Class Actions in Finland in force since 1 October 1 2007 allowing the Consumer 
Ombudsman to bring collective cases. 
50
 Administration of Justice Act 2007 (Demark). 
51
 Group Proceedings Act 2002 (Sweden). 
52
 Dispute Act 2005 (Norway). 
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number of consumers have been affected.
53
 Under this recommendation, a business 
found in breach of the law would have to liaise with relevant enforcers which would 
help the business in question to propose a satisfactory compensation package on a 
voluntary basis. 
 
Professor Hodges also refers to possible approaches which would give public 
regulators the power to reach private solutions, such as restorative justice, which is 
primarily concerned with repairing the harm caused to victims and less concerned 
with penalties and deterrence.
54
   
However, a regulatory body could not replace the representative role in leading the 
class action. Public enforcement is not as efficient as private enforcement. Regulatory 
bodies are not likely to deal with collective redress cases for damages due to their 
limited resources and their traditional role as investigators and supervisors rather than 
damages collectors. An excellent example of good practice by a regulatory body is 
that of the OFT which has been granted powers under U.K. legislation to investigate 
‘super-complaints.’55 Under this special procedure, certain designated bodies which 
represent consumers are allowed to submit super-complaints to the OFT and to other 
regulators which may be relevant for consumers in the circumstances of the case if a 
certain business behaviour significantly harms the interests of consumers.
56
  
The OFT considers the evidence and has to publish a response within 90 days from 
the day after which the super-complaint was received stating what action, if any, it 
proposes to take in response and giving the reasons behind its decision. Alternatively, 
the OFT may refer the complaint to the Competition Commission for further 
investigation, or take any other action available to it.
57
 This procedure is very 
convenient and may be the basis for follow-on class actions because the procedure 
acts as a preliminary barrier to a merits examination before the case reaches the 
                                                 
53
 Department for Business Innovation & Skills, Consultation: The Role and Powers of the Consumer 
Advocate (2 December 2009) <www.bis.gov.uk/files/file53816.pdf> accessed 15 December 2011. 
54
 Professor Christopher Hodges, 'Collective Redress in Europe: The New Model' [2010] Civil Justice 
Quarterly 383-384. 
55
 Enterprise Act of 2002, s 11 (U.K.). 
56
 For example, super-complaints to the Director General of Telecommunications, the Gas and 
Electricity Markets Authority, the Northern Ireland Authority for Energy Regulation, the Director 
General of Water Services, the Rail Regulator and the Civil Aviation Authority. 
57
 The OFT’s guidance on Super-Complaints at <http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/markets-work/super-
complaints/> accessed 16 December 2011.  
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courts, and thus may filter out unmeritorious claims and save defendants from strike 
suits which have no real merits but are aimed at threatening the defendants.  
The process of bringing super-complaints is currently not sufficiently efficient as such 
complaints are only available to certain designated bodies
58
 such as the consumer 
organisation ‘Which?’59 and the Citizens Advice Bureau.60 Thus far, no super-
complaint has led to any income for affected consumers and, from a financial 
perspective, the current super-complaint has proved to be toothless. It is clear that if a 
new model is to be based on the existing foundations of the OFT super-complaint and 
the prior examination of a public regulatory, it will need to amend Section 11 of the 
Enterprise Act so as to allow every individual to bring a complaint to the regulator for 
prior inspection. Indeed, the super-complaint mechanism operates only in the U.K. 
However, there are foundations for strong regulatory bodies in Europe, such as the 
Consumer Ombudsman in Denmark. These regulatory bodies might even cooperate in 
cross-border cases within the European Community.
61
  Such a safeguard ensures that 
actions are brought only where a public authority has examined the facts and has 
found that the defendant has acted wrongly. A good example of the operation of such 
a mechanism is the follow-on action brought in the U.K. by the consumers’ 
organisation ‘Which?’ against JJB Sports Plc.62 In this case, JJB was found guilty of 
price-fixing by the Office of Fair Trading and was fined GBP 18.6 million. Following 
conviction, a follow-on action for damages was submitted. The follow-on action fits 
the idea of a prior filtering procedure by a regulatory body to determine whether the 
                                                 
58 Designated by the DTI according to section 11(5) of the Enterprise Act: The Consumers' 
Association, National Consumer Council and Citizens Advice Bureau were designated in July 2004. 
Energywatch and the Consumer Council for Water (formerly known as Watervoice) were designated 
in January 2005. Postwatch, CAMRA and the General Consumer Council of Northern Ireland were 
designated in October 2005. The list is available at: 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.berr.gov.uk/consumers/enforcement/super-
complaints/page17902.html> accessed 15 December 2011. 
59 
For example, just recently Which? submitted a super-complaint to the OFT relating to surcharges that 
are payable when customers use a debit or credit card. See the OFT site 
<http://www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-updates/press/2011/45-11> accessed 16 December 2011. 
60 For example, the Citizens Advice Bureau submitted a complaint alleging consumer detriment caused 
by two practices in credit brokerage and debt management and the OFT reacted by warning 129 
businesses and asked the government to issue new guidance. See 
<http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/markets-work/super-complaints/cita> accessed 15 December 
2011. 
61 Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 2004 
on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection 
laws. 
62 The Consumers Association v JJB Sports plc (case number: 1078/7/9/07). 
 <http://www.catribunal.org.uk/238-640/1078-7-9-07-The-Consumers-Association.html> accessed 
16 July 2011. 
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action stands on solid merits. Only then will a further collective damages action be 
available. Such a mechanism is more capable of managing the fears of European 
legislators of a U.S.-type of procedure and in fact it will further good practice in  trade 
within the European Union. 
 
The Israeli law allows stand-alone actions as a first recourse and there is no need to 
take any prior action. The private stand-alone actions are the source of the Israeli flood 
of actions. Thus the new model should filter stand-alone actions and should provide 
that stand-alone class actions are not the most appropriate or efficient way to deal with 
a collective consumer dispute, unless secure claimants such as organisations and public 
bodies are taking on the representation of the class.
63
 Adopting this view in the new 
model would prevent the courts from being flooded with cases.  
 
The new regime should therefore provide that if a complaint, similar to a super-
complaint, to a public body or a regulator results in a conviction or a disciplinary 
ruling, then a follow-on action should be available to all potential plaintiffs. Such a 
provision would minimise the volume of unmeritorious collective cases which reach the 
courts.  
 
At the certification stage, the court would then take into consideration the fact that a 
complaint had been submitted to the relevant public body or regulator and such body's 
response. This being the case, follow-on actions will go through fairly easy. In addition, 
since consumers do not incur any expenses in bringing a complaint, there is no need to 
introduce incentives for making such a complaint. The incentives should be available 
only if the case goes to court with the approval of a public body or following a 
conviction and is represented by private individuals. 
 
 
 
                                                 
63 In its response to the CJC’s recommendations, the British government stated that at the certification 
stage the court should consider issues such as whether the claim could be achieved more cost-
effectively by a non-court mechanism (such as regulatory action or via an ombudsman), whether the 
representative body or party is likely to be able to meet the defendant’s costs if unsuccessful (from 
insurance, its own resources or otherwise), whether to order the payment of security for costs and, 
depending on the statutory provisions in the particular sector, authorisation or approval as 
appropriate of the proposed representative body or party.’ Ministry of Justice, (n 44). 
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D. Appeals on Certification 
 
The question of allowing an appeal on the certification decision is a very important 
one as regards the certification stage being a safeguard against unmeritorious cases. 
On one hand, the defendant would want to appeal if the certification of an 
unmeritorious action is granted, whilst on the other hand, defendants have the 
tendency to appeal even if the motion for certification relates to a substantiated action. 
The latter appeal by the defendant is made for tactical reasons to exhaust the 
representative plaintiff's funds in a bid to force the representative to settle the case 
cheaply.  
 
The defendant's fear that an unmeritorious action may be approved may bring the 
defendant to settle a 'strike suit', a case with no real merits which is aimed at 
intimidating the defendant.  In the absence of the possibility of an appeal on the 
decision at the certification stage, a defendant may be under a great deal of pressure 
from the very beginning of the action as the action, if certified, will have to be heard 
in its entirety up until judgment in the first instance, even if the first instance court has 
incorrectly certified the claim as a class action. Allowing the courts to deal with a 
class action risks a bad reputation for the defendant, and fewer possibilities of raising 
funds since the filing of the action must appear as a threat to the company on the 
company's balance sheet. In addition, defending the class actions means extensive 
discovery of the company's documents, and high legal costs. This means that once the 
motion to certify the action is approved, in most cases the defendant will try to settle 
the case in order to escape lengthy and costly proceedings. 
 
The question of appeal on a certification decision arose before the Israeli Supreme 
Court in the case of Celcom v. Tal Fatal.
64
 In this case, Celcom, a mobile telephone 
provider, began charging its subscribers for providing an itemised telephone bill 
detailing the calls made which it sent its subscribers by post, despite having 
agreements with the subscribers as to the amounts they would charge which did not 
include such charges and despite the fact that the service had been provided free of 
charge in the past. The Israeli Supreme Court indicated that it would allow an appeal 
                                                 
64
 Leave to Appeal no. 1112/21 (Supreme Court) Celcom v Tal Fatal (6 May 2010). 
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against a certification decision only in exceptional circumstances, for example, where 
the decision raises a new question of law or where the hearing of the case may cause 
the defendant very severe damages mainly due to the amounts in question or where it 
is clear that the court of first instance mistakenly certified the action. This decision to 
allow appeals on the certification decision only in exceptional circumstances seems to 
run contrary to the current U.S. trend. The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure promulgated an amendment to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure that would provide litigants with an additional means by which to 
seek an interlocutory appeal. The new provision which came into force in 1998, when 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 was amended to include a new subdivision (f), 
provides the court with the power to grant a discretionary appeal in relation to class 
certification decisions. Under the new rule in the U.S., appellate judges must now 
decide whether to hear such appeals.
65
 The U.S. approach reduces the pressure on 
defendants to settle a case once certification has been approved, because it gives the 
defendant a second chance to prevent an unjustified action. However, on the other 
hand, past experience in Israel and in the U.S. shows that defendants will make an 
appeal knowing that the funds of the representative claimant are limited and therefore 
plaintiffs may be pressurised into agreeing to an unfavourable settlement.  
During the debate in England on this issue, the Civil Justice Council (CJC) expressed 
its concern about the appeal on certification. The CJC felt that the Quebec model, 
which does not allow an appeal on certification (appeals are allowed only on refusals), 
would be the right model. The CJC observed that
66
: 
The main problem with appeals on certification is their automatic use, in 
particular by defendants to delay proceedings and unnecessarily increase costs 
in order to try to apply pressure on claimants, leading to withdrawal of claim 
or forced settlement. Extensive appeals, especially where they are prosecuted 
for tactical reasons, are therefore to be deprecated, not least because they 
subvert the aim of the litigation process away from the determination of cases 
according to their substantive merits. 
                                                 
65 Michael E.Solimine, and Christine Oliver Hines, ‘Deciding to Decide: Class Action Certification and 
Interlocutory Review by the United States Court of Appeals under Rule 23(f)’ [2000] Vol. 41 
William & Mary Law Review 1531-1600. 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=264342> accessed 8 November 2011. 
66
 Civil Justice Council, (n 16).  
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There is a case for proposing that the appeal rights be altered in collective 
actions, such that for instance there will be no right of appeal from a positive 
certification, although appeals are permitted from refusals to certify. This is 
the position in Quebec. 
 
The Quebec model is in accordance with the recent Supreme Court decision in Israel 
which allows appeals only in exceptional circumstances.
67
 This approach seem to be 
preferable as it does not enable defendants to drag plaintiffs into lengthy appeals 
which will increase costs, unless there are exceptional circumstances in which 
refusing an appeal would lead to an unfair result. In such cases, the court should allow 
the appeal.  
Since a certification procedure is the recommended path for a coherent collective 
redress model, there should also be a provision relating to the appeal on certification 
in the new model, so as to retain the certification procedure in tact as a useful 
safeguard against unmeritorious cases. Retaining the appeal on certification eases the 
pressure on defendants so as not to agree to settle a suit under blackmail conditions. 
  2. Representative Replacement 
 
An additional precondition under the CAL is the requirement that a reasonable basis for 
concluding that the interests of the class will be represented and managed in an 
appropriate manner
68
 by the representative exists, and that the interests of the whole 
class will be represented appropriately and in good faith.
69
 However, this precondition, 
which in fact consists of two distinct preconditions (i.e. adequate representation and 
good faith), is not necessary where the representatives are public or organisational 
agencies. The reason for this is that there is no real danger that public authorities and 
organisations will bring unmeritorious claims. Therefore, in fact these two 
preconditions dealing with the adequacy of representation are aimed at private 
                                                 
67
 See (n 64). 
68 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 8(A)3 (Israel). 
69 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 8(A)4 (Israel). 
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individual representatives both in follow-on actions and especially in stand-alone 
actions.  
 
With regard to lawyers who represent the class, there are commentators who argue 
that representation in class actions demands particularly good qualities and levels of 
professionalism, and thus the class lawyer should be more than merely adequate.
70
 It 
should be noted that in class action cases the group representative is unable to 
properly monitor the activities of the group’s counsel.71 The counsel is regarded as the 
class representative and not the representative lawyer. The CAL provides that the 
lawyer owes his duties to the class in general.
72
 Therefore it was recently held by the 
district court that the representative plaintiff cannot dismiss the class lawyer even if 
there are serious disagreements between them.
73
 Consequently, where the court 
doubts counsel’s ability to represent the group adequately, certification of group 
proceedings may be denied or the representing lawyer may be replaced. Normally the 
courts are reluctant to disqualify a lawyer from representing the class. Replacement of 
the representing lawyer should only occur in very rare circumstances where the court 
finds that counsel does not have the ability to adequately manage a class action. The 
court may also replace the representative plaintiff if it finds that the representative 
plaintiff does not have a personal action. In this case, the court may approve a class 
action conditional on replacing the representative or on condition that an additional 
representative is be appointed.
74
  
 
Other circumstances where CAL provides for replacement of the class representative 
plaintiff or the class lawyer is in cases where these representatives have requested 
voluntary dismissal of the action. In such cases, the court may approve the dismissal, 
                                                 
70 Debra Lyn Bassett, ‘When reform is not enough: Assuring more than merely "adequate" 
representation in class action’ [2004] 38 Ga. L. Rev. 927. 
71 Alon Klement, ‘Who Should Guard the Guardians? A New Approach for Monitoring Class Action 
Lawyers’ [2002] Vol. 21 The Review of Litigation 25 at 
<http://www.faculty.idc.ac.il/klement/EngArt/TROL.pdf> accessed 29 October 2011; Alon Klement, 
‘Private Monitoring in Common Fund Class Actions’ Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper 
No. 310 (02/2001).  
<http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/> accessed 29 October 2011. 
72 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 17 (Israel).  
73 Case No. 4263-03-11 (Central District Court) Eshel Hayeor v. Adv Shilo and Partner (5 March 2012) 
(Judge Groskopf).  
74 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 8( C)1 (Israel). 
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though appoint other representatives to continue the action
75
 if the action seems to be 
meritorious or beneficial to the public. 
 
It is said that the lawyer should be replaced where there is a conflict of interest. 
However, it is undeniable that conflicts of interest are inherent in class actions, as it is 
inevitable that there will be divergent interests among the various members of the 
class, particularly at the remedy stage. Such a conflict may be dealt with by dividing 
the class into subclasses and appointing a lawyer for each subclass.
76
  
 
The aim of this provision is two-fold. Firstly, it ensures that meritorious claims will 
not be struck down simply because the representative claimant or the representative 
lawyer is an unsuitable class representative. Secondly, it reduces the number of 
actions where the defendants might launch a tactical personal attack on the 
representative claimant or on the class lawyer in an attempt to have the action struck 
down.
77
 Indeed, lawyer replacement may run contrary to the interests of the defendant 
because the assumption is that the court will replace the representatives with 
individuals who are better qualified.  
 
The Israeli law is silent on the question of how to decide who will replace the 
representative. It only provides that a notice should be published to the general public 
and a suitable representative or a lawyer may put himself forward as a class 
representative.
78
 The notice aims to find a lawyer who will best serve the interests of 
the class. As yet, there is no authority in Israel on this issue, and the lawyers who 
bring the initial action tend to reach an arrangement between themselves and do not 
have any interest in searching for another lawyer. 
 
Thus, according to the Israeli law, where numerous actions have been submitted in the 
same matter,
79
 or where the court finds that the representative lacks the required 
                                                 
75 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 16( D) (Israel).  
76 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 10(C) (Israel). 
77
 Alon Klement, Guidelines for Interpretation of the 2006 Class Action Law (2007) 49 Hapraklit 131 
available at <www.hapraklit.co.il/_Uploads/dbsAttachedFiles/memtet1_6.pdf> accessed 18 
December 2011. 
78 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 16 (Israel). 
79 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 7(b) (Israel). 
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features or has misbehaved,
80
 or where a representative asks to terminate the action, 
the court may decide to replace the representing claimant or the representing class 
lawyer.
81
 However, if the court has to make an appointment there are no criteria in 
Israel for doing so. 
 
Representative replacement is an important safeguard that prevents abuse of the 
collective redress process by corrupt representatives. The power to replace 
representatives also exists in several European jurisdictions, even though private 
actions are very rare in Europe and organisations or public bodies are the main 
potential representatives. 
 
In Portugal, the Public Prosecutor has the power to review the legality of proceedings 
and settlements in collective actions. In this capacity the Public Prosecutor may 
replace the plaintiff in the case of withdrawal from the action or when the plaintiff 
acts in a manner which is contrary to the interests of the class members.
82
 
 
In Denmark, following the appointment of the representative, the new members may 
require appointment of another representative. The court must decide whether it is 
necessary to appoint a new class representative if at least half of the class members 
who have joined the class action so request and the request is accompanied by a 
proposed new representative who is willing to undertake the task.
83
 
 
In Sweden, the court may appoint other representatives on certain occasions, either on 
specific issues or to conduct the whole action in addition to, or instead of, the 
suggested representative. The new representative should be a member of the group or, 
if there is no such suitable person, someone from outside the group.
84
 
 
However, in all these jurisdictions as well as in Israel, the law is silent on how to 
decide who will replace the representative.  It is very important to equip the court with 
                                                 
80 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 8(C) (Israel). 
81 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 16(D) (Israel). 
82 Henrique Sousa Antunes, (n 42).  
83
 Section 254 of the of the Danish Administration of Justice Act as amended by Act 181/2008 
(effective 1 January 2008) para 6. subparagraph 6.  
84
 According to Sections 20 and 21 of the Group Proceedings Act (GPA) of 2002 which came into 
force in Sweden on 1 January 2003. 
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a procedure for appointing an adequate representative to lead the action and this is 
clearly a shortcoming that any new class action rules should address. If the court 
wishes to appoint a new representative, it should be clear which procedure should be 
employed in order to ensure that a skilful lawyer is appointed and that the class 
members will receive professional standards at a reasonable price. In the event that 
the representative lawyer does not possess the required skills to take on the action, the 
claim may be rejected due to malpractice. Furthermore, if the lawyer’s fees are too 
high then the class members' share in any award will be reduced. Therefore, a practice 
was developed in the U.S. to auction off the role of the lawyer on any court 
appointment. 
 
A. The Auction Mechanism to Select a Lead Lawyer 
 
The auction procedure to choose the lead lawyer without selling the action is practised 
in the U.S. in a number of situations.  
 
Firstly, the practice applies where there are several actions concerning the same issue 
and the judge must appoint a lead lawyer. In these circumstances, the law in Israel 
provides that if actions, which raise similar questions of fact or law, are submitted to 
different courts, then the subsequent actions should be transferred to the place where 
the earlier action was submitted.
85
 Once the actions are joined, the court may decide 
to replace the representative or the lead lawyer, as the court may find appropriate, for 
the best management of the action. Secondly, it applies where the lawyer who 
represents the class is not suitable and needs to be replaced.
86
 The Israeli law is silent 
on the question of how to decide who will replace the representative. As mentioned 
above, it only provides that a notice should be published to the general public and a 
representative who has the suitable characteristics or a lawyer may suggest himself to 
represent the class.
87
    
The notice aims to find a lawyer who will best serve the interests of the class. 
However, if the court has to make an appointment there are no criteria for doing so.  
                                                 
85 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 7(A)(1) (Israel).  
86 As provided in the Israeli Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 8(a)4 (Israel). 
87 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 16 (Israel).  
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The need to appoint a lead lawyer is not unique to Israel; it is a common issue in a 
number of jurisdictions and there is often a lack of coherent criteria for a lawyer's 
appointment. 
 
A good example is the English Group Litigation Order (GLO), which was introduced 
in the amendments to the 1998 Civil Procedure Rules.
88
 A GLO is a way of managing 
existing cases and differs from a ‘representative action’ which is the English term for 
a class action (although representative actions are not in use in England). In GLO 
proceedings, a common solicitor may be appointed by the managing judge, although 
there is no representative plaintiff or incentives. 
 
The appointed solicitor has to consult the Law Society’s ‘Multi–Party Action 
Information Service’ and obtain information about other cases which might give rise 
to a proposed group action.
89
 If there are several solicitors dealing with the same 
matter, it is expected that the group or the court will appoint a leading solicitor. Any 
interested party may apply to the court for a GLO, although the court may issue such 
an order at its own motion.
90
 The appointment of a lead solicitor is usually left to the 
discretion of the groups of claimants, subject to the court’s approval. However, there 
are no criteria to guide the court on whether to approve the appointment. 
In the U.S., the criteria for appointment of lead counsel provide that the court:
91
  
(A) must consider: 
(i) the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims 
in the action; 
(ii) counsel's experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, 
and the types of claims asserted in the action; 
                                                 
88 Contained in Civil Procedure Rules Part 19, Section III and in a Practice Direction entitled Group 
Litigation. 
89
 Neil Andrews, ‘Multi–Party proceedings in England: Representative and Group Actions’ 11 Duke J. 
of Comp. & Int'l L. 249. 
90
 Practice Direction 19 B– Group Litigation para 4. 
91
 Rule 23(g), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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(iii) counsel's knowledge of the applicable law; and 
(iv) the resources that counsel will commit to representing the class; 
(B) may consider any other matter pertinent to counsel's ability to fairly and 
adequately represent the interests of the class; 
(C) may order potential class counsel to provide information on any subject 
pertinent to the appointment and to propose terms for attorney's fees and 
nontaxable costs; 
(D) may include in the appointing order provisions about the award of 
attorney's fees or nontaxable costs under Rule 23(h); and 
(E) may make further orders in connection with the appointment. 
When one applicant seeks appointment as class counsel, the court may appoint that 
applicant only if the applicant is adequate under Rule 23(g)(1) and (4). If more than 
one adequate applicant seeks appointment, the court must appoint the applicant best 
able to represent the interests of the class.
92
 
These provisions are in the best interests of consumers, since the lead lawyer is 
crucial to the success of the action. The U.S. criteria may be divided into several 
categories: 
Work Carried Out Before the Appointment: This is the ‘entrepreneurial’ 
stage where the lawyer identifies the relevant class action, presumably after 
examining several ideas. The entrepreneurial lawyer has to examine the facts 
and legal material and should be paid for this work, regardless of whether he 
leads the legal proceedings. Indeed, although the entrepreneurial lawyer may 
have initiated bringing the action, another lawyer may be better placed to 
present the case in court. Therefore, it is fair to award a share of the fees to the 
lawyer whose idea it was to bring proceedings. 
                                                 
92 Rule 23(g)(2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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The Lawyer's Reputation: This includes the lawyer's experience in the 
relevant field and in collective redress cases, as well as his record of conduct.  
The Lawyer's Resources: Finance is crucial to class actions. A lawyer who 
has insufficient resources to fight the case to its end may be tempted to settle 
the case at the expense of the class members. One possible solution which 
exists in the Israeli system is for the court to permit the lawyer to receive 
interim payments.
93
 However, in the absence of interim payments, the court 
should not appoint a lawyer that has no proven resources to finance the 
proceedings until judgment.   
The criteria for appointing lawyers are very important and will form a crucial part of a 
collective redress framework. The issues of resources, reputation and work completed 
prior to submission of the action should be taken into consideration in any future 
legislative instrument in order to serve the best interests of consumers represented in 
collective proceedings.  
In the event that there are a few candidates well-suited to leading the action, an 
auction for the best fee agreement provides a possible solution. The auction procedure 
is an approach which appeared in the U.S. in 1990. The first judge to use an auction 
procedure was Judge Vaughn Walker of the Northern District of California, in In re 
Oracle Securities Litigation.
94
 
 
In some states in the U.S. it is common to conduct an auction in order to find a 
replacement representative.
95
  
 
Once a judge has decided to auction the lead counsel position, the judge will develop 
guidelines for the bidding process. Once all bids have been received and evaluated, 
the court selects a winning bidder. The auctioning method is a judicial substitute for 
the free market factors that would control attorney selection in traditional litigation.  
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 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 23( C ) (Israel).  
94 In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 689–90 (N.D. Cal. 1990). 
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 Laural L. Hooper and Marie Leary, ‘Auctioning the Role of Class Counsel in Class Action Cases: A 
Descriptive Study’ August 29, 2001 reprinted in (2002) 209 F.R.D. 519. 
Safeguarding the Collective Redress Procedure from Abuse 
 111 
Considerable commentary has been written about the advantages and disadvantages of 
using an auction method.
96
 For example, the auction procedure opens the market to 
more law firms and creates a competitive process which lowers attorneys’ fees and 
costs, thus creating a benefit for the class of represented consumers. In fact, in a U.S., 
study, twelve securities and two antitrust actions in which the auction process was 
used were studied and the conclusion was that attorneys’ fees were generally less than 
the reported percentages in other class actions in the respective circuits.
97
 The 
majority of fee awards were less than 9 per cent (either including or excluding 
expenses depending on the case) of the total recovery and ranged from a low of 
approximately 5 per cent in In re Auction Houses
98
 to a high of 22.5 per cent in In re 
Oracle. In two cases, In re Amino Acid Lysine and In re Bank One,
99
 the winning bid 
contained a voluntary cap on the total amount of attorneys’ fees. In both cases, fee 
awards were approximately 7 per cent. of the total class recovery.
100
 This means that 
generally class members were better off once the auction procedure was employed, 
due to the reduction in agency costs. 
 
With regard to the auction procedure, it should be remembered that the first stage of 
the auction concerns the quality and reputation of the lawyer – the fees are not in 
question. Therefore, before the auction takes place, the judge must decide on 
minimum standards required from lawyers who may participate in the auction. This 
way the quality of representation is not harmed due to the employment of the auction 
procedure. The other issue with the auction procedure is that the involvement of the 
judge in the process of selecting the lead counsel threatens the court’s neutrality. 
Therefore, the auction may be conducted by the registrar or the monitor, roles which 
                                                 
96
 R. S. Thomas and R.G. Hansen, ‘Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Lawsuits, A Critical 
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will be discussed in Chapter Five. The auction procedure should be considered a 
viable option for appointing a lead lawyer in a new model. 
 
B. The Sale of the Action in an Auction Procedure 
 
Academics in the U.S. have suggested that the action is sold in an auction procedure 
for the best lawyer bidder. Under this model, Macey and Miller
101
 suggest that the 
action should be sold in an auction either to a lawyer or to any person who will own 
the action.
102
 According to this recommendation, the trial judge would conduct the 
auction and if the original lawyer who brought the proceedings was replaced as a 
result of the auction, fair compensation should be paid for the initiative efforts and the 
costs. The auction system is more suitable in cases where few actions are brought for 
the same cause. Macey and Miller claim that the advantage of selling claims to 
entrepreneurial lawyers is that agency costs would be reduced. The winning bidder 
would not look for collusive settlements, but rather, would be expected to prosecute 
the action to its final conclusion and maximise the class profits. The lawyer simply 
buys the action and hence the whole income of the action becomes his. In such cases, 
the lawyer acts as his own agent.
103
 
 
Another advantage is that this system would avoid any potential conflict of interest 
between the lawyer and the class members since the lawyer who won the right of 
action would be acting in his own interests and would be unlikely to agree to a quick 
or unfavourable out of court settlement because he would want to maximise his 
profits.  
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accessed 27 April 2012. 
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Although the lawyer might want a quick turnover, such a move would be in most 
cases for the class' benefit, assuming that the class action was auctioned for a 
reasonable price.  
 
It should be noted that the auction procedure is not suitable in all cases and it may be 
the case that the action does not succeed, with the case then reverting to  the initial 
lawyer who raised the idea. Indeed, if the court forced an auction, even if the case 
were unsuitable, the action might fail and the injured consumers would be left with no 
remedy. Therefore auctions should be used only in appropriate cases where there are a 
number of lawyers who are interested in the case. 
 
According to Schaefer, the auction procedure should be as follows:
104
 
  
1. A lawyer brings the class action before a court. The role of the representative 
plaintiff is abandoned and, instead, it is assumed a priori that the lawyer is acting 
solely in his own interests as a fee entrepreneur. The court decides whether the 
claim is suitable for auctioning. The criteria that should be taken into account are:  
Does the claim have a sufficient chance of success? If not, there is no reason to 
auction an action for which no reasonable lawyer would bid.  
Does the case contain large scale claims or small-scale claims? If the former, the 
case is not suited generally to class actions as class members may sue in their own 
name if the personal claim is for substantial sums. In the event that several 
lawsuits are filed, it supports the auction procedure
105
 because there is a good 
chance that the lawyers will compete to be the lead lawyer. 
 
2. If an auction is appropriate, the authorisation to conduct the lawsuit will be 
auctioned off to the highest bidding lawyer. The entire claim is subsequently 
transferred to the lawyer who wins the auction.  
 
                                                 
104 Hans-Bernd Schaefer, ‘The Bundling of Similar Interests in Litigation: The Incentives for Class 
Action and Legal Actions taken by Associations’ [2000] 9(3) European Journal of Law & 
Economics 183, see at pages 196-197. 
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3. The proceeds of the auction are used to compensate the lawyer who originally 
brought the action for his costs, including a risk premium. The remaining amount 
is paid to members of the group.  
 
4. The winning lawyer conducts the lawsuit at his own risk but with a real chance of 
profit. 
 
The auction system for selling the action is academic only at the moment
106
 and it is 
difficult to see how selling an action could be justified to the general public. Such a 
sale may undermine legal procedure, as it looks only at the financial aspects of the 
case and not at other issues that class actions are deemed to address, such as 
deterrence and the promotion of public interests. Yet if the auction procedure were 
introduced, it might reduce the cost of lawyers’ fees. Such a procedure should be 
distinguished from bidding for the role of the lead lawyer in a class action, which was 
discussed in the previous part of this chapter and has been used several times in the 
U.S.  
In Europe there are circumstances in which a class of represented persons needs to 
appoint a lawyer to represent the class. As in the case of the GLO, in the U.K there 
are no criteria shaping the court's appointment of this kind. Yet, the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) treats the appointment of a lawyer as indispensable for a fair civil 
proceeding according to Article 6 of the European Human Rights Convention. 
Therefore, the right to be represented by lawyers must not be limited.
107
 Furthermore, 
in the Eschig case (C-199/08 Eschig),
108
 the legality of the so-called, ‘mass claims 
clause’ used by Austrian legal protection insurers (as in other EU countries) was 
questioned. The mass claims clause allows insurers to select the legal team when 
several insured parties in similar situations wish to pursue claims against the same 
opposing party. The ECJ ruled that the Austrian legal expense insurers' practice of 
selecting the lawyers to represent their clients in collective redress proceedings is an 
inadmissible limitation of the rights of the insured. Article 3(2)(c) of Directive 87/344 
                                                 
106 Hans-Bernd Schaefer, (n 104) at page 197.  
107 ECJ, Case C-305/05, Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone, Ordre français des avocats 
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allows conflicts of interests to be avoided by granting the insured person the freedom 
to choose his representative as soon as an insured claim is made. 
 
The recommendation for the new model would therefore need to be that any party 
should be entitled to choose a lawyer as a representative without any limitations. This 
provision is in line with the decisions of the ECJ on the rights of any litigant to select 
their own lawyer. The problem arises in circumstances in which the court finds that 
the class lawyer should be replaced or if a few lawyers are involved in similar cases. 
In these circumstances, the court may allow the parties to suggest a new lawyer or 
apply the auction procedure after deciding on suitable criteria for leading the action. 
In such cases, the court should demand that the lawyer has previous experience and 
suitable finances to manage the action.  
 
Representative replacement is one of the powers which the court maintains in order to 
prevent abuse of the procedure by improper representation. However, there are also 
other safeguards which are aimed to bridge information asymmetry and thus supervise 
the suggestion of the representative to bring the action to an end by a settlement. In 
the following part we shall examine the need to supervise such settlements.    
 
  3. Supervision of Compromise Agreements 
 
The law in Israel regards representative suggestions to bring the action to an end as 
dangerous. It is in these circumstances that the representative may make use of his/her 
information advantage and recommend a solution which is less preferential for the 
class members, in a bid for personal gain.  
 
Supervision of settlements is also familiar in Europe where actions are led by 
organisations, and one should ask if the organisation is trustworthy, or whether a 
settlement offered by an organisation should be treated with the same caution as 
private-led settlements. 
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In this part, the importance of this safeguard will be viewed so as to decide if the 
Israeli mechanism of supervision should be adopted or other methods of supervision 
should be suggested. 
 
A. European Review on Settlements Prior to Legal Proceedings 
 
The European Commission concentrates on settlements prior to legal proceedings in 
order to prevent the parties from having to litigate in court. There are two 
Commission Recommendations which already exist at European level to facilitate 
alternative dispute resolution through simple and inexpensive procedures. Both 
recommendations set out principles for the good functioning of out of court 
settlements.
109
 These principles are not relevant to supervision of court settlements in 
collective redress, but rather to ADR agreements which are aimed at facilitating 
agreements so as to prevent court proceedings. The European Parliament has given 
precedence to ADR proceedings which are generally regarded as providing for a 
quick and fair settlement and should be more attractive for resolving a dispute than 
court proceedings. Thus the European Parliament has recommended that these 
proceedings be made obligatory to seek out-of-court settlements before bringing 
collective actions.
110
 The Netherlands has introduced a Collective Settlements Act of 
2005 which allows a U.S.-style settlement for all members of the class who do not 
actively opt out. It has been used to settle class action suits initiated in the United 
States on behalf of foreign investors who were excluded from the class in U.S. 
actions.
111
 However, the Dutch legislation does not facilitate settlements during trial 
as there is no procedure for collective actions for damages yet in the Netherlands. 
 
The Israeli model lacks procedures to deal with out of court settlements which 
precede the legal proceedings. Thus all collective disputes must go to court and 
                                                 
109
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impose a burden and costs on the litigating parties. A change in this respect in the 
Israeli model may assist in easing the flood of cases which reach the courts in Israel. 
Suggested amendments to the Israeli model will therefore be examined in Chapter 
Five of this work. 
 
B. The Need to Supervise Settlements 
 
Settlements and voluntary dismissals are the most volatile junction in collective 
disputes. The agency problems of collective proceedings reach their boiling point as 
the agent is dealing with the question of what amount of funds will be allocated as 
lawyer and representative fees, and how much should be paid to the class. The 
settlement procedure is also the point at which the defendants are blackmailed to pay 
compensation for unmeritorious claims. Therefore it is said that in settlements, the 
agency costs to the class may be too expensive due to the agency problems, or may be 
too high due to the extortion of the defendant to pay money in unmeritorious 
claims.
112
     
 
Where private enforcement is involved, a settlement which is reached during the trial 
may not be in the interests of the class members. The interests of class lawyers and 
representative claimants may conflict with their clients’ interests, since the class 
lawyer or representative may try to achieve a compromise which is more for their own 
financial benefit than that of the members. One additional problem of the settlement 
and voluntary positions in collective proceedings is that there is asymmetry in 
information. Class members do not know how to evaluate the risks of the action, the 
chances of success, and the reasonable amount of compensation which they deserve. 
In a settlement or voluntary dismissal, the agent could conceal a private profit paid by 
the defendant to the representatives. It is often difficult to estimate the benefit of 
compromise settlements to the class members, and as such, the representative may 
argue that the value of the benefit paid to class members is higher than it is in reality. 
Such a compromise is also known as a 'sweetheart settlement' where the 
representative evaluates the value of the action as being higher than the benefit in the 
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reality, in order to obtain a share of the alleged benefits in contingency payments.
113
 A 
good illustration of the problem of benefit to the class assessment arises in coupon 
settlements. In ‘coupon settlements’ which are common in the U.S. and to some 
extent also in Israel, the defendant sells his merchandise for a low price or for free to 
class members instead of paying damages. There is a danger that the settlement may 
benefit the defendants without bringing any real economic benefit to the class. For 
example, in an antitrust class action case which concerned an unlawful agreement 
between the importer of Crocs
tm
 shoes
114
 (which are very popular in Israel) and the 
shop owners to fix the price of such shoes, the outcome was that the shoes were sold 
for a reduction of NIS 25 for a period of nine months. The reduction was given to any 
customer who could demonstrate that he owned Crocs
tm
 of  specific types included in 
the unlawful agreement. The compromise included clear orders to advertise the 
reduction in each of the twenty two Crocs
tm
 shops in Israel and on the Israeli Crocs
tm
 
website. In addition, the court awarded the representatives (lawyers who were 
representing themselves) a payment of NIS 425,000 (on the judgment date equivalent 
to EUR 90,000). The judge in this case mentioned that coupon settlements are far 
from satisfactory,  though common practice in class actions. Furthermore, in this case 
the court followed an expert opinion and found that the price reduction period should 
be extended from six months to nine to cover the sales period for such shoes. The 
shoes constitute a perishable product and thus there is good chance that consumers 
will come forward to use the production coupon. In general, the court mentioned that 
the settlement saves legal proceedings and benefits the relevant class of consumer. 
In a different case, price reduction coupons for meat products were awarded to 
consumers who had bought chicken products for which the expiry date had passed in 
the same chain of stores.
115
 In this case, the representatives' fees amounted to NIS 1 
million (approximately EUR 200,000) of which NIS 900,000 constituted lawyers' fees 
and NIS 100,000 for the representative plaintiff. The settlement was checked by an 
expert who found that it benefitted the class members.  
                                                 
113
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Prof. Klement
116
 criticised the latter compromise, arguing that it left many questions 
unresolved, such as how many of the reduction coupons would be used in practice, 
and the fact that price increases were possible in the defendant chain store, which 
could result in the store raising prices before offering the price reduction. Prof. 
Klement claims that the settlement was missing a provision that keeps the reduction in 
force even where the shop has a sale. Prof. Klement argues that in such coupon 
settlements, lawyers' fees should be limited to the coupons used in practice or paid to 
the lawyers in coupons which they can sell on the market.
117
  
 
In light of the danger that lawyers will prefer their own interests over the class 
members' interests, it is essential that a number of safeguards be built into any class 
action system as a means of protecting consumer interests. Such a system could 
include the features of the Israeli class action framework that already exist in some of 
the European jurisdictions which permit collective proceedings. The safeguards 
offered in Israel are aimed at resolving settlement hazards such as these. The benefit 
to the class is examined by expert testimony. The prevention of hidden profits by the 
representative's agents is dealt with by the submission of affidavits by lawyers and 
parties and settlement content is subject to court approval, notice, and publication and 
further objections as examined in the following part of this chapter.  
 
C. Special Considerations in Court Approval of Settlements in Collective Redress 
Cases 
Settlements or voluntary dismissal should be approved by the court to prevent an 
unfair settlement and to protect class members who are not a party to the action.  
In Israel, every compromise agreement in a class action is subject to the court’s 
approval and must be published prior to its consideration by the court. The court has 
to ensure that the suggested compromise is proper, fair and reasonable considering the 
interests of the absent class members.
118
 Court approval is needed in every two-party 
case in order to examine the legality of the agreement. However, since collective 
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proceedings may affect individuals who are not a party to the action, additional 
safeguards are needed to protect absent class members. For example, in Gelnic v. 
Harel Insurance Company
119
 the plaintiffs argued that the defendant had acted 
wrongly towards all class members when reducing the value of cars that had been 
‘written-off’ in accidents. The defendants argued that the reduction was based on 
terms in insurance policies to which the insurers had agreed by telephone. The 
suggested compromise included a future correction of the defendant's behaviour so as 
to enable insurers to cancel insurance policies agreed by telephone once the 
documentation had been received by post. In addition, the settlement included a 
suggested payment to the class lawyer and to the representative lawyer of 
approximately EUR 40,000s altogether. The district court in Israel refused to approve 
a compromise which did not require the defendant to pay damages to class members 
and barred class members from suing the defendants personally in the future. The 
court explained its refusal to approve a settlement which benefits only future class 
members and does not include any benefit for the class of injured class members. The 
court decision reflects the additional role that judges play in collective procedures to 
guard the interests of absent class members whilst the lawyers representing the class 
are engaged in a conflict of interests, looking to maximise their personal income. 
 
The supervision on settlements in Europe is primarily vested in the hands of each 
member state's courts. In Denmark
120
 for example, a settlement entered into by the 
class representative only becomes valid once it has been approved by the court.
121
 The 
court will not approve the settlement if it discriminates against some class members or 
is otherwise patently unfair. Class members who are parties to the action must be 
advised of the court’s approval of a settlement.122  
 
In Portugal, where all class actions to date have been led by consumer organisations, 
any compromise agreement between the parties is subject to court approval.
123
  
                                                 
119
 Case no. 222111/21 (Tel Aviv District Court) Gelnic v. Harel Insurance Company Motion No. 
21111/21 (decision dated 8 November 2007) (Judge Ronen). 
120
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 19(A) (Israel).  
121 Section 254(h) of the Administration of Justice Act (Denmark). 
122
 Professor Erik Werlauff, ‘Class actions in Denmark – from 2008’ 
<http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events_media/Demark_Legislation.pdf> 
accessed 28 November 2011. 
123
 According to Article 300 (3) of the Code of Civil Practice (Portugal). 
Safeguarding the Collective Redress Procedure from Abuse 
 111 
 
In Spain, the court will only withhold its approval to an agreement if it is ‘forbidden 
by law’ or ‘limited by public interest reasons or a third party interest.’124 The court 
has the opportunity to examine the agreement and ensure the fairness of the 
negotiated outcome.  
 
In the Netherlands, court approval of a settlement is subject to the following 
criteria:
125
  
 
(i) The amount of compensation should not be unreasonable; 
(ii) The defendant’s performance must be sufficiently guaranteed (the court 
investigates whether the plaintiff is insured); 
(iii) The representative organisation must sufficiently represent the class; and  
(iv) The number of class members must be sufficient to warrant certification. 
 
The court in Netherlands can employ the help of a legal expert
126
 to examine the 
terms of the settlement agreement. If the court finds that the settlement does not meet 
the criteria, it may order the parties to make the necessary changes to the settlement in 
order to obtain the court’s approval.127  
 
As seen above, the safeguards in Europe are not as detailed and severe as are those in 
Israel. However, generally settlements in Europe are not as problematic as in Israel 
and the U.S., mainly due to the trustworthiness of the representative leading the 
action. Organisations licensed by the government are more trustworthy and thus 
settlements which are led by organisations licensed by the state are clear of any 
ulterior motive or conflict of interest. Yet the European system does not provide 
sufficient benefits to the class members due to the constraints of the current model, 
especially the deficiency of the opt-in mechanism.  
 
D. Prevention of Hidden Profits to the Representatives    
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An application to approve a settlement in collective proceedings must be 
accompanied by affidavits from the lawyers who are representing the parties in which 
they reveal all the relevant information relating to the suggested compromise and 
from the parties themselves.
128
 The production of lawyers’ affidavits by both parties 
prevents the lawyers/representatives from making a hidden agreement which benefits 
the representatives rather than the class members. The affidavit requirement is unique 
to the Israeli class action system and is aimed at requiring personal accountability of 
the class lawyers in providing all the important information known to them about the 
suggested compromise.
129
 The requirement to present a lawyer’s affidavit is a good 
safeguard in order to prevent the representative from concealing benefits unknown to 
the class members. The reasonable presumption is that a lawyer would not run the risk 
of disciplinary and criminal charges for an untruthful affidavit and therefore the court 
may rely on such affidavits to allay fears of secret payments made to the class lawyers 
or to the class representative. 
E. Publication of the Settlement Content for Objections 
   
The Israeli jurisdiction is based on the adversarial system. Under the adversarial 
system, the parties to a controversy develop and present their arguments, and gather 
and submit evidence. A judge or jury usually remains neutral and passive throughout 
the proceeding. However, in class action settlements, the litigating parties present a 
united front in appraising the settlement reached, and in most cases the judge also 
approves. The adversarial system is not suitable to deal with such situations as there 
are no arguments presented by other interested parties such as the absent class 
members.  
 
In the U.S., the new CAFA settlement rules require a proposed settlement to be served 
on appropriate governmental officials to give them an opportunity to comment on the 
suggested settlement before it is approved.
130
 Government officials must be given 
notice of the proposed settlement and copies of the complaint, notice of pending 
hearings, the proposed or final notification to class members of their right to opt-out 
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or a statement that no such right exists, the proposed or final settlement, details of any 
side agreements between class counsel and defendants, any final judgment or notice 
of dismissal, the names of the class members residing in each state and that state’s 
percentage share of the settlement, and any relevant judicial opinions.
131
 
 
The suitable safeguard at that stage requires a voice to be given to those who object to 
the suggested settlement, and a right to opt-out from the settlement for those members 
who are not satisfied by the compromise reached by the representatives.
132
  
 
Under the Israeli model, the suggested compromise must be published in the class 
action registry, and notice should be given to the class members, to the Attorney 
General and to any other person the judge orders in order to enable them to present 
their objections.
133
 Every class member, relevant group or the Attorney General may 
object to the compromise.
134
 Any member of the class who does not wish to be bound 
by the compromise may opt-out at that stage.
135
 
 
This safeguard allows class members, the Attorney General and other relevant bodies 
and organisations to investigate the proposed compromise and object to its contents if 
it does not benefit the class members or it awards excessive funds to the 
representatives. The court may ask the opinion of relevant organisations if the matter 
is in their interests, such as a trade union's opinion in a labour law case or the opinion 
of consumer organisations in consumer-related cases.
136
 The views of such 
organisations should be warmly welcomed, since normally they have the required 
expertise to recognise matters which the representative parties have omitted in their 
suggested settlement. Currently the most active intervener in class action settlements 
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in Israel is the Attorney General who objected to one third of the suggested 
settlements in 2010.
137
 
 
Some safeguard provisions to prevent hidden agency profits can be found in Europe. 
In Portugal, for example, the Public Prosecutor has the power to review settlements 
and to replace the representative where he finds that the settlement is not in the 
interest of the class.
138
 He also has the power to review the legality of proceedings and 
settlements and may reject the settlement or even ask for representative 
replacement.
139
 These powers which exist in Portugal are similar to those in Israel, 
namely, the public prosecutor must examine the benefits of the suggested settlement 
for the class members. 
 
In most cases, the public Attorney General's view is insufficient. The Attorney 
General deals with many civil and criminal cases. The traditional role of the Attorney 
General is not to supervise the damages paid to consumers, but rather to deal with the 
general interests of the state. Therefore the availability of an unbiased expert opinion 
is essential to reviewing the compensation included in any settlements and the 
benefits of the suggested settlements to the class. Such a provision has been 
introduced in Israel and will be reviewed in the following paragraphs of this chapter. 
 
F. Expert Opinions 
 
In order to deal with 'sweetheart settlements' and with problems of evaluations of 
certain coupons and undertakings that the defendant may undertake in such 
settlements, the courts in Israel are obligated to hear every objection to the agreement 
and must obtain an expert opinion in the relevant field on the suggested compromise, 
in order to ensure that the compromise is beneficial to the class. The court may 
conclude  that an expert opinion is unnecessary only for ‘special reasons’, for 
example, where the compromise requires evaluation of the legal position or the 
strength of the arguments of the parties.
140
  
                                                 
137 The Calcalist, Newspaper (30 May 2011) available at 
<http://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3519248,00.html> accessed 4 May 2012. 
138
 Article 16 (3) of Law 83/95 (Portugal). 
139 Henrique Sousa Antunes, (n 42). 
140 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 19 (b).  
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The expert opinion is employed in order to examine the contents of the suggested 
compromise and the court may refuse to approve a compromise where the action 
seems to be unmeritorious.
141
  
The Israeli court may require the appointment of two experts if the case is connected 
to more than one field. For example, in Lazar v. Strauss and Tnuva,
142
 the defendants 
were sued for false advertisement in relation to a 'probiotic yoghurt' which was 
advertised as having the effects of strengthening the immune system and assisting in 
digestion. The suggested compromise agreement contained several provisions. Firstly, 
the defendants were required to change the advertisement. Secondly, they had to 
reduce the price of the product for a certain period. Thirdly, the defendants were 
asked to supply the yoghurt to organisations for the needy. The parties argued that the 
value of these two elements of compensation was approximately NIS 5,754,544. In 
addition, the defendants undertook to pay the representative NIS 25,000 and the 
representative lawyers NIS 675,000. The parties asked the court to exempt them from 
the requirement to appoint an expert. The court upheld in part the Attorney General’s 
position opposing the suggested agreement until an expert was appointed. The 
Attorney General took the view that it was necessary to appoint two different experts; 
a medical expert to examine the suggested wording of the modified advertisement and 
a second expert on economics and marketing to ensure that the reduced price would 
benefit the end users and not the company itself. In the end, the court appointed only a 
medical expert who opined that the advertisement was misleading as the alleged 
effects of the yoghurt were incorrect, and that the suggested settlement would 
therefore not be of great assistance to the general public. On the basis of this opinion, 
the court decided to approve the settlement but reduced the payment to the plaintiff's 
lawyers from NIS 675,000 to NIS 300,000.   
There have been other cases where the appointed expert's opinion has led to 
substantial changes in the suggested compromise. For example, in Asher v. Osem, the 
representative plaintiff argued that the size of packets of certain crisps produced by 
the defendants had been reduced without any corresponding change in price. The 
                                                 
141 Sher v. Strauss and the Elite decision of the Court of Appeal, Judge Baron dated 24 May 2009 
(refused to approve payment of NIS 25,000 for the plaintiff's lawyer and a reduction of the price of 
the product since the action was unmeritorious). 
142
 Case no. 221111/21 (Tel Aviv District Court) Motion no.  21111/21  Lazar v. Strauss and Tnuva 
(decision dated 22 September 2009). 
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parties reached an agreement and produced their own expert opinion to prove that the 
agreement was fair and beneficial for consumers at large. The court, following the 
opinion of the Attorney General, found that a neutral expert opinion should be 
sought.
143
 Following the appointment of an external expert, the compensation 
awarded was increased by 20% and the period for the reduction offered to consumers 
was extended.
144
 
However, the requirement to seek an expert opinion was criticised by lawyers and 
judges. Judge Pilpel from the Tel Aviv District Court argued that there is much sense 
in appointing an expert where questions of economic calculations arise, whereas in 
many other cases, for example in cases of restitution of payments, the judge has the 
required knowledge and expertise to decide on the matter without the need to appoint 
an expert.
145
 Other judges also objected to the appointment of an expert to check the 
content of a suggested settlement due to the extended time that such an examination 
would take or the additional costs which may be incurred by the parties.
146
 Indeed, 
there is no point in appointing an expert where the compromise is reached as a result 
of legal problems which the judge may review using his own knowledge, and where 
the sums concerned are low.
147
 In practice, this criticism has led to low use of the 
external expert examination provision in Israel. According to a survey led by Prof. 
Klement between 2007 and 2009, there were 31 cases in which the court had to decide 
on a settlement and only one expert was appointed.
148
 This low figure reflects the 
antagonism which the provision on the compulsory appointment of an expert has 
faced in its early days. There are no later statistics on this issue. However, due to 
intense pressure from the Attorney General, experts are now appointed in many cases. 
                                                 
143
 Civil Case no 1953/06 Application no. 16615/06 (Tel Aviv District Court) Amar Asher v. Osem 
(decision dated 13 March 2008) (Judge Binyaminy).  
144 Civil Case no 1953/06 (Tel Aviv District Court) Amar Asher v. Osem (decision dated 25 January 
2010) (Judge Binyaminy).  
145 Noam Sharvit, 'We Are Not Trusted' Globes News (Report from the Eilat conference on class 
actions, 3 June  2007) available at <www.faculty.idc.ac.il/klement/NewsClips/Globes3607.pdf>  
accessed 4 May 2012.  
146
 Civil case no 1953/04 (Tel Aviv District Court) Shechter v. Carmel (Judge Binyaminy) (15 July 
2007). See also Case no. 5590/08 (Tel Aviv District Court) Krinstein v. Turkiz Restaurant 
(Judgment dated 30 March 2009) (Judge Ronen). 
147
 Case 2296-09-08 (Central District Court) Levi v. Pizza Hat (Judge Shtemer - Published in Nevo 9 
November 2011).  
148
 Prof. Alon Klement, 'Settlement and Volantary Dismissal in Class Action' (2011) Mishpatim Mem 
777 at page 817. 
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The provision in a class action law which orders the appointment of an expert is 
welcomed and should not be opposed. The expert only provides a recommendation to 
the court, with the final decision remaining in the hands of the courts. The expert 
primarily assists in the evaluation of the settlement benefit to the class and is 
necessary especially in certain types of compromises such as coupon settlements, or 
settlements where the defendant undertakes to correct their behaviour instead of 
paying damages etc.
149
   
The duty to appoint an expert is not strange to European culture. It exists in the 
Netherlands, for example, where under the Collective Settlements Act
150
 the court 
must appoint an expert in order to examine whether the compensation for the class 
members in a compromise is unfair. The courts in the Netherlands are very active in 
the settlement review process in order to satisfy the main purpose of the WCAM, 
which is an efficient legal device to deal with mass damages. 
 
In the Dexia case
151
 for example, the court appointed an expert panel on its own 
initiative with regard to issues that were brought up by some objectors. The court 
established a team of 30 people including ten judges to deal with the individual claims 
of those who opted out.
152
 In addition, the court charged Dexia with the costs 
associated with notifying interested parties and those of the appointed expert. 
 
However, the lack of an expert opinion may be problematic and cause problems of 
under-evaluation of settlements in other European regimes. For example, in the JJB 
case mentioned above
153
 which was led by the Which? consumer organisation in 
England, the compensation was aimed to reach class members by actual repayment of 
funds to the fans who were members of the different classes mentioned in the 
settlement. According to the JJB settlement, fans who joined the action could claim a 
GBP 20 repayment. Others who presented either proof of purchase at a JJB store 
before February 5, 2009, the shirts themselves, a till receipt, credit card statement or 
                                                 
149
 Ibid at 818-820. 
150 Wet collectieve afwikkeling massaschade (WCAM), The Act on Collective Settlement of Mass 
Damage enacted on 27 July 2005, see Article 1016(1) CCP. 
151
 Dexia Case, Amsterdam Court of Appeal 25 January 2007, JOR 2007, 71.  
152 M.-J. Van der Heijden, 'Class Actions/les actions collectives' (Dec 2010) vol 14.3 Electronic Journal 
of Comparative Law at <http://www.ejcl.org/143/art143-18.pdf > accessed 4 May 2012. 
153
 The Consumers Association v JJB Sports plc (case number: 1078/7/9/07) (n 62). 
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bank statement showing proof of purchase during the relevant periods in 2000 and 
2001, obtained a GBP 10 repayment coupon per shirt. Fans who brought the shirts 
themselves were entitled to a GBP 5 repayment if the label was missing. Customers 
could claim a payment from JJB Sports even if they bought the replica shirts from 
Allsports Ltd, Blacks Leisure Group plc, Manchester United plc, Sports Soccer Ltd or 
JD Sports. Under the terms of the agreement, JJB Sports also had to pay the 
reasonable legal costs of the case.  All information regarding the settlement was 
published in the press and on the Which? website. The problem with this settlement 
was that the expected return to consumers in 2008 (seven years after the alleged price 
fixing arrangements) was minimal and valued at GBP 18,000, whereas the legal costs 
were estimated to amount to several hundred thousand pounds.
154
 The low figure of 
actual distribution could have been predicted by an expert and the compensation 
should have been confined by actual figures with an order to distribute the remainder. 
  
The introduction of an expert in collective redress cases under a new coherent regime 
is crucial to overcome questions of evaluation and benefits to consumer class 
members. As seen above, it is already employed in the Dutch collective settlements 
mechanism and should also be adopted in other European jurisdictions. Such a 
provision enables the courts to supervise a wide variety of settlement types, including 
coupon settlements and undertakings by defendants, and may even be used to 
supervise lawyer fees vis à vis the benefit to the class members.   
 
G. Problems with the Israeli Settlement Provisions 
 
The Israeli safeguards on compromise supervision cover all existing measures in 
order to prevent abuses at the compromise stage. Indeed, in his response to the 
European consultation paper on collective redress, Professor Hodges cited several of 
Israel’s ‘interesting controls on the scrutiny of settlements’.155 The Israeli measures 
are aimed at dealing with problems which may arise where litigation is led by private 
representatives. 
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 Slaughter and May, Competition Briefing, January 2008 available at 
<http://www.slaughterandmay.com/search.aspx?search=competition+briefing+january+2008> 
accessed 27 April 2012. 
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 Professor Christopher Hodges, (n 15). 
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Looking at the Israeli model the strict supervision of compromise agreements is 
enshrined in the provisions of the CAL and compromise supervision plays a very 
important role in safeguarding private collective actions. The safeguarding 
mechanisms in Israel are suitable to combat some potential problematic features of 
collective redress. Problems of evaluation and 'sweetheart settlements' are dealt with 
by the use of expert opinions, while problems of conflicts and hidden profit by the 
representatives are dealt with by lawyer and representative affidavits. Unmeritorious 
actions and blackmail actions are presumably barred from getting through the 
certification process. Information asymmetries are dealt by wide notice requirements 
and publication of suggested settlements. In addition, there is general supervision by 
interested class members, the Attorney General, and relevant organisations which are 
given a voice in objecting to settlements which are not beneficial. 
 
However, these safeguards do not prevent many other cases from getting to court. The 
operation of the safeguards begins once the case is in the legal process. Thus class 
actions in Israel are submitted to the courts in huge numbers and cause real economic 
hazards to the Israeli economy. Furthermore, the Israeli safeguards on settlements do 
not distinguish between secure agents such as public bodies and organizations on the 
one hand and private actions which may lead to risky actions for personal gain on the 
other. Where secure agents are concerned, there is no need for any safeguards because 
there is no risk of abuse. The only relevant provisions for secure agent actions would 
be the publication and notice of the suggested settlement in opt-out actions and a right 
to opt-out of the class. An expert opinion may be optional even where secure agents 
lead the action in order to assist the parties in shaping a beneficial compromise. 
Representative and lawyer affidavits in order to combat hidden profits are not 
necessary where secure agents lead the action because fear of representatives looking 
to make hidden profits is not an issue. 
 
It is possible to change the Israeli safeguard model by adding a few more provisions. 
Adding these provisions will make the Israeli safeguards suitable for a new coherent 
European model.  
 
Firstly, the Israeli model lacks provisions which allow the parties to settle the dispute 
prior to any court proceedings, such as the Dutch provisions which allow settlements 
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of collective actions in out-of-court proceedings. Under the Dutch model, the courts 
only supervise the suggested out-of-court settlement and there is no need to go into 
long legal proceedings. ADR proceedings as known in Europe may be adopted to fit 
collective redress cases.  
 
Secondly, under the Israeli regime the first time that a merits observation takes place 
is at the certification stage. Until this stage in the proceedings, the defendant may 
have incurred heavy expenses and may have had to spend a lot of time and funds on 
an action with little merit which may force the defendant into a blackmail 
compromise. It is recommended that an additional filtering mechanism be added in 
order to block actions from getting to the courts. Such a filtering mechanism may 
involve requiring every action to first undergo a regulatory examination by way of a 
complaint and only allowing those complaints which are found to be substantiated to 
continue to a collective action.  
  
Private agents may make a system very workable, though they are less credible than 
public or organisational representative plaintiffs in collective redress cases. The 
interaction between a public regulator and private representatives is crucial and 
happen at the outset of the case, before the case goes to court. Both the Israeli model 
and the U.S. model fail to bring the action to the regulator’s scrutiny at a sufficiently 
early stage. However, the operation of regulatory bodies does exist in Europe, for 
example the OFT in England. Requiring a prior complaint to a regulatory body may 
prevent abuses and extortion, phenomena that may occur in collective actions led by 
private representatives. Therefore, it is recommended that a regulatory authority 
consider the merits of the case before it goes to court. 
 
Thirdly, the supervision of settlements in Israel is suited to the Israeli regime where 
collective actions are lawyer-driven or led by private individuals.
156
 However, in 
Europe there is strong history of organisations and public bodies leading cases. In 
these cases it would be recommended to exempt such secure agents from the stringent 
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 Rule 23 (e)(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, therefore provides that the court must approve any 
settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise of the claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class. 
The court must direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound by a 
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rules relating to compromise supervision. Such an exemption may promote secure 
agents to be more active in submitting collective redress cases.  
  
  4. Supervision of Voluntary Dismissals 
 
A. The Need to Supervise Voluntary Dismissals 
 
Having seen the defendant's evidence, the representative may find out that the claim is 
not substantiated or that a genuine dismissal may take place after the judge has 
commented on the weak basis of the action. However, the fear with voluntary 
dismissal is that the representatives have received a personal benefit and may 
therefore decide to abandon the collective action.  
The legislative scrutiny relating to voluntary dismissal is different from the 
supervision on settlements. This is because voluntary dismissals do not bar the class 
members from bringing a later action on the same cause of action. However, similarly 
to the requirements due to fear of defendants receiving hidden profits in compromise 
agreements, the CAL requires some supervision of an application for voluntary 
dismissal. The representative plaintiff must apply to the court to request dismissal of 
the action
157
 and must present an affidavit from the applicant, representative, plaintiff 
or lawyer which includes all information relevant to the dismissal. In addition, a 
voluntary dismissal does not bar other plaintiffs from bringing the same action in the 
future.
158
 In practice, most actions that have been dismissed in Israel were not 
submitted again by other claimants.
159
 This is because a reasonable representative will 
not ask for voluntary dismissal unless it is clear that the action is weak on its merits. 
In practice, in most actions in Israel the courts either approve the voluntary dismissal 
with either payment to the representative, a decision to lower the payment, or even not 
to make a payment to the representatives. 
An additional safeguard introduced in Israel to deal with problems of voluntary 
dismissals is the authority to replace the representatives once they have decided to 
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discontinue the action if the voluntary dismissal is not appropriate or genuine.
160
 This 
provision reduces the risk of hidden agreements between the defendants’ and the 
plaintiffs’ representatives, because any attempt to bribe representatives will be 
fruitless if the court can decide to replace them.  
The voluntary dismissal safeguard is intended to prevent the parties, i.e. the 
representative plaintiff and the defendant, from reaching an agreement that is of no 
benefit to the class members or a settlement which benefits the representatives at the 
expense of the class members. The main issue with the voluntary dismissal 
mechanism is that the parties may reach a secret compromise, but make an application 
for voluntary dismissal to circumvent the more complicated procedure for court 
approval of a compromise agreement.  
Bearing in mind these issues, the court is guided by the need to protect absent class 
members when deciding whether to approve an application for voluntary dismissal. 
Consequently, the courts are especially active in preventing dismissal of actions 
where only the representatives stand to profit if the action is dismissed. This is a very 
important safeguard which prevents abuses such as bribing the representatives in 
order to obtain their consent to dismissal of a rightful action.  
 
In Europe, the necessity of these safeguards is questionable according to the current 
models. The safeguards relating to voluntary dismissals are mainly related to opt-out 
mechanisms where the class members are not part of the action, allowing the 
representative to decide to dismiss the action on his own motion. Furthermore, where 
the action is led by secure agents, there is no need to question the genuine motives of 
the representatives. Thus in the existing opt-out models in Europe there are some 
references to the situation of voluntary dismissal. In Portugal,
161
 the Public Prosecutor 
(the Ministério Público) has the power to replace the claimant in the case of 
withdrawal from the suit or if he behaves in such a manner that could put the claim at 
risk.
162
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In Denmark, if questions of withdrawal or dismissal of the group action arise, group 
members participating in the action must in principle be notified and be given time to 
react. The court also has discretionary power to decide that the group members be 
notified about essential matters other than the withdrawal or dismissal of the case, 
including if questions of settlement approval where such questions arise.
163
  
 
B. The Operation of the Safeguards on Voluntary Dismissals in Israel 
 
Voluntary dismissals may be divided into several categories. The first and simplest 
category is where the plaintiff decides to withdraw the action as it has become clear to 
the representative that the chances of success are very weak. 
 
The safeguards relating to voluntary dismissals should not be operated rigorously to 
prevent such a dismissal where the representatives genuinely decide to dismiss the 
action, for example, where the defendant presents new facts or legal arguments which 
were not known to the representatives before submission of the action
164
 in his reply, 
or where the court has expressed its view on the meager merits of the actions.
165
 In 
these cases voluntary dismissal is justified and should be approved as the dismissal is 
not prejudicial to the class members. 
 
The second type of dismissal is where the action, albeit dismissed, has brought a 
benefit to the class members or to consumers at large. Sometimes the voluntary 
dismissal is a result of the defendant undertaking to correct a wrongful behavior, and  
thus the action brings a certain benefit to the class members or to the general public 
despite there being no payment of damages to the class members. In such cases where 
the action has brought some benefit to the class members or to future consumers, the 
courts should allow the voluntary dismissal even if it contains a payment to the 
representatives who have brought their action to correct the defendant’s wrongful 
                                                 
163 Chapter 23 (a) § 254 (G) of the Administration of Justice Act (Denmark) as amended by Act 
181/2008 (effective from 1 January 2008). 
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 See, for example, Class action Case 12275-09-08 (Central District Court) Itay Lanuel v. Tnuva 
(unpublished) (Judgment dated 26 January 2009). 
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behaviour.
166
 A good illustration of the dismissal of the case with a justified payment 
of fees to the representatives due to a benefit to the class members is the case of In 
Azury v. 013 Netvision.
167
 In this case, the court was asked to approve dismissal of an 
action where the defendant was ready to correct a misleading advertisement in 
relation to the price of telephone calls abroad. The court provided that the major 
factors to consider when approving such an agreement were the merits of the action 
and its prospects of success. The court found that the action brought some benefit to 
the general public as the misleading advertisement was corrected, thus the court 
approved the dismissal and awarded the representatives’ fees; namely NIS 15,000 to 
the representative and NIS 30,000 to the class lawyer. The court was troubled with the 
damages to the injured class members who relied on the misleading advertisement but 
when the court analysed the prospect of success in the damages action, it found that 
that reliance on the misleading advertisement would be difficult to prove. 
Consequently, it found that voluntary dismissal of the action was reasonable in the 
specific case. 
 
The third possible dismissal which is a more problematic situation is where the parties 
present a voluntary dismissal application to the court which is in fact a compromise 
agreement disguised as a voluntary dismissal in order to avoid the additional 
safeguards such as expert opinions to which compromise agreements are subject. 
Such voluntary dismissals contain elements of a settlement, for example, asking for a 
payment to the representatives or awarding benefits to class members. In the latter 
case, allowing a voluntary dismissal will exempt the parties from the need to appoint 
an expert to examine the benefits of the settlement to the class. 
 
The criteria for court approval of voluntary dismissal, which contains elements of a 
compromise, were suggested in Goldstein v. Bank Hapoalim
168
 where the court 
considered whether a dismissal request (which included correction of the defendant’s 
conduct and a financial donation to agreed public bodies) was a hidden compromise 
agreement. The court stated that before approving a request for dismissal, it should 
consider whether any payments had been made to the plaintiff or his lawyer. In the 
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absence of such payments, or where only minimal payments had been made, it would 
assume that there was little danger of conflict between the representatives and the 
group members. In the event that payments had been made to the representatives, the 
court might still approve the dismissal after examining the merits of the case and the 
possibility that more claims would be brought in the future on the same issue.  
 
The Israeli safeguards on voluntary dismissals are partly legislative, deriving from the 
provisions of the CAL, and partly based on court decisions. The CAL sets out the 
procedural requirements for voluntary dismissals, such as sworn affidavits, to ensure 
that all information is produced in court,
169
 and requires court approval for a voluntary 
dismissal
170
 with the special power to replace a representative who has asked to 
dismiss an action which he submitted.
171
 The other criteria have been set out in court 
decisions such as Azury and Goldstein, mentioned above,
172
 which provide that the 
court should distinguish compromises which require special scrutiny and even expert 
opinions from voluntary dismissals. The latter will be allowed generally where no 
payments are paid to the representative.
173
 If there is a payment to the representative, 
then the application should be examined carefully in order to ensure that payment is 
not in fact a representative bribe to persuade him to dismiss the action. Where the 
court finds that the dismissal is not appropriate it may order continuation of the action 
and the engaging of other representatives. 
 
According to a recent study which examined one hundred and seventy seven dismissal 
applications (which constitute approximately 10% of the collective actions which 
were submitted to the courts in Israel), about 50% of the applications were for 
dismissals without any payment to the representatives. In 45% of the cases, the parties 
asked the court for a payment to the representatives and in only 5% of the cases did 
the parties leave the matter of such payment to the court. In 67% of the cases where 
parties asked for payments to the representatives, the court approved the motion and 
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ordered the dismissal with payment to the representatives. In the other 33% of  
dismissal applications with payments to the representatives, the courts intervened and 
ordered a low payment to the representatives or no payment at all.
174
  
 
The assumption is that the courts allow some financial benefits to the representatives 
if the action has brought with it some benefits. Therefore the conclusion from the 
above-mentioned statistics is that most collective actions have brought some benefits 
and thus the courts have awarded payments to the representatives. The class action 
instrument may bring change in traders' behaviour even if the legal proceedings reach 
an early end with a voluntary dismissal. 
 
Voluntary dismissal is a very popular way to end a collective action. About 10% of 
the actions in Israel end by way of voluntary dismissal. These safeguards concerning 
voluntary dismissals are very important in order to prevent private representatives 
from making hidden profits whilst withdrawing the actions. The opt-out mechanisms 
which operate in Europe such as the Portuguese and the Danish models have 
employed safeguards on withdrawal. However, these safeguards should be enlarged to 
allow dismissal with payments to the representatives, representative replacement 
where appropriate, and representative and lawyer declarations to confirm that no 
concealed profits have been made.  
 
 
  5. Notices and the Registry 
 
A. The Importance of the Online Registry in order to Bridge the Information 
Asymmetry 
 
Collective actions are characterised by information asymmetry between the 
representatives and the class members.  This is because group members in opt-out 
class actions are usually not identified and there are difficulties in contacting the 
group members personally. The representative plaintiff and the class lawyer are 
generally in possession of information which should be shared with all class members 
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in order to give them some scrutiny over the action and enable them to make informed 
decisions in relation to the proceedings. When the real clients (i.e. the class members) 
do not possess the relevant information, they cannot assess the results of the case and 
cannot properly scrutinise the actions of the representatives in the same way that a 
client would supervise his lawyer in a two party action. 
 
The CAL established an online registry which tracks and publishes developments in 
each collective action.
175
 This registry is quite a novel idea, although not unique. 
Indeed, there is a registry of Group Litigation Orders (GLO) in the U.K.
176
 and a 
registry in Norway, while in Canada a voluntary registry system is operated by the 
Canadian Bar Association.
177
 The Israeli registry contains all the relevant information 
about individual class actions commenced after March 2007, including the date the 
action was submitted, the court where it is managed, the essence of the action, the 
representing plaintiff and the defendant, the description of the represented class, the 
certification decision, proposed compromise agreements, applications for voluntary 
dismissal, and any notices to group members. In addition, decisions in the case are 
published on the registry. 
 
The documents in the registry may be viewed in 'pdf' format enabling class members 
and the general public to follow all the developments and issues in every filed case.   
A copy of every new application to certify an action as a class action must be filed 
with the court's central management and is listed there in a new ‘class action 
registry.’178 Once sent to the registry, it is open to the general public. 
 
Prior to filing a new action, each representative must check the registry in order to 
ensure that there are no similar previous class actions.
179
 Consequently, the register 
makes the collective redress process more transparent, and helps to avoid multiple 
claims and contradictory decisions on the same issue. 
 
                                                 
175
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 28 (Israel). 
176
 Available at <http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/courts-and-tribunals/courts/group-litigation-
orders.htm>. 
177
 For the Canadian Bar Registry see <http://www.cba.org/classactions/main/gate/index/about.aspx> 
accessed 26 May 2011. 
178
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 6 (Israel). 
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 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 5 (Israel).  
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In the event that there are several similar actions, either involving a similar class of 
represented persons or similar questions of fact or law, the court may order the new 
action to be transferred to the court where the earlier action was submitted.
180
 The 
court which deals with the former action may join the two actions or may strike down 
the subsequent action.
181
 
 
B. Notice Requirements in European Jurisdictions 
 
In addition to the online registry which is aimed at reducing information asymmetry, 
at some critical stages of the action the CAL requires that notices be given to class 
members, the Attorney General, and if the judge finds it is appropriate, to relevant 
bodies. The rationale for giving notices is to keep the procedure transparent and to 
prevent the representatives and the defendant to conspire together against the interests 
of the absent class members. With regard to notices, the CAL sets out a list of 
circumstances in which the court must provide notice to class members, for example, 
the decision to approve a class action and submission of a petition for approval of a 
compromise agreement.
182
 In addition, the CAL gives the court discretion to issue 
further notices.
183
  
 
Publication of a notice is required if the court decides to certify the action,
184
 dismiss 
the action or order replacement of the representative plaintiff or the group’s lawyer185 
as well as on an application for,
186
 or approval of, a compromise.
187
 In addition, the 
judgment in the action should also be published.
188
 The court must approve the draft 
notice before its publication,
189
 but the form of publication is left to the discretion of 
the judge in each case,
190
 bearing in mind the costs of the action,
191
 the damages that 
                                                 
180
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 7 (Israel).  
181
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 7(b) (Israel). 
182
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 25(a) (Israel).  
183
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 25(b) (Israel). 
184
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 25(a)(1) (Israel). 
185
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 25(A)(1) (Israel).  
186
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 25(A)(3) (Israel). 
187
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 25(A)(4) (Israel). 
188
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 25(A)(5) (Israel).  
189
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 25(D) (Israel). 
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 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 25(E) (Israel). 
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may be involved,
192
 the number of members in the group and the ease of identifying 
them,
193
 the cost of giving them personal notice
194
 and any special characteristics of 
the group’s members, including different languages.195 
 
The notice should include the details specified in Section 14 of the CAL, namely the 
definition of the class, the identity of the representative plaintiff and the group’s 
lawyer, the causes of action and the remedies which are being sought. 
 
The notice requirement reflects the need to share the procedures in court with the 
class members and enables the latter to have an opportunity to comment on the action 
that is being pursued in their name, though without their participation. Once the notice 
reaches individual class members, then they may opt-out from the action or have a say 
in the management of the action, for example by raising objections to a suggested 
settlement. 
The involvement of class members in the procedure is vital for the fairness and 
credibility of the legal proceedings. A good and effective notice may blur the 
distinction between an opt-out mechanism and an opt-in mechanism because in 
theory, it may allow all class members to become involved in the action. It should be 
noted that views may change about how many notices should be sent to class 
members in opt-out cases, as opposed to opt-in systems, and at which stage of the 
action. However, there should be differences in the notice requirement in opt-out 
regimes and opt-in jurisdictions. In an opt-in action, the lawyer meets his client and 
they agree on the extent of the information that should be provided to the client in the 
terms of representation. However, in opt-out mechanisms, the law regulates the extent 
of information and the stages at which the representative should update the class 
members, since the class lawyer does not meet all class members.  
This requirement can cause many difficulties, especially where the class is large and 
the members are scattered across a wide geographical area.
196
 For example, in the 
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 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 25(E)(2) (Israel). 
193
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 25(E)(3) (Israel). 
194
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 25(E)(4) (Israel). 
195
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 25(E)(1) (Israel).  
196 In the Federal Courts, notice is required to be given to each class member whose identity is 
ascertainable with reasonable effort. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin 417 U.S. 156 (1974). 
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well-known case of Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, the Supreme Court, upholding a 
judgment of the Second Circuit, held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (C) (2) 
requires that individual notice be sent to all identifiable class members. In that case, 
the plaintiff class numbered 6,000,000 of whom over 2,000,000 could be ‘easily 
identified’ through the analysis of computer tapes. The cost of individual notice was 
estimated at USD 225,000. Notice by publication plus individual notice to a portion of 
the class was held to be inadequate, and the cost of sending notice could not be 
transferred to the defendant, despite the trial court’s determination of the likely 
success of the plaintiff class on the merits. 
It should be noted however that in other cases financial considerations were found to 
be relevant in deciding the form of notice required by due process.
197
  
Some provisions for notices can be found in existing European provisions. For 
example, in Spain,
198
 the law provides that once the court has admitted the claim, 
notice should be published in the media in the area where in which rights giving rise 
to the action arose. The notice must give affected consumers a maximum of two 
months (which suspends the proceedings) to join the claim (the opt-in mechanism). 
Once this period has elapsed, the proceedings will continue with the participation of 
consumers that have responded during that period. No further intervention in the 
proceedings will be permitted thereafter. Parties not intervening in the proceedings 
will nevertheless be bound by the final judgment of the Spanish court.
199
  
In Sweden, even though the system is based on the opt-in mechanism notice is given 
by the court (or paid for by the court) to all the members of the group. Payment by the 
court assists the plaintiffs and reduces the risk that the representative plaintiff will be 
forced to settle the case due to a lack of resources. The members of the class are 
allowed to join the proceedings and, if so, the judgment will bind them. Settlements, 
judgments and some other developments of the case require further notices. Court 
expenses are paid only by the parties and not group members.
200
  
 
                                                 
197
 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Company 339 U.S. at 313-20, 70 S.Ct at 657-60. 
198 Art 15 (3) LEC. 
199 Art 221 and 519, LEC. 
200
 Professor Per Henrik Lindblom, 'National Report: Group Litigation in Sweden' (December 2007) at 
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accessed 4 May 2012. 
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In Portugal, a notice must be given to all the parties that have an interest in the case. 
The notice allows the members of the class to exercise their right to opt-out otherwise 
they are deemed to approve the representation.
201
 Opting out is possible until the stage 
at which evidence is produced. The advantage of the Portuguese notice requirement is 
that it may be given by an advertisement in the media or press, depending on the 
circumstances and the geographical distance between the class members. 
 
The Dutch enactment on collective settlements which also provides for an opt-out 
mechanism requires direct notice to the ‘known’ interested persons, and public 
notification through advertisements in Dutch and foreign newspapers to the ‘unknown 
persons.’  Notice must be given via hardcopy newspapers and websites.202 To the 
extent that the known persons are domiciled in the EU, direct notice is governed by 
Council Regulation No. 1393/2007
203
 and a public notice may be published in 
newspapers worldwide. In the Netherlands, notice is given at two stages in 
proceedings: firstly, when negotiations start between the representative organisations, 
and secondly, where an out-of-court settlement has been agreed and is filed for court 
approval. After approval of the settlement, the notice requirement must also be met on 
an individual basis. However, individual notice to known injured parties can be sent 
by ordinary post unless the court provides otherwise.
204
 
The importance of the notice procedure in the Netherlands is that the collective 
settlements are based on the opt-out machinery. All interested members are notified of 
the negotiations and may raise their objections which should then be determined in a 
court hearing. At this point, the court approves the settlement agreement and 
determines the opt-out period. The second notification is then sent and following the 
opt-out period, the settlement becomes legally binding. If the persons have not opted 
out within the requisite time period, in principle no legal action can be taken 
concerning the same legal issue.
205
 
                                                 
201 Article 15 (1) of Law 83/95 (Portugal). 
202 Article 1013(5) Rv, WCAM (Netherlands). 
203 Regulation (EC) No. 1393/2007 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial 
documents in civil and commercial matters OJ L 324/79, which supersedes the former Council 
Regulation No. 1348/2000, 29 May 2000, OJ L 160, 37. 
204
 Article 1013(5) CCP (Netherlands). 
205
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Personal notification of the decision is arranged by providing a copy of the decision to 
the parties entitled to compensation. The decision and the settlement agreement must 
be filed at the court registry and the parties have the right to inspect and receive a 
copy of the documents.
206
 
 
C. The Content of the Notice 
 
Under the Israeli law, the content of the notice is left to the discretion of the judge.
207
 
However, in the U.S., the relevant provision provides that the notice must concisely 
and clearly state in plain, easily understood language the following: the nature of the 
action, the definition of the certified class, the class claims, issues, or defenses, the 
procedure for joining the action, that the court will exclude from the class any 
member who requests exclusion, stating when and how members may elect to be 
excluded, and the binding effect of a class judgment on class members under  Rule 
23(c)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  
 
Looking at the approaches of the above-mentioned legal systems, it is clear that in all 
jurisdictions notice is an integral part of the collective redress system. The 
representatives in collective redress actions have a great advantage over class 
members since they are in possession of a great deal of information to which class 
members are not privy. Indeed, in opt-out cases, potential class members are 
sometimes not even aware of the existence of the case.  
 
The notice requirement requires that the best possible notice should be given to all 
class members so as to provide them with all the relevant information concerning the 
case. Personal notice is the most assured form of notice as it is the only way to ensure 
that information reaches the group's members. 
 
However, there are cases where there are many members or the members are scattered 
and personal notice is not relevant or may be too costly. It should be borne in mind 
that opt-out cases normally consist of many small individual claims and the 
difficulties of giving personal notice in cross-border actions in Europe would be 
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similar to the problems which arose in the U.S., as illustrated in the Eisen case 
mentioned above.
208
  
 
It is essential that class members are given notice of any suggested termination of the 
action, either by dismissal or compromise, to allow the members to opt out of the 
compromise or to object to its suggested contents or, in the case of voluntary 
dismissal, to allow the members to continue the case where previous representatives 
have decided to leave the case. 
 
From the jurisdictions researched, it is clear that there are several potential ways to 
keep class members updated about case developments. The CAL gives the court the 
discretion to choose the most suitable way to give notice to class members in each 
case. With regard to the form of notice, the suggested draft publication should be 
brought before the court for approval prior to publication.  
 
D. Increased Notice Requirements in Opt-out Cases 
 
The distinction between notices in opt-out cases and opt-in cases is crucial with 
regard to the requirement of notice. In opt-in cases there is a direct connection 
between the class members and the class lawyer. It is therefore possible to leave the 
issue of notice and its extent to the terms of representation between the lawyers and 
their clients, as is the practice in two-party cases. 
 
The Israeli CAL fails to make a distinction between opt-in cases and opt-out cases in 
terms of the need for sending a notice. This failure is not important under the Israeli 
system as no opt-in cases have been brought due to class member apathy and an 
aversion from taking part in proceedings. However, when looking at a new model, 
there should be a distinct provision with regard to notices in opt-in actions as opposed 
to opt-out actions. For example, most European member states prefer the opt-in 
mechanism over the opt-out systems and there is therefore no need to send a personal 
notice at every stage of the case, and no need to allow any member to opt out of the 
action. The aim of the notice is to make class members aware of the cases which have 
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been brought on their behalf and to enable them to get involved in the case as much as 
possible. The notice is of crucial importance in opt-out cases where the class members 
are not part of the action and should be given the opportunity to opt out or to object to 
any actions made on their behalf by the representatives. 
 
  6. Should the "Loser Pays" Principle Remain in Force? 
 
In contrast to the U.S. where each party has to bear his own costs in class actions, the 
CAL provides that the losing party must pay the other party’s expenses. The purpose 
of the "loser pays" principle is to deter potential representatives from bringing actions 
in bad faith, intended to blackmail defendants into settling an unsubstantiated case.
209
  
The imposition of costs is at the discretion of the judge at the end of each case
210
 and 
the amount is subject to a minimal tariff which is recommended by the local bar 
association, unless provided otherwise by the ruling judge.
211
 
 
However, under the CAL, in certain circumstances the court in Israel may reverse a 
costs order and grant the losing party an award of its costs from the winning party 
after considering the following factors:
212
  
 
1. The extent of work and the risks that the representative has assumed; 
2. The benefits that the action has brought; and 
3. The importance of the action to the public. 
 
A reverse costs order should only be made where there is some fault on the part of the 
defendant. This view is shared by the Bar Council of England and Wales, which 
stated in its reply to the EU consultation paper ‘Towards a Coherent Approach to 
Collective Redress’:  
 
The only circumstances in which the “loser pays” principle should be 
overridden are when the behaviour of the winning party is such as to require 
                                                 
209
 Charles Silver, ‘We’re Scared to Death: Class Certification and Blackmail’ [2003] 78 N.Y.U. Law 
Review 1357. 
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 The Civil Law Procedure Regulations 5744-1984, Rule 511 (Israel). 
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the principle not to be applied e.g. when the winner refused unreasonably to 
enter ADR or when its conduct was abusive of the applicable domestic 
process. Such circumstances should be left to the assessment of the courts on a 
case-by-case basis.
213
  
 
Many European jurisdictions also adopt the "loser pays" principle, but in most cases, 
unlike Israel, the threat of having to pay the reasonable expenses of the winning party 
is not balanced with financial incentives that encourage the bringing of an action. 
According to the "loser pays" principle, a claimant must pay certain fees in advance. 
Victims may be discouraged from bringing an action if the outcome of the action is 
uncertain and the possible damages awards are modest.
214
 
 
For example, the "loser pays principle" operates rigorously in France and Italy.
215
 In 
Italy, the losing party may have to pay the other party’s costs of proceedings and there 
are no incentives, such as bonuses for the class representative and lawyers to bring an 
action.
216
 Similarly, the operation of the "cost risk" principle in France means that the 
loser may have to pay a part, or all, of the opponent’s costs,217 depending on the 
judge’s decision.218 Such provisions bar the operation of collective redress because 
the costs may be imposed on the representative if the action fails, and if the action is 
won, the representative is not entitled to a share of the compensation. Thus there is no 
incentive for representatives to take on the risks of bringing collective redress cases 
under such a system. 
 
                                                 
213 The Bar Council of England and Wales, 'Response of the Bar Council of England and Wales to the 
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October 2011. 
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 Section 91 of the Italian Civil Procedure Code.  
216 Prof. Elisabetta Silvestri, ‘The Globalisation of Class Actions: Italian report’ 
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accessed 23 September 2011.   
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 Article 700 of the Code of Civil Procedure (France).  
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> accessed 2 December 2011. 
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Other jurisdictions in Europe have less rigid rules on the payment of costs and they 
allow cost concessions so as to reduce the risk which the representatives take upon 
themselves. For example, in Portugal the judge will determine the costs, which may 
be reduced to between 10%-50% of normal costs if the value of the action does not 
exceed the monetary competence of the first instance court.
219
 In Spain the basic 
principle is that the loser pays the expenses (which may not exceed one-third of the 
value of the claim), including fees for lawyers, expert witnesses and certain public 
officials, which are included in the concept of costas.
220
  
 
The problem with the Portuguese and Spanish approaches is that although 
concessions from the rigid loser payer rule are offered, the decision on costs is not 
made from the outset of the case and thus the representative cannot calculate the risk 
of costs which may be imposed. 
 
In Sweden, the general rule is that the losing party must pay the winning party’s costs 
and lawyer’s fees, except in small claims cases where the value of the personal claim 
does not exceed EUR 2,000.
221
 However, although this approach discourages the 
bringing of unmeritorious claims, it does not offer incentives to encourage the 
bringing of well-founded collective redress actions. Such a system is much preferred 
as the representative knows with certainty that if the case concerns a low value, no 
costs will be imposed. 
 
There is no doubt that the "loser pays" principle is an important safeguard in 
collective redress actions as the representative has to make a careful decision whether 
to put forward a case because they may be liable to pay the other party’s expenses. On 
the other hand, where the action has brought a benefit to the class or to the general 
public, the judge should have the discretion to overturn the principle by making a 
reverse costs order where the plaintiff’s actions (including actions taken before the 
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case was commenced) have brought the violating behaviour to an end. For example, 
the Dutch have adopted cost shifting machinery which includes a wide discretion for 
the court to order the shifting of costs.
222
 
 
The existing measures in Israel and in Europe fail to distinguish between the 
application of the "loser pays" principle between private-led litigation and litigation 
led by organisations and public bodies. Furthermore, there is no distinction in the 
relevant legislation between stand-alone and follow-on actions which are more risky 
than follow-on actions. Such a distinction is necessary because the risk which the 
"loser pays" principle is trying to shield against, namely unmeritorious claims, is not 
relevant to organisations, public bodies and follow-on actions which follow a 
conviction by a disciplinary or judicial body. There is no evidence and there are no 
allegations of abusive litigation led by organisations and public bodies. Therefore, as 
a matter of policy and in order to encourage claims from public bodies and 
organisations rather than private individual stand-alone actions, the general rule that 
the loser pays the other party’s expenses should only operate where the representative 
plaintiff is a private individual bringing a stand-alone action. 
  
Public authorities, organisations and representatives in follow-on actions, should not 
have to pay the other party’s expenses, except in exceptional cases where it is shown 
that the representative’s action was in bad faith and, in addition, where the 
representatives acted negligently or did not check the case properly, thus causing 
expenses to be incurred by the other party. Only in exceptional cases where the 
representative has acted in bad faith or negligently should a penalty in the form of 
costs be available. Acting in bad faith in such circumstances occurs where the action 
is brought only to threaten the defendants and cause them to pay damages in a weak 
action.
223
 It is said that if the action is brought for external causes other than winning 
the action, for example an action aimed to cause damage to a competitor or to make 
the competitor reveal confidential documents, then the action should be treated as an 
action brought in bad faith.
224
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In a recent decision, the Supreme Court in Israel overturned a district court decision 
and held that where a representative plaintiff had not approached the defendant prior 
to submitting the class action in order to check the facts or to enable the defendant to 
right the wrongdoing, the action should not be presumed to have been submitted in 
bad faith. The Supreme Court expressed the opinion that if a representative did not 
ask to receive his personal share of the proceeds, it should prevent such representative 
from bringing a class action in favour of a group of injured class members.
225
 In a 
different decision, the Tel Aviv District Court noted that the representative plaintiff's 
good faith should endure for the entirety of the legal procedure.
226
   
  
The exemption from the "loser pays" principle as suggested above will act as an 
incentive for submitting secure actions which are actions brought by public bodies, 
organizations, and follow-on actions. Private actions remain available and are 
welcomed as follow-on actions. Such actions will only bare costs in exceptional 
circumstances of bad faith or severe negligence in conducting the action. On the other 
hand, stand-alone actions cannot be exempted from costs in the first stage unless it 
has been decided that the action is well-founded in the certification process. The 
reason for this is that it would be unfair on a defendant to exempt the plaintiff from 
costs where the action has not passed through any filtering process and the merits 
have not been examined by a regulatory body or the organisation's institutions before 
being submitted.  
 
The question of costs is critical in consumer cases where the representative plaintiff 
normally has limited financial resources to combat powerful traders which normally 
act as the defendants in such cases.  
 
Therefore, on the one hand the plaintiff is faced with the very severe hurdle of the  
"loser pays" principle. On the other hand, it is a very important safeguard against 
unmeritorious claims, since it is reasonable to think that the plaintiffs in unfounded 
cases will not fight the case when they run the risk of having to pay high costs.  
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With regard to the problem that the "loser pays" principle may also deter plaintiffs in 
well-founded cases from bringing their action because of the fear of an unfavourable 
decision on costs at the end of the case, the solution offered is to totally exempt 
actions by secured agents such as public bodies, organizations, or representatives in 
follow-on actions from costs. Stand-alone actions should remain subject to costs.
227
 In 
this way, the "loser pays" principle remains an effective safeguard in stand-alone 
actions only where it is needed, and may prevent unfounded actions which bring no 
benefit to consumers. 
 
 
 
C. Conclusions 
 
The collective redress mechanism is a very important tool to remedy wrongdoings 
that would otherwise not go to court due to the small personal damages involved in 
such actions. Collective actions may also change the balance of power between the 
individual consumer and the large companies normally acting as the defendants in 
such cases. 
 
In order to make a collective redress system workable, if public actions or 
organisational actions are not submitted in a certain case, private actions should be 
permitted. The problem with private actions is that they may lead to abuses. The idea 
which stands behind private class actions is that private persons who are acting for 
their own benefit are promoting public goals and promoting important policies of safe 
trade which will be secure from unlawful behaviour. However, since private actions 
often result in litigation which abuses the process, the imposition of additional filters 
is recommended. 
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Israel’s implementation of a number of important safeguards offers a useful insight 
into controlling and fighting the inevitable abuses of private collective litigation. The 
"loser pays" principle and the certification process act as barriers to unmeritorious 
cases and actions brought in bad faith. The central role of class proceedings plays out 
at the certification procedure, both in terms of filtering out unmeritorious claims and 
in terms of preventing procedural unfairness. The operation of the certification 
procedure is exemplified in the following Chart 4A. 
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Chart 4A 
The Decisions of the Court at the Certification Procedure: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Certification 
Procedure 
Apply the preconditions: 
1. The merits of the case 
2. Is there a class to be   
    represented? 
3. There are similar 
questions of fact or law. 
4. Class action is the most 
appropriate way to 
resolve the dispute. 
5. The action is within the 
permitted scope.  
Disallow the class 
action 
Allow the action and give 
management orders 
Define the 
represented 
class 
Set time limit for 
opt-out or time 
limit to join in, 
in opt-in actions 
(exceptional) 
Representative 
replacement if 
necessary 
Auction Appoint other 
representative 
suggested by the 
class 
Where the 
representation is not 
proper the court may 
disallow the action 
Supervise a 
proper notice 
to all class 
members 
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In addition to the certification procedure the Israeli model regards settlement 
agreements and voluntary dismissals as very dangerous stages in collective 
proceedings where the representative plaintiffs and the defendants may collaborate in 
order to deceive the class members by reaching hidden agreements with personal 
benefits to the representatives but with no real benefit to the class. Therefore, the CAL 
has introduced procedural requirements such as affidavits from both parties’ lawyers 
and an expert examination of the suggested settlement. 
 
The Israeli mechanism also requires transparency by establishing a public registry of 
class actions open to every interested person, and by sending notices to the class 
members and to the Attorney General when the case reaches its critical stages, such as 
voluntary dismissal or a compromise agreement. 
 
Looking at European needs, the importing of Israeli safeguards is highly 
recommended if private actions are to be permitted under a new collective action 
procedure subject to a filtering examination by a regulatory body. However, it should 
be borne in mind that there is no real need for safeguards in organisational or public 
actions, which are common in Europe, simply because these actions are rare and carry 
with them no risk of abuse. 
 
However, even if a new opt-out model is introduced for private collective actions, the 
Israeli safeguards will not be sufficient. A flood of actions which could be detrimental 
to the economy is still possible. Thus, some changes and improvements are needed in 
relation to the Israeli model and its safeguard mechanism in order to avoid a similar 
flood of cases in the suggested new model. The following chapter deals with the 
proposed amendments to the Israeli mechanism to enable it to cater to European 
consumers.  
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Chapter Five 
A New Suggested Model – Implementing Lessons 
from the Israeli Model 
 
 
Introduction 
 
One of the European Union's most important goals is to merge Member States' 
economies, and to further free trade between them. The European Union has 
proclaimed the importance of secure trade between Member States on various 
occasions. The existence of a collective redress mechanism is crucial to improving 
confidence in cross-border trade within the community, providing consumers with the 
option of bringing their dispute before the courts should things go wrong. The search 
for a coherent system of collective redress in Europe is on its way,
1
 and the Israeli 
collective redress model is certainly a very useful case study in helping to structure a 
coherent and unified European model. 
 
The Israeli class action model has proven to be very workable, with many collective 
actions having been launched since the introduction of the new system under the 
Class Action Law in 2007. As emphasised in previous chapters, this author would 
recommend adopting the Israeli model with some changes which address problems 
which have come to light following several years of operation. The most troubling 
problem is the flood of actions which Israel is now seeing. The number of actions in 
Israel is higher than that of any other European jurisdiction due to the special features 
of the Israeli model as analysed in Chapter Three, namely, the opt-out mechanism, 
financial incentives for representatives, provisions allowing private individuals to act 
as representatives in stand-alone actions, and the wide scope of the action available. 
  
                                                 
1 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Public Consultation: Towards a 
Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress, SEC (2011) 173 final (Feb. 4, 2011) available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0054/sec_2011_173_en.pdf> accessed 4 
February 2011. 
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The safeguards in Israel do not preclude a flood of actions, and this author has 
therefore suggested the adoption of a model which includes additional filters limiting 
the actions which may proceed to court. The mechanism offered is based on the 
distinction between stand-alone actions and follow-on actions,
2
 the latter of which 
features in the area of competition law in England.   
 
The Israeli experience shows that 99% of Israel's class actions are stand-alone actions 
brought by private individuals, and thus the European emphasis which is mainly on 
organisational claims results in less class actions being initiated. With regard to public 
bodies, their position in most European Member States as preferred enforcers should 
take precedence over private individual actions due to their credibility and high 
powers of investment. This author has therefore suggested that private individuals be 
allowed to bring only follow-on opt-out or opt-in actions, or stand-alone actions only 
in exceptional circumstances where the authorities unjustly refuse to intervene. 
 
Adopting this view in a new model would prevent the courts from being flooded with 
cases, since the entrusted public regulatory body would act as a barrier to certain 
cases. A new regime should only make a follow-on action available to all potential 
private plaintiffs where a complaint such as a super-complaint to the OFT in the U.K.
3
 
was justified. Once a complaint to a public body or to a regulator appointed to deal 
with consumer complaints has resulted in a conviction, a disciplinary ruling, or an 
opinion that an infringement of consumer law has occurred, then a follow-on action 
should be available. If a public body or regulator does not take any action within a 
certain period of time following the submission of a super-complaint of this kind, and 
has not opposed private collective redress on the grounds that the claim is unfounded, 
then a private representative should be permitted to initiate a stand-alone action. 
However, this stand-alone action would be subject to depositing a surety and subject 
to financial requirements and examination of the adequacy of the representative's 
qualifications at the certification stage, in order to disqualify opportunistic private 
actions. 
 
                                                 
2
 Competition Act 1998, s 47. 
3
 The existing practice is explained in Chapter Four, Part B at section 1 (B) relating to the court 
decision at the certification stage on page 218. 
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Such a process would compel public authorities to deal with every complaint within a 
reasonable time limit to avoid having to explain their failure to do so to the court. 
Although this process would require public bodies to work more efficiently, and may 
require more manpower, the costs would be outweighed by the benefits of preventing 
the economic damage caused by an overwhelming number of collective actions. 
These benefits may revert to the regulator as part of the benefits of the successful 
actions.  
 
In addition, some amendments are also recommended in relation to financial 
incentives in order to adapt the incentives to the new suggested model. The incentives 
should be available only for cases which require court proceedings and representation 
by private individuals. This is because as shown, public bodies and organisations are 
not motivated by financial incentives. The incentives would be available where the 
complaint was checked and approved by a certified regulator such as the OFT, and the 
class action was found to be appropriate in the circumstances of the case. The other 
type of case which may qualify for a payment for the complaining consumer is a case 
in which the trader changes his unlawful behaviour as a result of the complaint. 
 
A. Rebalancing Private and Public Enforcement 
 
The Israeli law allows stand-alone actions as a first recourse and there is no need to 
take any prior action. Private stand-alone actions are the source of Israel's flood of 
actions, and thus the new model should filter out such actions while continuing to 
ensure access to justice for private individuals where no other public measures are 
available.  
 
In order to supervise stand-alone actions, a public control role is needed, combining a 
secure public supervisor with an ambitious private representative. The combination of 
these two roles would result in a solution which ensures that the law remains 
workable, while preventing a flood of actions. This is the additional filter which 
should prevent the flood problem which undermines the many advantages of the 
Israeli model. The new filter is aimed at dealing with the flood problem and is based 
on a new balance between private actions for damages and public enforcement. 
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  1. The Operation of the Additional Filter in the New Model 
 
 
In Israel, any private individual may go to court as their first recourse, bringing a 
high-value class action without needing to pay court fees or to produce a surety. The 
claim may be unfounded on its merits, such as a claim brought against a producer 
simply because the customer was not content with the service or the products 
purchased. Such an action is extremely inconvenient to the producer, requiring him to 
invest funds and time in fighting the action. The earliest time at which the producer 
becomes directly involved in challenging such an unmeritorious action in Israel is at 
the certification stage. Until that stage, the producer will most likely have to recruit 
the services of expensive legal counsel. Due to the sum of the action, a reasonable 
producer will probably need to employ the services of a leading law firm. In addition, 
if the producer is a public company with shares listed on the stock market (as is the 
case with most large defendants, such as telephone companies, internet providers, 
large pharmaceutical companies, banks and so forth) an immediate notice must be 
served on the shareholders and the general public. Following such notice, a serious 
drop in the value of such a company is expected. In addition, news of a very large 
action will normally reach the front pages of the financial newspapers. The publicity 
may harm the good reputation of the defendant and may bring a fall in sales of its 
products or services. Furthermore, the defendants will need to report the action for the 
purposes of the company balance sheet as a standing conditional commitment. This 
may harm the defendant's potential to raise funds from banks and other lenders due to 
the possibility that the action may succeed, thus having a severe negative effect on the 
defendant's viability.  
 
The suggested filter should operate by putting stand-alone actions brought by private 
individuals in the back seat as second in line after public action has been taken and by 
ensuring that private actions are supervised by public scrutiny. Such an additional 
filter may be based on the English approach in competition cases, which distinguishes 
"follow on" actions from "stand-alone" actions, and gives preference to public 
enforcement when it is available. This should be adopted as the basis of the new 
collective redress model, while not totally abandoning private actions which are much 
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more frequent.
4
 In fact, in Israel, 99% of actions are brought by those in the private 
sector. If no such actions were brought, the Israeli class action mechanism would 
remain almost totally ineffective and unused. 
 
Under the English system, private claims for damages may take two different forms. 
Firstly, they may be conducted following public enforcement, as so-called "follow-
on" suits, or they may arise where no public action has been taken, such actions being 
referred to as "stand-alone." One problem with the English competition model as it 
stands today, is that representative collective actions, brought by a body which 
represents the interests of those harmed by an unlawful practice on behalf of those 
who have suffered loss, is limited to "follow-on" actions only. In such proceedings, 
those who have been harmed are not themselves party to the action and are not 
required to pay the other side's costs where the case is lost (although the 
representative body may be required to do so). Currently in the U.K, representative 
actions on behalf of named consumers are only allowed in follow-on cases under 
section 47B of the Competition Act 1998.
5
 However, the OFT itself has recommended 
allowing representative bodies to bring both stand-alone and follow-on actions on 
behalf of consumers and businesses in the area of competition law.
6
 This 
recommendation is crucial because it will enable appropriate representatives, such as 
organisations which are deemed to be secure agents, to bring stand-alone collective 
actions relevant to the organisation in order to defend consumers. If this is the case, 
then it is expected that few new actions will be brought by organisations. On the other 
hand, the number of actions will remain low as private plaintiffs are still restricted 
from bringing collective actions and the cases of Israel and the U.S. demonstrate that 
the vast majority of actions are private individual actions. Thus, in order to improve 
the OFT recommendation, this author would argue that private individuals should be 
allowed to bring follow-on actions, as well as private stand-alone actions (the latter in 
                                                 
4 
In the Civil Justice Council Report, ‘Reform of Collective Redress in England and Wales: A 
Perspective of Need’, Professor Rachael Mulheron sets out the advantages of the follow-on 
procedure compared to stand-alone actions at 
<http://www.civiljusticecouncil.gov.uk/files/collective_redress.pdf> accessed 27 November 2011. 
5
 The Office of Fair Trading, Private actions in competition law: effective redress for consumers and 
business - Recommendations from the Office of Fair Trading, Discussion Paper OFT916resp 
(November 2007) 
available at <http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/publications/publication-
categories/reports/competition-policy/> accessed 5 November 2011. 
6
 The Office of Fair Trading, (n 5), see section 5.13 on page 17 and section 6.2 on page 18. 
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exceptional circumstances only), where no other action is available and the case, 
prima facie, looks very strong. 
 
Indeed, follow-on actions are superior to stand-alone actions in several respects. A 
follow-on action entails a prior procedure in front of a regulatory body or a tribunal 
which has examined the facts and merits of the case and has found that the defendant 
has breached its duty. This means that the follow-on action will be based on facts 
which were examined by a responsible public body. The follow-on action should be 
more manageable in court as there is no need to engage in discovery for documents 
which have already been disclosed to the public body. The main aim of the procedure 
is to set the amount of damages. In follow-on actions, questions of liability or breach 
require less attention as they have already been decided by the regulatory body or the 
relevant tribunal.
7
 The problem of the follow-on action is that public bodies are slow 
and have limited financial resources, thus the number of investigations is very low. 
However, in the suggested model, time limits would be imposed and the regulatory 
body would have to give its decision within a specified time-frame failing which a 
stand-alone action would become available.  
 
This author suggests combining public and private enforcement, particularly as 
private enforcement is favoured by the general public and would raise the confidence 
of consumers in cross-border trade. The suggested mechanism makes it clear that 
public enforcement is superior to private enforcement as it avoids the risks of 
unmeritorious claims and the extortion of defendants. This author believes that 
follow-on actions are superior to stand-alone actions, though they are not in 
themselves sufficient to provide consumers with the required confidence in consumer 
transactions. The follow-on actions must be supplemented with a form of stand-alone 
action which will be used where the relevant public regulator fails to take proceedings 
within the specified time limit. This approach does not completely exclude the 
possibility of bringing private actions. 
 
                                                 
7
 Enron Coal Services (in liquidation) v. English Welsh & Scotish Railways [2009] CAT 7 and the 
Court of Appeal in Enron Coal Services (in liquidation) v. English Welsh & Scotish Railways [2009] 
EWCA Civ 47. The Competition Appeal Tribunal and the Court of Appeal held that the plaintiffs in 
the follow-on action must prove causation and not merely their damages. 
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This author recommends that private actions for collective redress be allowed only 
where there is no possibility of intervention by a public authority. Private claims for 
damages should be an additional and possibly a suitable complement to public 
enforcement. The best solution would be to bring every private action to the relevant 
public regulator. This regulator would be appointed by the member state government 
similarly to the way in which the OFT in the U.K or the Danish Ombudsman in 
Denmark is appointed. At Community level, the task would be handed to D.G. 
SANCO which will have similar powers to those exercised by D.G. Competition (the 
European Commission’s Directorate General for Competition)  in competition cases. 
A private person would only bring a representative stand-alone action where the 
public body decided within a reasonable period, such as within 60 days, not to 
commence group proceedings but rather, to allow the private individual to do so. The 
private stand-alone action should be allowed in extraordinary circumstances and 
should be treated with caution. In addition, the representatives in stand-alone actions 
would have to comply with financial conditions and consider the viability of each 
case on its merits. The application of this model means that stand-alone actions would 
undergo a filtering process before the action could be submitted to court and even 
prior to the certification process, in addition to the adequacy of representation test 
imposed at the certification stage. 
 
With regard to incentives, it seems fair that a private individual or organisation which 
refers the matter to a public body should be remunerated with a share of any financial 
award in return for initiating the process that led to compensation for the group's 
members.  
 
A. Examples of Combinations of Private and Public Enforcement in Criminal 
Proceedings 
 
Unfortunately, this suggested model which combines private and public enforcement 
does not exist in Israel in relation to actions for damages in general, nor in relation to 
class actions. Nonetheless, Israel's criminal legislation
8
 provides an example of a 
procedure which allows individuals to bring a criminal complaint against a suspect for 
                                                 
8
 Sec 68 of the Criminal Procedure Law 5742-1982 (Israel). 
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violations which are regarded as having less public interest than other criminal 
offences.
9
 Once an individual private accusation is brought to the court, a copy is sent 
to the Attorney General's office in the relevant district where the claim was submitted. 
The Israeli Attorney General must declare whether his office will deal with the case 
within 15 days
.10
 If the Attorney General decides to pursue the case, the private 
criminal accusation is replaced with a formal criminal charge.
11
   
 
Such a procedure gives preference to public enforcement, yet if the public authority is 
not efficient enough to deal with the action or it does not object to allowing a stand-
alone action within a certain period, then the private individual may continue with the 
proceedings. The procedure of bringing private criminal charges has been criticised in 
Israel, and in 2011 the government suggested cancelling this avenue for bringing 
private criminal charges.
12
 The main reasons for suggesting the abolition of this 
procedure were to prevent harassment, to ensure skilled and professional management 
of the criminal process, and to promote the coherence of the enforcement of legal 
proceedings against criminal offences. 
 
The combination of public and private enforcement is also illustrated in England 
where there is a history of allowing the private prosecution of criminal offences. In 
England's early history, the victim of a crime had the right to bring criminal charges 
against an offender.
13
 An individual private prosecution
14
 is still available under 
English law. The right to bring private prosecutions is preserved by Section 6(1) of 
the Prosecution of Offences Act, 1985. There are, however, some controls which 
exemplify the coordination of public and private enforcement. The Director of Private 
Prosecutions (DPP) has power under Section 6(2) of the Prosecution of Offences Act, 
1985 to take over private prosecutions and either to continue or discontinue them. In 
                                                 
9
 The list of offences which are allowed for individual criminal accusations are listed in the second 
annex of the Criminal Procedure Law 5742-1982 and include defamation, violations of privacy, 
nuisance of various kinds and even some offences which are listed in the Consumer Protection Law 
5742-1981. 
10
 Sec 71 of the Criminal Procedure Law 5742-1982 (Israel). 
11
 Sec 72 of the Criminal Procedure Law 5742-1982 (Israel). 
12
 The cancellation suggestion is available in Hebrew at: 
<http://www.justice.gov.il/MOJHeb/News/SederDinPlily.htm> accessed on 25 November 2011. 
13 David Friedman, "Making Sense of English Law Enforcement in the 18th Century" available at 
<http://www.daviddfriedman.com/Academic/England_18thc./England_18thc.html> accessed 5 
January 2011. 
14
 A prosecution led by a prosecutor who is not acting on behalf of the police or any other prosecuting 
authority or body. 
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some cases, the private prosecutor must seek the consent of the Attorney General or 
of the DPP before the commencement of proceedings.
15
 In order to decide how to 
proceed, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) may ask both parties to supply 
information within 14 days, inform each party of their examination of the case, and 
receive full disclosure from the private prosecutor even of documents which were not 
disclosed to the defendant. There is no obligation for the private prosecutor to inform 
the CPS that a private prosecution has commenced. However, in practice, the CPS 
may find out about the legal proceedings from the prosecutor, the defendant, the judge 
dealing with the case, or through other channels such as the press.  
 
The mechanism which is suggested in this work for bringing private collective actions 
may be similar to the criminal procedure for a private prosecutor who is acting as a 
private attorney general.
16
 It is in the public interest that the rogue trader be punished 
and the representative consumer and his/her lawyer have the opportunity to achieve 
this by suing for damages as a private litigant. The public interest is served where 
public goals are pursued by private litigants. The problem with private actions is that 
they may be abusive and uncontrolled and therefore harm the public interest instead 
of serving it. The search for a mechanism to control the use of private stand-alone 
collective actions has brought to light the degree of public control over private 
criminal prosecutions. In such cases, the prosecution supervises proceedings brought 
by public interested parties. Private criminal proceedings are rare because criminal 
proceedings do not result in receiving an income at the end of the trial, unlike civil 
proceedings where some damages are expected.
17 
However, consumer cases may be 
similar to criminal actions in the sense that where an action is for minimal or low 
sums, the machinery will rarely be used if no incentive is introduced. Therefore the 
system of incentives should not be abandoned under the improved model. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15
 The Crown Prosecution Service on Private Prosecution available at: 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/private_prosecutions/#an01> accessed 28 January 2012. 
16
 William B. Rubenstein, 'What a “Private Attorney General” is—And Why it Matters' (2004) 57 
Vand. L. Rev. 2129, 2148. See also John C. Coffee, Jr., 'Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why 
the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working' (1983)42 Md. L. Rev. 215, 216. 
17
 David Friedman, (n 13). 
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B. Leaving Incentives Intact 
 
In order to motivate private litigants to bring consumer collective actions, an incentive 
should be introduced. Yet, as seen in Israel, financial incentives can be the source of a 
flood of actions and the regular safeguards introduced in Israel have not succeeded in 
resolving this problem. Therefore, the incentives system should be adapted to the 
solution offered in this work. 
 
An interesting and innovative illustration which involves combining private collective 
actions with a public regulatory body and with incentives paid to successful actions is 
taking place in California in the field of employment law. California has adopted a 
new approach to enforcing the state's Labor Code by enacting the Private Attorney 
General Act 2004 (PAGA).
18
 This law allows a private citizen to pursue civil 
penalties on behalf of the State of California Labor and Workforce Development 
Agency (LWDA) provided that the formal notice and waiting procedures set down in 
the law are followed
.19
 This law grants a private citizen the right to pursue fines as an 
attorney general where such fines would normally only be available to the State of 
California. The interaction between the private prosecution and the regulatory body 
are very interesting in this context. The first pillar of this action is the reward granted 
to the representative plaintiff as an incentive for representatives to bring actions where 
it is proper to do so. Thus the fines which are obtained through an action under this 
law are split between the LWDA and the employee, with the State Fund and the 
LWDA receiving 75% of the penalties and the employee receiving 25%
20
 in addition 
to their lawyer's fees. Secondly, the procedure under the PAGA preserves the 
preference of the regulatory body
21
 (in this case the LWDA), and thus the private 
person should inform the LWDA of the alleged violations. A private individual may 
only issue the proceedings where the LWDA does not pursue the allegations or does 
not issue a citation within a certain time period.
22
 As a private attorney general, the 
                                                 
18
 Cal. Lab. Code § 2698. 
19
 Private Attorney General Act of 2004 available at: 
<http://www.privateattorneygeneral.com/paga_law.html> accessed 5 February 2012. 
20
 Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(i).  
21
 Douglas A. Wickham, 'The Private Attorneys General Act of 2004: One of California's Newest Laws 
Threatens to Flood Employers with Class Action Lawsuits when an Ounce of Prevention Could 
Avoid Them' available at <http://library.findlaw.com/2003/Oct/1/133315.html> accessed on 5 
February 2012. 
22
 Cal. Lab. Code § 2699.3. 
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aggrieved employee is allowed to seek civil penalties not only for violations that he 
has suffered personally, but also for violations of "other current or former 
employees".
23
 
 
  2. The Suggested Combined Procedure 
 
Having considered the PAGA model above, the need to have private enforcement 
monitored by a regulatory body and the system of private prosecution actions 
available both in Israel and in England, this author suggests a system of control based 
on a combination of the private representative and the regulatory body. The 
combination is based on the prior examination of the suggested action by a public 
body similar to the CPS in the U.K. or the Attorney General in Israel, having the 
authority to allow the criminal action to continue through the initial representative or 
to take the action on themselves. The regulatory authority may have the power to 
order that the action be stopped where the action is not serving the public or has little 
merit. 
 
The model offered in this work is based on adding a filter mechanism on to stand-
alone private actions. This filtering mechanism is not necessary in actions led by 
secure agents such as public bodies or organisations which are entrusted with the role 
of bringing collective actions for the state. The filtering mechanism is also irrelevant 
to follow-on actions which have already been examined by a tribunal or a public 
regulatory authority. The aim is therefore to promote follow-on actions led by private 
enforcement as much as possible, though actions of organisations and public bodies 
are very welcomed despite being perceived as rare due to the nature of these 
enforcers. 
 
The new filtering mechanism in stand-alone actions should therefore operate in the 
following way:   
 
Every consumer wishing to bring a collective action should apply to the regulatory 
body, producing all the information that he possesses regarding the matter. 
                                                 
23
 Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(a). 
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Alternatively, the consumer may approach the relevant licensed consumer 
organisation which may bring a stand-alone action.  
 
This root of action to regular personal actions either by solving the dispute directly by 
direct dialog with the business or by bringing further personal proceedings. The 
consumer may apply to the supervisor of the business e.g the ombudsman acting in 
that particular area, or bring a personal action or a personal ADR. All these ways of 
actions are not relevant to small claims which have negative in their natures, as the 
expected personal income is very low. The options available to consumers with a 
complaint are illustrated in Chart 5A annexed to this chapter. 
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Chart 5A 
Options Available to Consumers with a Complaint 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consumer Complaint 
Try to resolve 
the problem 
directly with 
the business 
Apply to the 
relevant licensed 
consumer 
organisation with a 
"super collective 
complaint" 
Approach the 
regulator with a 
Super Complaint 
The Consumer 
organisation if 
licensed may bring 
a stand-alone 
collective action 
The consumer 
organisation 
Applies for a 
collective ADR 
Bring 
personal 
complaint 
to the 
supervising 
body 
Go for 
personal 
ADR 
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The regulatory body would have a certain time period in which to examine the 
complaint, following which it may decide on one of three actions. It may take the 
action itself, it may order that the representative cease taking any further action on the 
matter, or it may allow the representative to proceed with his stand-alone action. The 
possible decisions which the regulatory body may take are further explained in the 
following subsection. 
 
A. Suggested Considerations for Ceasing the Action in the New Model  
 
Looking at criminal private prosecutions in England, the DPP will take on the action 
in order to bring it to an end where the prosecution interferes with the investigation or 
prosecution of a criminal, where it can be said that the prosecution is vexatious
24
 or 
malicious,
25
 or where the prosecuting authorities have promised the defendant that he 
will not be prosecuted.
26
  
 
These grounds are also relevant to civil collective proceedings led by private 
individuals. Thus, if the regulatory authority considers a complaint to be vexatious or 
malicious, it should intervene in order to prevent a class action being filed against the 
defendant. Similarly, if the regulatory body has previously dealt with a similar 
complaint and reached an agreement with the trader for the benefit of the public, it 
should not allow a private action to proceed since this may hamper the pre-existing 
agreement reached with the trader. There should be some additional criteria similar to 
the grounds which the court takes into account at the certification process. Therefore 
the regulatory authority should be permitted to examine the merits of the action and 
disallow an action which is unsound on its merits. Furthermore, the regulatory body 
should examine the size of the class, and the adequacy of representation in order to 
decide whether it is appropriate to intervene so as to prevent the action from being 
filed. When the class of members is very small there is no reason to allow a class 
action, and where representation is unsuitable the regulator may order a replacement 
of representation. The regulatory body should adopt guidelines regarding when to 
                                                 
24
 Within the meaning of section 42, Supreme Court Act 1981, as amended by section 24, Prosecution 
of Offences Act 1985. 
25
 According to the Public Prosecutor's view. 
26
 The Crown Prosecution Service on Private Prosecution, available at: 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/private_prosecutions/#an01> accessed on 28 January 2012. 
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certify an action, and the guidelines should be published in order to assist consumers 
in deciding when a super-complaint should be filed. Once the regulatory authority has 
brought proceedings to a halt, no class action should be filed. At least in theory, the 
regulator's decision to cease collective proceedings should not prevent a personal 
action from being filed. In practice, a private action for a minimal sum is not 
reasonable due to the hazards and costs involved and thus the decision of the regulator 
brings the matter to an end. 
 
B. Suggested Considerations for a Regulatory Body Undertaking and Leading 
Proceedings 
 
In the field of criminal law in England, the DPP will take on an action where evidence 
shows that a crime has been committed and there is public interest in bringing charges 
as well as a particular need for the CPS to take over the prosecution. Applying these 
considerations to civil procedure, the regulatory body should take on the action 
mainly to protect a public interest. Thus if the relevant case has a wide application to 
many class members and the action has good merits, then the public may lose if 
private hands lead the action. This may occur due to the abuse which can characterise 
private proceedings or due to inadequate representation or the lack of funds 
experienced by the representing plaintiff when dealing with a complex case and using 
expert opinions. If the case concerns large groups, or the decision may lead to a very 
important precedent, and there are good merits, then the regulatory body may 
continue with the action as the class representatives. If the regulator decides to take on 
the action, some remuneration should be paid to the persons who brought the super 
complaint. This remuneration is important in order to convince consumers to break 
with their apathy and submit proper complaints to the regulatory body.  
 
C. Suggested Considerations for Allowing the Action to Proceed by the Same 
Representative 
 
In the field of English criminal law, the relevant guidelines state that where there is 
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that a crime was committed, as well as public 
interest in bringing proceedings, and where there is no particular need for the CPS to 
take over the prosecution (either to stop it or to continue pursuing it) then the case 
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may proceed with the representative suggested unless there are exceptional 
circumstances. These guidelines may also be used in civil cases. Thus, if the 
complaint is found to be substantiated with evidence, it does not involve an important 
precedent, the representative can be trusted, and the suggested lawyer is adequate, 
then there is no reason to intervene and public funds may be saved by allowing the 
private action to proceed. 
 
D. Failure to Respond within a Certain Time Limit or Decision not to Intervene: 
 
The regulatory body should act efficiently. The examination of consumer complaints 
may require some additional manpower and resources; however, the regulatory body 
may be financed by the successful actions. 
 
Consumer complaints should be dealt with in a reasonable time, otherwise the 
damages inflicted by the trader’s misconduct may increase. 
 
Therefore a time limit should be imposed. Where the trader fails to intervene within 
that time limit, a private stand-alone action should be available. 
 
Where the state regulatory body cannot carry out the task of regulating collective 
actions itself, the privatization of this task should be considered. 
 
The regulatory body may have the discretion not to intervene where it finds that the 
action may go through the courts procedure without inflicting too many costs or 
where the regulator finds that there is no need for further investigation and thus 
intervention is unnecessary. 
 
The operation of the regulatory body may be exemplified in the following Chart 5B. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A New Suggested Model: Implementing Lessons from the Israeli Model 
 111 
Chart 5B 
The Operation of the Regulatory Body 
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3. Privatising the Role of the Supervising Authority
27
 to Allow the Action to 
Proceed with the Same Representative  
 
Professor Hodges suggests that if ADR proceedings do not bring the parties to a 
consensual solution, a regulatory public body should intervene.
28
 He argues that 
Europe has come to the realisation that public enforcement may have a significant 
role in delivering consumer redress.
29
 The supervising public authority should have 
various powers, the first power being to bring collective damages claims on behalf of 
a group of consumers and distribute the sums of damages amongst the class members 
at the end of the action. Such powers are already familiar to some European Member 
States, such as the powers vested in the consumer ombudsman under the Finnish 
Act,
30
 and those invested in the Swedish Consumer Ombudsman.
31
 Another power is 
that which allows the regulatory body to impose damages on a business under its 
supervision. Some good examples are provided by the Italian telecoms complaints 
authority which has the power to award damages, as well as the U.K.'s 
telecommunications regulator, Ofcom, and the medical regulator, the MHRA.
32
 The 
new approach which is suggested by Professor Hodges
33
 is based on restorative 
justice, and on the Hampton Report
34
 on reducing enforcement burdens on businesses 
and the Macrory Report on penalties policy.
35
 Though both these reports are not 
directly connected to collective redress, Professor Hodges considers them a good 
starting point for his new and innovative approach. The Macrory report encourages 
the settlement of infringements through restorative justice, a process where those most 
directly affected by a wrongdoing come together to determine what needs to be done 
                                                 
27 Prof. Alon Klement, 'Who Should Guard the Guardians? A New Approach for Monitoring Class 
Action Lawyers' [2002] Vol. 21 The Review of Litigation 25 
<http://www.faculty.idc.ac.il/klement/EngArt/TROL.pdf> accessed 14 May 2011.  
28
 Professor Christopher Hodges, 'Collective Redress in Europe: The New Model' (2010) 7 Civil Justice 
Quarterly 370. 
29
 Professor Christopher Hodges, The Reform of Class and Representative Actions in European Legal 
Systems: A New Framework for Collective Redress in Europe (Hart Publishing, 2008). F. Cafaggi 
and H.-W. Micklitz (eds.), New Frontiers of Consumer Protection. The Interplay between Private 
and Public Enforcement (Intersentia, 2009). 
30
 Act on Class Actions (444/2007), in force from 1 October 2007. 
31
 Group Proceedings Act 2002 (2002:599). 
32
 Professor Christopher Hodges, 'Collective Redress in Europe: The New Model' (n 28). 
33
 Professor Christopher Hodges, From Class Actions to Collective Redress: A Revolution in Approach 
to Compensation, (2009) 28 Civil Justice Quarterly 41. 
34
 P. Hampton, Reducing Administrative Burdens: Effective Inspection and Enforcement (HM 
Treasury, 2005).  
35
 R. Macrory, Regulatory Justice: Making Sanctions Effective (HM Treasury, 2006). 
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to repair the harm, to prevent a reoccurrence, and to give preference to restitution of 
illicit gains. The U.K. English legal system has proposed establishing a Consumer 
Advocate to liaise with relevant enforcers and seek to help the business in question to 
propose a satisfactory compensation package on a voluntary basis.
36
  
 
In this work, this author suggests vesting other important powers in public regulatory 
hands. These are mainly monitoring powers rather than enforcement powers. These 
new powers require the public regulator to decide when and how a collective action 
should proceed either by public enforcement or by follow-on private action. The 
regulator also has the power to decide to bring a complaint to an end when 
appropriate. These tasks may be too much to ask from the public sector in some 
states. Yet, it does not bring the model advocated in this work to its end. It is very 
much envisaged that in many instances the monitoring role of the regulator will be 
privatised and transferred into the hands of a private monitoring agency. 
 
Professor Klement deals with a private monitoring system to ensure that lawyers 
perform their role for the benefit of the class they represent.
37
 Prof. Klement's 
approach entails privatising the monitor's role in class actions in order to prevent 
abuses which are related to lawyer-driven litigation. Thus public regulatory bodies are 
not required in order to supervise class actions. The monitor will choose the class 
lawyer and negotiate his fee. The monitor will examine the lawyer's performance and 
may object to settlement offers. The monitor may even petition the court to replace 
the lawyer where this is necessary. The monitor will be appointed on an auction basis 
and will be remunerated from the income generated by the action. Private monitoring 
will therefore save a regulatory body's public funds. The problem with this model of 
                                                 
36 HM Government, Consumer White Paper “A Better Deal for Consumers: Delivering Real Help Now 
and Change for the Future” (July 2009) available at <http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file52072.pdf> 
accessed 20 April 2012. See further Department for Business Innovation & Skills, Consultation: The 
Role and Powers of the Consumer Advocate, (2 December 2009) at 
<http://www.berr.gov.uk/consultations/page53813.htm.>  
37
 Prof. Alon Klement, (n 25); Prof. Alon Klement, 'Private Monitoring in Common Fund Class 
Actions' (Harvard J. M., Olin Center For Law, Economics, and Business Discussion Paper No. 310 
2/2001) available at <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=262336> accessed 24 September 
2011. 
 
  
 
A New Suggested Model: Implementing Lessons from the Israeli Model 
 111 
privatisation, is that it does not prevent the problem of flooding the system with cases 
since the monitor is only chosen once the action has been submitted to court.  
 
Therefore, Professor Klement's model may be modified and the monitoring task 
enlarged to include privatisation of the regulatory body which filters the actions 
before such actions are submitted to court. The appointed privatised body should give 
its written opinion on every proposed action and should be permitted to refuse the 
action, or propose that the relevant parties enter negotiations with a view to reaching a 
settlement. Where a settlement is reached, it would be approved by the privatised 
body. Furthermore, the privatised body could suggest adequate representation with 
proper remuneration to the entrepreneur. 
 
If such a system of private monitors with extended powers is adopted, states may run 
a system of tenders in order to appoint private organisations to filter and supervise the 
management of class actions, both before and after they are submitted to the courts. 
The private body may be chosen in an auction procedure and may be funded by the 
successful actions exactly as Professor Klement suggests with regard to a monitor's 
remuneration even though the powers are extended to include the supervision of 
suggested actions (consumer complaints) before they are submitted to court. 
  
In this author's opinion, Professor Hodges' proposal to monitor the proceedings using 
a regulatory body is preferable, since it enables the court to enjoy the advantages of 
public enforcement including very wide powers requiring discovery of information as 
well as wide powers of investigation. Public enforcers appear to be more objective 
and will look at the general good of enforcement, whereas private enforcers may look 
at their own pockets.
38
 A further objection to the private monitoring system lies in the 
traditional powers of states. According to this view, it is the state that should maintain 
authority regarding when to prosecute its citizens.
39
 Therefore, if the regulator is to 
                                                 
38 
Wouter P.J. Wils, 'The Relationship between Public Antitrust Enforcement and Private Actions for 
Damages' [March 2009] 2(1) World Competition 3-26 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1296458> accessed 24 November 2011. 
39 
Jody Freeman, 'The Private Role in Public Governance' (2000) 75 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 543, 632-633 
(2000). See also Clifford J. Rosky, "Force, Inc.: The Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and 
Military Force in Liberal States" (2004) 36 Connecticut Law Review 879 available at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1402522> accessed 9 February 2012. 
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decide when an action should be submitted or when it should be dismissed or settled, 
then the state retains its powers to supervise the proceedings. This objection to private 
regulation is not convincing because theoretically, collective proceedings are merely 
the bundling of civil actions which are in any case dealt with by the private sector. 
Furthermore, in Europe, public enforcement of consumer complaints may rely on the 
existing infrastructure mentioned above, such as the Consumer Ombudsman under the 
Finnish Act
40
 the Swedish Consumer Ombudsman,
41
 the Italian telecoms complaints 
authority, the U.K. telecommunications regulator, Ofcom, and the medical regulator, 
the MHRA.
42
 
 
For the purposes of this work, it is sufficient to conclude that whatever system of 
regulation is to be employed, it is clear that in order to prevent the flood problem 
which is so evident in Israel, some scrutiny is required prior to the submission of the 
action to the judicial system. Thus, even if the regulatory body finds that there are 
good grounds for the submission of a case, it should still try to keep the case out of 
court using available ADR systems (as explained in the next part of this chapter) or 
try to settle it where a settlement is possible.  
 
B. The Introduction of ADR in Collective Disputes 
 
A different mechanism which could be used to deal with the flood of legal actions in 
Israel would involve enlarging the existing system of out of court procedures. These 
procedures are commonly known as ADR procedures.  
 
  1. ADR Procedures 
 
ADR procedures are generally and internationally defined as out-of-court dispute 
resolution processes conducted by a neutral third party. ADR may be agreed upon by 
the parties or initiated by the court which then refers the dispute to a third party.
43
 
                                                 
40
 Act on Class Actions (444/2007), in force from 1 October 2007. 
41
 Group Proceedings Act 2002 (2002:599). 
42
 Professor Christopher Hodges, 'Collective Redress in Europe: The New Model' (n 28). 
43 Commission of the European Communities, 'Green Paper on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Civil 
and Commercial Law' COM(2002)196 final (Brussels, 19 April 2002) available at  
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Certain out-of-court decisions bind one of the parties to the dispute, such as the 
decisions of an ombudsman which bind the companies subject to his supervision, 
including insurance companies or banks. Other ways to settle cases out of court 
involve adopting the recommendation of a non-judicial body such as complaint 
board.
44
 ADR procedures are aimed at reaching a decision agreed upon by the parties 
with the assistance of a third party. These procedures should be distinguished from 
arbitration which is a less formal adjudicative procedure leading to a binding decision 
by a third party.  
 
The most common type of ADR procedure is mediation. The international 
characteristics of mediation are that it is an informal, non-coercive procedure, based 
on the voluntary participation of the parties who engage in assisted, confidential 
negotiations in order to reach an agreed solution.
45
 
 
The mediation process is informal and completely confidential so that the parties may 
speak more openly than in court. In Canada, the Attorney General of Ontario adopted 
a mandatory mediation scheme
46
 arguing that
47
 
 
Many people find mediation more satisfying than a trial because they play an 
active role in resolving their dispute, rather than having a solution determined 
by a judge. 
 
The procedure is less costly and prevents years of legal proceedings. The legal costs 
are reduced as there is no need for lengthy litigation and no need to prepare long 
statements or witnesses for cross-examination. Many parties negotiate during the 
course of litigation. Over 90 percent of all lawsuits in Canada settle before getting to 
                                                                                                                                            
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2002:0196:FIN:EN:DOC> accessed 
14 January 2011. 
44 Commission of the European Communities, 'Green Paper on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Civil 
and Commercial Law' (n 43). See the reference to the consumer complaint boards which operate in 
the Scandinavian countries mentioned at footnote no. 8. 
45
 See the Department of Justice in Canada, 'Dispute Resolution Reference Guide' available at 
<http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/dprs-sprd/ref/res/drrg-mrrc/04.html> accessed 13 January 2012. 
46
 The Ontario Mandatory Mediation Program came into operation on 4 January 1999 in Toronto and 
Ottawa, and on 31 December 2002 in Windsor. 
47
 Ontario Ministry for the Attorney General, 'Public Information Notice Ontario Mandatory Mediation 
Program' available at <http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/courts/manmed/notice.asp> 
accessed on 13 January 2011. 
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the trial stage.
48
 Mediation assists in finalising the action by a settlement in the 
earliest stages of the process. 
 
Generally, the best solution to a problem is one carved out by the parties themselves. 
Mediation often leads to resolutions that are tailored to the needs of all parties. The 
solutions in mediation proceedings are flexible and are particularly suited to situations 
where the parties have an ongoing relationship, and wish to resolve the dispute whilst 
preserving this relationship.
49
 
 
  2. ADR Developments in Europe  
 
In Europe, ADR is generally preferred over legal proceedings since it is thought that 
the best solution to a problem is one fashioned by the parties themselves, rather than a 
decision imposed by the court which may be subject to appeal and further legal 
proceedings. The European Commission has taken various initiatives over the last 
decade to promote ADR solutions in general, and mediation in particular, in order to 
build consumer confidence at EU level.
50
 The European Commission has financed 
certain bodies entrusted with the task of promoting consensual out-of-court 
settlements.
51
 Online dispute resolution systems, generally known as ODRs have also 
been developed.
52
 
                                                 
48
 Ontario Ministry for the Attorney General, 'Public Information Notice Ontario Mandatory Mediation 
Program' (n 47).  
49
 Ontario Ministry for the Attorney General, 'Public Information Notice Ontario Mandatory Mediation 
Program' (n 47). 
50
 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal 
aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market 
('Directive on electronic commerce'), a Joint Declaration by the Council and the Commission made 
when the "Brussels I" Regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters was adopted.  
Directive 98/10/EC on the application of open network provision (ONP) to voice telephony and on 
universal service for telecommunications in a competitive environment provides that "easily 
accessible and in principle inexpensive procedures shall be available at a national level to resolve 
such disputes in a fair, transparent and timely manner" in the Member States.  
Directive 2002/21/EC (Framework Directive) on a common regulatory framework for electronic 
communications networks and services provides for non-judicial structures to settle disputes between 
professionals.  
51
 See the Commission Recommendation 2001/310/EC of 4 April 2001 on the principles applicable to 
the extrajudicial bodies charged with the consensual resolution of consumer disputes, OJ L 109, p.56. 
52 See Melissa Conley Tyler, 'More than 1.5 million disputes resolved online', (2004) Vol. 7(3) ADR 
Bulletin, Article 5. Available at <http://epublications.bond.edu.au/adr/vol7/iss3/5> accessed 17 
January 2012. See also Jason Krause, "Settling It On the Web New technology, lower costs enable 
growth of online dispute resolution," The ABA Journal, posted 1.10.2007 at 12:12 PM CST. 
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The European Commission issued a Green Paper on Alternative Dispute Resolution in 
2002, once many Member States had already passed legislation encouraging such 
practices. In its Green Paper, the European Commission explained the growing 
interests of the community in ADR mechanisms due to increasing awareness of ADR 
as a means of improving general access to justice in everyday life.
53
 
 
The European Commission recommended that parties reach a mutually-agreed out-of-
court settlement using procedures based on the principles of impartiality, 
transparency, effectiveness and fairness.
54
 In its "Consumer Policy Strategy 2002-
2006," the European Commission emphasises ADR as an ideal means for cross-
border conflict resolution.
55
 
 
The European Commission has also established two European networks of national 
bodies both aimed at facilitating consumer access to out-of-court procedures for the 
resolution of cross-border disputes. The European extra-judicial network (EEJ-Net) 
was launched in October 2001 to co-ordinate out-of-court-settlement procedures 
throughout Europe.
56
 The EEJ-Net provides a communication and support structure 
made up of national contact points (or "clearing houses") established by each Member 
State. The clearing houses are aimed to help consumers with information and support 
in making a claim to an appropriate out-of-court alternative dispute resolution system. 
The EEJ-Net is complemented by FIN-NET, which is a network of the competent 
national ADR bodies which provide consumers with direct access to an ADR facility 
for problems relating to financial services, such as banks, insurance companies and 
investment services. FIN-NET, which was established in February 2001, has a wide 
out-of-court network for dealing with such complaints. 
                                                                                                                                            
Available at: <http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/settling_it_on_the_web/> accessed 17 
January 2012. 
53 Commission of the European Communities, 'Green Paper on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Civil 
and Commercial Law' (n 43). 
54
 Commission of the European Communities, 'Green Paper on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Civil 
and Commercial Law' (n 43). 
55 Commission of the European Communities, 'Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, The Council, The Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions 
Consumer Policy Strategy 2002-2006' COM(2002) 208 final (Brussels, 7 May 2002). 
56 See in particular, on the EEJ-Net, Commission working document SEC(2000) 405, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress/out_of_court/eej_net/acce_just07_en.htm> accessed 14 
January 2012. See also Council Resolution of 25 May 2000, OJ C 155, p.1, available at  
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/legis/latest/chap152010.htm> accessed 14 January 2012. 
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With regard to mediation, the European Commission launched a Code of Conduct for 
Mediators in July 2004,
57 
which was approved and adopted by a large number of 
mediation experts. In October 2004, the European Commission and the European 
Parliament issued a Directive on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial 
matters.
58
 
 
ADR schemes have also been developed on national levels, including the following: 
 
Spain has adopted a system of consumer arbitration.
59
 The Consumer Arbitration 
Board cannot intervene when the claimant is not a final consumer, or where there is a 
reasonable suspicion that a crime is involved. Consumer arbitration is only relevant 
where both parties have agreed to settle their dispute
60
 before the Arbitration Board 
and the arbitration prevents a claim being brought to the courts or a court hearing the 
case.
61
 
 
In England, the Ministry of Justice has already announced that financial and child 
custody disputes must initially go through mediation before continuing, if unresolved, 
in court. This initiative is aimed at reducing expensive, lengthy and often stressful 
litigation which ends in a judgment. "For far too long, access to justice has been 
equated with 'having one's day in court."
62
 Mediation aims to resolve the difficulties 
involved in lengthy, stressful and costly legal proceedings. 
 
                                                 
57
 Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/adr/adr_ec_code_conduct_en.htm accessed 14 January 
2012. 
58
 Directive 2008/52/ EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on certain 
aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters [2008] OJ L136/3. Available at 
<http://translate.google.co.il/translate?hl=iw&sl=en&tl=iw&u=http%3A%2F%2Feur-
lex.europa.eu%2FLexUriServ%2FLexUriServ.do%3Furi%3DOJ%3AL%3A2008%3A136%3A0003
%3A0008%3AEn%3APDF&anno=2> accessed 14 January 2012.  
59
 Royal Decree 231/2008 of 15 February, 2008, 
<http://www.uclm.es/centro/cesco/english/legislacion.asp> accessed 16 December 2011. 
60 Eduardo Vazquez de Castro, 'Mediation in Consumer Matters. An Approach in European and 
Spanish Law' (June 2010) 1(2) Journal of Conflictology 1 available at <http://journal-of-
conflictology.uoc.edu/ojs/index.php/journal-of-conflictology/issue/view/vol1iss2> accessed 15 
December 2011. 
61
 Spanish National Consumer Arbitration Board, <http://www.ukecc-
services.net/SpanishNationalConsumerArbitrationBoard.cfm> accessed 15 December 2011. 
62
 The Justice Minister, Jonathan Djanogly, (Civil Mediation Council conference, Lowry Hotel, 
Manchester, 11 May 2001) at <http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/about/moj/our-ministers-
board/speeches/djanogly-110511-mediation.doc> dated 11 May 2011. 
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The new Italian law which incorporates the EU Directive on mediation for cross-
border civil disputes requires those involved in most civil cases to attempt mediation 
initially. There has been much criticism from Italian lawyers, particularly over the fact 
that mediation will now be compulsory. Yet the general public in Italy has welcomed 
the initiative because they consider that their civil justice system does not work well. 
The introduction of mediation was seen as a positive way of avoiding waiting two 
years for trial and paying costly lawyers' fees. On the other hand, many lawyers fear 
they will lose business. Commentators have pointed out that lawyers' opposition to the 
Italian reforms has resulted in further damage to their reputation.
63 
 
In Israel, the courts may recommend that parties settle their dispute by methods which 
include mediation, arbitration, or a third party examination of the merits of the case.
64
  
 
In Israel, mediation is defined as a procedure where a third party tries to bring the 
litigating parties to an agreement. The mediator has no authority to decide the dispute, 
nor to compel the parties in any way.
65
 These out-of-court proceedings are regarded as 
ADR proceedings. They are not compulsory and are based on the consensus of the 
parties to enter into ADR proceedings and to settle the case out of court.  
 
With regard to collective proceedings in Israel, any party may bring a stand-alone 
action without paying court fees. They will have a reasonable chance of obtaining a 
bonus if the action succeeds or if a settlement is imposed on the defendant. 
Consumers in Israel have no incentive to try and settle their disputes using ADR 
mechanisms prior to submitting the action to court. ADR procedures are not common 
in collective actions, either before or after the commencement of the action. However, 
compromises during the legal procedure (following the submission of an action) are a 
well-established practice once the collective action has been submitted to court. Such 
                                                 
63 Owen Bowcott, 'Compulsory mediation angers lawyers working in Italy's unwieldy legal system - 
Industrial action by the country's advocates' union has tarnished the reputation of lawyers further in 
the eyes of the general public', The Guardian Newspaper, (23 May 2011) at 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/butterworth-and-bowcott-on-law/2011/may/23/italian-lawyers-
strike-mandatory-mediation> accessed 16 December 2011. 
64
 A certain court department was established in 2002 to refer cases for mediation under the Bylaws for 
the Courts Department for Directing Cases 2002, available in Hebrew at 
<http://elyon1.court.gov.il/heb/laws/manat.htm> accessed 14 January 2012.  
65
 Sec 79 C (A) of the Courts Law )Consolidated version) 5744-1984 (Israel) as amended in 2001. 
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compromises are subject to detailed legal provisions which deal with the approval of 
settlements.  
 
Whilst in Israel a collective legal action is the first port of call for consumers, 
Professor Hodges repeatedly recommends that recourse to the courts in collective 
proceedings should be the last resort once ADR and regulatory procedures have been 
exhausted.
66
 He argues that voluntary settlements should be encouraged, with the 
main questions being how best to encourage parties to settle their collective dispute 
without court proceedings and how to supervise such a settlement. 
 
  3. Encouraging Parties to Participate in ADR 
According to recent data provided by the Irish Chamber of Commerce, there are 
currently 750 ADR schemes operating in Europe relating to business-to-consumer 
disputes. Sixty-four percent of these ADR processes are voluntary. Yet only 9% of 
retailers were reported to have used ADR schemes and only 6% of traders are 
members of ADR schemes.
67
 According to a report by the London-based National 
Consumer Council (NCC), entitled the Availability and Usage of Consumer-to-
Business Alternative Dispute Resolution in the United Kingdom,
68
 the availability of 
ADR for consumer problems is "ad hoc and presents a lottery for the consumer." 
Moreover, the report noted that the provision of ADR services varies widely 
according to the type of dispute in question and when it arises. It found that 
"microscopically small fractions of consumer complaints are referred to an ADR 
service". The usage was found to be very low even where the ADR schemes were 
free. The NCC found that the major reasons for the low take-up rates are a lack of 
awareness of the procedures, the unenforceable nature of the outcome of the 
                                                 
66
 Professor Christopher Hodges, 'Collective Redress in Europe: The New Model' (n 28). Professor 
Christopher Hodges, 'Response to consultation: Towards a Coherent European Approach to 
Collective Redress:' available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/index.html> accessed 28 July 2011. 
67
 Lynnsey Delaney (European Consumer Centre) Speech on Alternative Dispute Resolution (Dublin 
Chamber of Commerce, 11 May, 2011), available at 
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 Margaret Doyle, Katrina Ritters and Steve Brooker, Seeking Resolution: The Availability and Usage 
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Council, 2004) available at <www.ncc.org.uk/protectingconsumers/seeking_resolution.pdf<accessed 
20 January 2012. 
A New Suggested Model: Implementing Lessons from the Israeli Model 
 121 
procedure, the quality of the scheme, and the fee to be paid. The payment of a fee in 
consumer cases is very problematic since normally the value of the damage suffered 
is very small.  
A dispute may be settled quickly and easily using ADR proceedings. These 
proceedings are less costly than litigation and do not require the intervention of 
lawyers and other experts. ADR procedures do not bear the risk of abuse which is 
attributed to court class actions. Yet they are very rarely used and the question 
remains as to how to encourage the use of ADR mechanisms, especially in collective 
redress cases which may run the risk of abuse. 
 
In relation to collective disputes, scholars including Professor Hodges claim that ADR 
procedures should be encouraged and given preference over court proceedings which 
should remain the last recourse.
69
 However, one should ask how to realise this ideal. 
Professor Hodges answers this question by explaining that a court procedure would 
act as a stick if parties (especially the defendants) knew that failure to settle the case 
would result in a class action being launched against them.
70
  
 
In Israel, some steps were taken to encourage ADR schemes in party to party cases. 
Since 2007, every action for an amount not exceeding 50,000 NIS (approximately 
GBP 12,000) is subject to a compulsory informal meeting where the possibility of 
settling the case through mediation is examined.
71
 Judges cannot deal with such 
claims unless the informal meeting has taken place. The informal meeting takes place 
following submission of both the claim and the defence papers by the respective 
parties. The advantage of this system is that mediation takes precedence, and parties 
may not proceed with the action unless the possibility of mediation is seriously 
discussed with them. Furthermore, if the case is settled either by mediation, 
arbitration, or in the early stages of the process before the hearing, the court may 
return a claimant's court fees.
72
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The problem with Israel's ADR incentive model is that it is a court-driven procedure, 
requiring that a legal action be brought before the informal meeting is imposed on the 
parties. The negotiations begin too late, once both parties have already expended 
substantial legal costs on the preparation of their claim or defence. The repayment of 
court fees provides little incentive where substantial costs have already been paid. 
Furthermore, the defendant has no real incentive to settle the case in mediation before 
the case goes to court, as court fees are only paid by the plaintiff.  
 
In this author's opinion, an effective ADR mechanism should operate from the outset, 
once a dispute has arisen. At that stage, the parties are not as angry as in later stages. 
They have not suffered substantial legal costs.  
 
ADR procedures should be mandatory in consumer cases and may be imposed at two 
levels.  
 
The first level should be based on direct negotiations between the consumer and the 
business, such as disputes involving small- or medium-sized businesses, since it is not 
logical to impose an in-house complaint settlement mechanism in these cases. 
However, if the small- or medium-sized company is a member of a certain union, it 
should be subject to the union's complaint resolution system. In-house complaint 
resolution systems should be imposed on large companies by the European Union.  
 
A second level is necessary when a business requires the customer to participate in an 
ADR procedure. Such a mechanism should appear in the contract between the parties, 
and such clauses should not bar the consumer from bringing legal action if ADR 
procedures fail. In Sweden, France, and the U.K., consumer contracts that contain 
arbitration clauses are invalid where they prevent consumers from pursuing court 
proceedings should they wish to do so. In this regard "the 1998 and 2001 
recommendations of the European Commission on out-of-court settlements in 
consumer cases, provide that ADR procedures may not deprive consumers of their 
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right to bring the matter before the courts unless they expressly agree to do so, in full 
awareness of the facts and only after the dispute has materialised."
73
 
 
A further protective measure which does not exist in Israel but could be integrated 
into a new model of collective redress is based on Part 36 of the Civil Procedure 
Rules of England and Wales. Under this provision, an English court may exempt one 
party from the full payment of costs if the other party unjustifiably refuses to accept 
an offer to settle the case.
74
 This provision could be adopted in relation to ADR 
procedure in collective redress cases so as to act as an incentive for parties to settle 
their dispute without the need for a court decision. The only problem is that such a 
provision might encourage a defendant to settle a weak case in order to minimise their 
legal costs. The advantage of making an offer to settle in consumer cases is that it 
may save legal costs that sometimes may be higher than the benefits to the class of 
consumers.
75
  
 
  4. ADR in Collective Redress Cases 
 
The problem with using dispute settlement in collective redress cases run by private 
representatives is that the representative plaintiffs and the defendants may reach an 
agreement which does not benefit the whole class. ADR procedures are mainly aimed 
at bringing the defendant and the plaintiff to an agreement. In their normal form, such 
proceedings are inappropriate for settling collective disputes. 
 
The question is how to ensure that an out-of-court settlement does not overlook the 
interests of absent members. This author believes that a solution lies in the Dutch 
mechanism of collective settlements introduced in 2005.
76
 The Dutch model was 
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which came into force on 27 July 2005. 
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created in order to ensure that a settlement binds all parties to a single legal action.
77
 
The settlement must be reached out of court, and the agreement is a prerequisite for 
the parties to apply to the court.
78
 
 
This model was the result of a case relating to the use of the drug DES 
(diethylstilbestrol) in pregnant women. A settlement was reached and a fund of EUR 
35 million was established,
79
 half of it financed by the pharmaceutical industry, and 
the other half by the insurers. The settlement came with the condition that it should be 
a final settlement for all Dutch victims. The settlement was approved by the court and 
a decision that it binds all other victims was reached.  
 
In a collective settlement, the main advantage for the injured parties is that the liable 
party is generally more willing to reach an agreed settlement because he/she can 
negotiate the amount of damages that will be paid out, and the action will be 
concluded in one procedure without any further satellite proceedings.
80
 
 
The Dutch system sits well with collective disputes pertaining to large classes. The 
opt-out period for class members in this system is at least three months.
81
 In other 
words, class members become parties to the settlement agreement and are entitled to 
receive payment of the stipulated compensation amount even if they are not aware of 
the existence of a settlement. Thus, the defendant may opt-out only if this is explicitly 
stipulated in the settlement and, in any case, the opt-out period for the defendant 
should be no longer than six months after the expiry of the opt-out period for class 
members. Such a provision is reasonable and should be included in any new collective 
redress framework, since a settlement which is not preferred by a majority of class 
members is no longer "representative" and should be dismissed as a collective action 
and allowed to proceed as a personal action.  
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The Dutch system has been found to be very useful in approving U.S. class action 
settlements in the Netherlands in order to prevent European consumers from bringing 
further actions against the same defendant.
82
   
 
The collective settlements agreements are reached in negotiations between the parties 
and are then examined by the court. Under Dutch law, the court examines the 
suggested settlement, ensuring that various criteria are met so as to protect class 
members from an unfair settlement. The most important requirements that must be 
met in order to obtain court approval for a settlement are as follows:
83
  
 
1. The amount of compensation should not be unreasonable;  
2. The defendant's performance must be sufficiently guaranteed – the court may 
look into the question of whether the plaintiff is insured. 
3. The representative organisation must sufficiently represent the class. The 
number of class members must be sufficient to warrant certification. 
 
The court in the Netherlands may appoint an expert in order to give his opinion as to 
the benefit of the settlement to class members. If the court approves the settlement, it 
binds all those class members who did not opt-out on time. In other words, class 
members become parties to the settlement agreement and are entitled to receive 
payment of the stipulated compensation amount even if they are not aware of the 
existence of such settlement. There is no possibility for appeal and only the 
petitioning parties can jointly present their case to the Supreme Court under restricted 
conditions.  
 
  5. Conclusions on ADR 
  
Looking at the Dutch model, it is certainly possible to use a system of settlements 
which are reached as a result of ADR proceedings prior to any legal action being 
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taken. The Dutch Collective Settlements Act should be incorporated into the new 
model in order to assist in preventing the flood of actions which is occurring in Israel 
as a result of private stand-alone actions being brought as an initial recourse without 
any prior negotiations between the parties and without any examination of the merits 
of the claim until the certification stage. The Dutch model examines the benefits of 
the suggested model to the class members and to those who are absent from the 
proceedings. 
 
As far as ADR is concerned, in order to encourage parties to settle their case using 
ADR procedures, some new measures should be considered. A Mandatory ADR 
should be imposed in consumer collective redress actions. The introduction of a 
mandatory ADR scheme would reduce the flood of actions and increase the number 
of settlements. Defendants should feel an incentive to settle the case on the basis that 
if the case is not settled, the class action which follows would be submitted with all 
the hazards and bad publicity it entails. Plaintiffs could be awarded a reasonable 
bonus for their efforts to reach a successful settlement, which would be appropriate 
when a settlement benefits the class members. 
 
The argument against introducing a mandatory ADR mechanism in collective redress 
cases is that mandatory ADR may result in a prejudicial delay being suffered by 
consumers. Thus, opponents of mandatory ADR in collective redress proceedings 
argue that the judge hearing the case may encourage the parties to try to resolve 
matters through ADR if he thinks it appropriate.
84
 Furthermore, ADR proceedings are 
less costly and quicker than collective court actions, and thus the argument that 
defendants may use the procedure in order delay matters is not a convincing argument 
for opposing mandatory ADR.  
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C. Cross-border Issues  
 
Questions of cross-border trade and applicable law remain unanswered with respect to 
the Israeli model. When looking to adopt the Israeli mechanism of collective redress, 
one clear adaptation that must be made is the need to deal with the issue of different 
jurisdictions. The Israeli model is reticent on the question of how consumers whose 
domicile is not in Israel may enforce a judgment in collective redress proceedings.  
Furthermore, the Israeli model is not suitable to cater to questions of "forum 
shopping" which may arise in Europe. The questions on forum shopping were found 
to be crucial in the U.S. where many states fall under federal jurisdiction, and thus this 
may be of great importance to any European debate. 
 
The lessons learnt from the Israeli model may be most relevant to a new European 
model. However, in Europe it is also important to resolve questions of differences in 
jurisdictions, an issue not covered by the Israeli model. Although these questions fall 
outside the scope of this work, it is still important to take a glimpse at some 
jurisdictional issues so as to enlarge the scope of the lessons learnt from Israel to 
cover the issue of jurisdiction through lessons learnt from the U.S. as these will form 
a crucial part of any future European collective redress instrument. 
 
Historically in the U.S., state decisions created inconsistency in class action treatment 
between different state courts. As a result, class representatives preferred to bring 
their cases in states where they were met with favourable treatment.  
 
Therefore, the only proper example to consider when examining the issue of how to 
deal with problems resulting from having different jurisdictions within one area is that 
of the United States.  
 
  1. The Problem of Different Models in the European Community 
 
In order to maximise the advantages of the European Union, the European 
Commission wants citizens to take full advantage of the internal market. The 
European Union institutions have come to the conclusion that they must do more to 
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ease cross-border transactions.
85
 In her policy strategy, Commissioner Kuneva stated 
that by 2013, the objective of promoting the internal retail market by making 
consumers and retailers as confident shopping cross-border as in their home countries 
is to be achieved.
86
 
 
In its recent consultation paper on coherent collective redress, the European 
Commission noted the following issues: 
 
[…] the current divergence of national legal systems notably as regards 
compensatory collective redress, the need for effective cross-border 
enforcement and the need to avoid abusive litigation, including "forum 
shopping."
87
 
 
Indeed, it is problematic that in Europe there are sixteen different types of collective 
redress mechanisms, and there is no coherent model for collective redress. The lack of 
a single collective redress mechanism results in uncertainty as regards trade between 
Member States, and causes difficulties to consumers when purchasing goods in other 
Member States.  
 
The importance of improved enforcement in the European Union has also been 
mentioned in the European Commission's consultation paper on collective redress 
which stated that:  
 
Effective enforcement of EU law is of utmost importance for citizens and 
businesses alike... Rights which cannot be enforced in practice are worthless. 
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Where substantive EU rights are infringed, citizens and businesses must be 
able to enforce the rights granted to them by EU legislation.
88
 
 
The lack of confidence in cross-border trade within the community and the need for 
an improved mechanism to settle cross-border disputes was also dealt with in the 
Flash Eurobarometer survey which analysed the problems of consumer confidence 
between August and September 2002.
89
 According to this survey: 
 
 Three in four Europeans see all measures to increase confidence in cross-
border purchases named in the survey as very or fairly important.  
 
 The top places among measures to increase confidence in cross-border 
purchases are occupied by:  
 
– strengthening consumer protection laws in all EU countries (by 80% 
seen as very or fairly important);  
 
– harmonisation of consumer rights and protection (by 79% seen as very 
or fairly important); and 
  
– allowing national authorities to intervene on behalf of consumers in 
other EU countries" (43%)   
 
As emphasised in this survey, it is crucial to allow European consumers from one 
Member State to pursue their rights against traders in another Member State in order 
to improve certainty in cross-border trade. The possibility of gaining redress will 
certainly empower and encourage trade amongst Member States. Consumer redress in 
cross-border trade is in line with the Community's interests. It is an important step in 
making consumers feel more confident that they can achieve proper and inexpensive 
redress should something go wrong. Without such a system, consumers will prefer to 
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shop in their own countries where they feel more secure rather than buying goods in 
other Member States.  
 
A further problem with the existence of different types of redress models in different 
Member States is that consumers may prefer to pursue their claims under a 
jurisdiction which boasts a more attractive system, rather than bringing the action in 
the proper jurisdiction. 
 
In order to resolve this problem of "forum shopping" for a convenient jurisdiction, the 
new model should provide a unified set of rules which does not prefer one state over 
another.  
 
  2. Problems with Cross-border Proceedings within the Community 
 
Collective redress in Israel was found to boost Israeli consumer powers. However, in 
Europe, collective redress is likely to have an additional role which is to further cross-
border trade within the European Community, by increasing confidence in cross-
border transactions. The European Union has made enormous progress in addressing 
individual cross-border disputes in a series of recent pieces of legislation.
90
 However, 
as cross-border trade increases, there are many situations in which European citizens 
from different Member States may be affected and suffer damage as a result of the 
wrongful action of one trader. Citizens from one Member State may purchase goods 
in another Member State or may order goods produced in another state electronically. 
The common question which arises in such a situation is which court should have 
jurisdiction if a collective action is submitted, and which law should be applied, given 
that collective redress mechanisms differ from one state to the next. 
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Ideally, if all collective redress mechanisms in Europe resulted in a similar outcome, 
it would not matter where the case was managed, provided that the judgment was 
recognised in all Member States.  
 
With regard to mutual recognition, it is the European Commission's role to ensure that 
a judgment given in one Member State is enforceable in another Member State.
91
 
Article 81 ex Article 65 TEC of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
provides that the Union shall develop judicial cooperation in civil matters having 
cross-border implications, based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgments 
and of decisions in extrajudicial cases. Such cooperation may include the adoption of 
measures for the approximation of the laws and regulations of Member States.
92
 The 
article provides that such measures include the mutual recognition and enforcement 
between Member States of judgments and of decisions in extrajudicial cases,
93
 
effective access to justice,
94
 and the elimination of obstacles to the proper functioning 
of civil proceedings, if necessary by promoting the compatibility of the rules on civil 
procedure applicable in the Member States.
95
  
 
The existing measure on jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters
96
 provides that the general rule regarding recognition is 
that a judgment given in a Member State is to be recognised in the other Member 
States without any special procedure being required.
97
 The Brussels Regulation 
provides for some exceptions as outlined in Article 34 of the Regulation giving power 
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to Member States to refuse to recognise a judgment which is contrary to public policy 
in the Member State in which recognition is sought, or where it was given in default 
of appearance, if the defendant was not served with the document which instituted the 
proceedings or with an equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as to 
enable him to arrange for his defence, unless the defendant failed to commence 
proceedings to challenge the judgment when it was possible for him to do so.  
 
With regard to the recognition of foreign judgments between Member States,
98
 there 
are strong fears that a judgment based on the opt-out mechanism would be regarded as 
manifestly contrary to public policy and therefore unenforceable.
99
 These fears are 
also shared by the CJC, which stated that problems can arise where a collective claim 
conducted on an opt-out basis in one state is not recognised or enforceable in another 
state on the grounds that such proceedings are either contrary to public policy, breach 
Article 6 of the European Convention, or breach a constitutional due process 
guarantee.
100
 Duncan Fairgrieve and Geraint Howells claim that it is certainly 
arguable that opt-out cases might infringe on fundamental values as they concern 
judgments relating to persons who are not present in court proceedings.
101
 Thus the 
authors suggest that some European guidelines on collective redress which accord 
with the jurisprudence culture in Europe be introduced even if they include an opt-out 
mechanism for non-viable claims.  
 
Further problems arise because consumers in Member States do not know where to 
bring their claims and they may not always understand the language of the trader's 
state.
102
 The Regulation on jurisdiction
103
 is highly complicated and sets out different 
places where a defendant may be sued on matters relating to insurance, consumer 
                                                 
98
 Based on Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L12/1, art 
33(1). 
99 
The authors Duncan Fairgrieve and Geraint Howells refer to Article 34(1) of Council Regulation No 
44/2001 above (n 98).  
100
 Civil Justice Council, 'Response to European Commission Public Consultation: Towards a Coherent 
European Approach to Collective Redress' (SEC (2011) 173 Final) available at 
<ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_collective.../cjc_en.pdf> accessed 28 July 2011. 
101
 Duncan Fairgrieve and Geraint Howells, (n 91), page 379. 
102 European Commission, Special Eurobarometer, 'Consumer Redress in the European Union: 
Consumer experiences, perceptions and choices' (August 2009) available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/collective_redress_en.htm#Green> accessed 18 
February 2012. 
103 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters, OJ L12/1 of 16 January 2001. 
A New Suggested Model: Implementing Lessons from the Israeli Model 
 121 
contracts and individual contracts of employment. In consumer contracts, the general 
principle is that a consumer may bring proceedings either in the courts of the EU 
country in which the defendant is domiciled or in the courts of the place where the 
consumer (plaintiff) is domiciled. Proceedings may be brought against a consumer by 
the other party to the contract only in the courts of the EU country in which the 
consumer is domiciled.
104
 
 
In the recent Green Paper on collective redress,
105
 the European Commission 
mentioned that with regard to cross-border cases, the Regulation on jurisdiction would 
be applicable to any action including an action brought to court by a public authority, 
if it is exercising private rights (such as an ombudsman suing on behalf of 
consumers).
106
 Representative actions would have to be brought to the trader's court 
or the court of the place of performance of the contract. However, in mass cases 
where consumers come from different Member States, the court would have to apply 
the various national laws of the consumers in question to the contractual obligations 
in the case.
107
 This would cause practical problems. The solutions offered in the 
Green Paper are either to introduce an amendment to the rules imposing the law of the 
trader in collective redress cases, or to apply the law of the market most affected or of 
the Member State where the representative entity is established.
108
 The solutions 
offered in the Green Paper will not prevent the main problem from occurring, namely, 
the existence of divergent legislation in different Member States. This means that 
even if the question of a proper venue for the dispute is settled, questions will remain 
as to how to apply different laws to a similar transaction involving the same trader to 
different places within the European Union.  
 
Indeed, the European Union has mentioned that a horizontal instrument should 
prevent a rush to the courts and that forum shopping cannot be excluded by 
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establishing that the courts where the majority of infringement victims are domiciled 
or where the major part of the damage occurred are the relevant courts, since these are 
flexible measures that will not prevent the problem of forum shopping and abusive 
litigation.  
 
The European Parliament has therefore expressed its preference for a provision that 
will establish the jurisdiction in the place where the defendant is domiciled.
109
 The 
provision which the European Parliament has suggested will render a certain 
coherence with respect to the proper venue for bringing the action.  
 
However, it still leaves unanswered some important issues such as where an action 
should be brought if there are few defendants with domiciles in different Member 
States. Another question arises as to which law should be applied if the class of 
injured persons includes many consumers from different Member States. The 
European Parliament's response to the question of applicable law is that the law of the 
place where the majority of the victims are domiciled should apply. This answer is 
insufficient as, in most cases, plaintiffs do not know with certainty from the outset 
where the majority of class members are domiciled. Such information is in the hands 
of the defendants and may be revealed only later at the discovery stage.  
 
Furthermore, even if the question of jurisdiction and applicable law were to be 
decided on the basis of the majority of the plaintiffs in the action and not all class 
members in an opt-in action, it would still not prevent forum shopping. This is due to 
the fact that plaintiffs could decide to only include members in the action which 
would result in the case being heard in their preferred jurisdiction.
110
  
 
Another suggestion raised in the parliamentary report involved forming different sub-
classes, each of which would be treated according to its relevant applicable law. This 
suggestion may complicate matters as there could be members from many Member 
States (even from 28 states, which would require the court to apply 28 different laws).  
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It is worth looking at developments in the U.S. in order to gain some insights in 
relation to this issue. The issue of different judgments was a cause for great concern in 
the U.S., and in 2005, new legislation was developed there which may be used as an 
example for a new European model. 
 
  3. American Lessons on Jurisdictional Issues 
 
The experience in the U.S. has shown that there must be a "supervising" court in 
cross-border disputes, such as the federal courts, in order to render coherency to the 
proceedings and judgments in collective redress. Where this is lacking, plaintiffs may 
shop around for a convenient forum, resulting in all or most cases being heard in a 
preferred court of a certain member state.  
 
In the U.S., the fact that each state has dealt with class actions differently in the past 
has caused a lot of harm. Some courts have awarded higher damages than others. The 
various outcomes of cases in different states in the U.S. has caused plaintiffs' lawyers 
to file their actions in preferred jurisdictions, such as in Madison County: 
 
Madison County has gone from two in 1998 to 82 in 2004 -- even though the 
vast majority of the defendants named in those suits are not from Madison 
County. Trial lawyers have already filed 24 class-actions in Madison until 
February in 2005.
111
 
 
Against this background, the U.S. adopted a new mechanism for coherency between 
Member States in the new Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"). The new Act 
contains provisions relating to jurisdiction. For example, CAFA includes provisions 
that have the effect of widening the scope of federal courts' jurisdiction to deal with 
class actions and with mass actions in general (over 100 plaintiffs). Defendants 
                                                 
111 
See George Bush, Speech introducing CAFA (February 18, 2005), available at 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qR2fqSTHZNs> accessed 12 February 2012. 
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obviously prefer to litigate their cases in the federal courts so as not to be dragged 
through different state courts and different jurisdictions, hiring lawyers in each state 
to deal with the same matter. The CAFA provisions attempt to prevent forum 
shopping in class action cases and thus are very important as input for the suggested 
model for a unified European Community class action mechanism. 
 
A. CAFA's New Jurisdictional Rules
112
 
 
CAFA creates jurisdiction for classes with more than 100 class members if at least 
one class member's jurisdiction differs from that of at least one defendant and where 
more than USD 5 million in total is in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs. 
The idea behind the Act is to direct all large sum cases to the federal courts. 
 
B. CAFA's New Removal Rules
113
 
 
CAFA has introduced new removal rules as follows: 
 
a. In diversity cases that fit within the jurisdictional requirements of CAFA, any 
defendant, including in-state defendants, can remove cases from state courts to the 
federal courts; 
b. Any defendant can ask to remove the case to federal court even if all defendants do 
not consent; 
c. There is no one year limit on the timing of removal; and 
d. District court decisions to remand are reviewable if review is sought within 7 days 
and must be decided within 60 days of acceptance (with a possible 10 day 
extension).
114
 
 
                                                 
112
 Prof. William B. Rubenstein, Harvard Law School, 'Understanding the Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005' (2005) at <http://www.billrubenstein.com/Downloads/cafa-analysis.pdf> accessed 20 April 
2012. 
113
 These rules are in fact a liberalisation of the conventional rules. 
114
 Jacob R. Karabell, 'The Implementation of "Balanced Diversity" Through the Class Action Fairness 
Act' (April 2009) 84 New York University Law Review 300 at 
<http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv2/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__journals__law_review/docu
ments/documents/ecm_pro_061540.pdf> accessed 20 April 2012. 
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The CAFA example could be implemented in Europe, meaning that a provision 
should be adopted in the European Union allowing massive cross-border cases to be 
submitted to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) at first instance, or deciding which 
law should be applied and where the case should be tried, such as by deciding on the 
most affected market. Such provisions should allow the ECJ to define the class 
represented in each matter or to set up several sub-classes, and to then leave the 
management of the case to the Member State's relevant court. Furthermore, where 
there are actions on the same matter submitted to courts in different Member States, 
such European court should have jurisdiction to refer the case to one court (i.e. 
removal power) where the majority of the class members are represented. The 
applicable law in such cases should be the law of the defendant. Though collective 
procedures may differ from one state to another, the substantive law to be applied in 
each matter is the substantive law of the European Commission which should be 
similar in all Member States.  
 
  4. Trading with States Outside the European Union  
 
Another very different problem is the issue of trading in a jurisdiction which differs 
from the home state. As mentioned earlier, the Israeli model does not deal with this 
issue although consumers from Israel may form part of a group of consumers who are 
included in collective proceedings abroad following a purchase outside Israel. The 
question arises as to whether the new model should recognise class action judgments 
delivered in countries which are outside the state's jurisdiction.  
 
The rules of respecting foreign judgments are based on reciprocity.
115
 Thus, if a 
European citizen trades in the U.S., the U.S. courts would certify a class which 
includes foreign members (who are not domiciled in the U.S.) only if it considers that 
the judgment will be respected in their countries of origin. For example, the U.S. court 
                                                 
115
 Beligh Elbalti, 'The role of the reciprocity requirement in the harmonization of standards for the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments' (Tunis, 2008)  
 available at <http://www.memoireonline.com/12/08/1678/The-role-of-the-reciprocity-
requirement-in-the-harmonization-of-standards-for-the-recognition-and-en.html> accessed 22 
February 2012. See also Fransesco Parisi and Nita Ghei, 'The Role of Reciprocity in International 
Law' (2003) 36(1) Cornell International Law Journal 93, available at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=307141> accessed 22 February 2012. 
Joon Mok, 'The Principle in the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Award of 1958', (1989) 21 CASE W RES. J. INT'L L 123, at 124.  
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was faced with a securities case in which the defendant was a Canadian corporation 
and the class of members included foreign buyers of the corporation's shares. The 
U.S. court, following expert opinions from law professors, found that a judgment 
based on the opt-out mechanism would not be recognised in English, German, French, 
and Italian courts. It concluded that it should not certify a class whose members were 
subject to the courts of those jurisdictions.
116
 However, in a later decision, a U.S. 
court held that a decision based on the in opt-out rule was no longer seen in some 
European jurisdictions as contradicting public policy. It therefore allowed the 
inclusion of foreign plaintiffs from France, the Netherlands and the U.K. as members 
of the represented class. Commentators argue that the hostility of European legal 
systems towards granting the effect of res judicata to U.S. class action judgments is 
progressively declining due to the development of systems for consolidating 
individual claims into collective proceedings even if the action is based on the opt-out 
mechanism.
117
 However, a judgment which awards punitive or multiple damages is 
not likely to be accepted in Europe though other parts of the judgment are likely to be 
enforceable.
118
  
 
The current position is not similar with regard to the recognition of foreign judgments 
in all Member States and it is difficult to draw a clear conclusion on the issue of 
recognition of foreign judgments from the existing enactments on collective redress in 
Europe. 
 
Therefore, in order to protect consumers trading in other states, especially in the U.S., 
a provision should be inserted into the new model to provide for the respect of foreign 
judgments even where they are based on the opt-out mechanism.  
 
                                                 
116
 Bersch v. Drexel Firestone Inc., 519, West Federal Reporter, second series 974 (1975). 
117 The argument is that judgment based on the opt-out mechanism does not comply with the 
requirement of a fair trial mentioned in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
which is part of national law, and thus the judgment runs against public policy and cannot be 
recognised. US v. Montgomery (No 2) [2004] UKHL 37, [2004] 1 WLR 2241. See also Andrea 
Pinna, 'Recognition and Res Judicata of U.S. Class Action Judgments in European Legal Systems' 
(2008) 1 Erasmus Law Review 31; Dixon, 'The Res Judicata Effect in England of a US Class Action 
Settlement' (1997) 46 ICLQ 134. 
118 
Andrea Pinna, 'Recognition and Res Judicata of U.S Class Action Judgments in European Legal 
Systems' (2008) 1 Erasmus Law Review 31. 
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If the matter of recognition of foreign judgments in Europe is left to the state courts, 
the fear is that European consumers will be excluded from foreign class actions which 
deal with victims of different nationalities, including European citizens.  
 
  5. Conclusions on Jurisdiction 
 
The U.S. experience seems to warn against having different pieces of legislation in 
each Member State, as this is likely to lead to forum shopping. 
  
Commentators
119
 have suggested that the European Commission adopt guidelines 
(such as the IBA guidelines)
120
 in order to institute a system of good practice to be 
followed by Member States. However, given the diversity of views on this issue, it is 
clear that courts in Member States will give different constructions to the principles 
set down. With no supervision by the ECJ or a specially developed new section of the 
European Court, it is unlikely that a unified approach towards jurisdictions and 
applicable law will be developed. The CAFA mechanisms in the U.S. may be adopted 
in order to grant state courts the power to remove a cross-border case which concerns 
complicated issues, large financial sums, or internationally diverse groups to a new 
section of the European Court which could deal with questions of jurisdiction in 
cross-border collective redress actions. The U.S. exemplar demonstrates that with no 
overarching supervising body, it is impossible to prevent diversity of decisions and 
forum shopping in cross-border actions. The European Commission should impose a 
system of supervision over first instance state courts which are not removed to the 
central European Court in order to decide points of jurisdiction, and the relevant law 
to be applied in such cases. 
 
Only a collective redress measure aimed at creating coherency and harmonisation, 
which is subject to centralised inspection by the ECJ, will prevent forum shopping. 
This measure will create equality between jurisdictions for collective cross-border 
cases, and ECJ supervision will need to ensure that the decisions on collective redress 
issues do not differ widely from one Member State to another. 
                                                 
119
 Duncan Fairgrieve and Geraint Howells, (n 91) page 379. 
120 
International Bar Association, Guidelines for Recognising and Enforcing Foreign Judgmentsfor 
Collective Redress (16 October, 2008) available at 
<www.ibanet.org/LPP/Dispute_Resolution_sectionguidelines/Arbitration/Projects.aspx#>. 
A New Suggested Model: Implementing Lessons from the Israeli Model 
 111 
 
With regard to trading outside the jurisdiction of the consumer's home state, a new 
collective redress mechanism should specify the conditions for mutual recognition of 
claims outside the jurisdiction, and in addition, allow class members who are 
domiciled outside this jurisdiction to become part of any class action, with opt-out 
rights similar to any other class members. In the European context, notice of such a 
claim should be given through the consumer organisations' internet site and via the 
new registry which will form part of a new class action model.  
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Conclusion 
 
As discussed in Chapter One of this work, collective redress has some very important 
advantages. It improves access to justice, especially in large scale low-value cases, by 
turning Negative Expected Value suits into Positive Expected Value suits
1
 using 
economies of scale by aggregation of smaller actions into a single legal action which 
is economically worthwhile pursuing.
2
 Collective redress promotes adherence to the 
law, deters illegal actions
3
 and furthers public interests. Collective redress also helps 
in the management of multiple cases in court.
4
 
 
The lessons learnt from the Israeli model generally are that class actions should be 
introduced and that an opt-out model with some ‘brake’ mechanisms would be very 
welcome in a jurisdiction such as Europe. The Israeli model is generally praised in 
this work, though some improvements are advocated mainly to reduce the volume of 
the actions which currently swamp the Israeli market.
5
 With this in mind it is clear 
that an Israeli model is not one that can be directly transposed in a European context.  
The European Union is a very large market which is interested in furthering free trade 
between Member States, a far cry from the small state of Israel. But in both 
jurisdictions, the efficiency of consumer protection measures depends not only on the 
creation of rights, but also upon the availability of efficient and appropriate means to 
enforce them. Collective redress may fill the existing gap in enforcing consumers' 
rights in the European Union in the same way it did in Israel, especially where large 
scale low-value actions are concerned and personal actions otherwise result in 
negative outcomes (Negative Expected Value suits).
6
  
 
                                                 
1
 C.G. Lang, 'Class Actions and US Antitrust Law: Prerequisites and Interdependencies of the 
Implementation of a Procedural Device for the Aggregation of Low-Value Claims' (2001) 24(2) 
World Competition 285-302. 
2
 Steven Goldstein and Yael Efron, 'The Development of Class Actions in Israel' (1999) 27 Alei 
Mishpat 31. 
3
 Prof. Alon Klement, 'Class Action as a tool to neutralize the advantages of a single defendant against 
multiple plaintiffs – following the decision in The State of Israel v. E.Sh.T' (1994), 21 Mechakrei 
Mishpat available at <www1.idc.ac.il/klement/HebArt/EST.pdf> accessed 3 June 2011. S. Goldstein, 
'Class Actions in Israel' (1990) 13 Int. Cong. Comp. Law 45, 65. See also Leave to Appeal Request 
No. 4556/94 (Supreme Court) Tezet v. Zilbershatz, (26 May 2006, P"D Mem Tet (5) page 774. 
4
 See Chapter One, Part B, Sections (2) and (5) on pages 35 and 50 respectively. 
5 See Chapter Five for the recommended improvements. 
6
 See Chapter One, Part D (2) on page 55. 
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Israeli legislation in this field is important because it introduced a model which has 
dramatically improved the enforcement of local consumer law, increasing access to 
justice in relation to consumer cases which would not otherwise have been submitted 
to the courts. Consumers in Israel have also become much better off in many other 
respects following the introduction of the CAL such as in the fields of banking, 
telecommunications and the food industry where the result of class actions have led to 
changes in the behaviour of large companies operating in these markets.
7
  
 
The Israeli precedent exemplifies both the strengths and weaknesses of the collective 
action system. The Israeli legislator has succeeded in achieving the goals of 
improving access to justice yet the Israeli system has not avoided some of the 
difficulties which accompany private enforcement, in particular the problem of a 
flood of cases inundating the courts, Therefore, in the course of this work, some 
central characteristics of the Israeli model have been recommended whilst others such 
as adding a pre-action filter were suggested. 
 
The solution advocated in this work to improve the Israeli model and possibly make it 
workable in a European environment, is to add a pre-action filter which does not 
currently exist under the Israeli model. This filter mechanism is aimed at barring 
unmeritorious stand-alone cases from being filed with the courts. The solution 
suggested is aimed at preventing the flood of stand-alone actions which, as shown in 
the Israeli example, results from provisions allowing private individuals to bring 
stand-alone private actions as their first recourse. The suggested model only permits 
follow-on opt-out or opt-in actions, as well as stand-alone actions in exceptional 
circumstances where the authorities have failed to intervene.
8
 This could be achieved 
if public enforcers of the type which exist in Europe are required to take action first.
9
 
Only after the action has been subject to a first filtering process prior to the dispute 
reaching court, if necessary, would a private action be allowed. In this way, costs 
would be saved and the benefit to the consumer class could be similar to the benefit of 
pursuing a court proceeding.  
                                                 
7
 See Introduction, Part E on page 23. 
8
 As discussed in Chapter Five, Introduction, page 277. 
9
 In Chapter Five, Part A, Section 3 on page 294 we gave as examples of the Consumer Ombudsman 
under the Finnish Act, the Swedish Consumer Ombudsman, the Italian telecoms complaints 
authority, the U.K.'s telecommunications regulator, Ofcom, and the medical regulator, the MHRA.  
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The new regime should only make a follow-on action available to potential private 
plaintiffs where a complaint such as a super-complaint is filed with a public body, or 
where a complaint is filed with a regulator appointed to deal with consumer complaints 
and this has resulted in a conviction, a disciplinary ruling, or an opinion that an 
infringement of consumer law has occurred. If a public body or regulator does not take 
any action within a certain period of time following the submission of a consumer 
complaint, and has not opposed private collective redress on the grounds that the claim 
is unfounded, then a private representative should be permitted to initiate a stand-alone 
action. However, this stand-alone action would be subject to financial requirements 
such as a surety, with the adequacy of the representative's qualifications examined at 
the certification stage in order to disqualify opportunistic private actions. Under the 
new model, at the certification stage the court would take into consideration the fact 
that a complaint had been submitted to the relevant public body or regulator, as well as 
such body's response and therefore follow-on actions are likely to go through fairly 
easily. With regard to incentives for private representatives, these should be available 
only if the case goes to court with the approval of a public body or if the regulator 
allows for a follow-on private action following a finding that the complaint is justified 
and the case is represented by private individuals. 
 
Such a process would compel public authorities to deal with every complaint within a 
reasonable time limit in order to avoid having to explain their failure to do so to the 
court. Although this process would require public bodies to work more efficiently, 
and may require more manpower, the costs would be outweighed by the benefits of 
preventing the economic damage caused by an overwhelming number of collective 
actions. These benefits may revert to the regulator as part of the benefits of the 
successful actions.  
 
In order to understand how such key points need to imbricate in practice we put 
forward the following chart (Final Chart) which maps out a class action model that 
will not only function better in Israel but can also bring about valuable changes for 
European consumers. We will further below proceed with explaining its main features 
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and practical characteristics. This chart summarises the possible outcomes marked in 
all previous charts.
10
 
 
 
                                                 
10  Chart 4A and Charts 5A and 5B on pages 273, 287, and 291 respectively 
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A. The Commencement of the Action (marked green on the 
annexed chart - Final Chart) 
 
The main trigger for commencing a consumer dispute is by way of a complaint made 
by a consumer who was subject to wrongful behaviour. 
11
 
This complaint may be dealt by the consumer and the business by direct negotiations 
at the first stage as exemplified in Chart 5A of Chaper Five. However, if one 
consumer problem is resolved it may mean that many other consumers who have 
suffered the same wrong (for example, being subjected to unlawful charges by their 
bank or telephone company) remain untreated, they may never know of their right to 
be reimbursed for the sum with which they were unlawfully charged. For this reason, 
from the market point of view it is much better to deal with consumer complaints 
concerning petty damages collectively, aiming for a solution with a wide effect which 
resolves the problem for all consumers, even those who have not complained or are 
unaware of their rights. 
 
In the course of this work, the three possible starting points for commencing a 
consumer large scale small claim battle were discussed.
12
 Complaints to a private 
enforcer, i.e. the class representative, was found to be the most active solution in the 
sense that such actions are the most used in Israel. Most collective actions in Israel 
(99%) are based on stand-alone actions. However, these actions are also the source of 
the current flood of claims, and this work therefore advised adding an additional filter 
to stand-alone actions and to give preference to public enforcement and follow-on 
private actions.
13
  
 
The first filter would then be a public regulatory body which may be privatised if 
necessary if the public sector lacks funds or manpower. The operation of the 
regulatory body was exemplified in Chart 5B of Chapter Five
14
. A regulatory body 
                                                 
11 See Chapter Five, Chart 5A on page 289. 
12 See Chapter Three, Part B on page 130. 
13 See Chapter Five, Part One, Section A on page 279. 
14 See Chapter Five, Chart 5B on page 293. 
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appears to be more objective and will look at the general good of all players in the 
market, whereas private enforcers are likely to look at their own pockets.
15
 The 
operation of a public regulatory body (or privatized and publicly scrutinised body) has 
some clear advantages which include special powers of investigation and discovery 
conferred on public bodies
16
 which may assist in proving consumer cases. These 
powers are not shared by consumers who normally lack sufficient financial resources 
to prove business misconduct. In addition, where the misconduct also constitutes a 
criminal offence, or in other special matters such as competition infringements, public 
bodies might be granted additional powers to confiscate documents, to conduct 
searches and to force formal inquiries and interrogations.
17
 There are some good 
examples of existing regulatory bodies in member states which we mentioned 
earlier.
18
 We also recommended a supervising authority to be engaged in cross-border 
issues. This task may be handed over to a section of D.G. Sanco which will operate to 
establish a breach or appoint the proper regulator in cases involving multiple 
countries. In antitrust cases, Article 15 of Regulation 1/2003 provides for some sort of 
cooperation in antitrust cases where the European Commission plays a supervisory 
role. The Commission may
19
: 
 transmit information in its possession or procedural information (Article 
15(1)); The right of a national court to ask the Commission for an opinion 
pursuant to Article 15(1) of Regulation 1/2003 does not prejudice the national 
court’s right or obligation to request a preliminary ruling under Article 267 
TFEU from the Court of Justice. 
                                                 
15 Wouter P.J. Wils, 'The Relationship between Public Antitrust Enforcement and Private Actions for 
Damages' [March 2009] 2(1) World Competition 3-26 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1296458> accessed 24 November 2011. 
16 Klaus-Heiner Lehne, Report for the Committee on Legal Affairs of the European Parliament on 
‘Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress’ (2011/2089(INI)) available at 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2012-
0047&language=EN&mode=XML> accessed 12 April 2012. 
17 
See, for example, the powers of the OFT in investigating criminal cartels and competition cases in 
The OFT, 'Powers for investigating criminal cartels- guidance. The Enterprise act 2002' available at 
<http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaflets/enterprise_act/oft515.pdf> accessed 12 April 
2012. See also A guide to the OFT's investigation procedures in competition cases – Guidance March 
2011 OFT1263 available at <www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/policy/oft1263.pdf> accessed 12 April 
2012. 
18  See above at footnote no 9. 
19  See The European Commission – competition internet website available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/antitrust.html> accessed 25 September 2012. 
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 give its opinion on questions regarding the application of the EU competition 
rules (Article 15(1));   
 The Commission (and national competition authorities) may submit 
observations to national courts as amicus curiae under (Article 15(3)).  
National courts are obliged to submit a copy of any written judgment to the 
Commission where Article 101 or Article 102 of the Treaty has been applied (Article 
15(2)) in order to consider taking proper Community actions.  
These powers are complementary to other powers vested in the competition field such 
as powers of investigation and the imposition of fines in cases of a breach.
20
 
The suggested state regulatory body will have the authority to deal with the action 
itself as a public enforcer or appoint another public enforcer to deal with the case. 
Public enforcement should take place if the relevant case has a wide application to 
many class members and the action has good merits. In such cases, the public may 
lose if private hands lead the action. Where the regulator decides to take on the action, 
some remuneration should be paid to the persons bringing the super-complaint. This 
remuneration is important in order to convince consumers to break with their apathy 
and submit proper complaints to the regulatory body.
21
  
 
The state regulatory body may refuse to allow any further action taken against the 
defendant if the action is not substantiated or where the regulatory authority considers 
a complaint to be vexatious or malicious.
22
 Similarly, if the regulatory body has 
previously dealt with a similar complaint and reached an agreement with the trader for 
the benefit of the public, it should not allow a private action to proceed since this may 
hamper the pre-existing agreement reached with the trader. Once the regulatory 
authority has brought proceedings to a halt, no class action should be filed. Yet as 
seen in Chart 5A of Chapter Five, a personal action is still available for consumers yet 
it is not reasonable that such personal actions would be brought given the small 
amount of damages at stake. 
                                                 
20  See for example the imposition of fines for price fixing on Belgian brewers available at: 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/01/1739&format=HTML&aged=1&la
nguage=EN&guiLanguage=en> accessed 25 September 2012. 
21
 See Chapter Five, Part A at Section B (2) at page 291. 
22
 See at Chart 5B in Chapter Five, page 293.   
  Conclusion 
 111 
 
The state regulatory body may justify the action and allow for a follow-on action or 
decide to take the action to public hands where there is significant public interest in 
the case. The follow-on action is a combined public and private action, since the 
following private action relies on the findings of the regulatory public body. Such 
actions are based on the rationale that private enforcement is complementary to public 
enforcement, since the latter is more suited to dealing with wrongful activities and 
practices, while the former has a deterrent effect on businesses due to the magnitude 
of the possible damages.
23
 
 
It was also recognised in Chapter Five that in exceptional circumstances where the 
authorities refuse to intervene but do not disallow the action, or where the regulator 
fails to respond on time, a stand-alone should be available. Stand-alone actions should 
be conditional upon an adequacy requirement being fulfilled by the representative, 
who will have to prove himself as capable and must have the required resources to 
deal with the action.  
 
The representative in stand-alone actions would be asked to provide a surety. The 
surety requirements would take a form similar to the current Danish provision. The 
advantage of the Danish surety requirement is that it imposes a cap on the amount 
which a representative party for a class has to pay.
24
 In addition, the court may require 
that any group member wishing to join the action should provide security for the legal 
costs if such costs are not insured under Section 325 of the Danish Administration of 
Justice Act or where they are not covered by legal aid. The costs are paid by the state 
if the class action fulfils the terms for free legal aid under Sections 327 to 329 of the 
Administration of Justice Act, up to a maximum calculated according to Section 
254e(7).
25
 These measures have the effect of mitigating the risk of bringing a 
collective action as the representative knows from the outset of the case the amount of 
expenses which would be charged should the action fail.  
                                                 
23
 For support for the combined private and public enforcement, see: The Office of Fair Trading, 
Private actions in competition law: effective redress for consumers and business Discussion paper 
(OFT916)  
<http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft916.pdf> accessed 17 September 2011. 
24
 Prof. Erik Werlauff, 'Class actions in Denmark – from 2008' (Aalborg University) at 
<http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/content/class-actions-denmark> accessed 19 September 2011.   
25 Prof. Erik Werlauff, ibid.  
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Consumer organisations are another example of trustworthy enforcers dealing with 
consumer complaints. During the course of this work,
26
 it was noted that if a 
consumer organisation satisfies certain criteria, it may also represent in stand-alone 
collective actions with no need to go through the regulatory body, since it is 
sufficiently trustworthy to regulate the complaints itself. Thus a consumer may bring 
his collective complaint to both enforcers the regulator or the licensed organisation 
which may both deal with collective actions. 
 
Unfortunately, the Israeli jurisdiction lacks proper infrastructure for organisations to 
deal with class actions. Indeed, very few actions in Israel have been brought by 
organisations. On the other hand, organisational intervention is very welcomed in 
most European member states albeit such organisations in Europe have failed to bring 
collective redress actions for damages thus far. Consumer organisations have neither 
the incentives nor the budget, and would not take the risk of very expensive litigation 
in order to bring an action for damages for a group of injured members. In this work, 
it is supposed that if organisations go through the licensing process and there are less 
private stand-alone actions, such organisations will be more active in bringing 
collective actions. 
 
We explored  the licensing of organisations dealing with collective actions
27
 and put 
forward key criteria that ought to be considered for  their selection: 
 
- The Goals of the Association: The Memorandum of Association should 
indicate that the suggested legal action falls within the targets of the 
associations as suggested in the Israeli provision.
28
  
 
- Accountability: The organisation's system of governance will be accountable 
to its members. The organisations must have listed members and run an 
election process. 
 
                                                 
26
 See Chapter Three, Part B beginning on page 130 . 
27 See Chapter Three, Part B (2)(b)(iii) on page 149. 
28
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 2 (Israel). 
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- Funds Available: This means that the organisation is financially independent 
with no commitment to any third party.  
 
- Reputation: Reputation entails looking at the organisation's records and 
achievements in protecting the rights of its members.
29
 Furthermore, 
organisations that have a proven track record of bringing successful actions 
should be given preference over ad-hoc associations that are formed only to 
bring a specific action. Such organisations are deemed to act in a manner 
which will maintain their good reputation and preserve their integrity.
30
 
 
- Number of Members: The organisation must be representative in the relevant 
field in which it is active. The organisation should reflect the interests of the 
players in that specific field. There is no logic in limiting the number of 
members (apart from the minimum number of members required for 
establishing an association) as the minimum number may change from one 
area to another as there are markets with many operators and some other 
markets which have less operators to be represented in the relevant 
organisation. 
 
B. The Certification Procedure (marked in blue on the Final 
Chart)  
 
Under the current model in Israel, once an action has been submitted, the court needs 
to address the suitability of the action for collective proceedings at the certification 
stage procedure. This is the procedure which is aimed to filter out unmeritorious 
actions, or actions brought with poor merits and to ensure the fair hearing of the trial. 
As shown in Chapter Four and in Chart 4A,
31
 at this stage the court will look at the 
prima facie merits of the case in order to filter out unfounded actions. The court will 
ensure that the collective procedure is the most effective procedure and the most 
                                                 
29
  Department of Trade and Industry, 'Designation As Enforcer For Part 8 of the Enterprise Act 2002: 
Guidance for Private Bodies Seeking a Designation under Section 213' available at 
<http://www.dti.gov.uk/enterpriseact/pdfs/sec213guide.pdf> accessed 9 April 2012. 
30
 Department of Trade and Industry, 'Designation As Enforcer For Part 8 of the Enterprise Act 2002: 
Guidance for Private Bodies Seeking a Designation under Section 213', ibid. 
31 See Chapter Four, Section 1 of Part B on page 215 and Chart 4A on page 275. 
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appropriate means of resolving the dispute in light of the circumstances of the case 
and that questions which are common to the class prevail over personal issues.
32
 An 
additional precondition under the CAL is the requirement that there is a reasonable 
basis for concluding that the interests of the class will be represented and managed in 
an appropriate manner
33
 by the representative and that the interests of the whole class 
will be represented appropriately and in good faith.
34
 This precondition, which in fact 
consists of two distinct preconditions (i.e. adequate representation and good faith), is 
not necessary where the representatives are public or organisational agencies which 
are presumed in this work to be secure agents and thus exempt from many of the 
safeguards operating in Israel which aim to deal with abusive private litigation. 
 
The certification procedure operating in Israel is important in defending the rights of 
defendants by filtering actions and preventing claims which are brought in bad faith 
or which have a low chance of success. The other function of the certification process 
is that it provides the judge with an opportunity to give precise orders for the 
management of the case.  
 
The problem with the certification procedure is that, from the defendant’s perspective, 
conducting an examination of the case's merits at the certification stage sometimes 
comes too late. The certification itself may be very lengthy and costly and harm may 
already have been caused to the defendant’s business by the mere submission of a 
large class action against the defendant.
35
 Conversely, a lengthy examination of the 
merits may sometimes be very detrimental to the plaintiffs, since the defendants may 
try to prolong the certification hearing, exhausting the limited funds available to the 
class representatives.  
 
Therefore, the problem with the certification procedure which currently operates in 
Israel is that it operates following the submission of the action to the courts, requiring 
                                                 
32 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 8 (A) 2 (Israel). 
33 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 8 (A) 3 (Israel). 
34 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 8 (A) 4 (Israel). 
35 The British government, in its reply to the Civil Justice Council's recommendations on collective 
actions, stated that the merits examination should take place in the certification process, exactly as 
the case currently stands under Israeli legislation. Ministry of Justice, 'The Government’s Response 
to the Civil Justice Council’s Report: Improving Access to Justice through Collective Actions’ (July 
2009) <http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/docs/government-response-cjc-collective-
actions.pdf> accessed 6 January 2012. 
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the defendants to fight unworthy cases or blackmail suits which should have been 
barred at the court gates. Consequently, a filtering mechanism in addition to that 
which exists in Israel is required to filter out unmeritorious actions before certification 
proceedings are commenced in order to ease pressure on the court system and protect 
defendants. This filter is offered now by the establishment of the regulatory body 
which we advocated for. 
 
The outcome of the certification procedure as shown in our final chart (marked in 
blue
36
 and in Chart 4A which is part of our conclusions to Chapter Four) is that the 
court may allow the action and grant case management orders.
37
 These orders may 
include the definition of the class,
38
 a representative replacement if the court finds that 
the representative or the class lawyer are not adequate,
39
 setting a time limit to opt-out 
of the action for members who do not wish to remain part of the class
40
 and, in 
exceptional cases, turning the action into an opt-in action.
41
 The ruling judge may also 
certify the action with such changes as he finds fit.
42
 The other possible outcome of a 
certification procedure would be that the court decides that the action has no prima 
facie merits, in which case the case would be denied and the action rejected. The court 
may also reject the collective nature of the action, for example where the personal 
questions outweigh the common questions, in which case the collective action is 
rejected while the personal action remains a possible option (though such actions are 
likely to be merely hypothetical where very small sums are concerned). The court 
may also reject the collective action, leaving the plaintiff with the option of bringing a 
personal action in cases where the application falls outside the scope of class actions. 
However, the wide scope of class actions in Israel, as discussed in Chapter Three, Part 
Four of this work, enables representative plaintiffs to submit collective redress cases 
in almost all consumer actions, and class actions are permitted in very broadly-
defined areas of law resulting in wide use of the mechanism. 
 
                                                 
36
 See also Chart 4A on page 275. 
37
 See Chapter Four, Part B section 1 (A) on page 213. 
38
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 10 (Israel). 
39
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 8 (C) (Israel). 
40
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 12 (Israel). 
41
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 12 (Israel). 
42
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 13 (Israel). 
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  1. Setting Time to Opt Out of the Class Proceedings (marked in blue 
on the Final Chart). 
 
As shown in Part One of Chapter Three, the Israeli model is based on the opt-out 
system, which enables large classes to group together. The opt-out mechanism renders 
the defendant fully accountable for the damages caused by his behaviour, prevents 
satellite litigation, and deals better with the free riding problem which is so evident in 
opt-in litigation.
43
 
 
The CAL includes a default opt-out mechanism and provides that once a motion to 
allow class proceedings has been approved, every member of the class is considered 
to be part of the proceedings, unless he indicates within 45 days, or a period of time 
determined by the court, that he wishes to opt-out of the action.
44
 The opt-out period 
aims to give each member a reasonable period of time to consider his individual 
circumstances and to decide whether to opt-out of the proceedings. The CAL also 
provides that the judgment in a class action binds all the class members, unless 
explicitly provided otherwise.
45
 This provision is at the heart of the opt-out 
mechanism and it provides that unless the class members opt-out of the class, they 
will be bound by the judgment. 
 
Consumer cases are generally characterized by their negative expected value and thus, 
class members are usually indifferent to the outcome of class action proceedings and 
in most instances will not bother to opt out of the action in opt-out cases or opt in in 
opt-in cases. This consumer apathy may explain why opt-out classes are always larger 
than opt-in classes. The conclusion reached in this work is similar to Professor 
Mulheron's
46
 conclusions that a proportionate opt-out mechanism should be 
introduced with some brakes and safeguards in order to prevent possible abuses.  
 
                                                 
43
 See Chapter Three, Part A on page 94. 
44
 Class Action Law 2006, s 12 (Israel). 
45
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 24 (Israel). 
46
 Civil Justice Council, ‘Improving Access to Justice through Collective Actions: Developing a More 
Efficient and Effective Procedure for Collective Actions’ [2008] Final Report, 153. 
<http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/CJC/Publications/CJC%20papers/CJC%2
0Improving%20Access%20to%20Justice%20through%20Collective%20Actions.pdf> accessed 16 
July. 
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This work rejects the argument that the opt-out mechanism sweeps in even those who 
are not interested in joining the class action
47
 because many class members may not 
be aware of the proceedings or, because of consumer rational apathy, will not exercise 
their right to opt-out and thus opt-out classes tend to be large and include members 
who are often not interested in suing the defendant for his misconduct. Consumers 
who do not opt-out do so because of their rational apathy and not because they object 
to the legal proceedings. One of the major advantages of the opt-out system, is that it 
ensures that the damages awarded are based on the full loss caused and not merely on 
the number of class members who joined the action. There is no doubt that 
consumers’ interests are better served if large firms are held accountable for the full 
amount of harm they have caused.  
 
The European objections to the opt-out mechanism are unsubstantiated, and 
experiences learnt from the Dutch and Portuguese opt-out models clearly indicate that 
the introduction of an opt-out mechanism per se, with no further financial incentives 
for the representatives, would not result in a flood of cases. 
  
The corollary that should be learnt from these models is that the opt-out mechanism 
may be controlled and should not be feared. The opt-out mechanism is the only 
mechanism which may deal with small value claims. The opt-out mechanism 
conquers consumer apathy and makes rough traders pay for the damage caused by 
their unlawful actions. The opt-out model is equipped with the appropriate deterrence 
mechanism to prevent traders from acting unlawfully. Yet, it may be controlled by 
proper safeguards. 
 
With regard to opt-out actions, this author recommends distinguishing small claims 
from those involving large sums as the Danish model suggests.
48
 It is this author's 
view that in cases of low-value personal actions, the opt-out mechanism should be 
introduced and should not be feared. On the other hand, where large personal sums 
are involved, an opt-in scheme should be adopted. This is in fact a combined 
                                                 
47
 Rachael Mulheron, Reform of Collective Redress in England and Wales: A Perspective of Need 
(Civil Justice Council, 2008), <http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications-and-
reports/reports/civil/civil-justice-council/cjc-research-need-consumer-redress> accessed 18 
November 2011.  
48
 Although in the course of this work we did not agree with the Danish provision that allows only 
public enforcement opt-out actions. 
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procedure similar to the procedure in Israel which provides that large scale actions 
may be joined and managed on an opt-in basis, utilizing the management advantages 
of the class action provisions. 
 
  2. Turning the Class Action into an Opt-In Action 
 
The CAL preserves the right for the court to decide, in exceptional circumstances, that 
the class of persons represented should include only those members who have given 
notice that they wish to become part of the class.
49
 The opt-in procedure in Israel is an 
exception to the opt-out mechanism which is the default position in the Israeli class 
action and only applies if the process of ascertaining all members of the group and 
notifying them of the proceedings can be carried out at a reasonable cost.
50
  
The exceptional circumstances in which the court should impose an opt-in action 
include inter-alia: 
 
3. Where there is a reasonable probability that many of the class members will 
submit claims for the same cause of action; and 
4. Where the amount of each action is substantial, including negligence claims. 
 
The Israeli legislator took the view that ‘big sum’ claims were not suited to regular 
opt-out class action proceedings. Consequently, the CAL provides that where such 
claims are approved, the court may provide that they will be managed as opt-in class 
actions and that the expenses will be shared by all the members of the class. The 
Israeli legislator was of the opinion that the opt-in system was suitable for cases 
involving substantial sums where the plaintiff could bring and manage his own 
action.
51
 Class actions in these cases assist in the management of the proceedings and 
may prevent contradicting judgments which could result from several actions on the 
same issue. 
 
The Israeli jurisdiction has acknowledged the opt-in mechanism, though such 
provision has remained totally unused. All collective claims in Israel have been based 
                                                 
49 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 12 (Israel).  
50
 Ibid. 
51
 S. Goldstein and T. Fisher, ‘The Interaction Between Mass Actions and Class Actions – Procedural 
Aspects’ [2004] Mishpatim Lamed Dalet 21. 
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on the opt-out model without exception albeit that the new Israeli CAL includes a 
provision which thus far has never been used for opt-in actions involving large 
sums.
52
 In our suggested model, we left this option intact so as to leave opt-in actions 
as a possible root for action. Such a provision is familiar in some European 
jurisdictions and may be used as a complementary provision to the opt-out default 
provision which will be limited to certain personal actions with small values. 
 
  3. Representative Replacement 
 
As seen under the Israeli model, another outcome of the certification procedure may 
be that the court replaces the class lawyer where the representative lawyer asks to 
terminate the action. In such cases, the court may approve of the dismissal and 
appoint another representative to continue the action
53
 if the action seems to be 
meritorious or beneficial to the public.
54
 
 
Thus, according to the Israeli law, where numerous actions have been submitted in the 
same matter
55
 or where the court finds that the representative plaintiff does not fulfil 
the requirements for an action (not adequate or has no personal action) or has 
misbehaved,
56
 or where a representative asks to terminate the action, the court may 
decide to replace the representing claimant or the representing class lawyer.
57
  
The replacement of representative plaintiffs or lawyers in cases of voluntary dismissal 
reduces the risk of hidden agreements between the defendants’ and the plaintiffs’ 
representatives, because an attempts of representative bribery by the defendants will 
be useless where the court decides to replace the representatives.  
However, in cases of the court making such a replacement, there are no criteria in 
Israel governing the appointment of a new lawyer. 
                                                 
52 Class Action Law 2006, s 11 (Israel). 
53 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 16 ( D) (Israel).  
54
 See Chapter Four, Part B (2), Representative Replacement on page 226. 
55 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 7 (b) (Israel). 
56 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 8 (C) (Israel). 
57 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 16 (D) (Israel). 
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In Part 2 of Chapter Four, some methods for appointing a lead lawyer to represent the 
class were discussed. The procedure advocated in Chapter Four is based on 
establishing criteria and obtaining offers from lawyers relating to fees. The criteria 
should take into consideration the reputation of the lawyer, his experience in the 
relevant field, his experience in collective redress cases, and his record of conduct. 
The lawyer's resources for financing such an action should also to be examined. A 
lawyer who has insufficient resources to fight the case to its end may be tempted to 
settle the case at the expense of the class members.  
 
The power to replace the representative, as permitted under the Israeli regime, is a 
crucial part of any class action model and acts as a safeguard to abusive litigation. 
Under the new model, such a provision should include instructions to assist the courts 
in deciding how to appoint adequate representatives to lead the action where an order 
to replace class counsel is granted. It is suggested in the course of this work that 
tenders are conducted for lead lawyer roles once the minimum qualification standards 
have been set by the managing judge. 
 
C. Safeguards which are Required to Prevent Abuses 
Resulting from Private Enforcement (marked in yellow on the 
above Final Chart) 
 
It is clear from our exploration of class actions that an ideal model needs to include 
ways to safeguard against the worst abuses in private enforcement. Two main features 
have proven particularly useful in Israel and other jurisdictions and seems fit to serve 
the needs of a European class action well:  
- The use of the loser pays principle  
- The certification process.  
This is because both are able to act as barriers to unmeritorious claims and actions 
pursue in bad faith. In addition to these, we found that there are safeguards needed to 
save the procedure from possible abuses which may occur as a result of information 
asymmetry. The representatives possess information which is not known to the class 
members and thus such representatives are at risk of being bribed or may act where 
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there are conflicts of interest in order to enter into a covert agreement with the 
defendant. The representative may also evaluate the benefit of the settlement wrongly 
in order to obtain a higher rate of remuneration. Therefore we advocate that the 
procedure should be transparent and open for class members and other interested 
bodies especially when the private representative wishes to finalise the procedure with 
a settlement. 
 
  1. Supervision of Settlements and Voluntary Dismissals 
 
We have noted that settlement agreements and voluntary dismissals as very dangerous 
stages in collective proceedings, since the representative plaintiffs and defendants 
may collaborate in order to deceive class members by reaching covert agreements 
resulting in personal benefits to the representatives but with no real benefit to the 
class. Therefore, Israel's CAL has introduced procedural requirements such as the 
submission of affidavits from both parties’ lawyers and the examination of the 
suggested settlement by an expert. 
 
We have found that the new model should implement Israeli provisions which require 
that the compromise arrangement be published in the class action registry, and a 
notice should be given to the class members, the Attorney General and to any other 
person the judge may order to enable these parties to voice their objections.
58
 Every 
class member, relevant group or the Attorney General may object to the 
compromise.
59
 Any member of the class who does not wish to be bound by the 
compromise may opt-out at that stage.
60
 
 
This safeguard allows class members of the public, the Attorney General and other 
relevant bodies and organisations to investigate the proposed compromise and object 
to its content if it does not benefit the class members or it awards excessive funds to 
the representatives. The court may ask relevant organisations for their opinions if the 
matter is in their interest, such as trade unions in labour law cases or consumer 
                                                 
58 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 18 (C) (Israel). 
59
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 18 (d ) (Israel). 
60 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 18 (f) (Israel). 
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organisations in consumer-related cases.
61
 The views of such organisations should be 
welcomed as they usually have the required expertise to identify matters which  
representative parties have omitted in their suggested settlement.  
 
In order to deal with 'sweetheart settlements,' with problems of evaluations of certain 
coupons and undertakings by defendants in such settlements, the courts in Israel are 
obliged to hear every objection to the agreement and must obtain an expert opinion 
from the relevant field in relation to the suggested compromise to ensure that the 
compromise is beneficial to the class. The court may conclude that an expert opinion 
is unnecessary only where ‘special reasons’ exist, for example, where the compromise 
requires evaluation of the legal position or the strength of the arguments of the 
parties.
62
  
The expert opinion is employed in order to examine the content of the suggested 
compromise and the court may refuse to approve a compromise where the action 
seems to be unmeritorious.
63
  
Like the Israeli requirement, it is desired that any new model should provide that an 
application to approve a settlement in collective proceedings be accompanied by 
affidavits from the lawyers who are representing the parties and by the parties 
themselves. Such affidavits must reveal all the relevant information relating to the 
suggested compromise.
64
 The production of lawyers' affidavits by both parties 
prevents the lawyers/representatives from making a hidden agreement which benefits 
the representatives rather than the class members. 
 
Having seen the defendant's evidence, the representative may realise that the claim is 
not substantiated and apply for a voluntary dismissal. A genuine dismissal may take 
place after the judge identifies the weak basis of the action. However, the fear with 
                                                 
61
 In Class action Case no. 11122-21-22 (Tel Aviv District Court) Cohen v. Partner, the Israeli 
Consumer association objected to the suggested settlement arguing that the compensation offered 
to class members by awarding free talk minutes was of no benefit to many class members whose 
mobile telephone package did not charge them according to time spent on the telephone.  
62 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 19 (b).  
63 Sher v. Strauss and the Elite decision of the Court of Appeal, Judge Baron dated 24 May 2009 (The 
court refused to approve payment of NIS 25,000 for the plaintiff's lawyer and a reduction of the price 
of the product since the action was unmeritorious). 
64
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 18 (B) (Israel). 
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voluntary dismissal is that the representatives have received a personal benefit and 
therefore decide to abandon the collective action.  
 
The voluntary dismissal safeguard is intended to prevent the parties, namely, the 
representative plaintiff and the defendant, from reaching an agreement that is of no 
benefit to the class members or a settlement which benefits the representatives at the 
expense of the class members. The main issue with the voluntary dismissal 
mechanism is that the parties may reach a covert compromise, but make an 
application for voluntary dismissal to circumvent the more complicated procedure for 
court approval of a compromise agreement.  
We found that the requirements set down in the Israeli CAL should be welcomed in 
the new model. The Israeli CAL sets out the procedural requirements for voluntary 
dismissals, such as submission of an application to the court accompanied by sworn 
affidavits, to ensure that all information is produced to the court
65
 and requires court 
approval for a voluntary dismissal
66
 with the special power to replace a representative 
who has asked to dismiss an action which he himself submitted.
67
  
 
In addition, a voluntary dismissal does not create a "res judicata"  and thus does not 
bar other plaintiffs from bringing the same action in the future.
68
 The problem with 
this provision is that in practice as seen in Israel, most actions dismissed in Israel were 
not submitted again by other claimants.
69
 This is because a reasonable representative 
will not ask for voluntary dismissal unless it is clear that the action is weak on its 
merits. Yet, the provision that voluntary dismissal does not exhaust the cause of 
action is important in order to prevent the representative parties from reaching a 
concealed agreement which does not bar a third party from bringing the same action.  
 
                                                 
65
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 16 (B) (Israel). 
66
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 16 (A) (Israel). 
67
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 16 (D) (Israel). 
68
 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 16 (B) (Israel). 
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 Ronen Adini, 'This is also a Way to End Up - On Voluntary Dismissals in Class Actions' due to be 
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The new model should also adopt the criteria which have been set out in Israeli court 
decisions such as Azury and Goldstein
70
 which provided that the court should 
distinguish compromises which require special scrutiny and even expert opinion from 
voluntary dismissals. The latter are allowed generally where no payments are made to 
the representative.
71
 If there is a payment of some sort of remuneration to the 
representative, the application should be examined carefully in order to ensure that 
payment is not in fact bribery aimed at persuading the representative to dismiss the 
action. Where the court finds that the dismissal is not appropriate it may order 
continuation of the action and the replacement of representatives.  
 
  2. Notices and Registry 
 
Another Israeli provision which we found that should be adopted is the provision that 
requires transparency by establishing a public registry open to every interested person, 
and the requirement to send notices to the class members and to the Attorney General 
when the case reaches critical stages, such as voluntary dismissal or a compromise 
agreement. 
 
Thus a copy of every new application to certify an action as a class action must be 
filed to the court's central management and is registered there in a new ‘class action 
registry.’72 Once sent to the registry, it is open to the general public. 
 
Prior to filing a new action, each representative must check the registry in order to 
ensure that there are no previous similar class actions.
73
 Consequently, the register 
makes the collective redress process more transparent, and helps to avoid multiple 
claims and contradictory decisions on the same issue. 
 
                                                 
70 
Case No.  )21122-21-21 Central District Court) Azury v. 013 Netvision (decision dated 7 January 
2010);  Civil Case No. 2111/21 (Tel Aviv District Court) Goldstein v. Bank Hapoalim (14 December 
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 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 6 (Israel). 
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In the event that there are several similar actions, either involving a similar class of 
represented persons or similar questions of fact or law, the court may order that the 
new action be transferred to the court where the earlier action was submitted.
74
 The 
court which deals with the former action may join the two actions or may strike down 
the subsequent action.
75
 
 
In addition to the online registry which is aimed at reducing information asymmetry 
between the representative and the class members, at some critical stages of the action 
the CAL requires that notices  be issued to class members, the Attorney General and, 
if the judge finds it appropriate, to relevant bodies. 
 
The rationale for issuing such notices is to maintain the transparency of the procedure 
and to prevent the representatives and the defendant from acting together against the 
interests of absent class members. With regard to notices, the CAL sets out a list of 
circumstances in which the court must provide a notice to class members, for 
example, the decision to approve a class action and submission of a petition for 
approval of a compromise agreement.
76
 Similarly to this CAL provision, the court 
should have the discretion to issue further notices where such notices are relevant in 
order to maintain transparency.
77
 Such a provision makes collective proceedings 
similar to other situations where a lawyer represents a client and should inform his 
clients as a matter of good practice on any developments in the case.   
 
Publication of a notice is also required, a requirement similar to that under the Israeli 
law if the court decides to certify the action,
78
 allows the dismissal of the action, or 
orders replacement of the representative plaintiff or the group’s lawyer79 and on an 
application for,
80
 or approval of, a compromise.
81
 In addition, the judgment in the 
action should also be published in the registry.
82
 The court must approve the draft 
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 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 7 (Israel).  
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 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 7 (b) (Israel). 
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 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 25 (a) (Israel).  
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 Class Action Law 5766–2006, s 25 (b) (Israel). 
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notice before its publication,
83
 but the form of publication is left to the discretion of 
the judge in each case,
84
 bearing in mind the costs of the action,
85
 the damages that 
may be involved,
86
 the number of members in the group and the ease of identifying 
them,
87
 the cost of giving them personal notice
88
 and any special characteristics of the 
group’s members, including different languages.89 
 
The suggested model adopts the notice and registry provisions of the Israeli law to 
ensure that the parties in court do not reach a settlement which is preferential to them 
at the expense of the class members. Under the new model we recommend 
distinguishing opt-in actions from opt-out actions. There should be differences in the 
notice requirements for opt-in and opt-out regimes because in an opt-in action, the 
lawyer meets his client and they agree on the extent of the information that should be 
provided to the client in the terms of representation. However, in opt-out mechanisms, 
the law regulates the extent to which information is shared and the stages at which the 
representative updates the class members as the class lawyer does not meet all 
members.  
 
D. The Judgment and Subsequent Decisions (marked in grey 
on the above Final Chart) 
 
  1. Damages Distribution 
 
As shown in Chapter Three, Part A, Section 6 (B), once the court in Israel has held in 
favour of a class, it sets down the criteria for distributing the fund and appoints a 
trustee to monitor the distribution process.
90
 This means that only those who are 
interested in the action will step forward at the end of the case to collect their share of 
the compensation. This is preferable to the opt-in model which requires all members 
to be part of the case from the outset. In the opt-out class action, the class members 
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who join the proceedings at the end of the case only need to collect their share of the 
compensation and are not subject to questions on cross examination and costs. 
Professor Hodges seems to object to the type of Israeli provision which enables class 
members to come forward in order to collect their share at the end of the case. He 
claims that there is strong empirical evidence that consumers do not step forward in 
many cases, since the sums involved are too small to be worth collecting.
91
 Therefore, 
a solution is required to deal with uncollected funds. In Israel this solution takes the 
form of a cy-pres distribution whereby the court directs on how to distribute the 
uncollected funds.  
 
Under the suggested model damages are to be distributed among the class members as 
long as they can be traced. In any case no member is allowed to get more than his 
share. With regards to the remaining funds, these should be disgorged from the 
defendant and handed to causes which the court may find fit. The Israeli provision 
that the Treasury is to obtain the remaining funds without any limitation on the 
purposes for which it may use the collected funds
92
 should not be adopted per se. The 
court should first take into consideration the requirements of the regulatory body  
which we offered to employ. As noted in Chapter One, in collective proceedings the 
court may also order damages for the benefit of the public in general or the 
distribution of funds for good causes or may require the reduction of prices.
93
 In this 
way, the defendant is accountable for the full damage that he has caused. 
 
  2. Financial Incentives and Costs 
 
The conclusion which can be gleaned from non-functioning opt-out European models 
such as the Portuguese opt-out model is that in order to promote private enforcement, 
financial incentives and bonuses should be introduced for both representatives and 
class lawyers in order to drive collective redress forward. Financial incentives should 
be available only where private enforcement is concerned. In these cases, private 
enforcement should be led by lawyers who may profit from managing collective cases 
                                                 
91 Professor Christopher Hodges, 'Response to consultation: Towards a Coherent European Approach 
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rather than by class members whose share in the total action is very small. In order to 
convince lawyers to act as a ‘driving force’ for collective actions, contingency fees 
should be introduced. Contingency fees would also provide lawyers with an incentive 
to achieve the best possible settlement for their clients, since their own reward would 
depend on that of their clients.
94
 
 
Furthermore, in cases where the regulatory body examines the consumer complaint 
and finds that it is justified, disallowing a private action and instead appointing a 
public enforcer to deal with the collective action, the consumer who initiated the 
action should be entitled to a share of the proceeds should the action succeed. 
 
With regard to costs, the court should have the power to reverse a costs order and to 
impose costs on the winning party where the court finds that the action brought some 
benefit to class members or to the public in general, for example where the defendant 
ceased acting illegally following a collective action.  
 
The suggested model first requires covering all expenses associated with the action, as 
well as providing good remuneration for those who have contributed to the successful 
action, namely, the consumer who made the initial complaint, the regulatory body, the 
representing party and the class lawyer. However, the principle that the loser pays the 
costs should remain a general principle which the court may detract from in 
appropriate circumstances so as to act as a deterrent for unsubstantiated actions. 
 
E. Additional Collective Redress Issues 
 
  1. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) as an Additional Filter 
(marked green on the annexed Final Chart) 
 
We noted that the Israeli model created much pressure on the judicial system and 
therefore any provision which eases the burden on the courts should be very 
welcomed. The Israeli model lacks procedures to deal with out of court collective 
settlements which precede the main legal proceedings. Thus, all collective disputes 
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must go to court and impose a burden and costs on the litigating parties. A change to 
the Israeli model in this respect may assist in easing any flood of cases as experienced 
by the courts in Israel. This change may come by the introduction of mandatory ADR 
proceedings.  
 
As we saw the European Commission concentrates on settlements prior to legal 
proceedings in order to prevent the parties from having to fight their case in court. 
Two Commission Recommendations already exist at European level to facilitate 
Alternative Dispute Resolution using simple and inexpensive procedures. Both 
recommendations set out principles for the good functioning of out-of-court 
settlements.
95
 The European Parliament gave precedence to ADR proceedings which 
are generally regarded as providing a quick and fair settlement and are likely to be 
more attractive for resolving disputes than court proceedings. Thus the European 
Parliament recommended that these proceedings be made obligatory in seeking out-
of-court settlements before bringing a collective action.
96
 These measures are not 
relevant to collective disputes but may be useful when looking for a proper 
mechanism to resolve collective disputes out of court. 
 
Looking at ADR mechanisms for collective disputes we found the Dutch Collective 
Settlements Act of 2005 which allows a US-style settlement for all members of the 
class who do not actively opt out. It has been used to settle class action suits initiated 
in the United States on behalf of foreign investors who were excluded from the class 
in American actions.
97
 However, the Dutch settlement mechanism does not facilitate 
settlements during trial as there is no procedure for collective actions for damages as 
yet in the Netherlands. However, the Dutch mechanism is surely a proper mechanism 
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to settle disputes by alternative means before they go to court and later obtain the 
court’s approval so as to bind all class members. 
 
We found that as far as ADR is concerned, in order to encourage parties to settle their 
cases using collective ADR procedures, some measures should be introduced on a 
European scale, including the mandatory imposition of ADR in consumer collective 
redress actions. The introduction of a mandatory ADR scheme is likely to reduce the 
flood of actions and increase the number of settlements. Defendants would feel an 
incentive to settle the case on the basis that if the case were not settled, the class 
action which followed would be submitted with all the hazards and bad publicity that 
such an action entails. Plaintiffs could be awarded a reasonable bonus for their efforts 
to reach a successful settlement, which would be appropriate when a settlement 
benefits the class members. Therefore, and following the Dutch example, the courts 
should be equipped with powers to approve a settlement reached by the parties so that 
it becomes a legally binding decision. As we noted in the Final Chart, the parties 
should be able to apply for ADR at any stage of the case, regardless of which 
representative is leading the action, provided that any solution reached would be 
subject to court approval with the required supervision on settlements.  
 
  2. Cross-Border Issues 
In order to consider the model suggested in this work in European context it is 
necessary to look at cross-border consumer transactions.  
We noted that there is co-operation between organisations in cross-border cases in 
Europe. Such co-operation is essential for the enforcement of consumer rights in 
cross-border cases so as to make as much relevant information as possible available. 
The co-operation between member states relating to collective redress issues should 
be compatible with Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 27 October 2004 on cooperation between national authorities 
responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws albeit that the 
organisations should be allowed to bring collective redress cases for damages and not 
just for injunctive relief. Acting in accordance with this regulation means that when a 
competent authority becomes aware of an infringement committed in the EU, it must 
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notify the authorities of other Member States and the Commission. It must also 
supply, at the request of another competent authority, all relevant information 
required to establish whether an infringement has occurred. In addition, it must take 
all necessary enforcement measures to bring about the cessation or prohibition of the 
infringement.
98
 
Currently the requirement of mutual co-operation provides that the competent 
authorities inform the Commission of the existence of an infringement, the measures 
taken and the effects thereof, and the coordination of their activities. The Commission 
stores and processes the information it receives in an electronic database. All requests 
for mutual assistance must contain sufficient information to enable the authority to 
fulfil the request.
99
 
Co-operation is currently limited to investigation and injunctions to stop 
infringements. However, there is a clear need to enlarge the scope to allow qualified 
entities which conform to the licensing criteria which we have offered to be licensed 
to deal with collective actions. Such organisations should have a co-operation agenda 
in cross border cases within the community,
100
 which would include publishing 
important information.
101
 We recommended the publication of relevant information
102
 
which would appear on internet websites where all relevant information on collective 
redress cases would be published.
103
 This would assist in co-operation where the 
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members of the class are scattered geographically or where additional information in 
relation to rough trader is required. Registration would be mandatory immediately 
upon submission of every collective redress case in order to prevent a multiplicity of 
actions and in order to allow centralized information in this respect.  
Therefore we recommend that in our suggested model the consumer approaches either 
his or her state’s regulatory body or state licensed organisation. These entities should 
share information with eachother and include all relevant information on their 
websites. Organisations may bring stand-alone collective actions for all the class 
members from all over Europe. Private consumers may bring follow-on actions after 
finding of the state regulatory body representing all European consumers. 
 
We have had to discuss the issue of proper jurisdiction in these collective cases. 
Following the American experience, we raised concerns of forum shopping in these 
types of actions. The US example demonstrates that with no overarching supervising 
body, it is impossible to prevent a diversity of decisions and forum shopping in cross-
border actions. In view of the current position in Europe, and given the diversity of 
views in Member States relating to collective redress proceedings, it is clear that 
courts in Member States will give different constructions to the principles set down in 
any new collective proceedings. With no supervision by the European Commission, it 
is unlikely that a unified approach towards jurisdictions and applicable law will be 
developed in Europe. We suggested that a system of supervision over first instance 
state courts in collective cases to decide points of jurisdiction and the relevant law to 
be applied in such cases. Such a measure would prevent forum shopping and create 
equality between jurisdictions in collective cross-border cases. The Commission's 
supervision would need to ensure that the decisions on collective redress issues do not 
differ from one Member State to another.  
 
It looks as if the time is near for the introduction of a new European model and 
therefore the European Commission should step in and impose co-operation between 
organisations and state regulators as we suggested in collective redress cases in order 
to ensure conformity within the European Union. In this work,
104
 it is recommended 
                                                                                                                                            
who opt in) under Sec 35 of the Dispute Act in Norway and the Class proceedings registry in 
Ontario, Canada at <http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/scj/en/notices/pd/classproceedings.htm>. 
104  See Chapter Three, Part B beginning on page 129. 
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that binding criteria be introduced in order to license organisations which will be 
permitted to deal with collective redress issues and issues of jurisdiction will be set in 
place in order to prevent forum shopping so as to ensure that the outcome of the case 
is similar no matter where the collective case is tried.  
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